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This thesis compares Proust’s Recherche with the work of the Cubists, Futurists, and 
Surrealists. Few scholars have considered the novel’s engagement with avant-garde 
ideas and aesthetics, despite Proust’s geographical and temporal proximity to avant-
garde activity. Without arguing extensively for direct influence or even significant 
interaction between the two, my research focuses on a broader pool of ideas and 
cultural-historical developments, around which Proust’s work can be brought into 
dialogue with both the collective aims of particular groups within the avant-garde, 
and with the paintings and (to a lesser extent) writings of individual artists. 
Throughout the thesis, I use their work as a means of shedding light on the conflict 
and crossover between states of ‘insidership’ and ‘outsidership’, and on the manner 
in which these states define relations between perceiving, acting subjects and the 
external objects and spaces they encounter. Chapter 1 focuses on the artistic 
perceptive faculty and the relation it enables between the artist and the external 
world, using Bergson’s opposition of ‘analysis’ and ‘intuition’ as a theoretical 
framework. Chapter 2 is centred around the metaphor of the work of art as a 
‘window on the world’ and its implication that a painting is primarily a 
representation, rather than an object in its own right. Chapter 3 investigates the 
influence of mechanised transport technologies both on perceptions of space and on 
relations between people, while Chapter 4 uses Didier Anzieu’s theory of the Moi-
peau to argue that the self is defined not only by bodily but by architectural 
boundaries, which also shape the subject’s relationships with other people. 
Ultimately, the thesis asks whether the work of Proust and the avant-gardes 
conceives of the subject’s interaction with the world as a function of surface or of 
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This thesis is a comparative study of Marcel Proust’s A la recherche du temps perdu and 
the visual works of the Cubist, Futurist, and Surrealist movements. Proust and the 
historical avant-gardes are two immeasurably important strands in Western cultural 
history, and they overlap both chronologically and geographically. Yet the 
possibility for a comparison between the two has often been shunned, whether 
directly or indirectly. Roger Shattuck, for example, who has specialised in both 
Proust and avant-garde studies without ever attempting to reconcile them, writes in 
his study of the origins of the avant-garde, The Banquet Years, that Proust belongs in 
a ‘family group’ with Renoir and Ravel, whose ‘rich, beautifully orchestrated 
masterpieces portray la belle époque at its ripest and never lose control of its sensuous 
plenitude.’1 All three, he claims, ‘gaze fondly back toward the waning century and 
tell us not so much what has changed since 1885 as what can be made to survive. 
Their very technical mastery makes them the old guard who will never die.’2  
The scholarly landscape has changed since Shattuck wrote these words. For 
some time, the consensus has been that Proust was an innovator and a modernist, 
not a passéiste.3 But avant-garde? The lack of academic enquiry into this area suggests 
that such a comparison might be a step too far. A handful of studies, it is true, have 
compared Proust’s work to the Cubists and Futurists; one or two have speculated on 
his dealings with the French Dadaists, André Breton and Philippe Soupault. But 
while the role of the visual arts in Proust’s novel has quite rightly been explored in 
detail, generally speaking, as Luzius Keller writes, ‘on se tourne plutôt du côté de 
Giotto, Carpaccio, Botticelli ou Vermeer, de Degas, Manet, Renoir ou Monet, de 
Turner ou Whistler, de Moreau ou Redon que vers Boccioni ou Carrà, Gleizes ou 
Metzinger, Delaunay, Braque ou Picasso.’4 
The importance of older artistic currents for Proust’s novel is not in doubt. 
But we can no more deny the importance of cultural modernity for Proust’s novel 
                                                                  
1 Roger Shattuck, The Banquet Years: The Origins of the Avant-Garde in France: 1885 to World War I (London: 
Jonathan Cape, 1969), p. 30. 
2 Ibid. 
3 ‘Few writers,’ asserts Margaret E. Gray, ‘are so confidently cited as high modernist.’ (Postmodern Proust 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992), p. 1.) Hugh J. Silverman calls Proust’s novel, 
along with those of Virginia Woolf, Franz Kafka, and James Joyce, ‘major documents of modernist 
literary production’ (‘Introduction: The Philosophy of Postmodernism’, in Postmodernism – Philosophy 
and the Arts, ed. by Hugh J. Silverman (New York and London: Routledge, 1990), p. 2).  
4 Luzius Keller, ‘Proust au-delà de l’impressionnisme’, in Proust et ses peintres, ed. by Sophie Bertho 
(Amsterdam and Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 2000), pp. 57-70 (p. 59).  
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than we can ignore his admiration for the cultural heritage. As Nigel Harkness and 
Marion Schmid remind us: 
 
Proust, though a passionate admirer of the literature and art of earlier 
centuries – references to which are omnipresent in A la recherche du temps 
perdu – is above all, we must not forget, a contemporary of Freud, Einstein, 
Picasso and Schoenberg, to name only these four pioneers of the twentieth-
century modern revolution. Having made his debut in literature and criticism 
under the auspices of Decadence and Symbolism, the two dominant 
movements of the fin de siècle, Proust writes the early drafts for what will 
become A la recherche during the beginnings of Cubism and Futurism; the 
genesis of the last two volumes, on the other hand, coincide with Dada and 
Surrealism.5 
 
Harkness and Schmid’s observations appear in the introduction to their co-edited 
volume, Au Seuil de la modernité: Proust, Literature and the Arts. Published in 2011, this 
collection is a recent contribution to a sub-category of Proust studies that has 
emerged, broadly speaking, in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, and 
which considers Proust’s engagement with the objects, processes, and experiences of 
cultural modernity. It was inaugurated by William Carter’s The Proustian Quest 
(1992), which focuses on the theme of speed in Proust’s novel, opening with a 
fascinating account of a period shaped by such developments as electricity, 
telegraphy, cinema, the telephone, and the bicycle, automobile, and aeroplane, many 
of which find their way into Proust’s novel. Sara Danius’s work on Proust in The 
Senses of Modernism: Technology, Perception, and Aesthetics (2002) takes up many of the 
same themes, situating Proust in a context of social and cultural upheaval, in which 
new technologies were challenging traditional modes of perception and ways of 
thinking. Elsewhere, Akane Kawakami has published on the role of the aeroplane in 
the Recherche, while Harkness and Schmid’s volume features articles by Jack Jordan 
on the relation of Proustian car travel to Einsteinian space-time, and by Diane R. 
Leonard on Proust’s engagement with the idea of time as a fourth dimension. The 
importance for the Recherche of photography, in its various forms, has been explored 
                                                                  
5 Nigel Harkness and Marion Schmid, ‘Introduction’, in Au Seuil de la modernité: Proust, Literature and the 
Arts. Essays in Memory of Richard Bales, ed. by Nigel Harkness and Marion Schmid (Oxford, Bern et al.: 
Peter Lang, 2011), pp. 1-13 (p. 2). 
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in Mieke Bal’s Images littéraires, ou comment lire visuellement Proust (1997), Áine 
Larkin’s Proust Writing Photography: Fixing the Fugitive in A la recherche du temps perdu 
(2011) and Katja Haustein’s Regarding Lost Time: Photography, Identity and Affect in 
Proust, Benjamin and Barthes (2012), while Thinking Cinema With Proust, Patrick 
ffrench’s study of cinematic processes in the Recherche, is forthcoming with Legenda, 
projected to be published in 2018. 
 Some of these studies mention the avant-garde in passing, but the implication 
is often that Proust’s modernity plays out very differently from theirs.6 And indeed, 
his work does not possess the same iconoclastic radicalism: it is impossible to 
separate Proust from the past, even as we acknowledge his vitality and his affinity 
for the present and the future. Danius’s analysis sets out to prove that even after 1906, 
when Proust’s long period of engagement with the works of John Ruskin is thought 
to have come to an end, the author was ‘at once more Ruskinian and more modernist 
than has been thought’.7 Elsewhere, Leonard has argued that ‘Proust’s techniques of 
visual representation […] exhibit a tension between Turneresque impressionistic 
effects and “architectural” considerations of structure and depth. Thus we might call 
Proust a “Post-Impressionist” writer’.8 In this regard, her analysis echoes that of 
Taeko Uenishi, who detects ‘une étroite ressemblance entre les tableaux de Cézanne 
et l’écriture de Proust. Car, notre interprétation de la tendance picturale de Proust 
est de la situer sur la voie allant de l’impressionnisme vers le cubisme, et c’est ce 
chemin que Cézanne a suivi ou plutôt développé.’9 Proust, then, is ‘characteristically 
“in-between”’, as Harkness and Schmid put it.10 This sets him at odds with the avant-
garde, Antoine Compagnon suggests in Proust entre deux siècles: 
 
Certains franchissent, ou croient franchir, un seuil en regardant vers l’avant 
– ce sont ceux qu’on appelle, ou qui s’appellent, les avant-gardes –, d’autres 
en regardant en arrière, d’autres encore ne le franchissent pas. Et Proust? Il 
traversa peut-être l’avant-guerre à reculons, comme on recule pour mieux 
                                                                  
6 On Proust and Futurism, Carter remarks: ‘Proust was as intent at representing the dynamics of life as 
were the Futurists, but his vision was universal and comprehensive, unlike that of the Futurists, who in 
their iconoclastic zeal rejected the past and traditional art, failing to see how its documentary aspect, its 
persistent energy and beauty, could be revitalized and made to serve contemporary needs.’ (William 
Carter, The Proustian Quest (New York and London: New York University Press, 1992), p. 91.)  
7 Sara Danius, The Senses of Modernism: Technology, Perception, and Aesthetics (Ithaca, NY and London: 
Cornell University Press, 2002), p. 130. 
8 Diane R. Leonard, ‘Proust and Virginia Woolf, Ruskin and Roger Fry: Modernist Visual Dynamics’, 
Comparative Literature Studies, 18 (September 1981), 333-343, p. 338. 
9 Taeko Uenishi, Le style de Proust et la peinture (Paris: SEDES, 1988), p. 88. 
10 Harkness and Schmid, p. 4. 
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sauter, à moins qu’il n’ait éliminé l’idée de seuil, refusant, comme Pascal, de 
croire que la recherche de la vérité pût se faire par une seule voie: ‘On ne 
montre pas sa grandeur pour être à une extrémité, lit-on dans les Pensées, mais 
bien en touchant les deux à la fois et remplissant tout l’entre-deux.’11 
 
This fundamental ‘in-betweenness’ plays out in an ambivalent relationship 
towards the avant-gardes, whom Proust seems to have regarded with both interest 
and scepticism. A moment in A l’ombre des jeunes filles en fleurs attests to his awareness 
of the new trends in the visual arts, but seems at the same time subtly to undermine 
avant-garde claims to unprecedented radicalism:  
 
Sans doute, il est aisé de s’imaginer, dans une illusion analogue à celle qui 
uniformise toutes choses à l’horizon, que toutes les révolutions qui ont eu lieu 
jusqu’ici dans la peinture ou la musique respectaient tout de même certains 
règles et que ce qui est immédiatement devant nous, impressionisme, 
recherche de dissonance, emploi exclusif de la gamme chinoise, cubisme, 
futurisme diffère outrageusement de ce qui a précédé. C’est que ce qui a 
précédé, on le considère sans tenir compte qu’une longue assimilation l’a 
converti pour nous en une matière variée sans doute, mais somme toute 
homogène, où Hugo voisine avec Molière.12 (I, 522-553) 
 
This reads as a subtle attempt to burst the bubble of those avant-gardists whose 
‘prétention à aller toujours plus loin, plus haut et plus fort’ led them to rank the 
artistic progress they themselves were driving as ‘more progressive’ than the cultural 
revolutions of the past.13 The Futurists, who had been extremely active in the years 
preceding the publication of A l’ombre, giving a well-publicised exhibition in 1912 at 
the Galerie Bernheim-Jeune, inevitably spring to mind here. They were given to 
feverish declarations of their own modernity, using their manifestos both to assert 
the innovation and originality of their work, and to declare war on museums, nudes, 
art critics, linear perspective, the terms ‘harmony’ and ‘good taste’, and in their own 
                                                                  
11 Antoine Compagnon, Proust entre deux siècles (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1989), p. 26. 
12 Cubism is mentioned on two other occasions in the Recherche, but neither tell us a great deal about 
Proust’s attitude towards the movement, other than his awareness of its existence. In La Prisonnière, the 
Baron de Charlus comments on his incomprehension of certain younger gay men with the ‘ton […] d’un 
disciple de Claude Monet [parlant] des cubistes’ (III, 811), while in Le Temps retrouvé, the narrator 
remarks on the phenomenon of former dancers who ‘vivaient dans un appartement rempli de peintures 
cubistes, un peintre cubiste ne travaillant que pour elles et elles ne vivant que pour lui’ (IV, 520). 
13 Compagnon, p. 33. 
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words, ‘the fanatical worship of all that is old and worm-eaten’.14 As a contributor to 
Le Figaro, Proust is likely to have read the poet F. T. Marinetti’s ‘The Founding and 
Manifesto of Futurism’, published on the front page in 1909; Hugues Azérad 
imagines him reading it, sipping his café au lait, and ‘laughing into his sleeve’.15 
Nicole Savy has also tracked a mocking reference to Marinetti in a pastiche of Jean 
Cocteau that Proust wrote in 1915, which ends with ‘une phrase énigmatique sur le 
risque de rencontrer le caricaturiste Abel Faivre “ou ce qui serait pire encore 
Marinetti”’.16 It is safe to suppose that the Futurists would not have thought highly 
of Proust either, if they thought of him at all; the attention paid in Proust’s novel to 
the cultural heritage and to the workings of bourgeois and aristocratic society would 
doubtless have written him off as ‘old and worm-eaten’ in their eyes, regardless of 
any more modern impulses in his work. 
 Proust’s relations with the Cubists, Dadaists, and Surrealists are both more 
involved and more ambiguous. In an article on Proust and Cubism, Luc Fraisse cites 
an account of 1976 by a friend of Proust’s, Louis Gautier-Vignal, who recalls that after 
a visit to a home in which three paintings by Picasso were displayed, Proust ‘[les] 
avait jugé “insignifiantes”’.17 Yet an earlier declaration by the same friend, given at a 
conference in 1948, proclaims the opposite: ‘dans cette page,’ writes Fraisse, ‘les toiles 
de Picasso sont “d’extraordinaires compositions cubistes blanches et bleues”, et 
Proust à la sortie “fut éblouissant”’.18 Proust himself seems to have professed his 
sympathy for the new art movements, as, for example, in a letter of June 1919 to 
Cocteau. ‘Que nous pensions de même tout le temps sur l’art de l’Époque,’ he writes, 
‘si vous avez vraiment lu Swann et rien que ce que vous avez lu de A l’ombre des jeunes 
filles en fleurs, le prouve.’19 Savy takes this as evidence for his endorsement, given that 
‘la nature de la preuve’ is ‘ce roman auquel Proust tenait plus qu’à tout’ – this, she 
argues, ‘interdit de lire cette phrase comme une amabilité d’épistolier: c’est une 
déclaration claire et sans réserve d’appartenance à l’esthétique la plus 
contemporaine’ (59). Proust would also gush over Picasso’s portrait of Cocteau in his 
                                                                  
14 Umberto Boccioni and others, ‘Futurist Painting: Technical Manifesto’ [1910], in Futurist Manifestos, 
ed. by Umbro Apollonio, trans. by Robert Brain and others (London: Thames and Hudson, 1973), pp. 
27-31 (p. 27). 
15 Hugues Azérad, ‘Paris and the avant-garde’, in Marcel Proust in Context, ed. by Adam Watt 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 59-66 (p. 59). 
16 Nicole Savy, ‘Jeune roman, jeune peinture’, in Marcel Proust: l’écriture et les arts, ed. by Jean-Yves Tadié 
(Paris: Gallimard/Réunion des musées nationaux, 1999), pp. 55-65 (p. 63). 
17 Via Luc Fraisse, ‘Il y a plusieurs manières d’être avant-garde: Proust et le cubisme’, Peinture et 
Littérature au XXe Siècle, ed. by Pascal Dethurens (Strasbourg: Presses universitaires de Strasbourg, 2007, 
pp. 173-187 (p. 177). 
18 Fraisse, p. 177. 
19 Proust, Correspondance, ed. by Philip Kolb, 21 vols (Paris: PLON, 1990), XVIII, p. 267. 
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preface to Jacques-Émile Blanche’s Propos de peintres, also of 1919: ‘certainement […] 
Jacques Blanche rendrait justice au grand, à l’admirable Picasso, lequel a précisément 
concentré tous les traits de Cocteau en une image d’une rigidité si noble qu’à côté 
d’elle se dégradent un peu dans mon souvenir les plus charmants Carpaccio de 
Venise’ (CSB, 580). This is praise indeed. Yet neither of the two pencil portraits 
Picasso completed of Cocteau (one of 1916, the other of 1917; it is unclear to which 
Proust is referring here) are particularly cubistic – indeed, by Picasso’s standards 
they are relatively mimetic. Fraisse goes so far as to argue that Proust’s admiration 
is more likely to be a ‘hommage simplement mondain’ than an ‘admiration 
réellement esthétique’.20 This conclusion is supported by an anecdote recounted by 
Proust’s long-term servant, Céleste Albaret, in 1973, in which the author returns to 
his apartment late at night after a visit to Picasso’s studio: 
 
M. Proust m’en a fait le récit en rentrant:  
‘C’est un peintre espagnol qui s’est mis à faire ce qu’on appelle du cubisme.’  
Il m’a décrit un peu à quoi ressemblaient les peintures. Je lui ai fait remarquer 
que cela devait faire de drôles de museaux. Il a ri, puis il a dit:  
‘Je dois reconnaître que je n’y ai pas compris grand-chose.’  
Visiblement, il ne s’en souciait pas. Il n’a jamais reparlé de cette peinture.’21 
 
As for Picasso himself, the only clue as to his opinion of Proust is an anecdote 
recounted by Jean Hugo, an artist and the great-grandson of Victor Hugo. At a 
gathering in 1921, in which ‘Proust ne parlait qu’aux ducs’, Picasso turns to Hugo 
and says ‘regardez-le […] il est sur le motif’.22 Picasso’s use of this expression, 
referring to the plein air painting championed by the Impressionists, does not read as 
an endorsement of Proust’s modernity; rather, in Fraisse’s words, it attributes to 
Proust ‘une attitude de peintre que récusent, aux sens courant, les artistes 
modernes’.23 
Proust’s relationship with the Dadaists and Surrealists is more ambiguous 
still. On the surface, it seems fairly hostile: Louis Aragon labelled him a ‘snob 
                                                                  
20 Fraisse, p. 179. For her part, Juliette Monnin-Hornung questions Proust’s sincerity in praising Picasso: 
‘cette comparaison du portrait de Cocteau avec de “charmants” Carpaccio, étonne et fait douter de la 
sincérité du compliment adressé à Picasso.’ (Proust et la peinture (Geneva: Librairie E. Droz and Lille: 
Librairie Giard, 1951), p. 18.) 
21 Céleste Albaret, Monsieur Proust, ed. by Georges Belmont (Paris: Éditions Robert Laffont, 1973), p. 
278. 
22 Jean Hugo, Avant d’oublier, 1918-1931 (Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1976), p. 127. 
23 Fraisse, p. 176. 
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laborieux’ in a 1920 issue of the Dada journal Littérature,24 and in 1922 a Dada tract 
was distributed around Paris, the back cover of which had arranged the names of 
leading contemporary artists and writers in such a way as to ‘séparer le bon grain 
[…] de l’ivraie’, with Proust’s name appearing among those of the ‘honnis’.25 Two 
years later, André Breton would mention Proust in a footnote in the first Surrealist 
manifesto, giving his work as an example of the kind of literature his new movement 
was to react against.26 Yet this condemnation of Proust was not unequivocal. In fact, 
Dada was the only avant-garde current to which he had a definitive professional 
connection, Breton and Philippe Soupault having invited him to contribute a passage 
from Le Côté de Guermantes to Littérature in 1920. This move by the Dadaists seems to 
support a remark made by Jacques Rivière, the director of the Nouvelle Revue française, 
in a letter to Proust of the same year: ‘vous ai-je dit […] qu’André Breton, le Dada en 
chef […] m’a déclaré pour vous une admiration intense, fondée justement sur les 
trésors poétiques qu’il a découverts dans votre œuvre?’27 For his part, Proust wrote 
to Philippe Soupault that he was ‘fort honoré d’être ainsi imprimé dans une Revue 
où vous écrivez tous deux’.28 Franc Schuerewegen, who gives an exhaustive account 
of the connections between Proust and Dada in an article of 2007, takes the invitation 
as proof of Breton’s admiration for Proust, at least during the period in question.29 
Even so, doubts remain: for one thing, the episode was never actually published in 
Littérature, for reasons that are not entirely clear. For another, Sanouillet observes 
that the frequency of the journal’s publication meant that the task of finding material 
to publish in it was no small task, and that Breton and his colleagues ‘firent appel 
[…] à tout ce que Paris comptait de littérateurs de quelque importance, pourvu qu’ils 
restassent en deçà d’une certaine ligne moderne’.30 Neither does Schuerewegen’s 
conviction take into account the possibility of any intended irony on the part of the 
Dadaists, whose journal was ‘délibérément anti-littéraire’, according to Jacques 
                                                                  
24 Via Franc Schuerewegen, ‘Proust est-il dadaïste? (à propos d’une mystère encore non élucidé de 
l’histoire littéraire)’, Marcel Proust Aujourd’hui, 8 (2007), 137-160, p. 147. 
25 Michel Sanouillet, Dada à Paris, 4th edn (Paris: CNRS Éditions, 2005), pp. 297-298. 
26 ‘L’intraitable manie qui consiste à ramener l’inconnu au connu, au classable, berce les cerveaux. Le 
désir d’analyse l’emporte sur les sentiments. Il en résulte des exposés de longueur qui ne tirent leur 
force persuasive que de leur étrangeté même, et n’en imposent au lecteur que par l’appel à un 
vocabulaire abstrait, d’ailleurs assez mal défini.’ (André Breton, Manifestes du surréalisme (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1924), p. 19.) 
27 Correspondance, XIX, p. 337. 
28 Ibid., p. 474. 
29 See Schuerewegen, p. 139. 
30 Sanouillet, p. 89. 
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Bersani. ‘Dans son titre même,’ he writes, ‘on ne voit qu’ironie et dérision.’31 The 
possibility remains, then, that the request was at best a way of filling space, and at 
worst a joke on a fusty old author, twenty years their senior, and so detached from 
their movement that he could not write the word Dada without putting it in quotation 
marks.32 
No definitive conclusions can be reached, therefore, regarding Proust and the 
avant-garde’s respective opinions of one another. But a number of critics have looked 
past this real-life ambivalence, focusing instead on avant-garde affinities in the novel 
itself. In Proust’s lifetime, there were whispers of a Cubist tendency in his writing: in 
an article on Du Côté de chez Swann, published in 1914 in L’Écho de Paris, the painter 
Jacques-Émile Blanche remarked that ‘[Proust] regarde les êtres, d’en haut ou d’en 
bas, en raccourci ou plafonnant; ils les voit sous des angles singuliers, je dirais 
presque qu’il suggère la quatrième dimension des cubistes’.33 Jacques Rivière would 
eventually come to a similar conclusion, although it took him some time longer. ‘Une 
chose […] qui m’est apparue pour la première fois,’ he wrote in a letter to Proust in 
July 1922, having recently reread Sodome et Gomorrhe, ‘c’est votre relation avec le 
mouvement cubiste, et plus profondément votre profonde immersion dans la réalité 
esthétique contemporaine: je m’expliquerai un jour.’34 At a lecture on Proust’s work 
in 1923, Rivière declared himself in disagreement with the critic José Ortega y Gasset, 
who had argued for an Impressionist reading of Proust. Rivière’s response was as 
follows: ‘j’avoue ne pas être très sensible à cette analogue. J’en vois une au contraire, 
et très frappante, entre la manière de Proust et le cubisme.’35 Virginia Woolf also 
made the following bold assertion in an essay of 1925, three years after Proust’s 
death: ‘were all modern paintings to be destroyed, a critic of the twenty-fifth century 
                                                                  
31 Jacques Bersani, ‘Proust et Dada: Deux lettres inédites de Marcel Proust à Philippe Soupault et à 
André Breton’, Revue d’Histoire littéraire de la France, 65 (April-June 1965), 260-268, p. 264.  
32 In a letter to the critic Jacques Boulenger, Proust writes: ‘sans me pâmer comme les “Dadas” sur mes 
pages relatives à la surdité (que je trouve, malgré leur éloges, très médiocres), néanmoins elles sont 
vraies.’ (Correspondance, XIX, p. 580.) These ‘pages relatives à la surdité’ occur when the narrator visits 
Saint-Loup at Doncières, and describes a series of what Bersani calls ‘illusions auditives’: for example, 
a sound of ticking, belonging to a watch he cannot see, seems continually to change location until he 
eventually locates the watch visually, at which point it ceases to move. This, it seems, was the passage 
that Breton and Soupault hoped to publish in Littérature. Bersani offers an alternative – and more 
pleasing – explanation for their interest in it: ‘il s’agit moins ici de Dada que des goûts personnels de 
Breton et de Soupault, qui les pousseront bientôt à dépasser Dada.’ (p. 265.) The passage, he suggests, 
describes a sort of  ‘marvellous’ reality that could not have failed to appeal to the two soon-to-be 
Surrealists: ‘Proust est bien près d’opérer la fusion de l’objectif et du subjectif, de la réalité et du rêve, il 
touche à ce “point suprême” vers lequel tendra obstinément le surréalisme.’ (p. 267.) 
33 Via Keller, ‘L’Impressionisme’, p. 64. 
34 Correspondance, XXI, p. 376. 
35 Via Keller, ‘L’Impressionnisme’, p. 65. 
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would be able to deduce from the works of Proust alone the existence of Matisse, 
Cézanne, Derain and Picasso.’36 
In the second half of the twentieth and into the twenty-first century, a number 
of critics have taken up where these contemporary commentators left off. Uenishi 
devotes a chapter of her study to ‘l’affinité cubiste de l’écriture proustienne’, in which 
she cites a number of passages throughout the novel that seem to embody properties 
typical of Cubist paintings. For example, Proust’s description of the sky between the 
towers of the Trocadero as ‘une gradation verticale de bleus glaciers’ is cubistic, in 
her view, because it suggests the space between the two objects is as substantial as 
the objects themselves (‘le ciel a une épaisseur’);37 elsewhere, his suggestion of fusion 
between objects recalls the sense of reciprocity between the fragmented elements of 
a Cubist painting.38 Other studies have pinpointed a more specific collection of 
scenes that read like literary renderings of an avant-garde aesthetic, as in the case of 
Paola Placella Sommella’s Marcel Proust e i movimenti pittorici d’avanguardia, and 
Luzius Keller’s ‘Proust au-delà de l’impressionisme’. Keller refers to this group of 
scenes as the ‘Collection Marcel Proust’; unsurprisingly, it includes the episode in 
which the narrator witnesses the Martinville belltowers moving about on the 
horizon, the avant-garde nature of which has been commented on numerous times.39 
It also includes the episode in which he dashes about an overnight train trying to 
piece together a ‘tableau continu’ from a the fragmentary views of the sunrise 
afforded by the train windows, as well as his attempt to kiss Albertine, which reveals 
her endless physical variations (‘c’est dix Albertines que je vis’ (II, 660)), and the 
passages that describe his friend Saint-Loup as moving in a particularly ‘futuristic’ 
fashion (in the first, Saint-Loup punches a man who propositions him on the street;40 
                                                                  
36 From The Moment and Other Essays, via Leonard, ‘Dynamics’, p. 333. 
37 Uenishi, p. 92. 
38 See Uenishi, pp. 89-92.  
39 As Paola Placella Sommella asserts, the movement of the belltowers and the multiple aspects that are 
revealed by it distances the scene from Impressionism, ‘announcing new pictorial directions’ [‘nuovi 
indirizzi pittorici’] (Marcel Proust e i movimenti pittorici d’avanguardia (Rome: Bulzoni Editore, 1982), p 
22). Keller echoes her argument, pinpointing an affinity with Futurism: ‘les cahots de la voiture,’ he 
argues, ‘[…] sonnent pour nous comme un dernier écho de l’exposition des peintres futuristes italiens 
chez Bernheim-Jeune, puisqu’ils rappellent Cahots de Fiacre de Carrà.’ (‘L’Impressionisme’, p. 70.) For 
Georges Matoré, it recalls Cubism, demonstrating ‘comme certaines toiles cubistes où le mouvement 
était suggéré, une simultanéité des points de vue rendue possible par la vitesse à laquelle se déplace un 
observateur’ (L’Espace humain (Paris: La Colombe, Éditions du Vieux Colombier, 1962), p. 206). The 
Cubistic nature of the episode has also been noted much more recently, in Adam Watt’s The Cambridge 
Introduction to Proust: ‘when we read this passage primed with a knowledge of trends in visual art in 
the period, it seems that Proust’s prose is seeking similar ends to those of Cézanne in his later work and 
of the Cubist painters that came after him.’ ((Cambridge, et al: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 
28.) 
40 ‘Tout à coup […] je vis des corps ovoïdes prendre avec une rapidité vertigineuse toutes les positions 
qui leur permettaient de composer, devant Saint-Loup, une instable constellation […] ils me semblèrent 
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in the second, he emerges from what will be revealed as a homosexual brothel, the 
narrator remarking on ‘la disproportion extraordinaire entre le nombre de points 
différents par où passa son corps et le petit nombre de secondes pendant lesquelles 
cette sortie […] s’exécuta’ (IV, 389)).41 In his article, ‘Proust as a Cubist’, Claude 
Gandelman looks to Proust’s own sketches in his correspondence and in the margins 
of his manuscript, which also seem to bear the influence of modern art movements: 
one ‘represents a personage composed of squares and trapezoids’, while a drawing 
of a moving boat, sent to Proust’s one-time lover Reynaldo Hahn, is depicted at 
various stages of its movement, in the manner of Etienne-Jules Marey and Eadweard 
Muybridge’s images of bodies in motion and the Cubist and Futurist paintings they 
inspired.42 For Gandelman, this drawing is the ‘exact equivalent’ of the descriptions 
of Saint-Loup in movement.43 
Other critics have commented on similarities between avant-garde practice 
and the way Proust writes and structures his novel. In 1975, J. Theodore Johnson Jr. 
responded scathingly to those ‘critics and commentators [who] give us a “Marcel” 
remembering things past and a Proust who looks back to gothic architecture and the 
Pre-Raphaelites for his inspiration’.44 He argues that Proust’s novel is analogous to a 
collage from Cubism’s synthetic phase, the text as a whole being made up of many 
different kinds of texts: as well as ‘pastiches, repoussoirs, meditations and essays’ 
there are ‘dialogues, words picked up from a conversation, maxims, sayings, 
exempla, paraboles, legends, bons mots, jokes, etymologies, histories, theories […], 
parts of songs, a chorus from an opera, a telegram transposed, an article from Le 
Figaro’… Johnson’s list goes on.45 Proust, he argues, ‘is doing in his texts exactly what 
his contemporary Picasso is doing in collages and papiers collés’.46 The Recherche is 
comparable to Picasso’s Guitare et papier de musique ‘Valse’ (1912-13), which references 
                                                                  
être au moins au nombre de sept. Ce n’était pourtant que les deux poings de Saint-Loup, multipliés par 
leur vitesse à changer de place.’ (II, 480.) 
41 Reinhold Hohl is certain that this second episode is based on Nue descendant un escalier, which he 
suggests Proust could have seen in 1912, when it was exhibited at the Salon des Indépendants and the 
Salon de la Section d’Or in Paris. Although Saint-Loup is clothed, he is morally ‘naked’, Hohl argues, 
because he has left his croix de guerre in the brothel; moreover, the following page sees the narrator 
deciding to climb a small set of steps up to the entrance to the building his friend has just left. Saint-
Loup has indeed just descendu un escalier. (See Hohl, ‘Marcel Proust in neuer Sicht: Kubismus und 
Futurismus in seinem Romanwerk’, in Neue Rundschau, 88 (1977), 54-72 (pp. 70-71).) 
42 ‘Proust as a Cubist’, Art History, 2 (September 1979), 355-363, pp. 358-361. 
43 Ibid., p. 361. 
44 ‘Proust’s “Impressionism” Reconsidered in the Light of the Visual Arts of the Twentieth Century’, in 
Twentieth Century Fiction: Essays for Germaine Brée, ed. by George Stambolian (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Rutgers University Press, 1975), pp. 27-56 (p. 27). 




the nineteenth century by incorporating a scrap of sheet music for a waltz and pieces 
of ballroom-style wallpaper – but which then ‘cuts up [the] unified paper surface 
previously painted by others of a different time, […] arranges the fragments, and 
then covers them with other papers and paint’.47 Proust, too, ‘cuts up those worlds, 
causes them to intersect […] and builds on this new surface’.48 An unpublished paper 
by Adam Watt, given in 2013, makes a comparable argument, discussing the likeness 
between Proust’s creative method and the mixed-media guitar sculptures Picasso 
produced in 1912. Proust’s famously elaborate redraftings of his manuscript proofs, 
Watt argues, are processes of assemblage, layering, cutting, and pasting akin to that 
employed by Picasso in the construction of his guitars, which he made from papiers 
collés, cardboard, wire, and glue. This affinity can be also linked to the textual 
workings of the novel, since the non-linear, barely-navigable manuscript pages can 
be thought of as a ‘physical manifestation of the intellectual demands made by 
Proust’s writing’.49  
 
Still, there is a gap: no book-length study of Proust’s connection to the avant-garde 
has yet been published in French or English (Sommella’s study is untranslated, and 
it is in any case more of an extended essay than a book, despite being published as a 
stand-alone volume). There are admittedly very good reasons for this. In his own 
recent article on the aesthetic commonalities between Proust and the avant-garde 
poet Pierre Reverdy, Azérad rightly asserts that ‘there is simply not enough material 
[in the novel] to pinpoint the precise way in which Proust could be deemed to have 
been inspired by the avant-garde’.50 Elsewhere, Uenishi’s suggestion that the text is 
infused with cubistic elements has been unambiguously disparaged by Fraisse (‘elle 
voit souvent du cubisme où il ne peut y en avoir’).51 Even in passages where the 
avant-garde overtones seem unambiguous, it does not necessarily follow that Proust 
is endorsing the activity of his younger contemporaries. Azérad pinpoints the scene 
in which Saint-Loup punches the man who propositions him, which in his view is a 
‘rather direct reference’ to images of boxers by the Futurist painters Umberto 
Boccioni and Carlo Carrà. But the scene 
 
                                                                  
47 Ibid., p. 51. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Adam Watt, ‘Proust, Picasso, Guitars and Glue’, unpublished conference paper, March 2013. 
50 Azérad, ‘Disentangling Modernism: A Common Drive Towards Aesthetics’, in Proust and the Visual, 
ed. by Nathalie Aubert (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2013), pp. 69-94 (p. 71). 
51 Fraisse, p. 175. 
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is also a clear indicator of a possible pastiche or parodic fragment: the 
Narrator gives us a clue a few lines later when he debunks the entire scene 
and the ‘style’ he adopted in its depiction, by reducing his vision to mere 
‘ornament’, a trivial aesthetic flight of fancy belied by the real blood spilled 
on the pavement. Reality trumps aesthetics, as Proust’s narrative trumps its 
own rendering of futurist painting – self-parody and pastiches being 
recurring, structuring features of the Recherche. If parody always implies a 
twist in meaning or genre, and if pastiche implies distancing via imitation of 
style, Proust is taking a stand against the excessive aesthetic prowess of the 
contemporary avant-garde, intimating that behind such gestures lurks a 
possible drift towards violence, heralding the unleashing of technological 
warfare. Perhaps Proust never forgot the futurist glorification of war that 
formed the apex of Marinetti’s 1909 manifesto.52 
 
Azérad’s analysis lays out the main risk of a reactionary response to the kind of 
criticism that sees Proust as a passéiste, and which Johnson decries: that we go too far 
in the other direction. The bottom line is that it is simply not enough to pinpoint ‘the 
avant-garde bits’ in Proust’s novel, and to conclude from their existence that Proust 
was ‘avant-garde’. This approach might provide fodder for a short article or chapter, 
but a more in-depth study will need to come at the problem from a new angle. 
 A passing comment in Gandelman’s article on Proust and Cubism offers a 
clue as to what this new angle might be. The comment in question is a side note to 
Gandelman’s argument for a philosophical connection between Proust and the 
Cubists, via Husserlian phenomenology: he sees the multiplicity of Proust’s 
characters, particularly Albertine, as reminiscent of Husserl’s description of profiles 
or Abschattungen, according to which ‘the things and beings of the world […] offer 
themselves to us only as a series of “profiles” or “shadings” whose nucleus we will 
never perceive. We will never see the “table-itself”, but always “profiles” of table.’53 
This, Gandelman argues, is the ultimate message of both the Cubist practice of 
painting different facets of the object and Proust’s presentation of Albertine (for 
example) as ‘a “sea” of profiles’.54 The question of epistemology, and of whether the 
essence of an object can ever be known or perceived, will be explored here in due 
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course. But what is particularly intriguing about Gandelman’s analysis for the 
purpose of this thesis more broadly is not this argument in itself, but his casual aside 
that Husserl’s phenomenology was ‘apparently as unknown to Proust as to the 
Cubists’.55 Gandelman is suggesting that neither Proust nor the Cubists need actually 
to have read Husserl for there to be echoes of Husserlian thought in their work. 
Something similar is implied by the large body of scholarship devoted to reading 
Proust through the lens of Freudian psychoanalysis. Proust and Freud had famously 
never read each other’s work, despite considerable areas of overlap in their thinking 
– but Proust does not have to have been ‘a Freudian’ for such comparisons to be 
convincing. Nor, I would suggest, does he have to have been ‘avant-garde’ for his 
work to be read through the lens of avant-gardism – as Fraisse also suggests in his 
assertion that Proust ‘a côtoyé le cubisme sans presque y toucher’.56 The examples of 
Husserl and of Freud imply that certain ideas and currents of thinking were ‘in the 
air’, circulating through the creative and intellectual enclaves of western Europe – in 
journals, tracts, the popular press, and in conversation, through the salons, cafés and 
studios of Paris and beyond, being absorbed, taking root, and re-emerging in a 
variety of forms. A good example of such an idea is the theoretical ‘fourth 
dimension’, which will be considered in Chapter 3. Blanche’s passing reference to 
the term, in the quote above, is suggestive of its ubiquity: it appears in Proust’s novel, 
as well as in the writings of Umberto Boccioni, Marcel Duchamp, and Guillaume 
Apollinaire. As Linda Dalrymple Henderson’s pathbreaking work has shown, it was 
also used liberally in scientific, mathematical, philosophical, and spiritual circles in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, without there being any real 
consensus as to what it actually meant – often it was used to refer to the possible 
existence of an additional spatial dimension, while for others it referred to time, 
before eventually being reappropriated and redefined by Einsteinian relativity and 
its theory of four-dimensional space-time.57  
As well as conceptual inquiries and scientific (or pseudo-scientific) theories, 
artists, writers, and thinkers at this time were inevitably influenced by an ongoing, 
tangible transformation of everyday life: the period spanning the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries was a moment of cultural, technological, and scientific 
revolution equally as transformative as the digital revolution of the late twentieth 
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and early twenty-first. New inventions and discoveries, from the moving image to 
the car, brought about new ways of perceiving, experiencing, and understanding the 
world, and thus, inevitably, of engaging with it artistically.58 
Bringing Proust and the avant-garde into dialogue around a broader pool of 
ideas and cultural-historical developments inevitably reveals instances of overlap in 
their thinking, precisely because their thinking was shaped against the same cultural 
backdrop, and coloured by the air du temps. In this way, I aim to situate my analysis 
at the crossroads between the two sub-categories of Proust criticism already 
discussed, one of which considers Proust in the context of social and cultural 
modernity, but does not go so far as to include the avant-garde in this context, and 
one of which relates Proust to the avant-garde, but without sufficiently considering 
the influence on both strands of the broader changes wrought by modernity. I do not 
consider it a particular hindrance that Proust had minimal dealings with the pioneers 
of the avant-garde, that they may have despised or been indifferent to his work, or 
that he was generally perceived as a frivolous mondain rather than a bohemian 
revolutionary. Details like these, I am suggesting, should in no way preclude a more 
implicit, deeply-rooted ‘avant-garde impulse’ in his work.  
What is more, the singularity of the terms ‘avant-garde’ and ‘Proust’ – 
suggesting a pair of homogeneous, opposable units, each comprising a uniform set 
of goals, methods, and principles – belies, on the one hand, the richness and 
pluralism of a novel written over sixteen years, in seven volumes, and subjected to 
numerous redraftings, and on the other, the fact that the avant-garde was a fractious 
and antagonistic grouping structured around ‘rivalries, denunciations, alliances, 
betrayals and requests for favours’, in Azérad’s words.59 Indeed, the avant-garde was 
not a circle of allies so much as a network of headstrong individuals and factions 
whose disapproval of Proust was not necessarily any more deeply-set than their 
disapproval of each other. To suggest that Proust had nothing in common with any 
of these individuals or groups would be to make a sweeping, unhelpful 
generalisation; likewise, it would be short-sighted to conclude that Proust’s ‘non-
avant-garde’ passages preclude the presence of other elements that share or endorse 
avant-garde concerns.  
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Precisely because the avant-garde is so diverse, and because the artists I consider in 
this thesis do not share a unified vision, my investigation often posits ideas expressed 
in the Recherche, rather than any singular notion of ‘avant-gardeness’, as the factor 
that links them together. In many cases, elements of the novel function as the crux 
around which divergent currents of avant-garde activity can themselves be brought 
into dialogue; mapping the avant-gardes in relation to Proust, then, is also a means 
of mapping them in relation to each other. Moreover, reading these works through 
such a rich, heterogeneous work as Proust’s also often enables me to draw out ideas 
that might otherwise have remained implicit and, in turn, to relate them more 
directly to a broader profusion of ideas afloat on the air du temps. My comparative 
approach reveals itself as a method both of relating avant-garde activity to more 
widespread cultural changes and attitudes, and of making connections and 
articulating differences within the avant-garde itself.  
An exhaustive study of Proust and the avant-garde would, however, be 
unmanageably large, given the length of Proust’s novel and the extensive reach of 
avant-garde activity. I limit the parameters of this investigation by focusing above 
all on the novel’s pictorial, and more particularly painterly ‘avant-garde impulse’. In 
this regard, I take my cue both from previous studies of Proust and the avant-garde, 
most of which focus on painting rather than on avant-garde writing or performance, 
and from the numerous investigations into the broader role of painting in Proust’s 
work.60 The most obvious manifestation of Proust’s interest in painting is his ‘musée 
imaginaire’, which features many implicit and explicit references to real-life images 
that several critics have attempted to catalogue. (Thomas Baldwin refers to this 
tendency as ‘art-spotting’;61 Eric Karpeles’s Paintings in Proust: A Visual Companion to 
‘In Search of Lost Time’ is a case in point.) Yet the ‘musée imaginaire’ does not include 
any outright references to or descriptions of Cubist, Futurist, or Surrealist paintings. 
Studies like those by Sommella and Keller, while they have their limitations, 
nonetheless offer an alternative approach to tracking avant-garde pictoriality in 
Proust’s work, less restrictive than that which sees the Recherche as ‘pictorial’ only 
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insofar as actual pictures – whether real or imagined – are explicitly referenced. By 
engaging with the avant-garde ‘collection Marcel Proust’, they are arguing for an 
ideological relation to avant-garde practice, according to which the narrator 
perceives the world in a manner comparable to the way it is depicted in Cubist and 
Futurist painting, as if the visible world has undergone a sort of avant-garde 
aestheticisation.  
In fact, aestheticising the visible world is a habit of the narrator’s. ‘Déjà à 
Combray,’ writes David Mendelson, ‘nous le surprenons à transformer tel ou tel 
paysage qui lui est cher en un objet d’art dépourvu de matérialité, presque irréel.’62 
As Baldwin argues: 
 
[Proust] does not simply make reference (either directly or indirectly) to 
pictures by artists as varied as Bonnard, Botticelli, Breughel, Degas, 
Delacroix, Giotto, Manet, Monet, Moreau, Renoir, Robert, Turner, Vermeer, 
Watteau and Whistler, but imagines certain objects wholly or partly as things 
in pictures that are not coherently attributable to any artist. The contents of 
these pictures are, in fact, two-dimensional objects under ekphrastic 
description that appear in paintings that are purely the creation of Proust’s 
text. […] These quasi-pictures can be highly unstable, changing their form 
suddenly in the course of a description of what at first sight seems to be a 
single object.63 
 
One such object, which is described in Sodome et Gomorrhe and which Baldwin 
analyses extensively, is the ‘jet d’eau d’Hubert Robert’ that the narrator goes to see 
in the Guermantes’ garden. Hubert Robert was known as a painter, not a designer of 
fountains, and it is not entirely clear whether the narrator is referring to an actual 
fountain that Hubert Robert may have liked to paint, or a representation of a fountain 
in a Hubert Robert painting: the description, Baldwin writes, ‘slips and slides 
between the two’.64 The narrator remarks that from a distance ‘on avait l’impression 
de l’art plutôt que la sensation de l’eau’ – an impression that is compounded in the 
text by the curiously geometrical, immobile manner in which this (‘moving’) water 
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is described: it is, among other things, ‘durci’, ‘linéaire’, ‘infrangible’, and ‘immuable’ 
(III, 56-57). Yet shortly after these quasi-pictorial descriptions, the fountain’s 
materiality is restored by a breeze that carries the stream off course and leaves Mme 
d’Arpajon soaked through.  
What makes this passage particularly interesting is Baldwin’s contention that 
the geometricality of the ‘water’, combined with the fact that the droplets seem to be 
tearing each other apart (‘des gouttes sans force retombaient de la colonne d’eau en 
croisant au passage leurs sœurs montantes et parfois, déchirées’ (III, 56)), give the 
overall effect of a cubistic collage rather than the meticulous mimesis of a sculpted 
Fig. 1: Georges Braque, Broc et violon, 1910 
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Hubert Robert landscape. This opens up the possibility that ‘Proust was attempting 
to produce a description that “looked” – read – like a version of a painting by Hubert 
Robert that had fallen under the influence of the early Cubism of Braque or Picasso’.65 
Baldwin demonstrates that this is chronologically possible: Proust drastically 
reworked the original description, which appeared in an article of 1899, to include 
these ‘geometrical, rectilinear or collage-like effects’, and it is possible that he did so 
under the influence of analytic Cubism, which emerged in 1909. What this means is 
that as well as an actual fountain, with real water in it, the text seems also to be 
describing ‘at least two types of painting – the one viewed as more or less transparent 
and fully iconic, the other fragmented and opaque and tending to wear its picture 
plane on its “literal” surface’.66 
This, I would suggest, is a richer evocation of the Cubist tendency within the 
Recherche than those that stop at pinpointing objects or actions that are described 
‘cubistically’. The passage in question is not just a textual transposition of cubistic 
aesthetic effects, but also a means of engaging with a central debate in modernist 
pictoriality, which will be tackled head-on in Chapter 2: the question of whether art 
should function as a quasi-transparent ‘portal’ to a represented scene, or whether it 
should tend towards opacity by asserting itself as an object in its own right (i.e. a 
canvas with paint on it). This is a perennial debate concerning all art forms. But it 
takes on particular currency in a modernist pictorial context, as painting, already 
divorced from realist mimesis by the innovations of the Impressionists, began 
moving towards abstraction. Georges Braque engaged playfully with this debate in 
his Broc et violon of 1910 (fig. 1), pushing the image to its representative limits by 
fragmenting and distorting it in characteristically Cubist fashion, but ironically 
painting a figurative nail at the top of the canvas, creating the optical illusion that the 
image has been pinned to the wall like a poster. Braque thus uses the techniques of 
mimesis to draw attention to the fact that this painting is not mimetic at all – that it 
is, above all, just an arrangement of colours and forms on a flat surface. The Orphism 
(also called Orphic Cubism) of Robert Delaunay, among others, would go further, 
stripping painting of its representative function altogether and recasting it as an 
investigation of pure colour. Some among the Surrealists, on the other hand, would 
later move in a different direction, reappropriating linear perspective in order to 
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draw attention away from the manner of representation and towards the surrealistic 
nature of the represented scenes themselves.  
 
This debate has interesting implications for the relation between the observing 
subject and the observed work of art, and for the thematic concerns of this thesis 
more broadly. The ‘transparent’ work of art, we might argue, invites the viewer ‘in’ 
to the virtual world of the representation, while the ‘opaque’ one enforces a state of 
outsidership, thwarting any attempt on the part of the viewer to look past or through 
the surface of the canvas. But it is more complex than that, of course: we could also 
argue that the viewer is more of an outsider when looking at a transparent painting, 
since what is depicted is a virtual world she has no hope of entering, while an opaque 
painting asserts itself as an object that shares her space. In the same vein, modernist 
movements rejecting transparency were nonetheless arguing for the immersive 
potential of their work: in Du ‘Cubisme’, for example, Albert Gleizes and Jean 
Metzinger define Cubist pictorial space as ‘un passage sensible entre deux espaces 
subjectifs’,67 while the Futurists write on numerous occasions of their desire to ‘place 
the spectator at the centre of the painting’.68 All these aims have echoes of the 
narrator’s eventual conviction that art is the only means by which ‘nous pouvons 
sortir de nous, savoir ce que voit un autre de cet univers qui n’est le même que le 
notre’ (IV, 474). 
This complex interaction between transparency and opacity in painting, 
according to which images are understood as both ‘open’ or ‘closed’ to the viewer, is 
one manifestation of a broader dichotomy that will be my main area of investigation 
in what follows. Baldwin’s analysis suggests that in his description of the Hubert 
Robert fountain, Proust situates himself in an equivocal middle ground between the 
two camps, using paintings that function as figureheads for each side of the debate 
(one mimetic, the other abstract) as props to aid the text’s own ambiguous slippage 
between the two. What I will suggest in this thesis is that this tension does not only 
govern a mode of aesthetic engagement with paintings, but a mode of 
epistemological, phenomenological, and psychological engagement with the world 
more generally. The narrator’s story is in many ways a succession of attempts to 
                                                                  
67 Gleizes and Metzinger, Du ‘Cubisme’ (Sisteron: Éditions Présence, 1980). 
68 See, for example, Umberto Boccioni, Futurist Painting and Sculpture (Plastic Dynamism) [1914], trans. 
by Richard Shane Agin and Maria Elena Versari (Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute, 2016): ‘for us, 
the painting is no longer an exterior scene, a stage on which the event occurs. […] It’s an emotive, 
architectonic environment that creates the sensation and envelops the spectator.’ (p. 133.) 
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relate to objects (not just works of art but also trees, belltowers, parent figures, lovers, 
etc) as if they were ‘transparent’ – that is to say, as if he could ‘immerse’ himself in 
them, and thus access their most essential qualities. At the same time, he carries 
around a knowledge that such a privileged relation is impossible. ‘Quand je voyais 
un objet extérieur,’ he remarks in ‘Combray’, ‘la conscience que je le voyais restait 
entre moi et lui, le bordait d’un mince liséré spirituel qui m’empêchait de jamais 
toucher directement sa matière’ (I, 83). Proust, argues Baldwin, ‘describes 
consciousness as if it were a kind of hindrance to perception, that is to say, the 
condition of a distance between subject and object […] The object acquires a kind of 
impenetrable surface – a spiritual “edging”.’69 The narrator’s habit of ‘aestheticising’ 
the world reinforces this sense of distance: ‘in referring to objects or scenes […] as 
paintings, Proust’s Narrator makes a distinction between the worlds inhabited by the 
spectator (the Narrator himself) and by the objects and scenes in the “external” 
world.’70 
 
How, then, does the perceiving, acting subject navigate this conflict? Chapter 1 
considers this question with reference to Henri Bergson’s theories of ‘intuition’ and 
‘analysis’ as alternative processes for acquiring knowledge of the world, and 
investigates the extent to which we remain external to the objects that surround us, 
and the extent to which we can ‘enter’ them. It focuses particularly on the perceptive 
faculty of the artist and on the relationship it enables between artist and world, 
asking how this is influenced and challenged by ongoing developments in 
photographic practice. The artists in question are Proust’s fictional painter, Elstir; his 
narrator-as-nascent-author, whose writing faculty is activated at the sight of the 
Martinville belltowers moving on the horizon; and numerous real-life artists of the 
Cubist and Futurist movements. Cubism and Futurism figure heavily in this thesis, 
partly because a precedent has been set for comparing them with Proust: the 
comments made by Jacques Rivière and Jacques-Émile Blanche, cited above, are an 
open invitation to look more closely for a Cubist tendency in the Recherche, while 
existing articles and the ‘collection Marcel Proust’ provide a number of ‘leads’ or 
‘entry points’ that assist in assessing the topography of Proustian ‘Cubo-Futurism’. 
Moreover, Proust visibly shares a number of thematic interests with his Cubist and 
Futurist contemporaries, notably a belief in the plurality of vision and identity and a 
                                                                  




fascination with the technologies of speed. In Chapter 1, I take the two movements 
as collectives that are often philosophically at odds, considering individual 
paintings, as well as theoretical writings authored both individually and 
collaboratively, less on their own terms than as contributions to broader artistic, 
intellectual, and epistemological projects. With varying levels of detail, I discuss the 
work of Giacamo Balla, Umberto Boccioni, Carlo Carrà, Albert Gleizes, Juan Gris, 
Jean Metzinger, Pablo Picasso, Luigi Russolo, and Gino Severini. As an outspoken 
theorist and the principle author of the main manifestos of Futurist painting, as well 
as a prolific practitioner, Boccioni emerges as a particularly important figure in my 
analysis. 
Chapter 2 focuses specifically on the art object itself, investigating the extent 
to which the viewer of an image or the reader of a text is immersed in or distanced 
from the work with which they are engaged. It does this by interrogating the 
metaphor of the work of art as a ‘window on the world’, and its relation to modernist 
aesthetic goals. It looks in particular at Elstir’s fictional paintings, the quasi-gallery 
of images that the narrator sees in and through his hotel room window at Balbec, and 
the actual paintings of Robert Delaunay and René Magritte, both of whom use the 
idea of the window as a means of questioning processes of vision and of 
representation. Delaunay and Magritte were nominally associated with the Cubist 
and Surrealist movements, respectively, but both were comparative loners: Martin 
Jay notes that Magritte’s official association with Surrealism lasted only three years, 
from 1927 to 1930, and that ‘he ultimately came to regret his connection’, while 
Delaunay’s work was dubbed ‘Orphist’ by Guillaume Apollinaire, a term, Virginia 
Spate tells us, that he tried to ‘limit […] to his own kind of painting’.71 In contrast to 
Chapter 1, then, Chapter 2 is concerned with artists whose œuvre is relatively self-
contained.72  
                                                                  
71 Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought (Berkeley, Los 
Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1993), p. 246; Virginia Spate, Orphism: The evolution 
of non-figurative painting in Paris 1910-1914 (Oxford: Clarendon Press,1979), p. 1. 
72 My engagement with the Surrealist movement in this thesis is unconventional in that it skirts around 
the core Dada-and-Surrealism narrative – according to which the first segues into the second by way of 
automatic writing, collage, and an interest in the chance encounter – in favour of an investigation of two 
more peripheral figures (my inclusion of the second, Dorothea Tanning, is accounted for below). I have 
chosen to exclude Dada altogether – partly because it has its origins in writing and performance, rather 
than in the visual arts, with oil-on-canvas painting taking something of a back seat, and partly because 
its inclusion would require a shift to a more political discourse than the scope of my investigation 
allows. I have also left out Surrealist ‘automatic’ practices of drawing and painting, because non-
figurative practices of visual representation are already amply explored in my analysis of the near-
abstraction of analytic Cubism, and Robert Delaunay’s Orphist investigation of colour. Instead, I take 
Surrealism as an opportunity to consider a different approach to representation: that is to say, the return 
to a linear-perspectival, figurative style. 
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Chapter 3 investigates the influence of mechanised transport technologies 
both on perceptions of space and on relations between people. The first half considers 
the ways in which the train and the car (both in Proust’s account and more broadly) 
are the instruments of an avant-garde aestheticisation of the world that allows for 
varying degrees of ‘immersion’, developing my analysis in Chapter 2 by considering 
the aestheticising function of the vehicle window. This section is not concerned with 
individual paintings or movements per se, so much as with the seismic shift effected 
by the rejection of linear perspective, and the ways in which Proust’s engagement 
with new cultural developments might allow us to articulate a broader aesthetic 
coming-into-being. The second half examines the ideological barrier that Proust’s 
text and certain avant-garde works suggest is imposed between ‘practitioners’ of 
speed – chiefly cyclists and aviators – and those who remain sedentary, or who travel 
by organic means. It brings Proust into dialogue with Umberto Boccioni and Jean 
Metzinger, both of whose works demonstrate an explicit interest in speed, and, more 
implicitly, in its effects on those who partake of it. 
Chapter 4 continues this investigation into the barriers that demarcate 
individual subjects and separate them from one another. It argues that the self is 
defined not only by bodily but by architectural boundaries, and that these also shape 
the subject’s relationship to other people. The first half considers the role played by 
internal spaces, and the walls that demarcate them, both in the narrator’s project of 
self-definition and in that of the Surrealist painter Dorothea Tanning, as it is explored 
in her paintings of the 1940s. The second half draws on the same metaphors to 
examine the epistemological stakes of the relationships between the narrator and his 
lover Albertine, on the one hand, and on the other, between Tanning and her fellow 
Surrealist Max Ernst, as recounted in her memoir, Between Lives: An Artist and Her 
World. Both sections weave together these architectural metaphors with the 
psychoanalyst Didier Anzieu’s theory of the Moi-peau, creating a framework by 
which to examine ways of being in the world, and of interacting with other people, 
that hover between states of ‘insidership’ and ‘outsidership’.  
Chapter 4 is the only chapter of the thesis, then, that focuses on a single figure 
from the avant-garde, rather than a selection of them. This figure in herself presents 
something of an anomaly among my corpus, partly because she began receiving 
recognition as a painter nearly two decades after Proust’s death, but also because I 
make detailed reference to her memoir, which appeared in its final, revised version 
in 2001 (having first been published as Birthday in 1989). Tanning’s inclusion is 
 
29 
germane for several reasons, however, and Between Lives serves more than one 
purpose. Unlike many male avant-gardists, she did not write tracts or manifestos or 
otherwise publish the theory behind her paintings; in that sense, then, the memoir 
will play a comparable role in this thesis to, say, Du ‘Cubisme’ or the Futurist 
manifestos, functioning as a guide that helps us navigate complex and often puzzling 
pictorial territory. I also use the memoir for the light it sheds on Tanning’s own rich, 
eventful life, central to which is her relationship with another painter. In this regard, 
and particularly when read in combination with her paintings, it allows me to 
address certain questions of gender that might otherwise have fallen by the wayside. 
I have found it to be a particularly rich source of material through which to examine 
the narrator’s troubling affair with Albertine in A la recherche. To have read this 
relationship in conjunction with an earlier, male-led incarnation of Surrealism, in 
which women featured more as sexualised models and muses than as active 
participants, would potentially have been problematic: such an approach would risk 
foregrounding the male experience of female alterity at the expense of the voices and 
experiences of women themselves. Tanning’s work enables a more nuanced 
perspective because it reverberates with a sense of female empowerment: to bring 
her account of self-other relations into dialogue with the relationship between the 
jealous narrator and the beleaguered Albertine is to throw the latter into sharp relief. 
Tanning’s inclusion is also apt from an art historical perspective: she was one of 
several women to become associated with Surrealism in the 1930s and 1940s (along 
with Leonor Fini, Lee Miller, Meret Oppenheim, Kay Sage, and others) whose lives 
and works have been something of a magnet for feminist art historians seeking to re-
evaluate the place of women in the avant-garde, which for many years was defined 
by a conspicuous and decidedly un-radical androcentrism.73 My own interest in 
Tanning is in line with this scholarly precedent: the inclusion of women in studies of 
the avant-garde is, I believe, both culturally important and intellectually enriching, 
and I am anxious to avoid implying, by omission, that it was an exclusively male-led 
phenomenon. 
                                                                  
73 See, for example, Whitney Chadwick’s seminal Women Artists and the Surrealist Movement ([London]: 
Thames and Hudson, 1985); Annette Shandler Levitt, The Genres and Genders of Surrealism (London: 
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I return, finally, to our picture surface. This can be figured as a self-effacing, 
transparent portal to the internal world of the image; as an opaque, tangible surface 
(and therefore barrier); or as something more unruly and less clearly defined. While 
Chapter 2 deals directly with these questions as they are addressed in actual images, 
and in writing about images, in other chapters the picture surface, in all its 
complexity, becomes a metaphor for the subject’s engagement with the objects, 
scenes, and people of the external world. Ultimately, this thesis will ask whether the 
work of Proust and the avant-gardes conceives of the subject’s interaction with the 
world as a function of surface or depth, immersion or distancing, insidership or 




1.    The Artist in the World: Epistemology, Optical 
Technologies, and the Limits of Perception 
 
 
Introduction: Technology, Bergson, and the Epistemic Crisis 
 
I begin my investigation with an exploration of the artistic perceptive faculty, a 
vehicle that governs a particular mode of relation between artist and world. How, I 
will ask, do artists see? And how do their visual processes shape the ways in which 
they understand and express their relationship to the world around them? Within 
and across these broad areas of inquiry, further questions arise. To speak of a 
uniquely ‘artistic’ form of perception is to assume that the artist perceives differently 
to the non-artist. Should we subscribe, in that case, to what Linda Dalrymple 
Henderson terms the ‘romantic image’ of an artist with a more refined sensibility 
than ordinary people?1 And if so, are we to expect a privileged epistemological 
relation between the artist and the world – if the artist sees with more clarity or depth, 
or in more detail, does this equate to superior clarity or depth or detail of 
understanding? These questions are both raised and answered, in complex and 
sometimes contradictory ways, by the figures and movements who will be my focus 
in this chapter: by the theory and practice of the Cubist and Futurist movements, and 
by Proust’s exploration of painterly processes and principles via his fictional artist, 
Elstir. The waters of the debate are muddied by the looming phenomenon of 
photography, the perceptual and epistemological function of which was understood 
in varying ways by its admirers and detractors. Proust, the Cubists, and the Futurists 
cast it, alternately, as an aid to painters or a threat to their authority and a means of 
undermining their achievements. 
My exploration of these contrasting artistic and perceptual strands will be 
underpinned throughout by the philosophy of Henri Bergson. Bergson was a hugely 
influential figure in cultural and artistic circles at this time; the Futurist painter 
Umberto Boccioni was a particular devotee. Except in the latter case, however, I am 
not concerned by the question of Bergson’s influence, beyond what is implied by his 
significant contribution to the air du temps. Instead, I use his two opposing models of 
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knowledge acquisition as a theoretical framework that sheds light on the 
epistemological projects of my chosen artists. The models in question, ‘analysis’ and 
‘intuition’, are modes of relating to the world that can be defined as a state of 
‘outsidership’ in the first case, and an ideal of ‘insidership’ in the second. This 
framework paves the way for a surprising revelation: that in this context Proust’s 
thinking, far from being at odds with that of the avant-gardes, actually functions as 
a bridge between the divergent views of two avant-garde movements that seem, on 
the surface, to have much more in common with each other than they do with him. 
 
In what remains of this introduction, I give an overview of a broader cultural and 
conceptual landscape that provides a crucial backdrop to my main analysis. The 
chapter will then comprise four further sections. The first focuses on Elstir, and the 
particular mode of vision that he explores and depicts in his painterly practice; the 
second, on the Futurists, and the ideal of an artistic perceptive faculty (which is not 
necessarily an exclusively visual faculty) that can be discerned from their writings. 
The third focuses on the Cubists, and the ways in which their own ideas about artistic 
perception set them at odds with the Futurists. In the fourth and final section, my 
definition of ‘art’ is broadened to include writing as well as painting, as I turn to the 
narrator’s own early experience of artistic creation in the famed Martinville episode 
of Du Côté de chez Swann, which critics have linked to both Cubism and Futurism, as 
we saw in the introduction. This episode, I will argue, provides a crux around which 
the diverse perceptual, artistic, and epistemological strands of my investigation can 
be brought together, and moreover, a scenario in which the boundary between 
‘analysis’ and ‘intuition’ is troubled, and perhaps even overcome. 
 
i. The redefinition of vision in the late nineteenth century 
The primary form of perception I will discuss in this chapter will be vision. It is 
therefore essential to my argument to understand that the work of both Proust and 
his avant-garde contemporaries emerged against a backdrop of changes that had 
altered understandings of and attitudes towards vision and its perceived role, 
powers and means of functioning. Sara Danius speaks of this sea change in a lexis of 
urgency – as a ‘crisis of the senses’ or an ‘epistemic crisis’ – that implies disorientation 
and upheaval.2 This crisis is understood as a split between ‘the epistemic and the 
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sensory’, after which vision could not longer be thought of as a failsafe route to 
knowledge. The visible world and ‘reality’ no longer mapped seamlessly on to each 
other; ‘seeing’ no longer corresponded to ‘knowing’. Proust and the avant-gardes 
were operating towards the end of a long process of uncoupling between individual 
perception and objective reality – and the split, as we shall see, was widening.  
At the root of this change was a fundamental shift in vision’s very definition: 
from a function of objective, external reality, it had come to be understood over the 
course of the nineteenth century as a function, above all, of human embodiment. As 
Jonathan Crary argues in Techniques of the Observer, the study of vision had shifted 
‘from the geometrical optics of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to 
physiological optics, which dominated both scientific and philosophical discussion 
of vision in the nineteenth century’.3 According to Martin Jay’s almost 
contemporaneous study of the denigration of vision in the twentieth century, 
Downcast Eyes, this shift marked a decline in the hegemonic status of vision as the 
most important of the senses. What was once the ‘privileged scopic regime’ of 
Cartesian perspectivalism became ‘[a] discredited “spectatorial” epistemolog[y]’.4 
Vision could not be trusted if it was rooted above all in the fallible and unstable 
structures of the human sensorium, and its privileged link to knowledge was, 
inevitably, severed. As Crary writes:  
 
Even before the end of the [nineteenth] century, an extensive amount of work 
in science, philosophy, psychology and art involved a coming to terms in 
various ways with the understanding that vision, or any of the senses, could 
no longer claim an essential objectivity or certainty.5 
 
Crary illustrates the perceived stability of the old visual order with the model of the 
camera obscura. ‘For two centuries,’ he writes, ‘[the camera obscura] stood as a 
model, in both rationalist and empiricist thought, of how observation leads to 
truthful inferences about the world.’6 Later, the photographic camera was thought to 
                                                                  
3 Jonathan Crary, Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century 
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34 
align neatly with the positivist logic that saw vision as a means of knowing and 
understanding reality, as Douglas R. Nickel has demonstrated. William Henry Fox 
Talbot, one of photography’s early pioneers, thought of the camera as a superior 
version of the human eye – ‘vision made perfect’, as Nickel puts it.7 Talbot and his 
contemporaries, he writes, ‘believed that the more distinctly the world was viewed, 
appraised, and catalogued, the more deeply its wondrous complexity might be 
understood […] an epistemological logic that instinctively related knowledge to sight 
had little difficulty assimilating the ocular medium of photography into its culture 
as a new, mechanically improved version of human vision.’8 
But Nickel pinpoints three key moments in the history of photography which, 
as doubts took hold about the epistemological function of vision, compounded the 
split between vision and knowledge. The first of these was the output of the 
photographer Peter Henry Emerson, working in the 1880s and 1890s. A proponent 
of the doctrine of photography as an art form rather than a purely mechanical means 
of documenting reality, Emerson believed that photography should remain true to 
the functioning of the human eye rather than attempting to perfect it. Since the eye 
was subject to all kinds of flaws that problematised its ability to clearly perceive 
reality, so too should photography avoid trying to portray the world ‘accurately’. 
This meant doing away with the sharp focus and intricate detail of his 
contemporaries in favour of an aesthetics of visual indeterminacy, in which the less 
important elements of the scene blurred together, in softer focus. By according 
aesthetic value to visual ‘error’ and uncertainty, Emerson’s work ‘undermin[ed] the 
photograph’s transparency and mimetic force and, with it, its privileged 
epistemological relation to exterior reality’.9 Moreover, it shifted the locus of 
perceptual truth from a quasi-objective, quasi-mechanical eye to a subjective, fallible 
observer.10 
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Nickel does not discuss it, but still photography also played a role in 
undermining vision’s privileged relation to knowledge within the popular field of 
stereoscopy. The stereoscope created the illusion of depth by presenting a pair of 
two-dimensional images – often photographs – which merged into a single three-
dimensional image when viewed through the lenses of the device. This highlighted 
the physicality and subjectivity of vision, since the dimension of depth in this case 
was not an external, spatial truth, but was created by and existed solely within the 
eye of the viewer. As Jay has it, ‘by removing the verification of touch […] the 
stereoscope called into question the assumed congruence between the geometry of 
the world and the natural geometry of the mind’s eye.’11 While Emerson’s 
photographic innovations highlighted the eye’s fallibility and tendency to error, the 
stereoscope highlighted its capacity to recreate as illusion the seemingly stable 
structures of the external world. 
Nickel does, however, discuss the development of motion photography, 
beginning with Eadweard Muybridge’s famous series of images of a galloping horse, 
produced in Palo Alto, California, in 1877 and 1878 (fig. 2), and continuing in France 
with Etienne-Jules Marey’s more precise process of chronophotography (fig. 3), 
which captured the successive stages of a subject’s movement on a single 
photographic plate. This process of stilling and fixing bodies in motion made visible 
those subtle and fleeting stages of movement that happened too quickly to be 
perceived by the naked eye. By making a concrete visual record of processes that 
were otherwise imperceptible, movement photography could not help but 
demonstrate the limits of bodily vision. In doing so Muybridge and Marey’s images 
redefined vision in terms of what it was not, and what it could not do, and inevitably, 
therefore, played a role in undermining its supposed infallibility. This is in spite of 
the fact that Marey, as we shall see, thought of his invention as a means of aiding and 
augmenting sight – of standing in for its inadequacies – rather than as a blow to its 
authority. 
The third moment that Nickel cites is the discovery of the X-ray by Wilhelm 
Conrad Röntgen in 1895, which went further than motion photography in its 
emphasis on a reality that escaped the limits of human perception. ‘Even more than 
motion photography,’ he asserts,  
                                                                  
or emerging medical, legal and municipal apparatuses in which photographs functioned as a means of 
record and a source of evidence’ (p. 60). 




X-ray photography (and radioactivity in general) was understood to disclose 
a new reality outside the realm of the visible. Articles in mass circulation 
periodicals carried titles like ‘Photographing the Unseen’, ‘The Invisible 
World around Us’, and ‘The World beyond Our Senses’.12  
 
Implied – though not developed – in Nickel’s argument is the fact that the X-ray was 
not just part of a series of photographic developments that undermined positivism 
and raised doubts about the epistemological function of vision, but also of a series of 
broader scientific developments that had the same effect. Its discovery in 1895 had 
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Fig. 2: Eadweard Muybridge, The Horse in Motion, 1878 
Fig. 3: Etienne-Jules Marey, Image of a pelican in flight, ca. 1882 
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been preceded by Heinrich Hertz’s identification of electromagnetic waves in 1888, 
which paved the way for wireless telegraphy, and was swiftly followed by Henri 
Becquerel’s discovery of radioactivity in 1896 and J. J. Thompson’s identification of 
the electron in 1897. Collectively, these developments underlined the limitations of 
the human eye by confirming the existence of invisible realms of activity that lay 
beyond its reach. As Marie Curie declared in relation to radioactivity in 1904, ‘once 
more we are forced to recognise how limited is our direct perception of the world 
around us.’13 These changes had implications for the role of the artist, as Henderson 
articulates: 
 
With reality so radically redefined by X-rays and radioactivity, avant-garde 
artists faced a serious challenge to the romantic image of the artist as 
possessing sensibilities more highly developed than those of the average 
individual. Could the modern artist, like the photosensitive plate struck by 
X-rays, reveal an invisible reality?14 
 
This goes straight to the structuring questions of this chapter. Artists, after all, are 
human beings: does anything exempt their perceptive capabilities from the weakness 
and inadequacy that now defines human vision more broadly? Can they and should 
they compete with these new, mechanical forms of perception, and how, if at all, 
should they engage with the unseen realities now revealed or known to exist? 
Contrasting approaches to these challenges are adopted in the Cubist and Futurist 
movements, as we shall soon see. 
 
ii. Bergsonian epistemology: analysis vs. intuition 
For Nickel, the X-ray is emblematic of ‘the shift away from Victorian positivism to 
the antimaterialism and antiocularcentrism of Henri Bergson and Sigmund Freud’.15 
For these thinkers, he asserts, ‘reality lay, not on the surface of things – the domain 
of the photographic – but in the structures of time, experience, and memory buried 
beneath, accessible only through penetration’.16 In mentioning Bergson, Nickel 
implicates the philosopher in the split between the epistemic and the sensory, 
                                                                  
13 ‘Radium and Radioactivity’ [1904], via Henderson, ‘Editor’s Introduction: I. Writing Modern Art and 
Science – An Overview; II. Cubism, Futurism, and Ether Physics in the Early Twentieth Century’, Science 
in Context, 17 (December 2004), 423-466, p. 447. 
14 Henderson, ‘X rays’, p. 328. 




suggesting his ideas might be a product of or a reaction to the so-called crisis of 
vision. This, however, is something of a simplification. Bergson explains in 
‘Introduction à la métaphysique’ of 1903 that metaphysics defines two ways of 
acquiring knowledge: that which comes through a process of analysis, and that 
which comes through an act of intuition. Our default approach is the analytic one, 
according to which we accumulate views and perspectives of an object from without, 
from an external point of view. This approach is descriptive and relative, and it has 
its place: we rely on it when we go about our regular, day-to-day business. But its 
influence also extends to philosophy, to which it is poorly suited: it does not aid the 
philosopher in his or her attempts to understand the world profoundly and 
completely. Significantly, Bergson uses photography to illustrate his point, arguing 
that even if relative views are accumulated ad infinitum, they will no more amount to 
a complete, essential representation than a series of photographs that attempts to 
recompose a city. In contrast, an act of intuition involves ‘entering’ into the object 
itself (Bergson admits that this does not come naturally); it produces absolute 
knowledge comparable to the intuitive, absolute knowledge that human beings have 
of themselves. An object experienced intuitively in its absolute state simply is, and in 
this sense the absolute is synonymous with perfection (‘l’absolu est parfait en ce qu’il 
est parfaitement ce qu’il est’).17 An object seen analytically, on the other hand, can 
only exist according to the medium through which it is seen, and will always remain 
imperfect when compared to the original (‘une représentation prise d’un certain 
point de vue, […] [reste] toujours [imparfaite] en comparaison de l’objet sur lequel 
la vue a été prise’).18 The ultimate purpose of intuition is to perceive what Bergson 
considers to be the basic state of reality: time and change as continuous and fluid. 
Analysis, on the other hand, tries to extract static, isolated fragments from this 
temporal flux, or durée, meaning the essence of reality is destined always to slip from 
its grasp. 
As Marta Braun explains in her study of Marey’s life and work, the latter saw 
the role of his machine as a means of overcoming the shortcomings of the human 
eye. Marey, she writes, ‘suggested not that reality was unknowable, but that human 
perception was limited. Only by substituting machines for the senses would we gain 
                                                                  





scientific knowledge.’19 But for Bergson, chronophotography did not offer a solution 
to vision’s inadequacies; it was itself inadequate precisely because it too closely 
resembled our everyday, practical, analytic experience of vision. As Braun writes:  
 
For Bergson reality, or time, could never be known by being made visible; 
any attempt to do so limited true knowledge, or intuition. Hence, in his view, 
the senses were deficient by the very fact of their being too much like a 
camera: they automatically stopped and fixed objects that flowed into their 
realm of action.20 
 
Bergson’s view invites an alternative assessment of the so-called ‘epistemic crisis’. 
As Mark Antliff observes, ‘Bergson singles out vision as the faculty most closely tied 
to our utilitarian needs and therefore a perceptual tool adapted to the “relative” 
knowledge discernible by our intellect.’21 In other words, vision is an analytic means 
of acquiring knowledge from the outside: it cannot therefore be a failsafe route to 
knowledge precisely because analysis is not a failsafe route to knowledge. The 
recasting of vision as a function of embodiment compounds the crisis not only 
because it suggests vision is unreliable, but also because it casts the perceiver as an 
outsider, separated from reality by a mediating body that reveals the world only as 
relative and incomplete. But if our approach to knowledge were to try and intuit it, 
the notion of a crisis would fall away.  
 
iii. Epistemological stability vs. epistemological precarity 
In this chapter, I will consider the opposition of intuition and analysis as part of a 
broader dualist model, which consists of two diverging epistemological and aesthetic 
currents with a broad alliance of values on each side: unity, flux, and a move towards 
‘wholeness’ – even the absolute – on one, and fragmentation, dispersal, and a focus 
on the perspectival and the relative on the other. The latter finds value in an ‘analytic’ 
approach, celebrating the inadequacies of the human sensorium, while the former 
implies a quasi-intuitive ability to overcome these inadequacies and to rise above the 
fragmentation and dispersal implied in the latter. I will seek to demonstrate in what 
follows that the Cubists and Futurists belong to separate camps, while Proust’s Elstir, 
                                                                  
19 Braun, Picturing Time: The Work of Etienne-Jules Marey (1830-1904) (Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1992), p. 280. 
20 Ibid. 
21 ‘The Fourth Dimension and Futurism: A Politicized Space’, The Art Bulletin, 82 (2000), 720-733, p. 722. 
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and the early literary endeavours of his narrator, trouble the boundary between the 
two.  
Both of these approaches oppose the camera obscura model of perceptual and 
epistemic stability. Indeed, they can be grouped together on the same side of an 
earlier dualist model, defined by Crary in Suspensions of Perception, his follow-up to 
Techniques of the Observer. He considers a shift in values in the late nineteenth century, 
after which realism ceased to be governed solely by mimesis and instead navigated 
‘a tenuous relation between perceptual synthesis and dissociation’.22 Among his case 
studies is Édouard Manet’s Dans la serre, of 1879, which has been written off as a 
return to a more conservative, conventional realism on Manet’s part, an attempt to 
garner more widespread critical acceptance in the light of several Salon rejections in 
the 1870s. Yet in Crary’s reading, the painting gives substance to ‘an essential conflict 
within the perceptual logic of modernity, in which two powerful tendencies are at 
work’ – the first, ‘a binding together of vision, an obsessive holding together of 
perception to maintain the viability of a functional real world’, and the second, ‘a 
dynamic of psychic and economic exchange, of equivalence and substitution, of flux 
and dispersal’.23 He sees in the painting ‘an attempt to reconstitute a cohesive visual 
field, in whose disassembly Manet had already prominently participated’; it is ‘an 
impossible enterprise of fastening together and grounding narrative contents that 
inherently resisted unification or immobilisation’.24 A number of motifs within the 
painting imply enclosure, restraint, and organised containment (the ‘corseted, belted, 
braceleted, gloved and beringed’ figure of the woman, for example, whose form is 
echoed in the posts of the bench on which she sits).25 Yet out of this attempt at order 
emerges ‘a disjunct, compressed and space-drained field’, an impossible 
overcrowding of a space that ‘seems to buckle and ripple at certain points’.26 This is 
the second tendency, ‘threaten[ing] to unmoor the apparently stable positions and 
terms that Manet seems to have effortlessly arranged’.27  
The painting, by this reasoning, is a palpable suppression of forces that would 
later erupt in avant-garde painting, in which the perceptual field is ‘unmoored’ not 
with reluctant inevitability, but as a matter of principle. Inherent in the avant-garde 
                                                                  
22 Crary, Suspensions of Perception: Attention, Spectacle, and Modern Culture (Cambridge, MA and London: 
The MIT Press, 1999), p. 92. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., pp. 92-93. 
25 Ibid., p. 92. 
26 Ibid., p. 93. 
27 Ibid., p. 92. 
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paintings I consider here is a desire, not to explore the tension between an older, 
more stable visual order and an emergent, disruptive one, but to do away altogether 
with the unifying perceptive norms and constancies of the former. The conflicting 
currents I describe above can be understood as differing manifestations of this same 
tendency: while I juxtapose flux with dispersal, for example, for Crary they are part 
of the same impulse. Ultimately, however, what Crary’s model amounts to is an 
opposition between certainty and uncertainty, stability and precarity. And this, I will 
argue, is an opposition that endures into modernism: in some quarters a desire for 
certainty remains, even as perception is unbound and unmoored. In this schema, flux 
is not so much an escape from a rigid, positivist system of perceptual constancies, 
but a move towards a higher unity and holism that affords the possibility of intuitive, 
absolute knowledge. The aforementioned dualist model, with its alliances of values 
grouped broadly around analysis and intuition, ultimately maps on to an opposition 
between an approach that finds inherent value in unknowing, in epistemological 
precarity, and, on the other hand, a pursuit of the knowledge and certainty that – 
despite the uncoupling of the epistemic and the sensory – may yet be attainable. This 
chapter, then, will explore the extent to which its subjects are content with instability 
as a state in and of itself, and the extent to which they seek to reanchor it as an 





i. Elstirean ‘precognitive vision’ 
The works of Elstir, though fictional, are nonetheless exemplary of a particular form 
of artistic perception and practice that took root in the nineteenth century, partly in 
response to the epistemic crisis, and which visually and conceptually separated 
seeing from knowing by championing a ‘pure’ form of vision, as opposed to a mode 
of vision informed by pre-existing epistemological structures. The central principle 
of Elstir’s aesthetics, which I call ‘precognitive vision’, is the notion of a split between 
the pure act of vision and the processes of recognition that inform and structure it. 
The narrator discovers this principle during his visit to Balbec in A l’ombre des jeunes 
filles en fleurs, when he visits Elstir’s studio and inspects the large seascapes the latter 




Naturellement, ce qu’il avait dans son atelier, ce n’était guère que des marines 
prises ici, à Balbec. Mais j’y pouvais discerner que le charme de chacune 
consistait en une sorte de métamorphose des choses représentées, analogue à 
celle qu’en poésie on nomme métaphore et que si Dieu le Père avait créé les 
choses en les nommant, c’est en leur ôtant leur nom, ou en leur en donnant 
un autre qu’Elstir les recréait. Les noms qui désignent les choses répondent 
toujours à une notion de l’intelligence, étrangère à nos impressions véritables 
et qui nous force à éliminer d’elles tout ce qui ne se rapporte pas à cette 
notion.  
Parfois à ma fenêtre, dans l’hôtel de Balbec […] il m’était arrivé grâce 
à un effet de soleil, de prendre une partie plus sombre de la mer pour une 
côte éloignée, ou de regarder avec joie une zone bleue et fluide sans savoir si 
elle appartenait à la mer ou au ciel. Bien vite mon intelligence rétablissait 
entre les éléments la séparation que mon impression avait abolie. [...] Mais les 
rares moments où l’on voit la nature telle qu’elle est, poétiquement, c’était de 
ceux-là qu’était faite l’œuvre d’Elstir. Une de ses métaphores les plus 
fréquentes dans les marines qu’il avait près de lui en ce moment était 
justement celle qui comparant la terre à la mer, supprimait entre elles toute 
démarcation. [...]  
C’est par exemple à une métaphore de ce genre – dans un tableau 
représentant le port de Carquethuit […] – qu’Elstir avait préparé l’esprit du 
spectateur en n’employant pour la petite ville que des termes marins, et que 
des termes urbains pour la mer. (II, 191-192) 
 
The narrator’s key preoccupation in looking at these images – particularly the Port de 
Carquethuit, the subject of a highly detailed ekphrastic description that spans several 
pages – is Elstir’s visual articulation of the idea that the act of looking is not merely 
a faculty of sight, but also of the intellect and, crucially for our purposes, of prior 
knowledge. When we look, our intelligence always intervenes to separate objects 
from each other, to distinguish and demarcate, and to fit the things we see into the 
categories we ‘know’ them to belong to. Sometimes, however, we experience a 
fleeting, precognitive, pre-linguistic form of seeing in the moments before these 
categories crystallise, when the boundaries between objects are blurred and 
rearranged. These boundaries are soon restored by the intervention of the intellect, 
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which demarcates the seen objects according to its knowledge of the names 
attributed to them. But it is their initial state of fluid instability that forms the subject 
of Elstir’s work, and his depiction of this state awakens the narrator to his own 
experience of it. 
It seems certain that this type of vision, or something akin to it, informed the 
aesthetic developments of real-life pioneers of post-realist aesthetics – James Abbott 
McNeill Whistler, for example, or Claude Monet. Indeed, Iris Schaefer, Caroline von 
Saint-George, and Katja Lewerentz define the ‘impression’ of Impressionism in 
precisely these terms – as ‘the image formed on the retina, before it is transmitted 
along the optic nerve to the brain to be interpreted’.28 But as Danius argues, it is 
perhaps most explicitly at play in the late work of J. M. W. Turner, and most 
articulately defined in the writings of his ardent defender, John Ruskin.29 Danius and 
others have cited a well-known anecdote, originally set down by Ruskin in 1872, in 
which Turner declares his affiliation to an aesthetic that separates vision from 
knowledge. When a naval officer comments on the lack of port-holes in a drawing 
Turner is making of a harbour, Turner explains that he has drawn no port-holes 
because he cannot see any. The naval officer retorts that he nonetheless knows that 
the port-holes are there. ‘”I know that well enough,”’ replies Turner, ‘“but my 
business is to draw what I see, and not what I know is there.”’30 Ruskin had also 
advocated a comparable type of vision nearly twenty years earlier, in 1857, without 
mentioning Turner: 
 
The whole technical power of our painting depends on our recovery of what 
may be called the innocence of the eye; that is to say, of a sort of childish 
perception of these flat stains of colour, merely as such, without 
consciousness of what they signify, – as a blind man would see them if 
suddenly gifted with sight.31  
 
                                                                  
28 Schaefer, Saint-George, and Lewerentz, Painting Light: The Hidden Techniques of the Impressionists 
(Milan: Skiro, 2008), p. 23. 
29 See Danius, pp. 110-111. In her article ‘Le Port de Carquethuit and Metaphor’, Gabrielle Townsend 
gives an overview of the painters that various critics have suggested as models for Elstir: as well as 
Monet and Whistler, Degas, Hokusaï, Renoir, Harrison, Helleu, Vuillard, and Wilson Steer have been 
suggested. Like Danius, however, she concludes that Turner is the most important of all these real-life 
references (in ‘When familiar meanings dissolve…’: Essays in French Studies in Memory of Malcolm Bowie, ed. 
by Gill Rye and Naomi Segal, (Oxford, Bern, et al.: Peter Lang, 2011), pp. 193-204 (pp. 194-195)). 
30 John Ruskin, The Eagle’s Nest, in The Works of John Ruskin, 39 vols, ed. by E. T. Cook and Alexander 
Wedderburn (London and New York: George Allen, 1906), XXII, pp. 111-287 (210). 
31 The Elements of Drawing, in The Works of John Ruskin (1904), XV, pp. 1-228 (27).  
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Proust’s admiration for Ruskin is well known. His interest began in 1899, and 
he went on to write an obituary for the critic in Le Figaro in 1900, and then to translate 
two of his books, The Bible of Amiens, in 1904, and Sesame and Lilies, in 1906. That 
Proust quoted the Turner anecdote in both his essay ‘John Ruskin’ and the preface to 
his translation of Ruskin’s The Bible of Amiens suggests a longstanding interest in the 
artistic philosophy of perceptual innocence that finds its culmination in the portrayal 
of Elstir.32 Inventing a painter and a body of paintings that embody this philosophy 
is, moreover, a watertight way of endorsing it, since paintings that do not exist in 
any material sense cannot be uncoupled from the enthusiastic conclusions of the 
narrative in which they are situated. (That is to say, the reader of the Recherche cannot 
disagree with the narrator’s assessment of Elstir’s paintings as the reader of a critical 
essay by Proust might disagree with his assessment of Turner’s.)33  
 
ii. Bergsonian ‘perceptive expansion’ 
In her study Bergson et Proust, Joyce Mégay considers the similarities between 
Ruskin’s approach to aesthetics and that of Bergson, remarking that many of their 
ideas are identical. ‘En ce qui concerne l’esthétique,’ she writes, ‘ils appartenaient 
tous deux à la même famille d’esprits.’34 And indeed, in ‘La Perception du 
changement’, of 1911, Bergson describes a type of artistic vision that aligns 
intriguingly with the ‘innocent’ perception championed by Proust and Ruskin, 
expounding on its philosophical value and proposing it as a model that could enable 
philosophers to surmount the obstacles that have hindered their ability to reach a 
true understanding of the world. His argument in the essay arises from a point that 
in his view is self-evident: that if we could perceive everything with our senses and 
our consciousness, we would have no need for either reason or concepts. The 
limitations of our perceptive faculties are the raison d’être of philosophy itself, since 
we conceptualise only as a means of filling the gaps in our perception; the role of 
conception is to ‘combler les intervalles entre les données des sens ou de la conscience 
et, par là, unifier et systématiser notre connaissance des choses’.35 What we call 
                                                                  
32 In Leonard’s argument, ‘it was Ruskin’s writings on Turner which offered [Proust] a literary example 
of representing optical effects in virtual prose poems of impressionism’, and which thus provided 
inspiration for Proust’s own ‘well-known set pieces of impressionism’ (‘Modernist Visual Dynamics’, 
p. 335). 
33 I do not dwell here on the crossover between text and image in Proust’s portrayal of Elstir, because it 
will be considered in more detail in Chapter 2. 
34 Joyce N. Mégay, Bergson et Proust: Essai de mise au point de la question de l’influence de Bergson sur Proust 
(Paris: Libraire Philsophique J. Vrin, 1976), p. 134. 
35 ‘La Perception du changement’, in Œuvres, pp. 1365-1385 (p. 1369). 
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knowledge comes from the careful combination of pure perception and the 
subsequent conceptualisation of what is perceived. But this is a far from ideal state 
of affairs. Although Bergson does not use the word, this method of knowledge 
acquisition is clearly analytic, and it cannot therefore lead us to a complete 
understanding of the world. The solution to this problem is to ‘revenir à la 
perception, obtenir qu’elle se dilate et s’étende’.36 Rather than dealing with concepts, 
we should work instead at enlarging our powers of perception. Arriving at an 
understanding of reality is not so much a question of transcending the human 
sensorium, as has commonly been thought in the field of metaphysics, but of 
expanding it. If we were able intentionally to expand our perceptive faculty, ‘nous 
aurions une philosophie à laquelle on ne pourrait en opposer d’autres, car elle 
n’aurait rien laissé en dehors d’elle que d’autres doctrines pussent ramasser: elle 
aurait tout pris’.37 This, we can conclude, would be an intuitive model of knowledge 
acquisition. Bergson admits that such an endeavour sounds impossible. How can we 
ask our perceptive faculties to see more than they already see? But here he holds up 
a category of people for whom such a practice is commonplace and indeed necessary: 
artists. 
The average, non-artistic brain, Bergson says, seems to have been constructed 
to avoid perceiving those elements of the world that do not correspond to practical 
and material need. It deliberately delimits its focus of attention, makes ‘un effort 
constant […] pour limiter son horizon, pour se détourner de ce qu’il a un intérêt 
matériel à ne pas voir’.38 As Proust also asserts, ordinary vision classifies and 
categorises objects in advance so that we barely need to look at the object – ‘il nous 
suffit de savoir à quelle catégorie il appartient.’39 This is a normal, necessary means 
of navigating the practical demands of everyday life. ‘Avant de philosopher, il faut 
vivre,’ Bergson writes, ‘et la vie exige que nous mettions des œillères.’40 But artists 
are not restrained by these demands. Inexplicably, they are born without that 
seemingly unbreakable link between the perceptive faculty and the faculty to act; 
when they look at an object, they see it for what it is and not in terms of its relation 
to their own actions. They perceive freely, sans œillères, and in doing so, they perceive 
what the rest of us do not. Elstir could easily be one such artist, were he a real person.  
                                                                  
36 Ibid., p. 1369. 
37 Ibid., p. 1370. 
38 Ibid., p. 1372. 
39 Ibid., p. 1373. 
40 Ibid., p. 1372. 
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To clarify my claim in the introduction to this chapter that vision is a form of 
analysis, it is important to note that two forms of vision are at play here: the first, 
analytic and conceptualised, is underpinned by preconceived social and linguistic 
categories – it is akin to the cognitive experience that follows the precognitive one 
depicted in Elstir’s paintings. The second, which Bergson defines here, is more akin 
to the precognitive experience: a pure, expanded, uninstrumentalised form of vision, 
which provides a model for philosophical intuition. The comparison between 
Bergson’s expanded perception and Elstir’s precognitive vision is strengthened by 
the fact that Turner is one of the two artists that Bergson mentions by name (the other 
is Corot). In fact, Elstirean vision draws closer to intuition than even Bergson implies. 
Like Ruskin, Bergson suggests a certain innocence on the part of the artist – that 
artistic perception is an accident of birth, in contrast to philosophical intuition, which 
demands a great effort.41 Yet Elstir’s evocation of precognitive vision does not come 
easily. He does not paint during the precognitive state itself (this would be 
impossible, since it only lasts a few moments) but deliberately cultivates an 
analogous perceptive state in which what he sees is divorced from what he knows. 
This is a particularly impressive feat, the narrator tells us, for a cultured man such as 
Elstir, who knows a great deal. The lengths he goes to accord with Crary’s argument 
that this type of vision is ‘achieved at great cost’, and that Ruskin is therefore 
misguided in calling it ‘innocence’.42 
Elstirean vision also leads to an awareness of a form of durée; that is to say, to 
vision itself as a durational, developing process, dependent on the self and its own 
constant state of change and development. Likewise, the depiction of spatial flux and 
becoming, through the suppression of all demarcation between the land and the sea 
– the sea becomes the land and vice versa – provides a visual analogue for Bergsonian 
durational flux and becoming. In this regard, the paintings realise Bergson’s claim 
that a ‘perception immédiate et désintéressé’ would perceive reality ‘comme un 
perpétuel devenir’.43 ‘Perception divorced from knowledge’ is therefore only one 
definition of precognitive vision; we might also think of it as a type of perception that 
leads to new forms of knowledge, and which leads both artist and viewer away from 
conceptual, analytic ‘connaissance actuelle’ and towards the more intuitive realm of 
                                                                  
41 ‘Notre esprit peut […] s’installer dans la réalité mobile […] la saisir intuitivement. Il faut pour cela 
qu’il se violente, qu’il renverse le sens de l’opération par laquelle il pense habituellement.’ 
(‘Introduction’, p. 1421-1422.) 
42 Techniques, pp. 95-96. 
43 L’Évolution créatrice, in Œuvres, pp. 487-802 (pp. 725-6). 
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‘connaissance virtuelle’, from which we normally remain blinkered.44 This is a 
curious corruption of the idea that vision or perception more broadly cannot lead to 
knowledge: perception can lead to knowledge if we think of both terms as intuitive, 
rather than as logical and pragmatic. Precognitive vision, we might conclude, 
actually enables a privileged epistemological relation to reality, and this is reinforced 
by the narrator’s claim that what Elstir paints is ‘la nature telle qu’elle est’.45 
 Yet alongside this intuitive element sits an analytic one that undercuts it. As 
I suggested in the introduction to this chapter, intuition is a state of flux, in which 
boundaries fall away, while analysis is a state of fragmentation, in which 
insurmountable boundaries are imposed, and true knowledge and understanding 
(in Bergson’s view) remain out of reach. Precognitive vision and its disruption of 
visual categories seem to produce both flux and fragmentation in equal measure. In 
certain parts of the paintings, boundaries have been imposed where no boundaries 
should be – so that in the Port de Carquethuit, for example, the lack of a clear 
demarcation between the sea and the land is countered by the separateness of 
different parts of the sea. ‘Entre ces parties [de la mer],’ the narrator observes, ‘il y 
avait autant de différence qu’entre l’une d’elles et l’église sortant des eaux, et les 
bateaux derrière la ville.’ (II, 193-194) In one area of the painting, the boundary is 
suppressed between two things that are separate, while in another, boundaries 
appear within something that we think of as being whole. As if to illustrate the 
coexistence of these two modes, one of the paintings depicts a river – a motif 
emblematic of durée, of reality-as-flux – seen from an angle that breaks it up into 
discontinuous, isolated fragments (‘pris d’un point de vue tel qu’il apparaissait 
entièrement disloqué, étalé ici en lac, aminci là en filet, rompu ailleurs par 
l’interposition d’une colline couronnée de bois’ (II, 195)). The fluid, durational, 
mobile quality of the river is stripped away in a manner not dissimilar to 
chronophotography’s transformation of the moving body. This is one of a number of 
instances in which the painter’s chosen point of view leads to a reshuffling of the 
landscape, and I shall consider this in more depth in the section on Cubism, later in 
this chapter. It seems pertinent to mention here, though, that the distorting, 
fragmenting role of perspective corresponds less to the narrator’s claim that Elstir 
paints reality ‘telle qu’elle est’ than to his remark, later in the episode, that Elstir does 
                                                                  
44 ‘Perception’, p. 1372. 
45 ‘Les rares moments où l’on voit la nature telle qu’elle est, poétiquement, c’était de ceux-là qu’était 
faite l’œuvre d’Elstir’ (II, 192). 
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not paint according to what he knows, but ‘selon ces illusions optiques dont notre 
vision première est faite’ (II, 193-195).  
The idea that Elstir paints both of these states at once – ‘la nature telle qu’elle 
est’ and ‘ces illusions optiques’ – gives pause for thought. Proust, writes Christopher 
Prendergast, ‘has put us in an intellectually uninhabitable place. Elstir paints one of 
the rare moments when we see nature as she really is, yet what he paints is not nature 
as she really is but nature through a prism of illusion. How can this be?’46 The 
coexistence of these two mutually exclusive subjects implies an unresolved tension 
between the idea that Elstir enjoys an intuitive connection to reality, which he 
expresses in his paintings, and the idea that his depictions are of relative, 
perspectival, subjective illusions. For Ruskin, the value lies in the optical illusion, as 
is suggested in the passage that follows his definition of the ‘innocence of the eye’. 
Discussing a patch of grass that appears yellow in the sunlight, he reasons: 
 
If we had been born blind, and were suddenly endowed with sight on a piece 
of grass thus lighted […] it would appear to us that part of the grass was 
green, and part a dusty yellow […] and, if there were primroses near, we 
should think that the sunlighted grass was another mass of plants of the same 
sulphur-yellow colour. We should try to gather some of them, and then find 
that the colour went away from the grass when we stood between it and the 
sun, but not from the primroses; and by a series of experiments we should 
find out that the sun was really the cause of the colour in the one, – not in the 
other.47 
 
This hypothetical scenario details a logical process of discovery by which the 
innocent – or ignorant – eye gradually learns to separate its initial visual experience 
from its subsequent understanding of reality. The illusion is celebrated – indeed, it is 
fundamental to Ruskin’s artistic ideal – but it is still indisputably an illusion, a 
deviation from what is really the case. By blurring the distinction between illusion 
and reality, then, Proust diverges from his mentor. His strategic use of the word 
‘poétiquement’ in the narrator’s description of Elstir’s practice (‘les rares moments 
où l’on voit la nature telle qu’elle est, poétiquement, c’était de ceux-là qu’était faite 
                                                                  
46 Prendergast, Mirages and Mad Beliefs: Proust the Skeptic (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2013), p. 123. 
47 The Elements of Drawing, pp. 27-28. 
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l’œuvre d’Elstir’) suggests that the ‘poétique’ might be a domain in which these 
contradictions cease to be contradictions. Moreover, when the narrator arrives at the 
studio, he likens it to ‘le laboratoire d’une sorte de nouvelle création du monde’, and 
Elstir himself to God (II, 191). Perhaps we might then surmise that the painter is 
deploying his techniques of representation to create a new world, with new 
conditions of possibility, in which paradoxes such as this can be resolved – where 
illusion and reality are not mutually exclusive after all.48 
 
iii. The artistic eye as ‘photographic’ 
A comparable state of tension between illusion and reality exists in the field of 
photography. Whether or not photography gives us a set of ‘illusions optiques’ or 
assists us in perceiving ‘la réalité telle qu’elle est’ depends on the use to which it is 
put: the former may be in play when the photographs in question have a primarily 
aesthetic role (as in the case of stereoscopy, or Emerson’s artistic images), while the 
goal of photography in its indexical, investigative function is to show us something 
of the latter. It is intriguing, then, to note that precognitive vision shares many 
qualities with photography. As Gabrielle Townsend remarks, ‘such a vision is 
essentially photographic, in that it records objectively, without manipulation’,49 
while elements of Bergson’s definition of artistic perceptive expansion could apply 
equally well to the camera: like artists, the camera ‘ne [perçoit] pas en vue d’agir; il 
[perçoit] pour percevoir – pour rien […] [il] [naît] [détaché]’.50 (Bergson himself does 
not make this connection – unsurprisingly, perhaps, given his use of photography to 
illustrate the notion of analysis.) The painter detaches vision from the logical, 
pragmatic part of the brain, à la Elstir, while the camera has no such faculty to detach 
itself from; the mode of seeing that results in both cases is comparable. 
 In her discussion of the Elstir episode, Danius implies that this commonality 
between photographic processes and Elstirean visual processes is also rendered 
physically. She remarks on the strikingly photographic set-up of the painter’s studio, 
which is dark except for one small window at the end: ‘Elstir’s studio is literally and 
figuratively represented as a camera obscura, complete with an aperture.’51 This, she 
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réalité, en une sorte de réalité absolue, de surréalité, si l’on peut ainsi dire’ (Manifestes, p. 24). 
49 ‘Port de Carquethuit’, pp. 199. 
50 Ibid., p. 1373. 
51 Danius, p. 108. 
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implies, provides a fitting metaphor for Elstir’s eye, backing up her claim with an 
analysis of the narrator’s discussion of photography in the latter half of the episode. 
‘The painter’s eye as camera obscura?’ she muses. ‘The metaphor acquires a peculiar 
resonance, as the episode also includes a lengthy reflection upon the rivalry between 
painting and photography.’52 Oddly, she does not make a distinction between the 
camera obscura and the camera – an oversight, although not an uninteresting one. 
For Crary, as we have seen, the camera obscura is emblematic of an older, more stable 
visual order. If it were to provide a model for Elstir’s project, as Danius suggests, 
then it seems fitting that he would seek to portray reality or nature ‘telle qu’elle est’; 
his aesthetics would work within a wider system that takes the existence of a stable, 
objective reality as a given. But this would only fit with a photographic model if we 
were to understand photography as an exclusively realist, indexical medium that 
aims to depict the world ‘as it is’. There would be no place in this scenario for an 
interest in optical illusion – still less for an untidy crossover between the latter and 
‘la nature telle qu’elle est’. 
The narrator, meanwhile, implicitly disowns the camera obscura model: his 
own discussion of photography, which follows his description of the Port de 
Carquethuit, makes it clear that his interest lies in its Emersonian capacity for optical 
illusion. His description is not a particularly favourable one; the implication is that 
photography has undermined the achievements of painting by appropriating and 
making them commonplace, and the narrator seems to wish to defend territory that 
belonged to painting – specifically Elstir’s painting – before photography usurped its 
place. Elstir’s eye does not resemble a camera; the camera resembles Elstir’s eye. But 
whichever came first, the equivalence between the two is plain, and at the heart of 
their resemblance is their ability to distort and reshuffle the spatial relations of the 
object and scenes they depict. He writes:  
 
Depuis les débuts d’Elstir, nous avons connus ce qu’on appelle ‘d’admirables’ 
photographies de paysages et de villes. Si on cherche à préciser ce que les 
amateurs désignent dans ce cas par cette épithète, on verra qu’elle s’applique 
d’ordinaire à quelque image singulière d’une chose connue, image différente 
de celles que nous avons l’habitude de voir [...] Par exemple, telle de ces 
photographies ‘magnifiques’ illustrera une loi de la perspective, nous 
montrera telle cathédrale que nous avons l’habitude de voir au milieu de la 
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ville, prise au contraire d’un point choisi d’où elle aura l’air trente fois plus 
haute que les maisons et faisant éperon au bord du fleuve d’où elle est en réalité 
distante. Or, l’effort d’Elstir de ne pas exposer les choses telles qu’il savait 
qu’elles étaient, mais selon ces illusions optiques dont notre vision première est 
faite, l’avait précisément amené à mettre en lumière certaines de ces lois de 
perspective, plus frappantes alors, car l’art était le premier à les dévoiler. (II, 
194; my emphasis) 
 
The italicised sections demonstrate the narrator’s subtle elevation of visual error to 
an important aesthetic principle. What these supposedly admirable photographs 
show is akin to what Elstir has achieved in his painting: perspective is distorted so 
that what is depicted is uncoupled from the reality to which it refers. This assessment 
will be germane for the forthcoming section on Cubism, where I consider a 
comparable reference to photography made later on in the Recherche, which 
questions the very status of this reality, thus opening up the possibility that 
photography’s privileging of optical illusion may in fact bring it closer to ‘la nature 





Elstir’s commitment to both optical illusion and reality-as-it-is positions him at the 
crux of the two diverging epistemological and aesthetic currents that I defined in my 
introduction. Cubism and Futurism, however, are more firmly wedded to specific 
positions within the dichotomy. The investigation that follows will explore these 
positions, and the epistemological implications that result from them. Do the Cubists 
and Futurists endorse Bergson’s belief in the superiority of intuition over analysis, 
or work against it? And how does photography, in its various forms, shape their 
attitudes and direct their practice? 
Unlike that of Elstir, the Futurist painters’ attitude to perception is difficult to 
pin down. In many respects this is unsurprising, given that we are not talking here 
about the beliefs of a single ‘painter’, definitively set down in writing by a single 
author, but the often contradictory opinions of a considerably less tidy grouping of 
opinionated individuals. There is no definitive description of what it means to 
perceive the world ‘futuristically’; although the collective aims of the Futurist 
 
52 
painters are broadly outlined in several co-signed manifestos, these largely express 
the beliefs of their unofficial leader, Boccioni, while elsewhere, others in the 
movement wrote manifestos of their own that did not necessarily align seamlessly 
with the declarations of their colleagues. When these writings are taken together, 
however, a broader position can be deduced: several strands emerge that suggest a 
general tendency towards the values of wholeness and flux, with regard to both the 
workings of perception itself and the understandings it affords of the external world. 
 
i. Futurism and ‘holistic’ perception 
Various examples of Futurist theory, not just those written by Boccioni, hint at the 
painters’ espousal of what I term a holistic perceptive faculty. Their visual capacities, 
for example, are described as further-reaching than usual, exceeding the scope of the 
camera or linear persepective. Their manifesto ‘The Exhibitors to the Public’ suggests 
that the Futurist eye transcends the usual limits of vision:  
 
In painting a person on a balcony, seen from inside the room, we do not limit the 
scene to what the square frame of the window renders visible; but we try to 
render the sum total of visual sensations which the person on the balcony has 
experienced […] You must render […] what we have on the right, on the left, and 
behind us, and not merely the small square of life artificially compressed, as it 
were, by the wings of a stage.53  
 
Although jointly signed, the manifesto is authored primarily by Boccioni, and the 
description above clearly alludes to his own painting The Street Enters the House, of 
1911, in which a woman leans over the railing of a balcony and looks onto the street 
below. The ground rises up towards the balcony, while the buildings on either side 
topple into the frame, distorting the perspective so that it appears to look at once 
downwards, straight ahead, and to each side. The catalogue description of this 
painting for an exhibition held at London’s Sackville Gallery in 1912 states explicitly 
that these visual distortions set the painting apart from photography; the painter 
‘does not limit himself to what he sees in the square frame of the window as would 
a simple photographer’.54 What they seem to be striving for is ‘perceptive expansion’ 
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of another, more literal sort – that is to say, the actual, physical broadening of the 
visual field. 
 Yet vision is only one part of the equation. Other elements of the Futurists’ 
theory make it clear that their paintings respond not only to visual experience, but 
also to sensory and subjective experience more broadly. Joshua Taylor’s suggestion 
that The Street Enters the House evokes an excess of aural as well as visual stimuli (‘it 
is like opening a window on a noisy city’) recalls a manifesto by the painter Carlo 
Carrà.55 ‘Before the nineteenth century, painting was a silent art,’ Carrà declares – 
but now, he says, Futurist attempts to depict elements of sound and smell as well as 
vision are broadening painting’s perceptual remit. He attributes aural and olfactory 
properties to the fundamental components of painting, and calls on painters to use 
‘reds, rrrrreds, the rrrrrreddest rrrrrrreds that shouuuuuuut’ and ‘greens, that can 
never be greener, greeeeeeeeeeeens, that screeeeeeam’.56 He credits Boccioni, Gino 
Severini, Luigi Russolo, and, naturally, himself with successfully incorporating aural 
and olfactory experience into their work. But it is Russolo whose work displays the 
most obvious allegiance to the synesthetic principle, as in Perfume, of 1910, in which 
a thick and palpable scent, depicted with repeated streaks of colour in a manner 
reminiscent of Divisionism, spirals around the head of the central figure, which is 
thrown back as if inhaling deeply. 
Perhaps it is only one step further to demand that painting, in addition to 
multisensory experience, also encompass other elements of subjective experience, 
namely affect and memory. Boccioni’s 1911 triptych, States of Mind, explores the 
emotions of those leaving on a train and those left behind. In ‘The Exhibitors to the 
Public’, once again basing his theoretical proclamations on a thinly-veiled reference 
to one of his own paintings, he explains the technicalities of depicting emotion as 
explored in the triptych, putting forward a theory for how different forms and lines 
might represent particular emotions.57 He also hints at the importance of memory in 
painting in his declaration that ‘the picture must be the synthesis of what one 
remembers and of what one sees’,58 while in his book, Futurist Painting and Sculpture, he 
argues more assertively for the role of memory in painting, declaring the Futurists’ 
intention to ‘unite in the same painting the plastic values that struck us yesterday or 
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a year ago and those that pushed us to take up the brush […] today and get to work’.59 
Boccioni was joined in this interest by his colleague and friend, Gino Severini, who 
made an explicit attempt to depict memory in his painting of 1911, Memories of Travel, 
a synthesis of remembered moments of a train journey, and declaring in an 
unpublished manifesto in 1913 that ‘memory […] will act in the work of art as an 
element of artistic intensification […] as sole raison d’être of an artistic creation’.60 To 
consider this emphasis on memory in tandem with that placed by Boccioni on 
emotion, and by Carrà and Russolo on synesthesia, is to piece together a composite 
theory in which painting is the product of a ‘total’ artistic sensorium that responds 
to both internal and external stimuli. The ideal Futurist painter, then, would be able 
to channel the experiences of the senses, of memory, and of emotion onto the visual 
medium of the canvas. 
 
ii. Intuition and perceptive expansion 
The Futurists’ ambitions for a ‘total’ artistic perceptive faculty (and they do on more 
than one occasion refer to their work as ‘total painting’)61 seems in many ways at 
odds with Elstir’s precognitive vision. Elstir’s technique, after all, is a reduction of 
vision; he strips away prior knowledge and intellectual experience until only the 
pure visual impression remains, while the Futurists reject the purely visual in favour 
of the more broadly sensory, which is in turn bound up with the psychological and 
the emotive. Boccioni declares that painting must synthesise vision and memory, 
while Elstir separates seeing from remembered visual categories. On the one hand, 
an aesthetics of reduction; on the other, an aesthetics of accumulation. Yet both of 
these modes, I would argue, are differing forms of Bergsonian perceptive expansion. 
Neither is practical on an everyday level; the role of the artist in both cases is to 
remove the restrictive conceptual structures, or ‘œillères’, imposed by practical need, 
and to see freely, without constraint. In one case, this leads to a paring-down of 
vision, and in the other, to an inflation of it. But in both, the artist sees outside of the 
conceptual, ‘analytic’ frameworks imposed on the rest of us, with inevitable 
consequences for what is required of and offered to the viewer. As the Technical 
Manifesto declares, ‘in order to conceive and understand the novel beauties of a 
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Futurist picture […] the eye must be freed from its veil of atavism and culture.’62 In 
Bergson’s words, ‘c’est donc bien une vision plus directe de la réalité que nous 
trouvons dans les différents arts.’63 
The links between the Futurist notion of perception and Bergsonian 
perceptive expansion are strengthened by the fact that the Futurists, inspired by 
Bergson, considered their art to have an ‘intuitive’ function. ‘It is by his intuition that 
[the painter] is penetrating nowadays into life, the soul, the activity of things,’ writes 
Severini in the catalogue for a solo exhibition held at London’s Marlborough Gallery 
in 1913.64 Elsewhere, he discusses his notion of ‘plastic analogy’, which he defines as 
the artistic equivalent of the technique of poetic analogy, as described by Marinetti, 
in which one object is represented by another that appears on the surface to be 
entirely unrelated to it.65 Linking these elements are their ‘qualitative radiations’, 
which are perceived intuitively by what Severini terms the ‘artistic sensibility’. He 
evidently means something specific by the latter term; the opaque (and sometimes 
illogical) nature of his prose, however, means its precise definition remains elusive. 
But it is nonetheless clear that in Severini’s view this sensibility affords a privileged 
connection between the internal, subjective reality of the artist as an individual, and 
the external realities of the objects he depicts. Artistic emotions, he writes, ‘are not 
only related to a particular emotional background, but united to the whole 
universe’.66 The artist appears to function as a sort intuitive receptor of ‘qualitative 
radiations’, which emanate from objects like radio waves. 
For Boccioni – a dedicated Bergsonian – the notion of intuition was a central 
concern of his aesthetics, as his writings frequently imply. In Futurist Painting and 
Sculpture, for example, he declares that ‘we Futurists are in the object and we 
experience its developmental concept’.67 Like Severini, intuition for Boccioni was a 
means of linking subjective, emotive experience to the realities of the external world: 
the Futurist, he claims, ‘create[s] a sort of emotive ambience, seeking by intuition the 
sympathies and the links which exist between the exterior (concrete) scene and the 
                                                                  
62 ‘Technical Manifesto’, p. 29. 
63 ‘Perception’, p. 1373. 
64 ‘Gino Severini’s Exhibition’ in Nuovi Archivi del Futurismo, p. 52.  
65 Severini cites Marinetti’s ‘Technical Manifesto of Futurist Literature’, which defines ‘analogy’ as ‘the 
immense love which brings together distant objects which are on the surface different and hostile’ – a 
distorted form of metaphor in which the elements brought together appear to share no likeness at all. 
In painting, such an analogy is to be rendered by using forms and colours apparently unrelated to the 
object depicted: ‘the sensation aroused in us by a real object of which we know the square shape and 
blue colour can be expressed artistically through its formal and chromatic complementaries, i.e. round 
shapes and yellow colours.’ (See ‘Plastic Analogies’, p.121.) 
66 ‘Plastic Analogies’, p. 121. 
67 Futurist Painting, p. 103; my emphasis. 
 
56 
interior (abstract) emotion’.68 In Brian Petrie’s argument, it is the idea of intuition that 
distinguishes Boccioni’s emphasis on emotion from a purely Symbolist investigation 
of subjectivity, since ‘to subscribe to Bergsonian intuition is to accept that this form 
of subjective experience offers ontological insight’.69  
What is said to be revealed by these links between exterior and interior 
realities, and what must therefore be represented, is ‘the dynamic sensation, that is to 
say, the particular rhythm of each object, its inclination, its movement, or, more 
exactly, its interior force’.70 This, without doubt, refers to the intuitively detected, 
absolute reality of Bergsonian durée. What I infer from this is that the Futurist ideal 
of holistic perception should make of the artist a hypersensitive locus of Bergsonian 
intuition, able to rise above the limitations of ordinary, analytic perception and, 
through intuitive sympathy, to gain ontological awareness of the external world, 
specifically an awareness of its inherent flux, and of the dynamic, durational 
existence of the objects in it.  
 
iii. The role of scientific discovery 
It is perhaps in this light that we should view Boccioni’s adoption of the X-ray as a 
metaphor for Futurist perception. In the Technical Manifesto, he asks: 
 
Who can still believe in the opacity of bodies, since our sharpened and 
multiplied sensitiveness has already penetrated the obscure manifestations 
of the medium? Why should we forget in our creations the doubled power of 
our sight, capable of giving results analogous to those of the X-rays?71 
 
His questions imply that Futurist perception is not just panoramic or holistic; it is 
also penetrative – capable, like the X-ray, of seeing beyond, behind, under, through. 
Since the Futurists clearly did not have X-ray vision in any real sense, this 
equivalence might be understood as a metaphor for what is actually a Bergsonian, 
intuitive ability to ‘pierce’ surface barriers and ‘enter into’ the objects of their 
perception.  
Yet the X-ray, through its chronological proximity to discoveries such as 
radioactivity and electromagnetism, also raises questions about the role of scientific 
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discovery in Boccioni’s artistic theory. It is important to note, in fact, that Boccioni’s 
interest in the notion of the inherent flux of the external world would have been 
encouraged not only by his readings of Bergson, but also by his fascination with the 
sciences, which predated his interest in the philosopher. ‘How, when and where can 
I study all that chemistry and physics?’ he asks in a diary entry of 1907, some years 
before his study of Bergson began in earnest.72 Boccioni implies in Futurist Painting 
and Sculpture that intuition and modern science have played an equal role in shaping 
the development of modern art: 
 
Today […] the artist rises to the essential element of creation. Artistic intuition 
has elevated him to new heights; and science, with steam, electricity, 
combustible fuels, Hertzian waves, and all of the research in biology and 
chemistry, has transformed the world […] With scientific discoveries, a new 
sensibility has emerged that the artist already expresses and that the masses 
refuse to recognize.73 
 
Far from undermining the artistic perceptive faculty, as Linda Dalrymple Henderson 
suggests it might, modern science has redefined it. The artist does ‘[possess] 
sensibilities more highly developed than those of the average individual’, or the 
‘masses’ that Boccioni so disparages, but the marker of this superiority is the ability 
to understand and integrate the implications of these new discoveries into the 
perceptive faculty – to see the world anew in the light of modern scientific 
understanding. What emerges here is an attempt to assimilate a personal, individual 
perceptive faculty with an ontological focus on the reality of the external world. The 
X-ray – as a new scientific discovery that challenges understandings of reality by 
directly enhancing human perception – provides the perfect metaphor for such an 
attempt. 
In another article, ‘Cubism, Futurism, and Ether Physics in the Early 
Twentieth Century’, Henderson makes a convincing case for the influence of 
contemporary scientific theories and discoveries on Boccioni’s aesthetic theory. 
Certain of these, I would suggest, might give an insight into the kinds of realities the 
Futurists’ supposed X-ray vision might be able to ‘see’, and suggest, moreover, that 
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qualities of wholeness and fluidity apply not only to the perceptive capabilities of 
the ideal Futurist artist, but carry over into understandings of the external world that 
he seeks to represent. One was the theory of the luminiferous ether, an invisible 
substance thought to fill the whole of space, and through which light waves were 
believed to move. Although its identity and composition were unknown, it was 
thought to permeate not only space but matter too, which was said to sit in it ‘as a 
sponge lies soaked in water’.74 The theory was particularly significant for Boccioni in 
its suggestion that space and matter were not radically separate entities, as they 
appear – rather, they could be imagined to exist on a continuum, possessing varying 
degrees of substantiality. Space, filled with an ethereal substance, could be 
understood as an intangible form of matter, and matter as nothing more than a 
densely compacted form of space. Such an understanding would have been bolstered 
by the phenomenon of radioactivity. As radioactive substances emitted alpha, beta, 
and gamma ‘rays’, their chemical composition changed, releasing energy. In 
Henderson’s words, this implied ‘a vibrating realm of atomic matter in the process 
of transformation’, in contrast to the traditional understanding of matter as a stable 
entity. The popular science writer Gustave Le Bon went further, arguing in 1905 that 
this realm of atomic motion was more widespread than thought, and that radioactive 
substances merely demonstrated to a particularly high degree a phenomenon that 
occurred in all substances: ‘l’aptitude de la matière à se désagréger en émettant des 
effluves de particules [...], animées d’une vitesse de l’ordre de celle de la lumière et 
capables de traverser les substances matérielles, est universelle.’ This disintegrating 
matter, he proposed, gradually returned to the ether, from which it was thought to 
have originated.75  
Le Bon was a friend of Bergson, and it is possible that the latter was referring 
in part to this theory when he declared that the movement of an object ‘n’est en réalité 
qu’un mouvement de mouvements’.76 Indeed, as Henderson points out, several of 
Bergson’s ideas ‘stand as counterparts to Le Bon’s popularization of universal 
radioactivity’77 – his declaration in Matière et mémoire, for example, that ‘toute 
division de la matière en corps indépendants aux contours absolument déterminés 
est une division artificielle’, which Boccioni quotes in an article of 1913.78 Elsewhere 
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in the same article, Boccioni writes: 
 
Sculpture must try and model the atmosphere [...] For me this atmosphere is 
like a material substance which exists between objects, distorting plastic 
values. [...] Areas between one object and another are not merely empty 
spaces but continuing materials of different intensities [...] This is why in our 
paintings we do not have objects and empty spaces but only a greater or lesser 
intensity and solidity of space.79 
 
The Technical Manifesto also refers to the same idea, stating that ‘our bodies 
penetrate the sofas upon which we sit, and the sofas penetrate our bodies’.80  
Two paintings from 1912, Horizontal Volumes and Matter [Materià] (fig. 4), 
appear to offer an aesthetic rendering of the idea of space and matter as fluid, mobile, 
and interconnected. Christine Poggi writes that Matter ‘posit[s] a continuity on the 
level of molecular structure between the human body and the objects of the world’.81 
Both paintings appear to be explorations of the idea that matter and space exist on a 
continuum, and that perceived spatial boundaries must be arbitrary – not rigid and 
immutable, but mutually permeable. Henderson remarks on the ‘tapestry of discrete 
brushstrokes’ in the latter painting, ‘with which [Boccioni] deliberately sought to 
convey the dematerialization of matter’.82 In both paintings the central figure is not 
clearly distinct from the surrounding space, but blends with it, while what would 
otherwise be treated as ‘background’ is given visual prominence and materiality, its 
interpenetrating planes and shafts of light slicing into the human body and distorting 
its features. As well as the theories of the ether and radioactivity, it seems likely that 
these aesthetic features reference the X-ray itself, which not only calls into question 
the stability and solidity of physical, material boundaries, but provides visual 
evidence for their permeability. Indeed, the aforementioned shafts of light might be 
read as a reference to the idea of the X-ray as a new form of ‘light’, which does not 
reflect off objects, but enters into them. Both paintings, as exercises in undermining 
the sanctity of physical categories and the boundaries that demarcate them, can be 
likened to Elstir’s seascapes. Yet Elstir’s depictions are concerned with fluidity as a 
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phenomenon that plays out on the visible surface of the world – not, like Boccioni’s, 
with fluidity as an inherent, ontological feature of the reality that lies beyond those 
surfaces. Elstirean flux is ultimately the product of a way of seeing, while in 
Boccioni’s work the emphasis is shifted firmly from an external world riven with 
‘illusions optiques’ to the external world as it is, ‘la nature telle qu’elle est’. If Elstir’s 
studio is a ‘laboratory’ in which the world is created anew (II, 190), Boccioni’s must 
be a laboratory in which the underlying truths of the existing world are sought.83 
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But while for Elstir there is a clear, causal link between a particular 
(precognitive) visual mode and an understanding of the external world as fluid and 
continuous, the links between Futurist holistic perception and a Futurist ontology of 
flux are harder to discern. We have seen that the Futurists considered the union of 
internal and external realities as fundamental to their art, and themselves as uniquely 
placed to facilitate such a union. But this belief does not in itself offer a convincing 
explanation for how they might be made privy to scientific, ontological realities. The 
irony here, of course, is that Boccioni clearly came to his understanding of the world 
as fluid and continuous through a decidedly analytic process of reading and study, 
seemingly of scientific theory and certainly of Bergson’s writings. But those same 
writings also champion the role of intuition in reaching such an understanding of the 
world: in Matière et mémoire, Bergson argues that the question again comes down to 
a conflict of visual modes. We habitually see objects as clearly defined from each 
other for the same reason that we do not see intuitively, as artists do: because such a 
mode of seeing would be incompatible with our practical need to go about our 
business. He writes: 
 
Comment morcelons-nous la continuité primitivement aperçue de l’étendue 
matérielle en autant de corps, dont chacun aurait sa substance et son 
individualité? […] Ce n’est pas là une donnée de l’intuition immédiate; mais 
ce n’est pas davantage une exigence de la science, car la science, au contraire, 
se propose de retrouver les articulations naturelles d’un univers que nous 
avons découpé artificiellement. […] À côté de la conscience et de la science, il 
y a la vie. Au-dessous des principes de la spéculation, si soigneusement 
analysés par les philosophes, il y a ces tendances dont on a négligé l’étude et 
qui s’expliquent simplement par la nécessité où nous sommes de vivre, c’est-
à-dire, en réalité, d’agir.84 
  
We might conclude, then, that an understanding of the world as fluid and 
continuous is a natural product of a uniquely artistic tendency towards perceptive 
expansion – an ability to see the world for what it is rather than in relation to practical 
and material need. But another reason also presents itself. The notion of an ethereal 
                                                                  
in Balbec, for example, is ‘substantiellement marinisée par la présence [des] parois luisantes et comme 
ruisselantes d’eau’ (Genette, p. 51). Elsewhere, pretty young peasant girls appear to the narrator to be 
organically fused to their surroundings (‘la terre et les êtres, je ne les séparais pas’ (I, 155)).  
84 Matière et mémoire, p. 333. 
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substance that pervades space and permeates matter implies a physical, if ordinarily 
imperceptible link between objects and spaces that appear to have nothing to do with 
each other. According to this understanding, then, the Futurist artist must exist on 
the same fluid continuum as all the other objects of the world. What is to say, then, 
that inherent truths cannot be communicated via this ether, a medium of 
transmission to which the Futurist perceptive faculty is, perhaps, particularly 
sensitive? Could the ether be the means of connection that Boccioni seeks ‘between 
the exterior (concrete) scene and the interior (abstract) emotion’? It is possible, 
against this cultural backdrop, that an aesthetic interest in sensory experience might 
also equate to an interest in the ether – for example, in a manner that recalls Russolo’s 
depiction of an ethereal cloud of perfume, Emile Durkheim claimed in 1912 that 
sensations of smell, taste, and sight ‘express the properties of particular materials or 
movements of the ether that […] have their origin in the bodies we perceive as being 
fragrant, tasty, or colorful’.85 Likewise, the ether as a means of communication would 
provide a concrete medium for Severini’s otherwise rather woolly conception of the 
‘qualitative radiations’ that emanate from objects. An ‘ethereally sensitive’ 
individual might enter by default into a dynamic of intuitive sensitivity with objects 
in the world, given that they all inhabit the same ethereal ‘soup’. 
 
iv. Boccioni’s denigration of photography 
The ultimate conclusion to be drawn from these arguments is that a privileged 
epistemological connection to reality is central to the Futurists’ – and particularly 
Boccioni’s – understanding of what it means to be an artist. Seeing on its own may 
not equal knowing, but perception, in its varied forms, affords the artist a fluid, 
intuitive connection to ontological truths. The Futurists’ declared aim to ‘put the 
spectator in the centre of the picture’ implies, firstly, that the relationship between 
their paintings and those who view them is underpinned by a state of continuity 
consistent with their ontological understanding, and secondly, that the painting itself 
functions as a sort of portal by which the viewer can access the truths it depicts.86 In 
the light of these ambitious aims, it is perhaps no surprise that Boccioni dismissed 
‘surface’ photography as limited and inadequate, as we saw at the beginning of this 
section. The photograph is demarcated by a ‘square frame’, as Boccioni points out 
                                                                  
85 Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life [1912], trans. by Karen E. Fields (New York: The 
Free Press, 1995), p. 229. 
86 ‘Technical Manifesto, p. 28. 
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scornfully, and is separated from the viewer by the same barrier that the Futurists 
sought to overcome in their painting. In its indexical quality, it posits as ‘truth’ a 
version of the world that Boccioni ‘knows’ to be illusion. The limited ‘eye’ of the 
camera itself does not have peripheral or X-ray vision, and certainly does not hear, 
smell, feel, or remember, while the chronophotographic and cinematographic 
cameras subdivide movement analytically, in a manner opposed to the indivisible 
flux of durée. As Boccioni writes, ‘any accusations that we are merely being 
“cinematographic” make us laugh – they are just vulgar idiocies.’87 
Yet this declaration sits uncomfortably with a marked tendency in Futurist 
practice to channel the aesthetics of chronophotography. Balla’s Dynamism of a Dog 
on a Leash (fig. 5), Movement of a Violinist and Girl Running on a Balcony (all of 1912), 
are particularly apt examples, while the female figure in Russolo’s Plastic Synthesis of 
Movements of a Woman (1912), the horse’s feet in Carrà’s The Red Horseman (1913) and 
the dancing woman in Severini’s Blue Dancer (1912) also owe a visible debt to Marey.  
Moreover, the Futurists had a photographer in their midst, Anton Giulio 
Bragaglia, who developed a practice of movement photography that he called 
                                                                  
87 ‘Plastic Foundations’, p. 89. 
Fig. 5: Giacamo Balla, Dynamism of a Dog on a Leash, 1912  
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photodynamism – similar to chronophotography, except that the movement 
appeared as a continuous blur rather than a series of individual positions (see fig. 6). 
For this reason Bragaglia claimed his practice was superior to Marey’s, providing a 
more detailed study of movement:  
 
Chronophotography could be compared with a clock on the face of which 
only the quarter-hours are marked, cinematography to one on which the 
minutes too are indicated, and Photodynamism to a third on which are 
marked not only the seconds, but also the intermovemental fractions existing 
in the passages between seconds. This becomes an almost infinitesimal 
calculation of movement.88 
 
Boccioni’s relationship with Bragaglia was contentious, and it is easy to see why. 
Bragaglia does not reject chronophotography because it is analytic rather than 
intuitive, but rather because it is not true analysis, unlike photodynamism, which 
‘analyses movement in its details’. This alone would surely have been enough to 
elicit Boccioni’s scorn, but Bragaglia goes further, suggesting that photodynamism 
should function as a sort of prop or aid to the painter:  
 
In the composition of a painting the optical effects observed by the artist are 
not enough. A precise analytical knowledge of the essential properties of the 
effect, and of its causes, are essential. The artist may know how to synthesize 
such analyses, but within such a synthesis the skeleton, the precise and 
almost invisible analytical elements, must exist. These can only be rendered 
visible by the scientific aspects of Photodynamism.89 
 
It is clear that the proud and volatile Boccioni would have been affronted by the 
suggestion that he might have need of photography to assist him in realising his 
artistic aims. The indignity would have been compounded by Bragaglia’s 
(mis)understanding of analysis, which goes directly against Bergson’s definition of 
it: analytic decomposition, in Bragaglia’s view, is a building block on the way to true 
understanding. Such was Boccioni’s distaste that he attempted to oust Bragaglia from 
the movement, and in 1913, refused outright to exhibit alongside him. He makes his 
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89 Ibid., p. 41. 
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disdain clear in a letter to Giuseppe Sprovieri, owner of the Futurist gallery in Rome: 
 
[Photodynamism] is a presumptuous uselessness that damages our aspiration 
to liberate art from the schematic or successive reproduction of stasis and motion. 
[…] To me [Bragaglia’s] little book [Futurist Photodynamism] seemed simply 
monstrous, and to our friends also. The pompousness and the infatuation with 
the nonexistent was grotesque.90 
 
His dismissal, of course, comes in large part from the fact that he sees photography 
as limited and inadequate. But there is also something of the paranoid in his attitude 
to Bragaglia; he is both so aggressive in his disparagement and elsewhere so self-
aggrandising in his assessment of Futurist painting as to suggest he recognises 
photography as a threat, fearing its potential to undermine his own art, as Proust’s 
narrator suggests it has undermined Elstir’s. Yet Boccioni himself had a certain 
degree of dependence on photographic means. Hints of chronophotographic 
repetition can be detected here and there in his work – in the ghost-like faces in Those 
Who Go (1911), for example, or the muscular forms in Dynamism of a Soccer Player 
(1913). For Marta Braun, ‘Boccioni’s desire to be free of “schematic or successive 
reproduction” is a telling indication that he felt encumbered and frustrated by it at 
                                                                  
90 Via Braun, p. 310. 
Fig. 6: Anton Giulio Bragaglia, Waving, 1911 
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the time.’91 He had been criticised, she remarks, for paintings that bore too close a 
resemblance to photography, and his response ‘was to immediately illegitimate any 
assistance photography gave to the solution of purely pictorial problems, to deny 
any influence it might have, and to insist on the originality of the painters’ 
investigations’. Bragaglia posed a threat because: 
 
[He] worked outside the system of those arts that Futurism – in spite of 
declaring itself partisan to all things modern – had revalidated: the old 
hierarchy of painting, sculpture, and architecture. If photography or any 
reproductive mechanical technique could produce dynamic sensation, then 
there would be serious consequences for the traditional arts.92 
 
To this I would add that Bragaglia’s medium posed an existential threat to Boccioni’s 
fundamental definition of an artist. We saw in the introduction to this chapter that 
photography played a key role in undermining the epistemological capacity of 
human vision. The risk of allowing photography into the Futurist fold, then, was not 
only that it might devalue painting as a medium, but that it might undermine the 
painter’s own privileged perceptual relationship to the world around him, 
challenging the supposed epistemological superiority of the Futurist perceptive 
faculty. With this in mind, we might be tempted to reconsider Boccioni’s use of the 
X-ray metaphor, which stops short of praising the X-ray itself but claims capabilities 
analogous to it. Perhaps it is not, in fact, an example of Boccioni’s engagement with 
modern science, but simply part of his attempt to defend the supremacy of the artistic 
sensorium in the face of rival visual trends. Boccioni seeks to preserve his version of 
what Henderson calls the ‘romantic notion’ of the privileged artistic sensibility. 
Ultimately, however, this notion is threatened not, as she suggests, by the existence 
of imperceptible phenomena, but by a competing, mechanical ‘eye’ that upstages the 






                                                                  




III. Cubism: Analysis and (Un)knowing 
 
Futurism and Cubism, though not dissimilar on an aesthetic level, are 
philosophically at odds. Cubism for Boccioni often provided an example of how not 
to do art, a convenient benchmark against which he could define his own project. 
Cubism, in his view, was too static and too calculated; moreover, it made no attempt 
to reach a higher unity between the painter and the world. ‘Any attempt to lay down 
the law in a situation where there is a gap between external and internal realities is a 
highly dangerous practice,’ he wrote in 1913, ‘as the cold image-making of some of 
the Cubists proves.’93 _Of course, it is highly plausible that Boccioni had a vested 
interest in discrediting Cubism, as he did photography, given the Cubists’ 
prominence on the modern art scene and recognition as innovators.94 Yet their 
conflict can also be explained to some degree by the fact that the two movements 
occupy opposing epistemological and perceptual strands. Where Futurism aspires to 
unity, holism, and intuition, Cubism sits primarily in the domain of fragmentation, 
dispersal, and analysis. 
 
i. Flux: photography, the X-ray, passage 
Before turning to a discussion of Cubist fragmentation, however, I want to consider 
the sense in which Cubism, too, can be considered a pursuit of ‘wholeness’. Indeed, 
it would be an oversight to consider the movement solely in terms of its processes of 
rupture and its breaking up of objects into disjointed facets, when equally important 
in the Cubist method is the blending and blurring of those facets – a technique 
reminiscent of and usually attributed to the influence of Cézannean passage. But 
Linda Dalrymple Henderson and Paul Hayes Tucker have suggested that this 
technique may have owed much to photographic technologies, as well as to Cézanne 
– respectively, to the X-ray and to still photography. Henderson observes that the 
Cubists did not explicitly mention X-ray technology in their writings, as Boccioni did 
(although she remarks that Gleizes and Metzinger discuss the related but more 
obscure phenomenon of ‘Fraunhofer lines’ in Du ‘Cubisme’ – perhaps, she suggests, 
                                                                  
93 ‘Plastic Foundations’, p. 90. 
94 To my knowledge, the only occasion on which he declares himself in agreement with a Cubist is in 
his article of 1913, ‘Futurist Dynamism and French Painting’ (in Futurist Manifestos, pp. 107-110), when 
he references an essay by Fernand Léger of the same year (‘Les Origines de la peinture et sa valeur 
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Futurists have already expressed themselves. 
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an attempt at scientific one-upmanship of their Futurist rivals) – but that it would 
nevertheless have been natural for them to have taken an interest in such a visually 
groundbreaking and culturally popular phenomenon. At the very least, it would 
have been impossible for them to be unaware of X-ray’s reception and impact, given 
that Röntgen’s publication of his discovery in late 1895 had ‘triggered the most 
immediate and widespread reaction to any scientific discovery before the explosion 
of the first atomic bomb in 1945’,95 and that it figured as a point of popular obsession 
in the years that followed, generating huge numbers of articles as well as songs, 
cartoons, poems, and public displays. Picasso himself was a keen amateur 
photographer, and X-rays at this time were frequently described as ‘photography of 
the invisible’. A query in one of his sketchbooks of 1917 – ‘a t’on [sic] mis un prisme 
devant la lumière des rayons x [?]’ – demonstrates at least a passing aesthetic 
engagement with the phenomenon.96  
 As Henderson acknowledges, it is impossible to draw definitive conclusions 
about possible cultural sources for Picasso’s aesthetic developments, since unlike 
many of his contemporaries he did not write manifestos or otherwise theorise in 
writing. Nevertheless, the cultural prominence of the X-ray, as well as discoveries 
contemporaneous with it, such as radioactivity and electromagnetism, offer a 
possible answer to the question that she believes has not been satisfactorily answered 
by scholarship on Cubism: ‘why would Picasso and Braque so stubbornly deny the 
solidity and boundaries of forms, causing their sitters to dissolve into the 
surrounding space?’97 She considers Picasso’s 1910 portrait of his dealer, Daniel-
Henry Kahnweiler, to exemplify this tendency: in a manner comparable to Boccioni’s 
portrait of his mother in Matter, the body of the sitter and the space in which it sits 
are indistinct. The painting is dominated by the same ‘transparency and fluidity’ as 
in X-ray photography – ‘a shift the sitter himself described as “pierc[ing] the closed 
form” or “skin”’.98 For Henderson, this is an example from a series of paintings from 
1910-1912 that ‘give physical form to Bergson’s philosophy of continuity and to the 
popular notion of universal radioactivity propounded by Le Bon, in particular’.99 
 Henderson discusses Picasso and Boccioni in tandem, and when their work 
is considered in the light of X-ray technology and contemporary science, there may 
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96 Henderson, ‘Editor’s Introduction’, p. 334.  
97 Ibid., p. 447. 
98 Ibid., p. 448. 
99 Henderson, ‘X Rays’, p. 335. 
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indeed be much to compare. But there the similarities end. In an earlier argument, 
Paul Hayes Tucker – backed up by more anecdotal evidence than Henderson – 
suggests that Picasso’s passage may have been influenced by the same medium that 
Boccioni disparaged: still photography. In an article of 1982, Tucker recounts that in 
1909 Picasso spent a productive few months in Horta de San Juan in Catalonia, 
during which time, according to John Golding, ‘the [Cubist] style at last crystallized 
in a succession of masterly analytical canvases’.100 Picasso had a camera with him 
during this time and took numerous photos of the landscape as well as painting it. 
The two surviving photographs of Horta show a view of the town seen from an 
elevated perspective, a view Picasso also painted in nascent Cubist style. Certain 
elements of the photographs blur into each other: Tucker pinpoints houses whose 
walls are not clearly delineated, bleached by exposure to the point of blending into 
the surrounding space. The result is visual indeterminacy, an inability to detect the 
boundaries that should set those elements out as separate. Tucker attributes this 
effect to the photographic technique (or error) of halation, or blurring – an ‘older 
counterpart’ of Cézannean passage.101 A photography manual of 1906 describes one 
effect of halation as follows:  
 
Whenever a brightly illuminated surface is crossed by dark lines, like those 
of branches of trees against the sky, the silver deposits representing the image 
of the bright surface spread into the dark spaces and if the lines are thin they 
may be obliterated entirely.102  
 
An earlier manual, of 1871, warned that such effects might cause ‘roofs of houses […] 
instead of being bordered by a well-defined line, [to] shade off as it were into the 
sky’.103 This is significant for several reasons. For one thing, the obliteration of 
demarcating lines and the resultant blending together of elements otherwise thought 
to be separate does not only recall Cézannean passage: it is also a perfect description 
of the technique Proust’s narrator so admires when he inspects Elstir’s seascapes at 
Balbec. Picasso’s blending of planes tends not to be associated with pre-Cézannean 
painters because it is only one part of the Cubist aesthetic, which is otherwise defined 
                                                                  
100 Via Tucker, ‘Picasso, Photography, and the Development of Cubism’, The Art Bulletin, 64 (June 1982), 
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101 Tucker, p. 293. 
102 Louis Derr, Photography for Students of Physics and Chemistry [1906], via Tucker, p. 293. 
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by its breaking up of perspective – a more radical technique that had no precedent 
before Cézanne. Nevertheless, in so far as the principle of blending and blurring can 
be isolated from its aesthetic context, it can be traced back through Monet and 
Whistler to Turner’s late manner, and to Ruskin’s notion of visual ‘innocence’, which, 
as we have seen, informed the character of Elstir and the style of painting his work 
represents. (Of course, we have also seen processes of blurring and blending at work 
in Boccioni’s paintings, but Picasso’s aversion to theoretical declarations or 
allegiances stalls any attempt we might make to definitively relate this to an 
ontology, which enables us, in turn, to align him more closely with Elstir.) The case 
for the ‘proto-Cubism’ of this type of vision and its aesthetic rendering is 
strengthened by the fact that it is essentially photographic in its detachment and de-
instrumentalisation, as I argue in Section I, and therefore by the possibility that the 
influence of an actual set of photographs led to the development of a comparable 
technique in Cubism.  
 
ii. Rupture: photography, perspective, relativism 
Picasso’s apparent interest in halation accords aesthetic value to what is technically 
an error – a move in the spirit of Peter Henry Emerson that allies him more closely 
to Elstir’s depiction of ‘ces illusions optiques dont notre vision première est faite’, 
rather than his depiction of ‘la nature telle qu’elle est’. It is here, I think, that we reach 
the limits of the Cubist pursuit of ‘wholeness’, unity, or continuity. No analysis of 
Cubism can ignore the principles of rupture and fragmentation that its breaking up 
of perspective entails, and the notion of ‘error’ and the possibility for ‘correctness’ 
come to the fore here. In deviating from linear perspective, the Cubists reject its 
hegemonic definition of the ‘correct’ way to view a scene. For that reason, it is 
significant that Elstir’s paintings can be described as ‘proto-Cubist’ not only for their 
elimination of the demarcations between elements, but also in their use of 
perspectival rupture. As I mentioned briefly above, the narrator describes a number 
of instances in which the painter’s chosen perspective fragments and distorts what is 
portrayed: in the Port de Carquethuit, for example, ‘la mer elle-même ne montait pas 
régulièrement, mais suivait les accidents de la grève, que la perspective déchiquetait 
encore davantage’; he notices ‘les coques […] que la perspective faisait s’enjamber les 
unes sur les autres’ (II, 193). The fact that perspective that is responsible for these 
distortions sets Elstir on a path towards Cubism. Rather than positioning himself in 
such a manner that the most rational, Euclidean vision of a scene presents itself to 
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the eye, Elstir – like the camera that emulates his style – chooses points of view from 
which the landscape appears irrationally distorted. Indeed, the very coexistence of 
flux and fragmentation (precognitive vision, as we have seen, seems to produce both 
elements in equal measure) anticipates Cubism’s combination of Cézannean passage 
with the perspectival rupture for which it is renowned. 
This cannot yet be called Cubism, since neither Elstir nor the camera combine 
multiple perspectives on a singular plane. Yet in casting perspective as a distorting 
force, they both reject the hegemonic rationality of linear perspective and its 
implication of ‘correctness’. Once again, Picasso’s interest in photography 
strengthens the argument for Elstir’s aesthetic link with Cubism. The photographs of 
Horta do not respect the rules of Renaissance perspective: Tucker notes that in the 
first of the two photographs, the lines of certain roofs ‘[deviate] from the Renaissance 
norm’ by appearing to diverge away from the viewer, rather than converge. He also 
notes that the distinction between the foreground, middle ground, and background 
is blurred, which he attributes in part to the fact that the town is situated on a plateau, 
but also to another photographic error.104 The same contemporary photography 
manual offers a damning explanation for such effects: 
 
If the different planes of distance are not well made out in a photograph, that 
is, if they do not appear to occupy the same relative position in the 
photograph which belongs to them in nature, the fault may arise from the use 
of a lens too short or too long. [...] When this compression of space occurs, it 
will yield prints that no one cares to look at a second time, prints in which the 
foreground lies flat upon the middle distance, and both on the extreme 
distance which, instead of striking the eye at once with a unity of effect, have 
to be looked at attentively before the relations of the different parts explain 
themselves – in a word, prints which are a reproach to photography.105 
 
We have already established that Picasso would have been likely to take an aesthetic 
interest in precisely these sorts of visual ‘errors’. So too did Proust, as we have also 
seen: the ‘admirable’ photographs that the narrator compares to Elstir’s work might 
show a cathedral as being close to a river, ‘d’où elle est en réalité distante’. And as we 
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have seen, Elstir himself, in painting ‘[d]es illusions optiques’, also elevates visual 
error to an aesthetic principle.  
The implication, then, is that Elstir and photography deviate from what is 
‘correct’, whether deliberately or not, but with valuable aesthetic effects in either 
case. Yet later, the narrator will discuss photography in a manner that seems to 
question this very notion of ‘correctness’. When he goes to kiss Albertine on the 
cheek, he finds that as he approaches her, her appearance changes in accordance with 
his own movement: 
 
D’abord au fur et à mesure que ma bouche commença à s’approcher des joues 
que mes regards lui avaient proposé d’embrasser, ceux-ci se déplaçant virent 
des joues nouvelles; le cou, aperçu de plus près et comme à la loupe, montra, 
dans ses gros grains, une robustesse qui modifia le caractère de la figure. (II, 
659-660) 
 
The narrator compares this to photography, in a description much like the previous 
one: 
 
Les dernières applications de la photographie – qui couchent aux pieds d’une 
cathédrale toutes les maisons qui nous parurent si souvent, de près, presque 
aussi hautes que les tours, font successivement manœuvrer comme un 
régiment, par files, en ordre dispersé, en masses serrées, les mêmes 
monuments, rapprochent l’une contre l’autre les deux colonnes de la 
Piazzetta tout à l’heure si distantes […] – je ne vois que cela qui puisse, autant 
que le baiser, faire surgir de ce que nous croyions une chose à aspect défini, 
les cent autres choses qu’elle est tout aussi bien, puisque chacune est relative à une 
perspective non moins légitime. (II, 660; my emphasis) 
 
Here, the perspectival variations are not a result of visual error or a deviation from 
an accepted visual norm; all are equally legitimate, demonstrating another aspect of 
the object or scene no less ‘true’ than that we are used to and which we thought to be 
‘definitive’. Photography is no longer simply a usurper of a painterly aesthetics; 
instead, it is tied with kissing as the most successful means of demonstrating the 
inherent multiplicity and relativism of the visible world. This offers us a possible 
means of resolving the apparent paradox in Elstir’s dual engagement with ‘la nature 
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telle qu’elle est’ and ‘les illusions optiques’: if relativism is an underlying principle 
of reality, then optical illusions are simply an element in that reality, rather than a 
misinterpretation of it. 
The experience of kissing Albertine is Elstirean in as much as the narrator sees 
her without knowing her; but it is also un-Elstirean, because this state of visual 
ignorance is not a valuable aesthetic principle but a problem to be overcome, and one 
that the kiss is intended to rectify; the narrator wants to obtain ‘connaissance par les 
lèvres’ (II, 659).106 We might reasonably expect that the actual moment of the kiss, 
when the narrator finally makes contact with the object of his perception, will work 
as a sort of climactic moment of truth, in which all the visions of Albertine through 
which he has passed are synthesised into a unified whole. But in Mieke Bal’s words, 
‘le baiser lui-même […] se présente plutôt comme une série d’agrandissements en 
cascade, qui […] finit par dissoudre l’image dans l’invisibilité.’107 By the time he 
physically touches Albertine, his eyes are too close to see her and his nose is too 
squashed to smell her; bizarrely, it is only from this sudden sensory blackout that he 
knows he is kissing her at all. The Albertine at the centre of these accumulated 
perceptions is negated and becomes a void; she exists only as the ‘dix Albertines’ (II, 
660) that he perceived as he moved towards her cheek. Her reality, for him, can only 
be as an accumulation of perspectives. The parallels with Bergsonian analysis here 
are clear; indeed, Bergson’s description of analysis and its failings maps onto the 
scene perfectly: ‘dans son désir éternellement inassouvi d’embrasser l’objet autour 
duquel elle est condamnée à tourner, l’analyse multiplie sans fin les points de vue 
pour compléter la représentation toujours incomplète.’108 It is a strange coincidence 
that Bergson defines analysis as a failure to ‘embrasser l’objet’, using the word 
embrasser in its sense of ‘to comprehend’ or ‘to encompass’, when embrasser in its more 
common sense – ‘to kiss’ – is precisely what the narrator does do to Albertine. And 
                                                                  
106 Perhaps the crucial difference here is that unlike Elstir, who suppresses knowledge he already has, 
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of Life and Art (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013 [second edition]), p. 28.) Chapter 4 will deal in 
more depth with the narrator’s epistemological relation to Albertine as an object of desire. 
107 Bal, Images littéraires, ou comment lire Proust visuellement (Montreal and Toulouse: XYZ Éditeur and 
Presses universitaires du Mirail, 1997), p. 193. 
108 ‘Métaphysique’, p. 1396. 
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yet, since he is only aware he is doing so because of the sudden sensory blackout it 
induces, he arguably fails at this too. He finds, in any case, that his lips are not privy 
to knowledge of Albertine any more than his eyes: ‘les lèvres […] doivent se 
contenter […] de vaguer à la surface et de se heurter à la clôture de la joue 
impénétrable et désirée.’ (II, 659) The narrator’s use of photography as a means of 
illustrating the kiss calls to mind Bergson’s use of photography as a means of 
describing analysis. The kiss no more provides intuitive knowledge of Albertine than 
the photographs provide intuitive knowledge of the town they portray. Thus, if the 
camera in its functioning relates, as I have already argued, to the artistic perceptive 
expansion Bergson describes, and which serves as a model for intuition, the results it 
produces align it much more closely with analysis. This, of course, fits with 
Boccioni’s view; the crucial difference, however, is that the narrator’s assessment of 
photography implies that its analytic function is one of its merits – since it brings us 
closer to an understanding of the world as plural and relative – rather than evidence 
for its inadequacy. 
 
iii. Conception as ‘unknowing’ 
The parallels between this passage and Cubism are also clear. The narrator’s 
movement in relation to Albertine and his accumulation of perspectives of her recalls 
the Cubist method as it is traditionally – if somewhat reductively – defined, 
according to which the fragmented facets on the canvas have been transcribed from 
a process of movement in relation to the object. That the Cubist method also aligns 
with Bergsonian analysis is implied in John Golding’s description of Picasso’s early 
Cubist canvases as ‘analytical’ and, most obviously of all, by the name attributed to 
the first stage of the movement: Analytic Cubism. Just as Bergson’s definition of 
analysis is a perfect description of the narrator’s attempt to kiss Albertine, so too 
could it be thought of as a critique of Cubism. Furthermore, Bergsonian analysis is 
ultimately an intellectual process, and Cubism is ultimately an intellectual method: 
if the camera, which sees without knowing, plays a role in the development of 
Cubism, it is as a stepping stone to a more cerebral aesthetic that distances the 
movement from Elstir’s precognitive, ‘innocent’ perception. The cerebral aspect of 
Cubism is indicated by Picasso’s famous declaration that ‘I paint things as I think 
them, not as I see them’,109 as well as by other remarks by other painters and critics: 
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in Les Peintres cubistes, Guillaume Apollinaire declares that Cubist paintings are ‘des 
œuvres plus cérébrales que sensuelles’;110 in Du ‘Cubisme’, the painters Albert Gleizes 
and Jean Metzinger write that the nineteenth-century painter Gustave Courbet ‘ne 
soupçonna pas que le monde visible ne devient le monde réel que par l’opération de 
la pensée’;111 in an appendix written later, Metzinger adds: ‘regarder le modèle ne 
suffit plus, il faut que le peintre le pense’.112 
It is the intellectualism of the Cubist approach that renders Cubist perception 
the precise opposite of artistic perception as Bergson defines it. Far from being a last 
resort that impoverishes perception, conception is itself the means of expanding 
perception and of rectifying its inadequacies, as the critic and supporter of Cubism, 
Maurice Raynal, asserted in Gil Blas in 1912: 
 
Nous ne voyons jamais, en effet, un objet dans toutes ses dimensions à la fois. 
C’est donc là une lacune de notre vue qu’il importe de combler. Or la 
conception nous en donne le moyen. La conception nous fait percevoir l’objet 
sous toutes ses formes, et elle nous fait percevoir même des objets que nous 
ne pourrions pas voir.113 
 
Thus, the year after Bergson had asserted in ‘La Perception du changement’ that the 
expansion of perception as practised by visual artists could serve as a model for a 
more effective way of doing philosophy, a proponent of Cubism was suggesting that 
perception, artistic or otherwise, did not go far enough, and that it must be expanded 
by thought and intellectual activity. In this account, what makes artistic perception 
different to ordinary perception is precisely its use of conception to expand and 
deepen it. (Of course, a philosophically- and scientifically- orientated movement like 
Futurism could hardly be free of the influence of the intellectual either, but the 
Cubists are open about their intellectualism in a way that the Futurists are not.) 
But what form did such a conception take? To what conclusions did it lead? 
Henderson has persuasively argued that the Cubists, like many artists of their era, 
sustained an interest in the idea of an invisible fourth dimension that coexisted with 
the three known ones; she reads a inference to this idea in Raynal’s remark about 
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‘objets que nous ne pourrions pas voir’.114 Speculation of this kind, she argues, was 
encouraged by discoveries like the X-ray and radioactivity, which, as we have seen, 
drew attention to the existence of imperceptible realities. As she asserts, ‘the 
existence of invisible realms just beyond the reach of the human eye was no longer a 
matter of mystical or philosophical speculation; it had been established empirically 
by science.’115 Or to adopt Danius’s terminology, the disparity between what could 
be seen and what could be known was now undeniable. Why should there not be 
further dimensions beyond those that could be perceived by the human sensorium? 
If the Cubist method does imply engagement with such theories, then, the conceptual 
aspect of their approach is speculative, questioning – it relates to that which may or 
may not exist, and thus to what cannot be known. 
But on the other hand, Cubist conception also relates to that which is already 
known. As Thomas Vargish and Delo E. Mook write, ‘Picasso and Braque attempted 
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Fig. 7: Juan Gris, Nature morte à la nappe à carreaux, 1915 
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to represent nature, or the object, as it exists in the mind’s eye, in what we know 
about its visual reality.’116 The accumulation of perspectives on an object – what 
Herbert Read has called a ‘memory-image’117 – are seemingly a realisation of 
Boccioni’s declaration that ‘the picture must be the synthesis of what one remembers 
and what one sees’. But Cubist paintings do not consist solely of remembered aspects 
of the object; often, they include associative elements, signs, and symbols that 
indirectly reference notions and concepts outside of the image. In Picasso’s The 
Aficionado, which portrays a bullfighting fanatic, a decidedly phallic form in the 
bottom right-hand corner can be read as a reference to the overt masculinity of 
bullfighting culture, while the fragments of a guitar (a frequent motif in Picasso’s 
work) imply Spanishness. Comparable motifs are at play in Nature morte à la nappe à 
carreaux (fig. 7) of 1915, by Juan Gris, another Spaniard in Paris. The outline of a 
guitar once again lends the scene an element of the Hispanic, while the accumulation 
of cups and wineglasses in the centre of the canvas form an abstracted bull’s head, a 
teacup standing in for its eye. A wine bottle is adorned with the word ‘eau’ – 
presumably a fragment of the word ‘château’ or ‘Beaujolais’, but also calling to mind 
the word ‘taureau’, as well as providing a wry comment on the importance of red 
wine in French culture. A glass of wine reinforces these undertones of ‘Frenchness’, 
while another bottle has a label in English. The newspaper on the table completes the 
group of signs that bring the wider concerns of national and world culture into the 
enclosed domain of the interior. There is a linguistic quality to paintings like these; 
Christopher Green describes them as ‘systems of signs to be read’.118 
This is certainly not Elstirean seeing without knowing, but neither is it the 
rational, collective knowledge that underpins realism – that which the naval officer 
expected to find in Turner’s painting – which re-presents the seen world as it is 
already known and understood, and which is required to attend to the object in its 
detail, so that it appears to function in the painting as it would in reality. And, as 
should by now be clear, this is not the absolute knowledge of Bergsonian intuition, 
either. Crucially, these fragments of knowledge do not form a whole; they exist only 
as hints, as inferences, and as unanswered questions. The interest lies not in any sense 
of completion, but in the breaking apart. Like the narrator’s successive visions of 
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Albertine, they exist only as pieces that cannot be put together or completed. For 
Boccioni, Cubism fails because it is analytic: the Cubist method, 
 
with its splitting of the object and the projection of the object’s parts […] is 
[…] only the translation onto the canvas’s flat surface of those planes of the 
object, which, because of the object’s accidental, perspectival position, we’re 
unable to see. It’s a rational procedure that relies on a relative situation and 
not on an act of absolute intuition.119 
 
Yet in stark contrast to Boccioni’s search for an intuitive absolute, Gleizes and 
Metzinger imply in Du ‘Cubisme’ that one of Cubism’s epistemological subtexts is the 
impossibility of attaining true or absolute knowledge of an object. They are dismissive 
of critics who suggest that Cubism has replaced a ‘false’ – ie. perspectival – model of 
reality of the object with a ‘correct’ one; the presentation of an object can be neither 
correct nor false because the object exists only as relative perspectives, rather than as 
an essential or absolute form. We can only know an object as an image in our own 
minds:  
 
Raisonnablement nous ne pouvons avoir de certitude qu’à l’égard de l’image 
[que les objets] produisent dans notre esprit. Aussi nous étonne-t-il que des 
critiques bien intentionnés expliquent la différence remarquable entre les 
formes attribuées à la nature et celles de la peinture actuelle, par la volonté 
de représenter les choses non telle qu’elles paraissent mais telles qu’elles sont. 
Comment sont-elles? D’après eux l’objet posséderait une forme absolue, 
essentielle, et ce serait pour la délivrer que nous supprimerions le clair-obscur 
et la perspective traditionnels. Quelle simplicité! Un objet n’a pas de forme 
absolue. Il en a autant qu’il y a de plans dans la domaine de la signification.120 
 
To a charge of turning uselessly about the object with no hope of reconstructing it, 
Gleizes and Metzinger might respond that they are not attempting to reconstruct it 
at all – that turning about the object is not a mistaken means to an end but an end in 
itself. Far from being an oversight, as Boccioni concludes, it is precisely the point. If 
the Cubists were inspired by the X-ray, then, it seems likely that their interest 
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stemmed not from its potential as a metaphor for a superior, penetrative form of 
artistic perception, but from the fact that it provided visible evidence for the 
inadequacy and relativity of human perception in general. The artist in this scenario 
is situated on the same epistemological trajectory as Elstir. The Cubist perceptive 
faculty may be supplemented by an intellectual dimension, yet this dimension seems 
both to affirm and surpass the premise of the epistemic crisis: perception is an 




IV. The Narrator-as-Artist: Martinville 
 
The famous clochers de Martinville episode in Du Côté de chez Swann provides us with 
a way of bringing together the various lines of inquiry that have made up my 
argument so far. In what remains of this chapter, I aim to demonstrate that the 
episode encompasses and yet also surpasses Bergson’s division between analysis and 
intuition, and that it contains elements of all the visual trends that we have 
considered. Four photographic modes are in play (chronophotographic, X-ray, still, 
and stereoscopic), and it recalls Cubism, Futurism, and precognitive vision by turns, 
synthesising a number of painterly perspectives into an end result that stands 
entirely on its own.  
In this episode, the young narrator is riding home to Combray in Dr 
Percepied’s carriage, when he sees three bell towers – two belonging to the church at 
Martinville, the other, much further away, to the church at Vieuxvicq – that appear 
to be moving back and forth on the horizon as the carriage speeds down the winding 
country lanes, merging together, changing places, and disappearing and 
reappearing. Believing them to be some distance away, the narrator is astonished 
when the carriage screeches to a halt in front of Martinville church, as if the building 
has thrown itself in their path. The sight of the moving bell towers gives the narrator 
‘un plaisir irraisonné’, a feeling that has in the past been awakened at random by 
other sights, sounds and smells (‘un toit, un reflet de soleil sur une pierre, l’odeur 
d’un chemin’), and by a sense that they contain some essential truth within or behind 
them (I, 176). Yet the nature and identity of these ‘essences’ has always eluded him. 
This time he determines to pin down the truth behind the impression, and with an 
application of attention this truth appears to him, spontaneously, ‘sous le forme de 
 
80 
mots’, and he recounts the episode on paper, then and there in the carriage (I, 179). 
The resulting prose passage, quoted in full in the main narrative, rids him so 
effectively of the towers (‘comme si j’avais été moi-même une poule et si je venais de 
pondre un oeuf’) that he begins to sing with joy (I, 180). 
 
 
i. Analysis or intuition? 
The episode highlights the embodied nature of vision, discussed in the introduction 
to this chapter, since the speeding carriage drastically alters the eye’s relationship to 
its object by acting upon the whole body, of which the eye is a part: vision is 
grounded in the relativism of the corporal, conditional on the body’s present mode 
of being. The experience is cubistic in its relativism (as analyses by Sommella, 
Matoré, and Watt, considered in the thesis introduction, imply), the more so because 
the narrator’s movement around the objects he sees distorts the spatial relations of 
those objects. These similarities with Cubism suggest that the episode can be placed 
comfortably in the domain of analysis. In an intuitive experience, Bergson writes, ‘ce 
que j’éprouverai ne dépendra ni du point de vue que je pourrais adopter sur l’objet, 
puisque je serai dans l’objet lui-même, ni des symboles par lesquels je pourrais le 
traduire, puisque j’aurai renoncé à toute traduction pour posséder l’original’.121 The 
opposite is true of the Martinville episode. The experience is the direct result of the 
point of view the narrator adopts on the object, which causes the towers to ‘elude the 
grasp of [his] perception, offering themselves only through a constant changing of 
aspects elicited by his movements’.122 The ultimate moment of realisation comes not 
because he somehow manages to transport himself ‘dans l’objet lui-même’, but 
because the objects open themselves up and reveal their truth to him (‘leurs lignes et 
leurs surfaces ensoleillées, comme si elles avaient été une sorte d’écorce, se 
déchirèrent, un peu de ce qui m’était caché en elles m’apparût’ (I, 178)). Moreover, 
the experience reaches its resolution only when the narrator can determine the 
‘symbols’ required to ‘translate’ it; it is precisely this act of representation that gives 
it value and meaning. Intellectualism is implied not just in the representation but in 
the experience itself: the application of attention that is required if the narrator is to 
go ‘au bout de [s]on impression’ is described as ‘un effort de la pensée’, and when 
the truth of the towers begins to reveal itself, it is as ‘une pensée qui n’existait pas 
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pour moi l’instant avant, qui se formula en mots dans ma tête’ (I, 178). As Martin Jay 
has it, intuition is, by contrast, ‘a prelinguistic grasp of fluid, creative, vital reality’; 
language for Bergson, ‘rather than being an alternative to visual perception, shares 
with it a weakness for atemporal abstractions’.123 (That Bergson’s ideas were 
themselves conveyed via language is a paradox that Jay highlights and of which 
Bergson himself was aware.)124  
But it is not quite that simple. The word ‘pensée’ in this context is used more 
as a non-specific shorthand for mental activity than in the Bergsonian sense of 
analytic intellection. The ‘thinking’ that the narrator undertakes is not an 
accumulation of analytic conclusions that combine to create something that looks like 
‘truth’, but a means of cultivating the conditions by which such a truth can break out 
of the towers that contain it and erupt into his consciousness of its own accord. 
‘Thinking’ in this context means staying focused in order to deepen the impression, 
without allowing himself to be distracted by the petty, habitual concerns that risk 
driving it from his mind. It is a sort of ‘effortful non-effort’ that recalls the state 
cultivated by Elstir when he paints precognitive vision, or by the narrator when 
trying to pin down the source of an involuntary memory.125 Put like this, it seems 
more appropriate to say that the truth of the towers is revealed by an intuitive effort, 
‘qui se violente’. 
 
ii. Intuition and motion 
The argument for the intuitive quality of the experience is given another dimension 
by the fact that the narrator sees the towers in a decidedly Elstirean manner. Danius 
argues that new technologies of speed such as the train and the car function, in 
Proust, as optical devices that encourage an ‘innocent’, Elstirean, or Ruskinian way 
of seeing.126 For the novice traveller, perception precedes cognition: speed creates a 
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(Orpington and London: George Allen, 1897), III, p. 311). This sets Ruskin apart from Turner, whose 
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disconnect between the prior knowledge that structures her understanding of the 
seen world, and the way it actually appears to her from the vehicle. Rendering the 
subject visually ignorant, technologies of speed enforce the Elstirean principle of 
‘seeing over knowing’. Yet although Danius stresses that the Martinville episode is 
based almost word-for-word on Proust’s earlier text, ‘Journées en automobile’, of 
1907, and that the carriage in the episode can effectively be understood as a car in 
disguise, she does not include it among her examples of occasions on which 
technologies of speed privilege the seen over the known. This is surprising: although 
it takes place well before the narrator’s instructive visit to Elstir’s studio, and 
although the latter is not mentioned, the episode heralds the importance of the 
‘seeing over knowing’ principle, highlighting its centrality by setting it up as the 
impetus for the first piece of prose the narrator has managed to produce since his 
resolution to become a writer. The narrator knows, of course, that the ‘movement’ of 
the towers is an optical illusion caused by his own relative speed, as his retrospective 
account suggests: 
 
Les clochers de Martinville, […] que le mouvement de notre voiture et les 
lacets du chemin avaient l’air de faire changer de place, puis celui de 
Vieuxvicq qui, séparé d’eux par une colline et une vallée, […] semblait 
pourtant tout voisin d’eux. (I, 177-178, my emphasis) 
 
In this version, the towers only appear to move. Yet in the spontaneous piece of 
writing, they simply move, apparently of their own volition: 
 
‘Seuls, s’élevant du niveau de la plaine et comme perdus en rase campagne, 
montaient vers le ciel les deux clochers de Martinville. Bientôt nous en vîmes 
trois: venant se placer en face d’eux par une volte hardie, un clocher retardataire, 
celui de Vieuxvicq, les avait rejoints. […] Puis le clocher de Martinville 
s’écarta, pris ses distances, et les clochers de Martinville restèrent seuls […] 
Nous avions été si longs à nous rapprocher d’eux, que je pensais au temps 
qu’il faudrait encore pour les atteindre quand, tout d’un coup, la voiture 
ayant tourné, elle nous déposa à leurs pieds; et ils s’étaient jetés si rudement au-
devant d’elle, qu’on n’eut que le temps d’arrêter pour ne pas se heurter au 
                                                                  




porche. Nous poursuivîmes notre route; nous avions déjà quitté Martinville 
depuis un peu de temps et le village après nous avoir accompagnés quelques 
secondes avait disparu, que restés seuls à l’horizon à nous regarder fuir, ses 
clochers et celui de Vieuxvicq agitaient encore en signe d’adieu leur cimes 
ensoleillées.’ (I, 179, my emphasis) 
 
In each of the italicised examples, one or more of the bell towers is the active agent 
of the verb, the instigator of its own act of motion. The towers’ autonomy to move 
themselves, and the changeability of their relative positions and of the distances 
between them, are unquestioned. It is, then, the raw data of the narrator’s initial 
visual impression rather than his knowledge of its cause that provides the basis for 
the piece, since for him, travelling along a road at such a speed is an experience 
without precedent. His inevitable ‘perceptual innocence’ provides the conditions for 
what he will describe in the Elstir episode as ‘ces illusions optiques dont notre vision 
première est faite’, precluding a rational and logical understanding of what is seen; 
laws like that which states that the towers are not really moving are not necessarily 
self-evident to the uneducated eye, little used to witnessing the effects of speed on a 
landscape. In Bergsonian terms, it is the narrator’s immediate intuition that tells him 
that the towers are moving; it is only in his retrospective, conceptual appraisal that 
he refutes this possibility. Thus, for the narrator, the experience of travelling at speed 
functions as a form of perceptive expansion – a means of detaching vision from 
practical necessity and prior knowledge, akin to Elstir’s self-induced precognitive 
state.  
It would be short-sighted, then, to write off the Martinville experience as an 
optical illusion and nothing more. I would argue, in fact, that all three of these visual 
modes – seeing from a speeding vehicle, Bergsonian perceptive expansion, and 
Elstirean precognitive vision – function within an alternative sensory epistemology 
in which vision leads to new forms of knowledge as a direct result of its separation 
from preconceived epistemological structures. They respond to a new logic in which 
‘[l]es illusions optiques’ are themselves the means by which reality can be perceived 
‘telle qu’elle est’. But what form might this new knowledge take? We know that the 
towers contain and lay bare some kind of essential truth, but it does not require a 
particularly astute reader to remark that the narrator’s piece of writing, purported to 
have pinned down this mysterious essence, is in fact little more than a second 
description of the phenomenon, not markedly different to the retrospective 
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description that we have just read in the main narrative. No new information is 
presented; no great revelations are forthcoming. This in itself might be understood 
as evidence for the intuitive nature of the experience, given Bergson’s assertion that 
intuitive knowledge is, by its very nature, inarticulable: ‘nous appelons ici intuition 
la sympathie par laquelle on se transporte à l’intérieur d’un objet pour coïncider avec 
ce qu’il a d’unique et par conséquent d’inexprimable.’127 But the passage is in fact 
revelatory at its most basic level of enunciation: namely, in the fact that it recounts 
the sight of the belltowers in motion. The narrator is not just moving in relation to 
what he sees; the objects are themselves in movement, elements in a phenomenon of 
which movement is both the cause and the effect. Danius remarks that the steeples 
on the horizon are metonymic of the churches;128 so, too, I would add, are the 
churches metonymic of the parishes they represent. And so, if we read between the 
lines, it is not only the church but also Martinville itself that comes running towards 
the carriage – not only the steeples that move, but also the villages that contain them. 
The narrator has already hinted at this in his quoted piece of writing, observing that 
‘le village, après nous avoir accompagné quelque secondes avait disparu’ (I, 179; my 
emphasis).  
Seen through a Bergsonian lens, the movement of the towers and of the space 
that contains them takes on metaphysical implications. In ‘Introduction à la 
métaphysique’, Bergson uses movement in space as an analogy for durée.129 In ‘La 
Perception du changement’ – the same essay in which he defines his idea of artistic 
perceptive expansion – he argues that movement is an inherent, basic principle of 
reality. The implication is that if artistic perception is to provide a model for 
philosophical intuition, the fruit of such intuition would be an understanding or 
perception of reality as movement, as flux, as duration. And if the notion of 
perceptive expansion maps neatly onto the Elstirean or Ruskinian idea of visual 
‘innocence’, it follows that the latter idea should also lead the way to an ontological 
understanding that takes movement and duration as its foundational principle.  
Significantly, Bergson’s argument in the essay is elucidated with the 
metaphor of a speeding train: 
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Le mouvement est la réalité même, et ce que nous appelons immobilité est un 
certain état de choses analogue à ce qui se produit quand deux trains 
marchent avec la même vitesse, dans le même sens, sur deux voies parallèles: 
chacun des deux trains est alors immobile pour les voyageurs assis dans 
l’autre.130 
  
When the trains appear not to be moving, Bergson says, the passengers in each could 
conceivably lean out and shake each other by the hand. We must perceive the world 
as static if we are to perform social, everyday actions such as these. But because it is 
a prerequisite for our ability to act in the world, we falsely equate stasis with 
reality.131 If we draw out the metaphorical scenario, we can imagine one of the two 
trains speeding away from the other, leaving the passengers in both to look out onto 
the landscape passing by the window. Without the other train to create the illusion 
of stasis, the passenger is aware of both her own motion and the relative motion of 
the landscape. In the world of the metaphor, this is ‘reality’ – the scenario in which 
movement can be understood as constant and universal. Is this also the essential 
truth revealed by the Martinville episode? The towers, by this reading, serve the 
same function as the speeding train. They are emblematic of a metaphysical premise 
– a material, visible metaphor for the Bergsonian belief in the inherent movement of 
all things, a paradigm for durée, and the symbol of a world in a continual state of flux, 
change and becoming.  
Such a conclusion takes us towards the concerns of the Futurists. In Cubism, 
movement is a means to an end rather than a focus in itself (the artist may move, but 
the object remains in one place, as suggested by the Cubists’ appropriation of those 
most static of genres, the portrait and the still life).  But it holds a central place in the 
Futurists’ artistic philosophy. For Boccioni in particular, as a dedicated Bergsonian, 
movement is an absolute and essential state of being, underpinning reality: he 
declares in his book that ‘rest, being only an appearance or a relative state, doesn’t 
exist. Only motion exists.’132 The parallels with Bergson’s train metaphor are clear, 
and are strengthened by the fact that the Futurists’ belief in the ontological 
                                                                  
130 ‘Perception’, p. 1378. 
131 A situation with the appearance of stasis ‘nous semble être la situation régulière et normale, parce 
que c’est elle qui nous permet d’agir sur les choses et qui permet aussi aux choses d’agir sur nous […] 
L’“immobilité” étant ce dont notre action a besoin, nous l’érigeons en réalité, nous en faisons un absolu.’ 
(‘Perception’, p. 1379.) 
132 Futurist Painting, p. 111. 
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importance of movement and dynamism is inseparable from their aspiration to an 
intuitive art form (the two principles that form the basis of their (or rather Boccioni’s) 
critique of Cubism as static and analytic). In this regard the Martinville episode can 
be understood as an experience in the spirit of Futurism, but it would be more 
accurate to describe it as a linking element between Futurism and the perceptual 
processes that are represented in Proust’s novel by Elstir, opening up the possibility 
for a trajectory between the two. The narrator’s attempt to resolve the problem of the 
towers is an application of intuition, akin to artistic perceptive expansion à la Elstir, 
which leads to a quasi-Futurist understanding of a dynamic world-in-motion, 
revealing both the towers’ durational existence and their place within an ontological 
framework of which movement is a structuring principle. 
 
iii. Art as a form of durée 
But the towers themselves are only one element in the equation. Equally if not more 
important in this episode is the fact that the experience enables the creation of the 
narrator’s first piece of writing. Its importance is underlined by the fact that it is the 
only time in the novel in which the narrator quotes his own work, as more than one 
critic has observed.133 In her discussion of the scene, Danius remarks on its status as 
a thematic thread that prepares the ground for a more significant work of literature 
to emerge. The prose passage is mentioned in Le Côté de Guermantes, when the 
narrator remarks in passing that he has sent a version of it to Le Figaro, and again in 
La Prisonnière, when he laments the fact that it has still not appeared in the paper. 
Then, in Albertine disparue, the article is finally published. As Danius argues: 
 
the thematic thread thus binds together a course of events that begins with 
the Martinville episode, when the narrator produces his first piece of writing, 
and that ends when Le Figaro finally runs the article and he makes his long-
desired debut. Only one thing remains: for the narrator to write a significant 
work of literature.134 
 
At issue in the Martinville episode, then, is not only a search for an external, 
ontological truth, but the production of a work of art and its conditions of possibility. 
                                                                  
133 Danius (p. 133) cites Keith Cohen in Film and Fiction: The Dynamics of Exchange (1979): ‘Marcel’s 
experience of seeing the […] steeples from a moving coach makes an indelible mark on the text, since it 
gives rise to the first piece of writing within the text attributed to Marcel himself.’ 
134 Danius, p. 135. 
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This is another sense in which the episode links to the Bergsonian question of 
duration. Obviously, both the passage itself and the novel it makes possible are 
durational objects, as all writing is: temporal media that unfold over the processes of 
writing and then reading. But what is essential here is the narrator’s decision to quote 
himself. Why does he not simply incorporate the earlier prose piece seamlessly into 
the later account? Why is the experience of viewing the towers described twice? What 
is the difference between the two that makes this doubling worthwhile? One key 
difference between the two accounts has already been noted: the apparent certainty 
of the prose piece contrasts with the implicit dismissal, in the later text, of this 
certainty as illusion. The fact that such a difference is discernable suggests a comment 
by both the narrator-author and the mature text on their origins as, respectively, a 
novice writer and a short, experimental piece of writing – a joint acknowledgement 
of their provenance akin to a person holding a youthful photograph of herself next 
to her older face. Certainly the framing of the earlier piece lends it something of the 
photographic, like a textual photograph of the narrator’s past (the more so because 
it seems in its content to respond to an Elstirean, quasi-photographic mode of seeing). 
Its position next to the later account turns it into an image in a sort of temporal 
stereoscope, lending the ‘surface’ of the novel a sense of temporal dimensionality. By 
embedding within itself the very seed from which it has grown, the novel we are 
reading draws attention to the dual processes of becoming on which it is founded – 
both its own development and the development of a writing-self able to produce it.  
I can think of few Cubist or Futurist paintings that comment on their own 
durational existence in this way.135 Bergson, however, would surely have argued that 
such paintings are nonetheless durational by their very nature, simply because all 
paintings are. In the final chapter of L’Évolution créatrice, of 1907, he illustrates his 
notion of durée with a description of the process of artistic creation: 
 
Le peintre est devant sa toile, les couleurs sont sur la palette, le modèle pose; 
nous voyons tout cela, et nous connaissons aussi la manière du peintre: 
                                                                  
135 A possible exception is Gris’s Portrait of Pablo Picasso (1912). The Cubist master is depicted here as a 
larger-than-life figure, with a corpulent confidence that belies his thirty years, and holds a palette 
containing concentrated versions of the four colours that dominate the painting. With its inscription, 
‘Hommage à Pablo Picasso’, the image clearly acknowledges Gris’s admiration for his fellow Spaniard, 
suggesting that the painted Picasso’s portliness refers to gravitas and influence rather than physical 
size, and implying that the older painter might himself provide a condition for possibility for the 
painting that we see. The painting is of particular significance because it was Gris’s first exhibit at the 
Salon des Indépendents in the spring of 1912 – a nod, then, to both the past and the future development 
of a painterly career. 
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prévoyons-nous ce qui apparaîtra sur la toile? Nous possédons les éléments 
du problème; nous savons, d’une connaissance abstraite, comment il sera 
résolu, car le portrait ressemblera sûrement au modèle et sûrement aussi à 
l’artiste; mais la solution concrète apporte avec elle cette imprévisible rien qui 
est le tout de l’œuvre d’art. Et c’est ce rien qui prend du temps. Néant de 
matière, il se crée lui-même comme forme. La germination et la floraison de 
cette forme s’allongent en une irrétrécissable durée, qui fait corps avec elle.136 
 
Although it does not use the terms themselves, this passage draws a clear distinction 
between processes of analysis and intuition. While an observer might be in 
possession of all the concrete elements of the equation, with knowledge of the 
subject’s appearance, the colours of the paints, and the painter’s usual style, she 
cannot hope to piece these together herself in order to predict what the painting will 
eventually look like. A painting cannot be produced quantitatively – analytically – 
in this way. Rather, it comes from something else: a qualitative, intuitive ‘rien’, which 
unfolds in duration and gives the painting its unique, essential quality. Bergson was 
writing before Cubism, with its analytic method, had taken off; he is clearly referring 
to an older, more classical era of visual art. Yet all paintings are products of a process 
of invention; while the Cubist method might be analytic, and while Boccioni might 
decry it as such, it would be unreasonable to suggest that Cubist paintings are pure 
calculation, and that there is nothing in them of this intuitive, durational ‘rien’ that 
makes a painting unique. 
 
iv. The photographic qualities of the Martinville episode 
Although the Martinville episode both is and concerns itself with writing, not 
painting, some of the same questions are at issue. As Bergson goes on to assert, ‘le 
temps est invention ou il n’est rien du tout’.137 The Martinville episode is not just the 
result of a process of invention, it also represents a process of invention in some detail. 
It encompasses durée on the level of both form and content. Yet, as Bergson goes on 
to state, ‘du temps-invention la physique ne peut pas tenir compte, astreinte qu’elle 
est à la méthode cinématographique’.138 Cinematography or chronophotography is 
emblematic of the kind of scientific, quantitative approach that cannot grasp reality 
                                                                  
136 L’Évolution créatrice, p. 783. 




in its true durational flux. It is curious, then, that the description of the towers’ 
movement in the prose piece gives a distinct impression of the flickering, unsteady 
motion of early cinema, the kinetoscope, or Muybridge’s running horse, while the 
towers are described at first as being ‘comme trois oiseaux posés sur la plaine’ (I, 179) 
– an image that recalls one of Marey and Muybridge’s favourite subjects for their 
studies. For Patrick ffrench, the Martinville episode is an example of what he calls 
Proust’s ‘Muybridge’ or chronophotographic mode, which is in play at numerous 
moments of the text.139 ffrench gives as further examples the sight of the three trees 
at Hudimesnil, which ‘agit[ent] leurs bras désespérés’ as the narrator passes by in 
Mme de Villeparisis’s carriage (II, 79); the journey of the narrator’s lips towards 
Albertine’s cheek, discussed in Section III; and, most significantly, the two episodes 
involving Robert de Saint-Loup that were quoted in the introduction to this thesis. 
ffrench quotes Mieke Bal, who argues that ‘Robert is a Muybridge character’, visions 
of whom ‘yield […] a contact sheet of rapidly taken photos of movement’.140 Proust, 
writes William Carter, ‘sees with the eye of a painter or sculptor who, after having 
studied Etienne-Jules Marey’s chronophotographs […] wants to represent the 
human body in each of its successive positions as it moves through space’.141  
For ffrench, Proust’s chronophotographic mode is a function of 
epistemological enquiry: ‘it is as if the decomposition of movement – what I have 
called Proust’s Muybridge mode, operates whenever there is a secret to know, a 
knowledge to grasp.’142 Like the steeples at Martinville, the trees at Hudimesnil 
contain a secret to be uncovered – the difference is that the narrator will not succeed 
in pinning it down. The narrator’s attempt to kiss Albertine is one of the many 
attempts he will make to ‘know’ her; the knowledge that he desires, and which 
remains forever elusive, relates specifically to Albertine’s sexuality and her 
faithfulness to him. Saint-Loup’s is a secret of the same order: his 
chronophotographic movements are directly related to his own status as a closeted 
homosexual. It is only in the Martinville episode, however, that the 
chronophotographic mode is related directly to the successful acquisition of new 
forms of knowledge, both of the external world and of the narrator himself – when 
seeing, in accordance with Marey’s vision for chronophotography, actually does lead 
                                                                  
139 ‘Proust and the Decomposition of Movement’, unpublished conference paper, given at Eadweard 
Muybridge in Kingston, 1894-1904 (Kingston University, London, November 2016). 
140 Bal, ‘All in the Family: Familiarity and Estrangement According to Marcel Proust’, in A Mieke Bal 
Reader (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2006), p. 78. 
141 Carter, p. 69. 
142 ‘Decomposition of Movement’. 
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to knowing. But to complicate matters, this chronophotographic process is associated 
with the sort of intuitive moment of realisation and invention that Bergson suggests 
should be entirely at odds with it; it is surprising that an intuitive process of artistic 
invention should call on elements of analytic chronophotography in its mode of 
representation.  
 But perhaps it is not so surprising if we consider that a reverse process, based 
on a different photographic model, is also at work. The X-ray is an equally if not more 
prominent figure in the novel; as Áine Larkin has documented, it is mentioned at 
various points, often functioning as a metaphor for the narrator’s sudden discovery 
of an unexpected – and pehaps unpleasant – truth.143 Martinville is not one of those 
occasions; the X-ray is not mentioned outright any more than chrono- or still 
photography. Nevertheless, the X-ray figures as an unspoken metaphor, with the 
narrator suggesting that the prose passage responds to a penetrative form of vision 
– an ability to see beyond and behind the towers to the essential truth they contain. 
‘Un peu de ce qui m’était caché en elles m’apparut’ (I, 178), he remarks, and later: ‘je 
sentais [que cette page] m’avait […] parfaitement débarassé de ces clochers et de ce 
qu’ils cachaient derrière eux.’ (I, 180) Precisely what form this truth takes is less clear, 
although the possibility that it is a Bergsonian, Futurist world-in-motion has been 
discussed earlier in this section. This, then, is the X-ray as it figures in the Futurist 
account: a metaphor for a superior, intuitive mode of perception, and a means of 
accessing essential truths.  
But in this instance, the X-ray is no more tied to intuition than 
chronophotography is tied to analysis. Ontological conclusions can be inferred from 
the passage when it is read in conjunction with Bergson and Futurism, but there is 
nothing in the text that explicitly ties us to such a reading. It is equally possible to 
conclude that the narrator does not satisfactorily define the elusive essences that he 
claims to have pinned down. What is revealed so clearly to the narrator is not 
revealed to the reader, who discovers, in Linda Gordon’s words, ‘that a “well-
wrought style” and metaphor are, like a sieve, incapable of containing anything 
essential about truth or life’.144 The only explicit ‘truth’ that emerges from the episode 
is the narrator’s newfound ability to write. The importance of this development must 
not be underestimated, of course – but we have been promised a truth about the 
                                                                  
143 Larkin, ‘Suspect Surfaces and Depths: Radiographic Images, Perception and Memory’, in Rye and 
Segal, pp. 208-210. 




towers, not a truth about the narrator. For him, Leo Bersani asserts, ‘the condition for 
knowledge is a total suppression of the difference between the self and the world’, 
and he behaves here as if just such a suppression has occurred.145 Yet it does not 
appear that way to the reader. What we are presented with is a text that gestures to 
something outside itself but ultimately only comments on its own act of creation.146 
In this regard it recalls an alternative understanding of the X-ray that sees the latter 
not as a source of wonder, a window into a previously unseen reality, but as a 
medium that highlights the relativity and inadequacy of human perception, and 
which, moreover, falls short of its perceptual and epistemological potential. Among 
the early, excited reactions to the discovery of the X-ray was the hope that it might 
prove capable of revealing the workings of the mind or the soul.147 Such hopes were 
to be disappointed, of course, because the X-ray can only reveal the underlying 
physical structures of the body. From this perspective, it fails to realise its 
epistemological promise.  
A comparable account of disappointment occurs in A l’ombre des jeunes filles 
en fleurs, when the narrator uses the X-ray metaphor to elucidate the failure of our 
attempts to know and understand those we desire: 
 
L’objet de notre inquiète investigation est plus essentiel que ces particularités 
de caractère, pareilles à ces petits losanges d’épiderme dont les combinaisons 
variées font l’originalité fleurie de la chair. Notre radiation intuitive les 
traverse et les images qu’elle nous rapporte ne sont point celles d’un visage 
particulier mais représentent la morne et douloureuse universalité d’un 
squelette. (II, 249; my emphasis) 
 
The narrator’s nod here towards the concept of intuition is a red herring. This is 
hardly the Bergsonian ideal; it is at best a half-hearted attempt at intuition, in which 
both the subject and the X-ray break through the surface of the object of their 
perception but fail to position themselves inside it, and thus to access the place where 
                                                                  
145 Fictions, p. 13. 
146 In this regard it is reminiscent of certain of the paintings that will be considered in Chapter 2.  
147 Henderson has remarked on Thomas Edison’s ‘confident assertion that x rays would ultimately 
unveil the activity of the human brain’; similarly, ‘x rays offered contemporary occultists a scientific 
rationale for phenomena such as clairvoyance as well as telepathy’ (‘X rays’, pp. 325-326). Proust 
gestures to this kind of thinking with Françoise’s naïve understanding of the X-ray: when the narrator’s 
mother guesses that Françoise is less than keen on her son-in-law, the latter replies, laughing: ‘Madame 
sait tout; Madame est pire que les rayons X […] qui voient ce que vous avez dans le cœur.’ (I, 53.) 
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the truth resides.148 In fact, it seems more appropriate to class it as analysis, since all 
it provides is another perspective on the object of our perception and investigation, 
defamiliarising it in the process. Our predicament as readers is not dissimilar to that 
of the lovers the narrator talks of: the prose passage functions as a sort of textual X-
ray that promises essential meaning but in fact reveals only a structuring principle; 
if it encapsulates the essence of the towers, this essence is not accessible to us through 
the act of reading. Although the passage does not defamiliarise the towers in the way 
the narrator’s ‘radiation intuitive’ defamiliarises the loved woman, it effects a 
comparable epistemological impasse. The emergence of a writing self is a euphoric, 
climactic moment for a narrator plagued with doubt about his artistic abilities, but it 
is no great revelation for the reader, for whom these doubts are negated by the 
graceful prose in which they are expressed and by the many artistic observations and 
philosophical musings that appear alongside them. Like an X-ray photograph of a 
skeleton whose presence beneath the skin was never in doubt, even before it could 
be directly apprehended, the emergent truth of the narrator-as-artist is, for the 
reader, merely a direct expression of what is already known to be the case. 
 
v. Overcoming the analysis-intuition divide 
Both of these photographic models complicate the distinction between analysis and 
intuition in a manner entirely in keeping with the rest of the Martinville episode, 
which, as we have already seen, contains both analytic and intuitive strands, setting 
up relative analysis as a direct means of accessing an intuitive truth about the world 
(according to the first part of this argument) and of setting in motion an intuitive 
artistic process (according to the second). It is precisely the accumulation of 
viewpoints of the towers that, on the one hand, reveals their durational instability 
and, on the other, allows the narrator to access a writing self, to mobilise the intuitive, 
durational ‘rien’ that is the foundation and the essence of any work of art. Yet this 
intuitive experience is filtered back to the reader as an analytic representation that 
fails to fully convey the truth it claims to pin down. 
This is not the only example of a coexistence of analytic and intuitive 
elements. We are reminded of the fragmenting force of perspective in Elstir’s 
paintings, which on one occasion breaks up the fluid continuity of a river. I have 
already suggested that the Cubist method is both analytic and intuitive, and this is 
                                                                  
148 The problematics of thinking of another person as an object of either perception or epistemological 
inquiry will be considered in Chapter 4.  
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corroborated – if perhaps unwittingly – by Metzinger’s oft-quoted assertion, 
published in Paris-Journal in 1911. The Cubists, he writes, ‘se sont permis de tourner 
autour de l’objet pour en donner, sous le contrôle de l’intelligence, une 
représentation concrète faite de plusieurs aspects successifs. Le tableau possédait 
l’espace, voilà qu’il règne aussi dans la durée.’149 What Metzinger describes is clearly 
a process of analysis: the artists move around the object and call on their intelligence 
in order to represent it, while this representation contains elements that appear in 
succession, like a chronophotograph. But Metzinger also appropriates Bergson’s 
notion of durée as an inherent quality of Cubist practice. For Bergson, analysis 
corrupts durée; here, the suggestion is that they coincide. Moreover, if Cubist 
paintings, as has been argued above, are ‘systems of signs to be read’, they are 
inevitably durational not only in their mode of creation but in their mode of 
representation, like texts. This is in contrast to realist or even Impressionist painting, 
which is not intended to represent durational becoming, but rather a momentary 
snapshot.  
In fact, this notion is not as un-Bergsonian as it might seem: Bergson himself 
seems to blur the distinction between analysis and intuition in his commentary on 
aesthetics. In Le Rire, of 1901, he suggests that artists have a privileged relation to 
reality – an argument much in the same vein as that in ‘La Perception du 
changement’, of 1911: 
 
Quel est l’objet d’art? Si la réalité venait frapper directement nos sens et notre 
conscience, si nous pouvions entrer en communication immédiate avec les 
choses et avec nous-mêmes, je crois bien que l’art serait inutile, ou plutôt que 
nous serions tous artistes, car notre âme vibrerait alors continuellement à 
l’unisson de la nature.150 
 
But then comes a passage that does not make it into the later piece: 
 
Nos yeux, aidés de notre mémoire, découperait dans l’espace et fixeraient dans 
le temps des tableaux inimitables. Notre regard saisirait au passage, sculptés 
dans le marbre vivant du corps humain, des fragments de statue aussi beaux 
                                                                  
149 Jean Metzinger, ‘Cubisme et tradition’ [1911], reprinted in Apollinaire, Les Peintres cubistes, pp. 159-
161 (p. 160).   
150 Le Rire, in Œuvres, pp. 383-485 (p. 459). 
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que ceux de la statuaire antique.151 
 
This is curious: a direct perception of reality, it seems, would lead to precisely the 
kind of fixing and isolating of fragments that we associate with the domain of 
analysis. Piecing together these fragments of Bergsonian theory seems to suggest that 
a painting is an inherently durational object at the same time as being an inherently 
analytic one: on the one hand, it fixes and isolates moments from the continuing 
passage of time, while on the other it is inextricably tied to the durational process of 
its own invention. 
What prevents these arguments from contradicting one another is the 
implication that a painting as analytic fragment has been extracted from a whole; it is 
not used to recompose a whole in a misguided attempt to arrive at an intuitive 
understanding. Painters do not make the mistake of philosophers and attempt to go 
‘de la partie au tout’, but instead go du tout à la partie, so to speak. Yet there is no 
suggestion that art itself can in any way channel ‘le tout’; it is always only a piece of 
that intuitive whole. For everyone but the artist, then, works of art must surely be 
analytic fragments – necessarily perspectival representations that can only ever circle 
around about the objects that they depict. And yet as Bergson himself argues, the best 
art enables the viewer to perceive reality in a manner similar to the artist; if the artist 
is successful, ‘nous ne pourrons nous empêcher d’apercevoir dans la réalité ce qu’il 
y a vu lui-même’.152 In short, artists pave the way for a quasi-intuitive mode of 
perception through the analytic medium of their paintings. Thus, when the narrator 
inspects Elstir’s series of seascapes – an accumulation of perspectives of the Balbec 
coast – he reaches a new, quasi-intuitive understanding of both the fluid nature of 
the visible world and the fallible, durational nature of the means by which we 
perceive it. In all these senses, then, art emerges as an arena in which the conflict 
between analysis and intuition can be resolved. 
 
vi. Towards a synthesis 
Resolved – or surpassed? There is another way of thinking the Martinville passage, 
and indeed all the works of art I have considered in this chapter, which takes the 
view that the goal of art is not only to reveal but to create – not so much to understand 
what already exists, but to bring something new into existence. This view looks 
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beyond the determined opposition of analysis and intuition, since the latter does not 
allow for the possibility that a process of analysis, as an accumulation of isolated 
elements, might also function as a process of synthesis, a bringing together that 
produces a new whole, greater than the sum of its parts. This, surely, is what we see 
in Cubism: despite the division of the Cubist chronology into ‘analytic’ and 
‘synthetic’ phases, in reality the analytic paintings bring together as much as they 
break apart. The analytic Cubist painting should perhaps be understood not as a 
means of accessing some form of existing truth, whether successfully or not, but as 
an entirely new ‘truth’ in and of itself: a new way of perceiving, a new way of 
representing, and above all, a new art object. We might also conclude that in the 
context of the Martinville passage, analysis has the ability not so much or not only to 
lead to intuition, but to form a new, synthetic object or truth. Even if the episode 
could be definitively classified as analysis, it would not be reducible to its analytic 
elements: the experience of observing the towers is defined by movement and 
duration, and any attempt to isolate one of the many points of view through which 
the narrator must have passed while looking at them from the carriage must 
inevitably rob it of this essential characteristic. The narrator’s later memory of having 
seen the towers ‘se peindre sur le couchant’ (II, 836) suggests we might think of them 
as some kind of self-creating work of art – a moving representation entirely distinct 
from the actual towers as one might look at them from the ground. By this argument, 
the Martinville belltowers are neither a collection of viewpoints nor a cloak for an 
essential truth, but something else, something apart – an entity unto themselves.  
The narrator’s eventual realisation about the nature of art seems to support 
this. In the lengthy essay on aesthetics that precedes the Guermantes matinée in Le 
Temps retrouvé, he declares that artistic truth lies not in surface descriptions of the 
visible world, but the skilful combination of two differing elements: ‘la vérité ne 
commencera qu’au moment où l’écrivain prendra deux objets différents, posera leur 
rapport […] et les enfermera dans les anneaux nécessaires d’un beau style’ (IV, 468). 
Truth lies not in any one object or scene but in the interstices between the two 
elements to be compared – in the act of comparison itself. As Gilles Deleuze argues: 
 
Étant qualité d’un monde, l’essence ne se confond jamais avec un objet, mais 
au contraire rapproche deux objets tout à fait différents, dont on s’aperçoit 
justement qu’ils ont cette qualité dans le milieu révélateur. En même temps 
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que l’essence s’incarne dans une matière, la qualité ultime qui la constitue 
s’exprime donc comme la qualité commune à deux objets différents.153 
 
Perhaps Gordon misses the point, then, when she accuses metaphor of being ‘like a 
sieve’. The point of metaphor is not to capture meaning, but to create it – to enable 
something to emerge from the space between the two elements. Therein lies the 
ultimate success of Elstir’s paintings: his innovation is to have developed a painterly 
technique ‘analogue à [ce] qu’en poésie, on nomme métaphore’, and it is through this 
technique that he creates the world anew (II, 191). It is a dynamic also embodied in 
involuntary memory, which in Gérard Genette’s words, ‘constitue pour Proust le 
fondement même du recours à la métaphore, en vertu de cette équivalence très 
simple selon quoi la métaphore est à l’art ce que la réminiscence est à la vie, 
rapprochement de deux sensations par le “miracle d’une analogie”’.154 Out of this 
process of rapprochement will emerge whole worlds that had ceased to exist – or 
rather, the narrator suggests in the madeleine scene, these worlds will be created by 
the remembering mind. ‘Chercher?’ he writes; ‘pas seulement: créer. [L’esprit] est en 
face de quelque chose qui n’est pas encore et que seul il peut réaliser, puis faire entrer 
dans sa lumière.’ (I, 45) For Genette, this process is not only ‘metaphorical’ but 
metonymical. After the initial, quasi-metaphorical rapprochement, which he terms ‘le 
détonateur analogique’, comes ‘une sorte de réaction en chaîne qui procède, non plus 
par analogie, mais bien par contiguïté’.155 Thus, from the taste of the madeleine 
emerges the memory of aunt Léonie’s bedroom, then that of her house and garden, 
then of the whole of Combray and its environs. After the initial shock or explosion 
of the ‘metaphor’ comes a process of metonymic, block-by-block construction. 
The creation of the Martinville prose passage is like the metaphor-metonymy 
process writ large. In a manner that recalls the Futurists’ aspirations to unite ‘external 
and internal realities’, it is the fruit of a process of subject-object coalescence, a 
synthesis of the observing subject and observed object into a new equation that 
creates both a writer and a piece of writing. First comes the ‘spark’ that belongs to 
the metaphorical axis (‘j’éprouvai tout à coup ce plaisir spécial qui ne ressemblait à 
                                                                  
153 Proust et les signes (Paris: Quadrige/Presses Universitaires de France, 1964), p. 61. 
154 Figures III, p. 55. 
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aucun autre’ (I, 177)); then comes the process of construction analogous to 
metonymy, in which a text is ‘built’. And as we have seen, the prose passage does 
not stand alone, but is inextricably bound to the writing of the novel itself. If the 
Martinville episode provides the conditions of possibility for the narrator’s great 
work – perhaps the very book we are reading – then this particular act of bringing 
together is one from which not only a short prose passage, but an entire novel will 
emerge.  
 
Perhaps, then, we also miss the point when we search in vain for the elusive ‘truth’ 
that the narrator purports to have pinned down, which seems to slip from our grasp 
but which is in fact hidden in plain sight. What is essential about the passage is not 
what it conveys but what it is; the ‘truth’ of the episode is the passage itself. This 
conclusion can be understood as a corruption of a familiar metaphor: an art object 
should not be judged on its ability to provide a window into reality. Rather, in 
Proustian terms, it is more fittingly described as an edifice, a building:156 as an object 
in its own right, which defines its own truth. 
 
 
                                                                  
156 The narrator talks on several occasions of his intention to construct his novel like a cathedral (‘cet 
écrivain […] devrait préparer son livre minutieusement […] le construire comme une église’ (IV, 609-
610)), which, as Leonard observes, calls to mind Proust’s own shelved idea of titling parts of his book 
in accordance with features of churches: ‘“Porche I, Vitraux de l’abside, etc”’ (from a letter of 1919 to 
the Comte Jean de Gaigneron, via ‘Modernist Visual Dynamics’, p. 335). 
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2. Modes of Engagement: Windows, Vision, Representation 
 
Introduction: Redefining the Window 
 
Having focused in Chapter 1 on the manner in which the artist perceives and 
understands the external world, I turn now to the ways in which the work of art itself 
is perceived and understood by its viewers. I structure my argument around the 
figure of the window, both as metaphor and motif, using it as a means of 
foregrounding the debate that was outlined in the introduction: that is, the complex 
relationship between immersion in and awareness of a work of art.  
The conclusion to Chapter 1 implied that the metaphor of the work of art as 
a ‘window’ is ill-suited to the works under discussion in this thesis, and indeed, it is 
inextricably tied to a particular style of and attitude towards painting that seems to 
set it at odds with the modernist project. Now commonplace enough to have become 
something of a cliché, it has its origins in painting – specifically in Leon Battista 
Alberti’s theory of linear perspective, the treatise On Painting of 1435, in which the 
author famously recounts ‘inscrib[ing] a quadrangle of right angles [on the canvas], 
as large as I wish, which is considered to be an open window through which I see 
what I want to paint’.1 Most windows in Renaissance Italy would not have had glass 
in them, and, when not shuttered, would have provided a direct visual 
‘thoroughfare’ to the space beyond.2 Alberti’s window, then, is tied to an ideal of 
transparency; it presumes an act of directed, unimpeded seeing. The implication is 
that the linear perspective system makes painting ‘window-like’ by rendering a scene 
so lifelike that it appears contiguous with the space occupied by the viewer. Rooted 
as it is in the mimetic and the representational, we could be forgiven for assuming 
that the window metaphor was ‘discredited by modernist abstraction’, in Martin 
Jay’s words, and thus had no currency for the artists under discussion here.3 And yet 
the window was still prominent as a motif in the paintings of both the Cubist and the 
Surrealist movements, as Christopher Green and Susan Harris Smith, respectively, 
                                                                  
1 Leon Battista Alberti, On Painting, trans. by John R. Spencer (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 1956 and 1966), p. 43. 
2 See, for example, Cathrin Senn, Framed Views and Dual Worlds: The Motif of the Window as a Narrative 
Device and Structural Metaphor in Prose Fiction (Berlin, New York, Oxford et al.: Peter Lang, 2000), p. 28: 
‘Only towards the middle of the nineteenth century did glass turn from a “rare, prohibitively expensive 
luxury” into “a reasonably priced, readily available material.”’ 
3 Jay, p. 244. Jay argues that the metaphor was ‘revitalised’ by André Breton in Le Surréalisme et la peinture 
– a usage that will be considered in due course. 
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have noted.4 Of course, a picture of a window must be distinguished from a metaphor 
that casts the picture as a window. But given how deeply this metaphor is embedded 
in Western culture, it follows that the use of the window as a motif might 
acknowledge, comment on, or question the very equivalence between paintings and 
windows that the metaphor takes for granted. What might such a usage tell us about 
the evolution of the metaphor in a modernist context? How might it have been 
reappropriated and redefined? This line of inquiry, as we shall see in the analysis 
that follows, interweaves in productive ways with enduring questions about the 
representative function of art. 
 
i. Manifestations of the window metaphor 
In the catalogue of an exhibition entitled A Window on the World […] Looking Through 
the Window of Art from the Renaissance to Today, held in Switzerland in 2013, Daniela 
Ferrari observes that the window metaphor is not always used in its strictly Albertian 
sense. ‘Alberti’s thinking serves as the incipit for a series of metaphors and variations 
on the theme,’ she writes, ‘that […] involve both the concept of the faithful 
reproduction of reality […] and a more abstract and conceptual elaboration.’5 Ferrari 
is referring to painting, specifically – but the window, in its various forms, also has 
currency in writing. ‘One can write nothing readable,’ declared George Orwell in 
1946, ‘unless one constantly struggles to efface one’s own personality. Good prose is 
like a windowpane.’6 In Orwell’s writing, the enduring ideal of ‘transparency’, in 
which the work gives an unimpeded view on to its subject matter, inevitably takes 
on political undertones; although it is depicted as a function of readability, the nature 
of Orwell’s work implies it might also pertain to the ability – indeed, the 
responsibility – of art to enable ‘vision’ in the sense of understanding. ‘Good prose’ 
is like a window because it provides its reader with a clear view and thus knowledge 
of the world, uninflected by the presence of the author. In his choice of metaphor, 
Orwell implicitly (although not necessarily deliberately) endorses a long history of 
ocularcentrism, according to which seeing is synonymous with understanding, and 
the window, as a source of light, is also a source of truth.  
                                                                  
4 ‘The open window was to become one of the most ubiquitous Cubist devices of the twenties,’ writes 
Green in Cubism and its Enemies: Modern Movements and Reaction in French Art, 1916-1928 ((New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press, 1987), p. 20). Smith’s article ‘The Surrealists’ Windows’ (1984) will 
be considered in some detail later in this chapter. 
5 ‘A Window Opened Onto the World: Frames as Windows… Windows as Frames’ in A Window on the 
World. From Dürer to Mondrian and Beyond: Looking Through the Window of Art from the Renaissance to 
Today, Museo Cantonale d’Arte and Museo d’Arte, Lugano (Milan: Skira, 2012), p. 273. 
6 George Orwell, Why I Write (London: Penguin, 1984), p. 10. 
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Jean-Paul Sartre takes this equation one step further in Qu’est-ce que la 
littérature, published two years after Orwell’s text. ‘Il y a prose,’ he writes, ‘quand 
[…] le mot passe à travers notre regard comme le verre au travers du soleil.’7 Here, 
the political inflections of the metaphor are made explicit. Prose can and should be 
‘travers[ée] comme une vitre’ precisely because its primary purpose is to ‘dévoiler’ – 
to reveal the world, and thus to change it.8 Seeing is not just synonymous with 
understanding, as Orwell implies, but with responsibility: prose renders us incapable 
of ignoring the truths and injustices that it reveals.9 In this regard, it is opposed to 
poetry. Poetic language functions as an object in its own right, not as a means of 
revealing objects in the external world. Words for the poet are ‘un piège pour attraper 
une réalité fuyante’ – a means of reflecting that reality back like a mirror, rather than 
unveiling it, clearly and concretely, like a window.10 When it comes to prose, 
‘puisque les mots sont transparents et que le regard les traverse,’ it would be absurd 
to ‘glisser parmi eux des vitres dépolies’.11 The implication is that just such a ‘vitre 
dépolie’ stands between the words of a poem and its reader. 
While these formulations seem to continue in the tradition that sees the 
window as a ‘faithful reproduction of reality’,  as Ferrari puts it, Henry James had 
used a ‘more abstract and conceptual’ version of the metaphor several decades 
earlier. In his preface to the New York edition of The Portrait of a Lady, he famously 
envisages the art of fiction as a house with many windows, an artist standing at each 
of them: ‘the house of fiction has in short not one window, but a million [...] every 
one of which has been pierced, [...] by the need of the individual vision and by the 
pressure of the individual will.’12 For James, the ‘windows’ offer a view on to a 
subjective reality that appears different to every individual looking at it. In his usage, 
the metaphor sidesteps objective, non-negotiable reality, and is deployed instead to 
illustrate nineteenth-century artistic interests in the nuances of individual perception 
and in the role of subjectivity as a framework for understanding the world.  
How, then, did the original window metaphor and/or its subsequent 
variations serve Proust and the avant-gardists who are the subject of this study? The 
Futurists seem (rather predictably, perhaps) to have rejected any notion that the 
                                                                  
7 Jean-Paul Sartre, Qu’est-ce que la littérature? ([Paris]: Gallimard, 1948), p. 26. 
8 Ibid., pp. 19, 28. 
9 ‘La fonction de l’écrivain est de faire en sorte que nul ne puisse ignorer le monde et que nul ne s’en 
puisse dire innocent’ (ibid., pp. 29-30). 
10 Ibid., p. 20. 
11 Ibid., p. 30. 
12 Henry James, The Portrait of a Lady [Preface] (New York and London: W. W. Norton and Company, 
1995), p. 7. 
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metaphor could still have relevance: Boccioni, quoted in Chapter 1, had declared that 
‘we [Futurists] do not limit the scene to what the square frame of the window renders 
visible’;13 Severini, in his turn, had remarked that ‘a picture will no longer be the 
faithful reproduction of a scene, enclosed in a window frame, but the realisation of a 
complex view of life or of things that live in space’.14 And indeed, there are many 
reasons to suppose that the metaphor had no currency in a modernist context. 
Modernism’s aesthetic developments make for a represented space very much at 
odds with the visually comprehensible world we observe from a window. Moreover, 
the example from Orwell suggests that the window can be read as a paradigm for 
precisely the sort of positivist ideology that was undermined by the ‘epistemic crisis’ 
considered in Chapter 1. The discoveries of the X-ray, radioactivity, and the electron 
had led to the unavoidable conclusion that the human eye was privy to only a 
fraction of reality, which undermined the emphasis Alberti had placed on visible 
space and on representing the seen world. (‘No one would deny that the painter has 
nothing to do with things that are not visible,’ he writes; ‘the painter is concerned 
solely with representing what can be seen.’)15 Contemporaneous with and fueled by 
these discoveries was a current of scientific and mathematical speculation that 
popularised the idea that space might not be accurately explained by Euclid’s 
theorems, and that it might contain more dimensions than the three that meet the 
eye. As Linda Dalrymple Henderson’s extensive investigations have suggested, and 
as I indicated in both the Introduction and Chapter 1, theories of non-Euclidean 
geometry and of the so-called ‘fourth dimension’ seem to have been much talked of 
in the artistic and intellectual circles of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. Henderson’s work has shown that the formal innovations of modernism 
developed against a backdrop of ideas that, if true, undermined the version of reality 
assumed by linear perspective, and dismissed the window as a pitifully inaccurate 
paradigm for the relationship of human beings to the world around them.  
Yet Henderson has suggested that the window metaphor is still applicable to 
modernism: the modernist work of art is a ‘window’ that ‘looks out’ upon new and 
unfamiliar landscapes, revealing objects and spaces that do not exist in the three-
dimensional world as we know it. Discussing Juan Gris’s Nature morte devant une 
fenêtre ouverte: Place Ravignan, she observes that: 
                                                                  
13 ‘Exhibitors’, p. 47. 
14 Via Simonetta Fracquelli and Christopher Green, Gino Severini: From Futurism to Classicism (London: 
Hayward Gallery Publishing, 1999), p. 5. 




only the curtained window in the upper left corner is painted conventionally 
in light and shade. However, it is dwarfed by the other ranges of light in the 
painting, which thus makes a powerful commentary on the changed status of 
the window as source of visible light and, metaphorically, truth. Gris’s Still 
Life and other cubist paintings are testament to a new paradigm of reality 
ushered in by the discovery of X-rays and interest in the fourth dimension. 
Such paintings are new kinds of ‘windows’ – in this case, into a complex, 
invisible reality or higher dimensional world as imagined by the artist.16 
 
In this reading, the window’s status as a positivist symbol is inverted: instead of 
revealing, it obfuscates and confuses, giving on to a world we do not know and 
cannot understand. This argument is convincing in all but one respect. Like many 
commentators, Henderson sees the window as an aperture in a wall, or other visual 
barrier, that allows the subject to look out, giving on to a reality that would otherwise 
be visually closed off. This, in my view, reveals a basic flaw in the metaphor as it is 
commonly used, which is its singular, limited definition of the window itself. In fact 
windows are multi-functional, multifarious objects, and there are many terms by 
which we might categorise the act of seeing or seeing through one. When we look 
out of a window, the external world is revealed, certainly, but it is also fragmented, 
delimited by the boundaries of the frame and obscured by muntins, window-
dressings, and flaws in or on the glass itself. The windows of a moving vehicle offer 
up a reality in flux, changing and evolving with every passing second. The act of 
looking in through a window is inextricably linked to notions of voyeurism, but also 
to those of show and display: an uncurtained window in a home allows a glimpse 
into a private, forbidden space, while a shop window showcases commodities with 
the express intention of enticing us inside. Additionally, a window’s primary 
function may be other than to be seen through. A skylight permits the control of light 
in an interior space but cannot inform our understanding of happenings outside 
(other than the weather or time of day); a window made from opaque glass is, by one 
reading, merely a differentiated section of wall, and by another, a tantalising 
blindfold that heightens our awareness of the very domain it hides. Stained-glass 
windows make the glass itself the focus of the gaze, which in a religious context 
                                                                  
16 Henderson, ‘The Image and Imagination of the Fourth Dimension’, Configurations, 17 (2009), 131-160, 
p. 146.  
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serves as a reminder of another reality, higher and worthier than the one that lies 
beyond the glass. 
With the definition of the window thus expanded, there is no reason to 
assume that its worth as a metaphor was lost with the advent of modernism; to 
discount the metaphor entirely is to presuppose not only that the function of the 
window no longer corresponded to that of art, but that the window had only one 
function to begin with. The notion that what is enabled by the window – when it 
allows us to see at all – is not just a sight, but a way of seeing, corresponds neatly to 
the values inherent in many modernist works, which sought not merely to pinpoint 
new objects of sight, but to rethink the very idea of vision. Jose Ortega y Gasset 
illustrates this in his 1925 essay The Dehumanization of Art, when he correlates the 
respective possibilities of looking through and looking at a window with the 
contrasting ways of looking required by twentieth-century works of art and those 
that preceded them: 
 
To see a thing we must adjust our visual apparatus in a certain way. […] Take 
a garden seen through a window. Looking at the garden we adjust our eyes 
in such a way that the ray of vision travels through the pane without delay 
and rests on the shrubs and flowers. Since we are focusing on the garden and 
our ray of vision is directed toward it, we do not see the window but look 
clear through it. The purer the glass, the less we see it. But we can also 
deliberately disregard the garden and, withdrawing the ray of vision, detain 
it at the window. We then lose sight of the garden; what we still behold of it 
is a confused mass of colour which appears pasted to the pane. Hence to see 
the garden and to see the windowpane are two incompatible operations 
which exclude one another because they require different adjustments.17 
 
A similar ‘adjustment in visual apparatus’, he continues, is needed to understand the 
twentieth-century work of art. In order to understand the new art, we must stop 
looking through it: 
 
A work of art vanishes from sight for a beholder who seeks in it nothing but 
the moving fate of John and Mary or Tristan and Isolde and adjusts his vision 
                                                                  
17 José Ortega y Gasset, ‘The Dehumanization of Art’ in The Dehumanization of Art and Notes on the Novel, 
trans. by Helene Weyl (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1948), p. 10. 
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to this. [...] Not many people are capable of adjusting their perceptive 
apparatus to the pane and the transparency that is the work of art. Instead 
they look right though it and revel in the human reality with which the work 
deals.18 
 
Ortega’s assertion stands in direct contrast to Alberti, partly because it no longer 
seemed possible or desirable to endorse Alberti’s assertion that a painting must be 
‘seen through’, but also because technological developments in glass production had 
altered the function of the window itself, ushering in a new manifestation of the 
metaphor. The glazed window is here seen to be an appropriate symbol for 
modernist abstraction: in drawing our attention to its materiality as well as what it 
portrays, the abstract work of art functions like a seen window, a window-object, 
rather than a mere transparency.  
 
ii. Illusion vs. awareness 
The conflict between these two modes of viewing – looking at and looking through – 
has a long cultural history, which I briefly touched on in the thesis introduction. It is 
emblematic of an enduring debate as to whether we should think of artworks 
primarily as representations or primarily as objects in the world, and the extent to 
which these identities coincide. Thomas Baldwin summarises the problem as 
follows:  
 
Do I see through the canvas to the object portrayed there, or can I also, or 
simultaneously, attend to the signifying, material substance of the picture? 
When I read a novel, while I may not actually see the object in the words, in 
what sense, if at all, am I able to see through the words to the object they 
appear to describe?19 
 
In Downcast Eyes, Martin Jay (citing the work of Svetlana Alpers) suggests that the 
problem goes back at least to the Renaissance, arguing that a split along precisely 
these lines can be detected between the Dutch and Italian painterly traditions. Dutch 
Renaissance painting, in his words, was ‘not as taken [as its Italian counterpart] with 
the reverse pyramid on the other side of the window’; it ‘accepted the materiality of 
                                                                  
18 Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
19 Spectre, p. 7. 
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the canvas and the paint on it far more readily than did Italian’.20 By this token, the 
‘adjustment in visual apparatus’ that Ortega describes is not required solely in the 
arena of modernism. 
As Marian Hobson recounts in The Object of Art, the approach favoured by 
the Italian tradition fell drastically out of favour in the twentieth century. ‘The 
illusion of art,’ she writes, 
 
has often been characterised by a scornful twentieth century as a fascination, 
a passive trance in front of a work which has effaced all trace of its production 
[…] a branch of the bourgeois drug trade, to lull the consumer from all critical 
spirit and even all activity, to envelop him and insulate him, to act as a diving 
bell in which the plunge into unreality may be effected.21 
 
W. J. T. Mitchell makes a similar claim for the field of ekphrasis, describing the 
phenomenon of ‘ekphrastic fear’ as the moment in ekphrastic theory in which ‘the 
utopian figures of the image and its textual rendering as transparent windows onto 
reality are supplanted by the notion of the image as a deceitful illusion, a magical 
technique that threatens to fixate the poet and the listener.’22 For the critic ‘fearful’ of 
ekphrasis, the traditional window metaphor is no mere cliché, but an object of 
suspicion. What is at stake, presumably, is the very stability of the material world, 
which risks being supplanted by a virtual one unless sufficient care is taken. If this is 
indeed a genuine risk, it is surely not limited to ekphrasis, but must be inherent in 
all ‘transparent’ art forms, whether textual or visual. The immersive model becomes 
dishonest and immoral; to see the art form as a ‘pure aperture’ is to allow the mutual 
contamination of two domains that should not, at least beyond a certain point, be 
breached.23 
                                                                  
20 Jay, pp. 60-61. 
21 Marian Hobson, The Object of Art: The Theory of Illusion in Eighteenth-Century France (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 3. 
22 W.J.T. Mitchell, Picture Theory: Essays on Verbal and Visual Representation (Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 156. 
23 The moral necessity behind this is, of course, highly debatable; this position seems largely like a 
melodramatic overstatement of the human ability either to engage with art and writing or to transcend 
the material world. That said, it does have a certain prophetic legitimacy in that it foreshadows 
contemporary debates about new and potential augmented reality technologies, which often involve 
predictions of a dystopian future in which computer images are so inextricably connected to the human 
visual faculty that it is no longer possible to distinguish between the virtual and the material. Most 
episodes of Charlie Brooker’s television science fiction series Black Mirror (2011—), for example, engage 
with this fear in some way. 
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 For Hobson, this militant rejection of illusion in modern criticism is 
misguided because it ‘fails to take into account the dialectic between representation 
and form, between imaginative tissue and awareness of production’.24 Her critique 
would presumably extend to Ortega, who allows for no such dialectic; for him, the 
acts of looking through and looking at are ‘incompatible operations that exclude one 
another’. In this schema, the reader or viewer cannot attend to the literal, formal 
properties of the image or text at the same time as its narrative or representational 
properties. Ortega’s view anticipates that of the art historian and theorist E. H. 
Gombrich. ‘Is it possible to “see” both the plane surface and the battle horse at the 
same time?’ Gombrich asks. ‘The demand is for the impossible. To understand the 
battle horse is for a moment to disregard the plane surface. We cannot have it both 
ways.’25 This ‘bipolar’ approach, in which ‘either the physical matter or the 
imaginative tissue of the work is present to us at one time’, is countered by a more 
nuanced, ‘bimodal’ one, in which awareness of the materiality of a work of art 
intersects with implication in what it depicts.26 Barthes, for example, argues in Le 
Plaisir du texte that ‘le lecteur peut dire sans cesse: “je sais bien que ce ne sont que des 
mots, mais tout de même … (je m’émeus comme si ces mots énonçaient une 
réalité)”’.27 This Hobson describes as ‘an oscillation’ in which ‘involvement and 
consciousness run together and succeed each other’.28 
The idea of an oscillation between these two modes of engagement will be a 
thread that runs through this chapter. It raises the possibility that modernist works 
of art might not function exclusively as ‘seen windows’ – that there might also be a 
sense in which they ‘double back’ towards a more immersive, transparent model. 
Examining the ways in which Proust and his avant-garde contemporaries interrogate 
and subvert the classic metaphor enables me to use the figure of the window as a 
means of navigating an indeterminate space in which the work of art is both 
transparent mediator and material, visible surface. In this regard, my argument here 
will continue in the same vein as Chapter 1, by exploring the ways in which a 
boundary between two apparently distinct states (there, intuition and analysis; here, 
immersion and awareness) is blurred or transcended. These questions will again be 
                                                                  
24 Hobson, pp. 4-5. Baldwin also sees this position as mistaken: ‘all resolutely anti-mimetic, pro-literality 
arguments implode as soon [as] they seek to amputate a term from what is (at least) a dialectical process’ 
(Spectre, p. 8). 
25 E.H. Gombrich, Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation (London: Phaidon 
Press, 1960), p. 237. 
26 Hobson, p. 23. 
27 Roland Barthes, Le Plaisir du texte (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1973), p. 76. 
28 Hobson, pp. 7-8. 
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examined with reference to Proust’s fictional painter, Elstir, as well as to the 
intersection of Elstir’s imagined painterly strategies with Proust’s own textual ones. 
I then turn to real-life paintings by Robert Delaunay and René Magritte, which I 
argue use the motif of the window as a means of commenting on and interrogating 
the metaphor. Finally, I consider Proust’s textual description of windows that appear 
to be ‘like paintings’, rather than the reverse.  
 
 
I. Elstir’s Textual Paintings 
 
Proust uses his fictional painter Elstir to thematise the immersion-awareness debate 
in a variety of ways. Two comedic moments, for example, send up an attachment to 
realist mimesis among the supposedly cultivated classes, which renders them 
incapable of grasping the significance of Elstir’s work. The first is in ‘Un Amour de 
Swann’, when Mme Cottard disparages Elstir (known as Biche at this point in the 
narrative) in favour of the (now largely forgotten) society portrait painter, Jules-
Louis Machard. A recent portrait by the latter, she declares to Swann, ‘fait courir tout 
Paris’; she herself is an enthusiastic member of ‘le camp de ceux qui approuvent’ (I, 
368):  
 
Moi, je le trouve idéal. Évidemment elle ne ressemble pas aux femmes bleues 
et jaunes de notre ami Biche. Mais je dois vous l’avouer franchement, vous ne 
me trouverez pas très fin de siècle, mais je le dis comme je le pense, je ne 
comprends pas. Mon Dieu, je reconnais les qualités qu’il y a dans le portrait 
de mon mari, c’est moins étrange que ce qu’il fait d’habitude, mais il a fallu 
qu’il lui fasse des moustaches bleues. Tandis que Machard! […]  je trouve que 
la première qualité d’un portrait, surtout quand il coûte dix mille francs, est 
d’être ressemblant et d’une ressemblance agréable. (I, 368-369) 
 
Mme Cottard’s assessment is both outmoded and paradoxical: portraiture, she 
declares blithely, must always be both realistic and pleasing to the eye. Her pompous 
fawning over Machard is rivalled in ignorance by a later remark made by (the 




Swann avait le toupet de vouloir nous faire acheter une Botte d’asperges. Elles 
sont même restées ici quelques jours. Il n’y avait que cela dans le tableau, une 
botte d’asperges précisément semblables à celles que vous êtes en train 
d’avaler. Mais moi, je me suis refusé à avaler les asperges de M. Elstir. Il en 
demandait trois cents francs. Trois cent francs, une botte d’asperges! Un louis, 
voilà ce que ça vaut, même en primeurs! (II, 790-791) 
 
In his conviction that a painting of a bunch of (fresh) asparagus is qualitatively no 
different to the actual, cooked asparagus on the narrator’s dinnerplate, M. de 
Guermantes confuses the image with its referent to the point of absurdity. His 
reaction is particularly ridiculous if Elstir’s Botte d’asperges, as critics have suggested, 
is intended as a nod towards Manet’s 1880 painting of the same name, since the 
latter’s proto-Impressionist developments were a catalyst for the movement away 
from mimesis: if Elstir’s asparagus look anything like Manet’s, then, they are not 
‘précisément semblables’ to those the narrator is eating.29 M. de Guermantes’s 
equation of a painting’s worth with the monetary value of its subject matter is based 
on a determination to see mimesis where there is none: his behaviour is no less 
farcical than Mme Cottard’s outdated attachment to pictorial resemblance and her 
enthusiasm for second-rate portraiture. 
 Proust’s message is clear: painting is about more than just resemblance. 
Needless to say, the narrator’s own discussions of Elstir’s paintings and their 
processes of representation are considerably more nuanced. He is frequently both 
taken with their subject matter and attentive to the artist’s method and rationale: his 
description of the Port de Carquethuit, for example, is exacting and analytic, intended 
to demonstrate the perceived intentions of the painter and the effects of these on the 
viewer rather than to offer a textual imitation of what he sees. We might, in this 
instance, describe him as hyper-aware of the workings of the painting in question, to 
the point of being oblivious to any mimetic function.30 But the actual objects depicted 
                                                                  
29 A frequently-cited anecdote seems to confirm that Elstir’s painting is based on Manet’s: in real life, 
Manet sold his Botte d’asperges to Charles Ephrussi (a model for Charles Swann), who paid him 1000 
francs instead of the asked-for 800. Manet’s response was to paint another asparagus spear, which he 
sent to Ephrussi with an explanatory note: ‘il en manquait une à votre botte.’ (Via Yoshikawa, p. 310.) 
‘With a wry sleight of hand,’ writes Eric Karpeles, ‘Proust fashioned a tiny morality play from this 
charming vignette […] transform[ing] an anecdote about largesse into a tale of arrogant refusal, using 
a beautiful small painting as a touchstone to expose the unpredictable behaviour of le beau monde.’ (pp. 
13-14.)  
30 That said, although the narrator is attentive to the artist’s intentions, he does not actually comment 
on the physical properties of the canvas itself. In J. M. Cocking’s words, ‘he never tells us whether 
Elstir’s surfaces were as smooth as Renoir’s or as rough as Monet’s, of which Renoir remarked that you 
could strike a match on them.’ (p. 133.) Gabrielle Townsend has also pointed out the lack of colour in 
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in the picture – the boats, the buildings, the people – are merely secondary, tools by 
which the painter communicates a broader vision. The real subject of the painting is 
precognitive vision, and in this the narrator unquestioningly believes, even as he 
applies his intellectual scrutiny to the surface of the canvas. We saw in Chapter 1 that 
there is some doubt as to whether precognitive vision communicates ‘reality’ (‘la 
nature telle qu’elle est’) or illusion (‘ces illusions optiques dont notre vision première 
est faite’) but what is not in doubt is the narrator’s belief in its status as a real-world 
phenomenon (II, 191-194). And yet he is also aware of this belief and of his investment 
in the ideas at play, and proves it by offering examples of their relation to his own 
prior experience. He is immersed in the painting, but self-consciously so. 
But of course, this is not really a painting: it is an ekphrastic description of 
one. There is much to suggest that this ‘upper’ level of representation, the text itself, 
is ‘transparent’ – that ‘les mots passent à travers notre regard’, as Sartre puts it. In his 
introduction to The Picture as Spectre, Baldwin identifies two distinct critical 
approaches to literary ekphrasis, the first of which is the domain of the ‘art spotter’: 
‘a form of detective labour that results in a precise identification of the “real” work 
of art described by the text’. This method effaces the text, which is ‘construed as a 
transparent linguistic window’.31 Many critics have approached the Port de 
Carquethuit from this direction, trying to pinpoint the actual painting or paintings 
hidden behind the words, as we saw in Chapter 1; the Pléiade edition prompts the 
reader’s inner eye by providing a list of possibilities in its footnote to the passage (II, 
1436). But Juliette Monnin-Hornung’s contention that ‘cette toile surchargée’ must be 
modelled on ‘six tableaux au moins’ suggests, in fact, that it should be understood 
less as a picture than as a prop for a piece of writing.32 If the Port de Carquethuit is 
really an impossible painting, which can have no real-world referent (and in Mieke 
Bal’s words, ‘de toute évidence, il ne saurait s’agir d’un art plastique référentiel dans 
la description du tableau’),33 would we not be better off directing our critical energy 
to the workings of the text itself, rather than to whatever image that text is able to 
convey? (I am not suggesting that this is Monnin-Hornung’s view; she herself goes 
                                                                  
Proust’s description (‘there is no attempt to describe the sky in terms of colour other than black and 
white’), which she attributes to the likelihood that the description was inspired, in part, by reproductions 
of Turner’s paintings (Imaginary Museum, pp. 88-89). As Mieke Bal puts it, ‘ce n’est pas à l’aide du verre 
grossissant du connaisseur […] que Proust présente les nombreuses œuvres d’art qui interviennent […] 
dans La recherche […] Proust n’est pas quelqu’un à qui on se fierait pour l’achat du grand art.’ (Images, 
p. 19.) 
31 Spectre, p. 1. 
32 Monnin-Hornung, p. 75. 
33 Images, p. 25. 
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on to guess at the identities of the six-plus paintings in question).34 The same note in 
the Pléiade edition asserts that ‘on ne saurait “voir” Le Port de Carquethuit, pas plus 
qu’on ne peut “entendre” la Sonate de Vinteuil’; the painting is not present in the text 
to be ‘seen’ (II, 1436). In this regard, the episode might be better served by the second 
critical approach that Baldwin pinpoints, which ‘understands ekphrasis in terms of 
outright textual obliteration – an “outdoing” – of the painted work. The latter 
disappears, overwhelmed by the seas of language.’35 Here the ekphrastic description 
is figured as a sort of opaque covering – the opposite of a ‘transparent linguistic 
window’. 
But this approach does not quite fit our purposes either. Proust’s text is still 
clearly descriptive; it is the sheer volume of goings-on within the painting described 
that creates problems for the ‘art spotter’, not the obfuscating virtuosity of a text that 
wants to steal the limelight for itself. But there is still a sense in which the painting 
has been effaced. This is because the primary purpose of the text is not, ultimately, 
to describe a painting, but to describe a mode of attention – not to make us ‘see’, but 
to explain a concept of vision. Seeing through the text does not, in this case, mean 
‘seeing’ the painting; it means understanding and believing in the mode of attention 
that the painting seeks to convey. The painting and its creator are vehicles that enable 
Proust to put forward a broader perceptual manifesto. The ‘effacement’ (or perhaps 
‘demotion’) of the painting functions, therefore, as another form of transparency – 
for if we as readers are to subscribe to this manifesto, the ekphrastic act must be seen 
not to have happened. We must look straight through the text and focus on the 
narrator, who conveys these perceptual principles by both looking through the canvas 
to its subject – precognitive vision – and looking at the representational techniques 
that the painting employs. 
Yet the mode of attention that is revealed by looking through the text also 
reflects back on the workings of that text. The entire description is intended to 
demonstrate the way Elstir employs a technique ‘analogue à celle qu’en poésie on 
nomme métaphore’, using, for example ‘des termes marins’ for the town and ‘des 
termes urbains’ for the sea (II, 191-192). As my conclusion to Chapter 1 suggested, 
his use of metaphor is emblematic of a broader dynamic that also underpins 
involuntary memory, and which the narrator will eventually exalt as a route to 
artistic truth. Elstir’s painting, then, gestures towards what is both an artistic ideal 
                                                                  
34 See Monnin-Hornung, pp. 93-94. 
35 Spectre, p. 2. 
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and a structuring principle of the text in which it is situated. In Sophie Bertho’s 
analysis, ‘on retrouve […] dans la peinture d’Elstir, dans ces “métamorphoses”, le 
rapport métaphorique fondé sur l’analogie qui a la prééminence absolue dans 
l’écriture proustienne […] La peinture d’Elstir synthétise, symbolise la poétique 
proustienne.’36 By this analysis, to look through the writing of this passage is to have 
our attention redirected to the macro-level workings of the text as a whole. This 
process is bolstered by micro-level references to language more generally. As well as 
the reference to metaphor, the narrator discusses Elstir’s process of naming and 
unnaming – his creation of a new reality based on removing or replacing the names 
of the objects he paints: ‘si Dieu le Père avait créé les choses en les nommant, c’est en 
leur ôtant leur nom, ou en leur en donnant un autre qu’Elstir les recréait’ (II, 191). 
Meta-linguistic references such as this are like the flaws in a pane of glass that remind 
us of its presence and prevent its being entirely, invisibly transparent; here, they 
enable the text to assert its presence through autoreferentiality. Like the Port de 
Carquethuit itself, then, the text can be understood as both transparent and not: our 
two modes of attention – immersion and awareness, looking through and looking at 
– do not cancel each other out, but coexist as a complex, multilayered structure. 
 
A few pages after the description of the Port de Carquethuit, the narrator discovers a 
watercolour depiction of a young woman, entitled Miss Sacripant, which dates from 
an earlier stage of Elstir’s career (in a departure from habit, Proust provides an actual 
date of execution: 1872). Once again, the narrator is captivated. But he is initially 
captivated by the model, not by Elstir’s depiction of her. The painting, he writes,  
 
me causa cette sorte particulière d’enchantement que dispensent ces œuvres 
non seulement d’une exécution délicieuse, mais aussi d’un sujet si singulier 
et si séduisant que c’est à lui que nous attribuons une partie de leur charme, 
comme si, ce charme, le peintre n’avait eu qu’à le découvrir, qu’à l’observer, 
matériellement réalisé déjà dans la nature et à le reproduire. (II, 203) 
 
This is the older narrator’s voice, providing a retrospective commentary on – or an 
excuse for – his younger self’s desire to look through the image to the object it depicts. 
                                                                  
36 Sophie Bertho, ‘Asservir l’image, fonctions du tableau dans le récit’ in L’Interprétation détournée: Proust, 
Magritte/Foucault, Beckett, Robbe-Grillet, Coetzee, Calvino, ed. by Leo H. Hoek (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1990), 
pp. 25-36 (pp. 32-33). 
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Deriving a general rule about human behaviour from his own experience of viewing 
the painting, he declares that our belief in the existence of such singular and 
seductive objects, which are ‘beaux en dehors même de l’interprétation du peintre’, 
satisfies an innate tendency towards materialism (‘un matérialisme inné’) that exists 
in defiance of our reason, and which counterbalances ‘[les] abstractions de 
l’esthétique’ (II, 203). He is suggesting that we have a natural inclination to equate 
the image with the material object it depicts: if a painting enchants us (as in this case) 
or bores us (as in the case of M. de Guermantes), we assume it is because its subject 
matter is enchanting or boring. To separate the two, he says, is a work of the intellect. 
The younger narrator has not yet realised this, and proves it a few pages later when 
he tells Elstir he would love to visit Carquethuit, ‘sans penser que le caractère si 
nouveau qui se manifestait avec tant de puissance dans le “Port de Carquethuit” 
d’Elstir tenait peut-être plus à la vision du peintre qu’à un mérite spécial de cette 
plage’ (II, 209-210). The temporal gap between the experience of looking and its 
rendering in the text allows the narrator to comment – as so often in the Recherche – 
on the actions and views of his younger self. In this instance, it enables him to 
position himself in relation to the conflict between looking through and looking at, by 
equating the former with a less mature stage in his own intellectual development. 
Making a retrospective assessment of his earlier mode of engaging with the image, 
he subtly accuses his younger self of an attitude comparable to that of Mme Cottard 
and M. de Guermantes. The episode does not just contain a textual rendering of an 
image, then, but an implicit aesthetic manifesto. 
 Moreover, the narrator’s attempt to focus on the subject matter is complicated 
by the latter’s ambiguity. Failing to live up to Mme Cottard’s high standards, the 
portrait is not ‘ressemblant’, since the narrator can only take a wild guess at the 
model’s identity (it is, in fact, an image of a very young Odette Swann) – nor, we 
must assume, would Mme Cottard find it particularly ‘agréable’, since the model is 
dressed as a man. Her androgyny means the narrator can never quite be certain of 
exactly who or what he is looking at (‘je ne savais pas exactement ce que j’avais sous 
les yeux’ (II, 204)). The model’s gender seems both to declare and obscure itself, 
fluctuating between one category and another: ‘le long des lignes du visage, le sexe 
avait l’air d’être sur le point d’avouer qu’il était celui d’une fille un peu garçonnière, 
s’évanouissant, et plus loin se retrouvait, suggérant plutôt l’idée d’un jeune efféminé 
vicieux et songeur, puis fuyait encore, restait insaisissable.’ (II, 205) This is the 
principle of precognitive vision in action once again: painting what he sees rather 
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than what he knows has prevented Elstir from fixing his model in a definitive, 
recognisable category, creating an aesthetic of visual indeterminacy. In fact, he has 
deliberately highlighted the androgyny and ambiguity of his subject matter, 
regardless of any social or moral questions that this might raise: ‘on sentait qu’Elstir, 
insoucieux de ce que pouvait présenter d’immoral ce travesti d’une jeune actrice […] 
s’était au contraire attaché à ces traits d’ambiguïté comme à un élément esthétique 
qui valait d’être mis en relief et qu’il avait tout fait pour souligner.’ (II, 204-205) Elstir 
has made a specific effort, it seems, to thwart the attempts of the naïve viewer 
determined to look through. 
 Proust himself has done something similar in his depiction of Elstir and his 
œuvre; what is more, he has done so in a way that seems to reference avant-garde 
practice. He tells us that the painting of Miss Sacripant is dated 1872, and is 
contemporaneous with numerous portraits by Manet and Whistler; the studio visit 
itself seems to be occurring some time in the 1890s. Yet in a manner comparable to 
the episode featuring the Hubert Robert fountain, the narrator’s own commentary 
on the painting seems inflected with Cubism. Mme Swann is unrecognisable as the 
subject of the painting, we are told, because Elstir has disrupted the carefully 
cultivated unity of her outer appearance, rearranging her traits according to his own 
vision: 
 
Le génie artistique agit à la façon de ces températures extrêmement élevées 
qui ont le pouvoir de dissocier les combinaisons d’atomes et de grouper ceux-
ci suivant un ordre absolument contraire, répondant à un autre type. Toute 
cette harmonie factice que la femme a imposée à ses traits et dont chaque jour 
avant de sortir elle surveille la persistance dans sa glace, chargeant 
l’inclinaison du chapeau, le lissage des cheveux, l’enjouement du regard, d’en 
assurer la continuité, cette harmonie, le coup d’œil du grand peintre la détruit 
en une seconde, et à sa place il fait un regroupement des traits de la femme. 
(II, 216) 
 
It is as if Cubism has influenced Proust’s thinking about the art that preceded it, so 
that Elstir’s work becomes stranded in chronological limbo. At the very end of this 
passage, however, the narrator declares that the painter’s tendency to rearrange the 
model’s features ‘[donne] satisfaction à un certain idéal féminin et pictural qu’il porte 
en lui’ (II, 216). This sounds less like Cubism than the idealism of the Romantics. 
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Information provided by Mme Cottard confuses the issue still further: at around the 
time he painted Odette Swann, Elstir – or rather ‘Biche’ – was rendering the subjects 
of his portraits (including Dr. Cottard) in blue and yellow, suggesting not the more 
subdued tones of Manet or Whistler, but the post-Impressionist or Fauvist palettes 
of Van Gogh or Matisse. And yet the description of the Port de Carquethuit – a much 
more recent painting – reads like a mid-nineteenth-century genre scene even as it 
propounds a late Turnerian, impressionistic aesthetic.37 As Monnin-Hornung notes, 
Elstir’s œuvre is ‘une suite de tableaux très différents, qui ne paraissent pas fortement 
unis par une esthétique commune’.38 Just as the Port de Carquethuit is an ‘impossible’ 
painting, then, so Elstir is an ‘impossible’ painter. We cannot look through Proust’s 
text to a logical, comprehensible gallery of imagined paintings that follow a real-life 
art historical trajectory. Elstir’s images exist only in, not beyond the text, in a virtual 
aesthetic space all of their own. This problematises Sartre’s claim that prose takes us 
‘au-delà des mots, près de l’objet’: Proust’s prose dangles the ‘object’ before us, only 
for it to fragment irretrievably when we look more closely.39 
Moreover, these paintings are motivated: they are not served by the text, but 
serve it. The ‘femmes bleues et jaunes’ and the Botte d’asperges highlight the stupidity, 
respectively, of Mme Cottard and M. de Guermantes. The Port de Carquethuit 
foreshadows the narrator’s later pronouncements on the importance of metaphor 
and enables him to articulate a concept of perception that is adopted into his own 
literary aesthetic. Miss Sacripant is loaded with intra-textual references: revealing 
another of Odette’s numerous identities, it accords with the recurrent theme of the 
inherent multiplicity of human beings, while also harking back to earlier discussions 
of her sexuality and ‘loose’ morals, and anticipating the narrator’s later 
preoccupation with the same issues as they concern Albertine, whom he is on the 
point of meeting. Thus, these textual paintings – or references to paintings – are not 
just concerned with painting as a genre, even if they do provide fodder for the ‘art 
spotter’: their primary purpose is arguably to draw our attention to the broader 
concerns of the text in which they are situated, helping it to assert its identity as an 
object in its own right, rather than just a window onto other objects.40 Proust’s text 
                                                                  
37 J. Theodore Johnson gives a damning assessment of Elstir’s chef d’œuvre: in his view, it is ‘little more 
than a terribly overcrowded studio piece heavily charged with nineteenth-century picturesqueness’, 
and ‘one of the all-time outstanding examples of kitsch’ (Johnson, pp. 28-29).  
38 Monnin-Hornung, p. 80. 
39 Littérature, p. 19. 
40 As well as detecting numerous possible sources for the Port de Carquethuit, Monnin-Hornung also 
suggests that Miss Sacripant could have been inspired by Renoir’s Madame Henriot en page (1875-1877), 
or Whistler’s Connie Gilchrist (1873) or Lady Archibald Campbell déguisée en Orlando (c. 1884), all images 
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practises what it preaches. Through parody, description, analysis, and self-
assessment, he has told us that the act of engaging with a painting is not a simple 
matter of looking through (or, indeed, of looking at). If we consider them closely, these 
very passages tell us the same thing about reading, by deflecting our attempts to look 
through the text to the images – and the artist – it describes. 
 
 
II. Robert Delaunay: Self-Referentiality and Abstraction 
 
The work of the painter Robert Delaunay provides an interesting counterpart to 
Proust’s layered construction of textual and painterly ‘seen windows’. Delaunay was 
a contemporary of the Cubists, and his work is often grouped with theirs. This is 
significant because Cubism is often seen as the point of origin for what Hobson calls 
the twentieth century’s ‘scorn’ for artistic illusion, and the shift in focus to the 
representation over the represented (even though, as Vargish and Mook point out, 
many critics ‘would want the credit shared with movements and individuals 
preceding and paralleling Cubism’ – namely Impressionism).41 Cubism, Gombrich 
contends, ‘is the most radical attempt to stamp out ambiguity and to enforce one 
reading of the picture – that of a man-made construction, a coloured canvas’ (238).42 
As Sartre argues in L’Imaginaire, ‘on a coutume, depuis le cubisme, de déclarer que 
le tableau ne doit pas représenter ou imiter le réel mais qu’il doit constituer par lui-
même un objet.’43 
 There are two oversights inherent in this ‘coutume’. For one thing, it 
presupposes a total lack of external referent in Cubist painting, which is simply not 
the case: the referent or referents may be fragmented to the point of being almost 
unrecognisable, but it does not follow that they are not there at all. For another, the 
fact that we do not recognise the represented reality does not mean there is no 
represented reality, and that the painting functions only as an object in the actual 
world, rather than as the container of a virtual world. Sartre goes on to argue that we 
commit a ‘grave erreur’ by thinking of Cubist and post-Cubist painting exclusively 
as an object: 
                                                                  
of women dressed as men. ‘Miss Sacripant’ also holds a straw hat against her knee – a motif frequently 
seen in Whistler’s work, as in his portraits Harmony in Grey and Green: Miss Cicely Alexander (1873) and 
Arrangement in Brown and Black: Portrait of Miss Rosa Corder (1876-1878) (p. 98-99). 
41 Vargish and Mook, p. 61. 
42 Gombrich, p. 238. 




L’objet réel ne fonctionne plus comme analogon d’un bouquet de fleurs ou 
d’une clairière. Mais […] ce tableau fonctionne encore comme analogon. 
Simplement ce qui se manifeste à travers lui c’est un ensemble irréel de choses 
neuves, d’objets que je n’ai jamais vus ni ne verrai jamais mais qui n’en sont 
pas moins des objets irréels, des objets qui n’existent point dans le tableau, ni 
nulle part dans le monde, mais qui se manifestent à travers la toile.44 
 
In other words, the painting can still be looked through, however abstract it is – it is 
just that the reality we look into does not resemble our own. Like Elstir, the Cubist 
painter creates a new world by undoing familiar systems of recognition and 
representation. This recalls Henderson’s suggestion, quoted in the introduction to 
this chapter, that the Cubist painting is still a window, but one that gives on to a 
different version of reality, full of unrecognisable objects and spatial configurations. 
Delaunay himself suggested much the same thing of his own more abstract works, 
speaking of the paintings in his Fenêtres series as ‘des fenêtres sur une nouvelle 
réalité’.45 
Delaunay’s relationship to Cubism is not straightforward, but much of his 
work is certainly cubistic, particularly his series of studies of the Eiffel Tower, 
produced between 1910 and 1911.46 The later Fenêtres series, however, of 1912-1913, 
would move away from the Cubists’ preoccupation with form; the paintings are 
studies of colour that verge on total abstraction. Apollinaire termed Delaunay’s work 
‘Orphism’, or Orphic Cubism, which he describes in Les Peintres cubistes as ‘l’art de 
peindre des ensembles nouveaux avec des éléments empruntés non à la réalité 
visuelle, mais entièrement créés par l’artiste’.47 Yet if we accept Sartre’s argument, 
there must be some kind of réalité conveyed by the images, even if they do not match 
                                                                  
44 Ibid., p. 366. 
45 Robert Delaunay, Du Cubisme à l’art abstrait, ed. by Pierre Francastel (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1957), p. 66. 
46 Virginia Spate suggests that the ‘diagrammatic thrusts of light’, which break into the structure of the 
tower itself, ‘could have been influenced by the Futurists’ ideas on the way light and movement can 
dynamically penetrate solid bodies’ (Spate, p. 174). 
47 Peintres cubistes, p. 57. As well as Delaunay, Apollinaire included Fernand Léger, Francis Picabia and 
Marcel Duchamp under this epithet. Yet the term ‘Orphism’ gives the misleading impression of a 
united, cohesive movement; in reality, many of the painters rejected the term. Virginia Spate notes that 
‘only Picabia and Delaunay accepted the designation, and Delaunay tried to limit it to his own kind of 
painting. Later he claimed that Apollinaire’s invention of the term was simply an art-political 
manœuvre designed to present the avant-garde as a united front, and there is some truth in this 
assertion.’ Nevertheless, she continues, ‘Apollinaire had perceived the first stirrings of something that 
was very real – an art which would dispense with recognizable subject-matter and would rely on form 
and colour alone to communicate meaning.’ (Spate, pp. 1-2.) 
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the appearance of the material world. What do we find, then, when we look into the 
‘reality’ of paintings like these?  
 
i. The Tour series 
In this more cubistic series, Delaunay presents numerous perspectives of the tower 
on the singular plane of the canvas, breaking it into fragments and reshuffling its 
composite parts. Indeed, as Sherry A. Buckberrough has observed, the Eiffel Tower 
is a particularly appropriate subject for a cubistic study, since its omnipresence on 
the Parisian skyline means it is visible all over the city, the optical centre of an 
extensive network of shifting sightlines.48 In drawing together multiple views of the 
tower, Delaunay’s studies subvert Alberti’s assertion that ‘the painter is concerned 
solely with representing what can be seen’ – and yet they do not quite uphold 
Apollinaire’s argument that Orphist paintings have nothing to do with ‘réalité 
visuelle’. Clearly, the presence of a recognisable referent means Delaunay is at least 
partly concerned with what can be seen – but as in the Port de Carquethuit, the seen 
object functions as a metonym for a way of seeing, a tool with which to explore the 
nature of vision itself. Like the Cubists, Delaunay’s interest at this stage lies in the 
multiple manifestations of objects as they are seen and experienced over time, or 
simultaneously from several viewpoints, rather than from the singular, static 
viewpoint of traditional perspectival painting. As well as a visual object, the Eiffel 
Tower is an elevated viewing platform from which the city itself can be observed, as 
is implied in several of the studies by the tiny apartment buildings around the base 
of the tower. It is presented, then, not only as a seen object but as a subject that sees; 
the images visualise Barthes’s observation that ‘la Tour […] transgresse cette 
séparation, ce divorce ordinaire du voir et de l’être vu’.49 Delaunay celebrates the 
tower as an emblem of the Cubist redefinition of vision, now thought of as a process 
that far exceeds the limited sensory capacity of individuals. 
Interestingly for our purposes, Delaunay’s depictions of the tower seem to 
have been partly inspired by the view from a window, after his friend, the poet Blaise 
Cendrars, spent time bedridden in a Paris hotel room in 1910 (or 1911 – the exact date 
is unclear), having broken his leg. Fortuitously, the window of this room gave on to 
the Eiffel Tower. Cendrars recalls in his essay Aujourd’hui that Delaunay ‘venait 
                                                                  
48 Sherry A. Buckberrough, Robert Delaunay: The Discovery of Simultaneity (Essex: Bowker Publishing, 
1978), p. 57.  
49 Roland Barthes, ‘La Tour Eiffel’ in Œuvres Complètes: Tome I, 1942-1965 (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1993), 
pp. 1380-1400 (p. 1384). 
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presque tous les jours me tenir compagnie. Il était toujours hanté par la Tour et la 
vue que l’on avait de ma fenêtre l’attirait beaucoup. Souvent il faisait des croquis ou 
apportait sa boîte de couleurs.’50 Yet the canvases themselves were not produced 
with direct reference to this view, but in the country, from memory – ‘a process that 
freed the artist to concentrate on formal and compositional considerations rather 
than labouring over realistic minutiae’, in Eric Robertson’s words.51 Delaunay’s 
refusal to depict the tower ‘from life’, even though the framed view of it that so 
attracted him must have lent itself to painterly transcription, both reinforces his 
rejection of vision as a singular and static process and provides another example of 
the Cubist intellectualism that we considered in Chapter 1. Delaunay’s series is a 
conceptualisation as well as a visualisation of the Eiffel Tower. He implicitly rejects 
the window as a paradigm for painting, perhaps because its implications are too 
purely visual, too divorced from thought. What is revealed by looking ‘through’ 
these paintings is not a visual continuation of the material world, but an undoing of 
familiar spatial systems and a conceptual interrogation of the practice of vision itself.  
The importance of the painting’s status as object, meanwhile, is highlighted 
by one image in particular: La Tour aux rideaux (fig. 8), of 1910, in which the tower is 
bordered by a pair of curtains and the angled line of what appears to be a windowsill. 
Here, the window ceases to be a metaphorical point of reference for painting and 
becomes an actual motif in the image itself, paving the way for a more deliberate, 
specific rejection of the traditional metaphor.52 In Robertson’s analysis, the motif 
introduces an element of Ortegan self-referentiality: 
 
In the manner of twin columns, the curtains draw the eye not only towards 
the view that lies between them but also to the window and its angled frame, 
to the very process of framing. This bipartite inner frame acts as a visual and 
conceptual focus, both channelling the view towards the centre of the canvas 
and emphasising the conscious act of choice that led to the picture’s 
creation.53 
                                                                  
50 Blaise Cendrars, Aujourd’hui 1917-1929, suivi de Essais et réflexions 1910-1916 (Paris: Denoël, 1987), p. 
76. 
51 Eric Robertson, ‘Painting Windows: Robert Delaunay, Blaise Cendrars, and the Search for 
Simultaneity’ in The Modern Language Review, 90 (October 1995), 883-896 (p. 884). Robertson credits 
Virginia Spate with revealing this information (see Spate, p. 172-173). 
52 Something similar happens in Juan Gris’s The Painter’s Window (1925). In this instance, as Vargish and 
Mook assert, the window ‘shows now an objectless grey-green-blue mottled blank. The window image 
subserves modernist reflexivity by suffering reduction into a light source for the artist’ (p. 146). 




The curtains’ role as a framing device underlines the presence of the outer frame – 
that is to say, the edge of the canvas – and thus the fact that the painting exists as a 
physical object in its own right as well as a medium through which a visual meaning 
or message is conveyed. Self-referentiality is a means by which the work of art can 
assert its own presence, as we saw demonstrated in Proust’s ekphrastic descriptions 
of Elstir’s canvases. The fact it is a painted window that permits this here seems 
deliberately to make an irony of the classic metaphor, which would not traditionally 
enable the painting to assert its status as painting, but would underline its role as a 
mimetic representational device. Delaunay challenges simplistic assumptions about 
the role and function of a window with a framed space that looks like a window but 
does not act like one, since the abstract nature of the ‘view’ frustrates any desire on 
the viewer’s part to look ‘beyond’ to a recognisable, comprehensible space. 
Robertson also points out a barely perceptible ray of light that originates 
about halfway up the tower and extends to the curtain in the foreground, which in 
his argument 
 
acts as a discreet clue to the self-referentiality of the work: it directs our gaze 
towards the translucent surface of the curtain, and in so doing links the most 
distant background with the immediate foreground. This unifying of 
perspectives creates ambiguity between the representational depth of the 
image and the actual flatness of the canvas. We are reminded that what we 
behold, besides being a re-creation of the sensation of perceiving different 
angles of vision, is ultimately nothing but combinations of colours on a two-
dimensional surface.54 
 
To Robertson’s discussion, I would add that the contrast between the fragmented, 
abstract tower and the (comparatively) mimetic depiction of the curtains creates a 
further level of ambiguity as to the identity of the ‘window’ and the ‘view’ it 
represents. Why, after all, would a largely realistic pair of curtains open on to a 
wholly unrealistic view beyond? The abstract tower robs the mimetic curtains of their 
status as logical, recognisable objects, while they in their turn undermine the very 
abstraction that the painting seems otherwise to promote. We could argue that the 
focal point is the foreground; the tower is disrupted into an Ortegan ‘confused mass 
                                                                  
54 Robertson, pp. 885-886. 
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of colour’ (or rather of form) because the painter has focused on the accoutrements 
of the window itself, rather than on the view it reveals. But this near-sighted 
rendering does not include evidence of the window’s actual, physical structure. Its 
presence is implied by the curtains, but only implied: we can see no outer or inner 
framework, nor any means of opening it. Might we argue, then, that this is not a 
representation of a window at all, but of a painting that happens to be kept behind 
curtains? The physical presence of the canvas is again called to our attention, this 
time by the possibility that we might be looking at a mise-en-abyme, an image within 
an image – that the subject of Delaunay’s painting might not be the Eiffel Tower so 
much as the practice of painting itself. The process of looking is neither bipolar nor 
bimodal, but cyclical: in a manner reminiscent of Proust’s Martinville episode, we try 
Fig. 8: Robert Delaunay, La Tour aux rideaux, 1910 
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to look through the representative object (the painting, in this case) to its subject 
matter, but its subject matter only directs our attention back to the representative 
object. The possibility of an oscillation between immersion and awareness seems 
negated, since the ultimate result of immersion in this painting is to have our 
awareness of its materiality reasserted. 
 
ii. The Fenêtres series 
Delaunay’s use of the window as a motif anticipates his later series, Fenêtres, 
produced between 1912 and 1913, which completes the progression towards 
abstraction heralded by the Cubistic Tour series. The Eiffel Tower appears here as a 
barely-perceptible triangle that almost gets lost among the brightly coloured 
geometric forms that dominate; its presence suggests that the ‘fenêtres’ in question 
look out on to a cityscape, but unlike in La Tour aux rideaux, the window is not present 
as an identifiable motif. Rather, as Delaunay himself articulated, the series can be 
understood as ‘des fenêtres sur une nouvelle réalité’. 
Turning away from the aesthetic concerns central to Cubism, Delaunay’s 
Fenêtres series foregoes the structured linearity favoured by his colleagues, instead 
foregrounding light and colour over form and volume. In this regard, his paintings 
belong to an Impressionist lineage rather than a Cézannean one.55 Blaise Cendrars, 
in Aujourd’hui, documents Delaunay’s study of light, recalling his practice of painting 
in a darkened room, making a hole in a shutter and studying the ray of light that 
penetrated it.56 Certain titles of Delaunay’s paintings (Les Fenêtres simultanées sur la 
ville; Fenêtres ouvertes simultanément) also betray his debt to the nineteenth-century 
chemist Michel Eugène Chevreul and his theory of contrastes simultanés, which 
considers the optical effects of combining juxtaposing colours, and which also 
influenced the Neo-Impressionists (for Delaunay, Rosanna Warren writes, ‘Seurat is 
elevated over Cézanne as the father of modern painting’).57 In Virginia Spate’s words, 
these interests were compounded by ‘[Delaunay’s] belief that colour was the very 
essence of life’, which she suggests was reinforced by his knowledge that light itself 
                                                                  
55 As if to acknowledge his debt to the Impressionists, Delaunay credits the movement with being ‘la 
naissance de la Lumière en peinture’ (Delaunay, p. 146). This has favourable implications for a study of 
Proust and the avant-garde: the endurance of Impressionist concerns in avant-garde practice 
undermines the suggestion, implicit in much scholarship, that Proust’s own ‘impressionism’ negates 
any possibility for an avant-garde impulse in his work. 
56 See Aujourd’hui, pp. 77-78. Incidentally, this calls to mind Proust’s description of Elstir’s studio: ‘Les 
stores étaient clos de presque tous les côtés […] l’atmosphère de la plus grande partie de l’atelier était 
sombre […] mais humide et brillante aux cassures où sertissait la lumière.’ (II, 191.) 
57 Rosanna Warren, ‘Orpheus the Painter: Apollinaire and Robert Delaunay’, Criticism, 30 (Summer 
1988), pp. 279-301 (285). 
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is composed of an intense spectrum of colours.58 The prismatic colours of the Fenêtres 
series can thus be understood not only as an exercise in combining ‘couleurs 
simultanées’, but as a reference to the structure of pure light. Unlike his Cubist 
contemporaries, then, Delaunay’s focus was no longer on the spatial and material 
elements of the physical world, but on the very components of vision itself.59 
                                                                  
58 Spate, pp. 190-191. 
59 Here Delaunay seems to diverge from changed ideas about the nature of vision, as discussed in 
Chapter 1. The set-up of his studio is strikingly reminiscent of the camera obscura – that emblem of an 
older visual order that Jonathan Crary discusses. Here, of course, the focus is on light itself as an 
abstracting force, rather than the logical reality that it reveals. Yet this focus also places the emphasis on 
vision as an externally produced phenomenon, effected by light rather than by the physiological 
workings of the human eye. 
Fig 9: Robert Delaunay, Les Fenêtres simultanées sur la ville, 1912 
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The window is a primary participant in this process, not least because it acted 
as a physical aid to his investigations; in the paintings themselves, Warren writes, 
‘the window asserted by the title serves to focus the act of looking, and, indeed, 
makes “looking” a major theme by partitioning off the segment of cityscape we are 
to contemplate.’60 Les Fenêtres simultanées sur la ville (fig. 9), of 1912, incorporates an 
internal frame, implicitly referencing the process of selection that looking through a 
window entails and further drawing attention to the act of looking itself. The 
window in Delaunay’s understanding is a metaphor for ‘seeing’ in its purest sense: 
that is, for the processes at work when the eye responds to external stimuli. If Spate 
is correct in her contention that Delaunay was influenced by his prior knowledge of 
the role of the colour spectrum in the make-up of light, we cannot quite call this a 
return to a Ruskinian/Elstirean notion of perceptual ‘innocence’ or precognitive 
vision. Nonetheless, in moving from the conceptualised vision of the Tours series to 
a purer form of vision here, Delaunay’s concerns do take a turn in an Elstirean 
direction; indeed, in Robertson’s words, ‘the principal challenge for Delaunay was 
[…] not conceptual but visual: how to portray the precognitive experience of the human 
eye as it perceives light.’61 If Elstir’s version of precognitive vision strips the act of 
seeing of its functional and intellectual quality, Delaunay moves further along the 
same path by stripping it of all relation to the everyday objects and events of the 
world. Read in conjunction with Delaunay’s work, Elstir’s disruption of spatial and 
material boundaries can be understood as a first step on the path to abstraction, while 
Delaunay’s Fenêtres images, which dispense with these categories altogether, are in 
Elstir’s direct lineage. (It may seem jarring to suggest that the work of a real painter 
could follow in the lineage of a real one, but it makes sense if Proust’s descriptions 
were inspired by Turner’s proto-Impressionist visual effects and Delaunay’s 
canvases owe a debt to Impressionism itself.) 
A causal link between precognitive vision and the act of looking through a 
window is implied both by the title of Delaunay’s series and by the fact that the 
narrator’s own experiences of it have occured when looking out of a window.62 An 
oblique link is also implied, then, between the act of looking through a window and 
the development of abstact or quasi-abstract representational techniques. Yet the 
                                                                  
60 Warren, p. 286. 
61 Robertson, p. 887; my emphasis. 
62 ‘Parfois à ma fenêtre, dans l’hôtel de Balbec, […]  il m’était arrivé grâce à un effet de soleil, de prendre 
une partie plus sombre de la mer pour une côte éloignée, ou de regarder avec joie une zone bleue et 
fluide sans savoir si elle appartenait à la mer ou au ciel.’ (II, 191.) 
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depiction of precognitive vision through an artistic medium presents a further 
challenge to the traditional window metaphor. There is a fundamental misalignment 
between the portrayal of this type of vision on the canvas and the experience of viewing 
the painting: a precognitive visual experience, in Proust’s definition, results in the 
blurring of boundaries and categories, but the act of engaging with a painting 
necessarily entails an unconscious process of categorisation, since it must be 
understood as distinct from its surroundings in order to be seen as a ‘painting’ at all. 
This paradox negates any possibility of complete Albertian illusion – of ‘looking clear 
through’ a painting that takes precognitive vision as its subject matter. 
 
 
III. René Magritte: Questioning Representation 
 
In Le Surréalisme et la peinture of 1928, André Breton declared that he found it 
‘impossible de considérer un tableau autrement que comme une fenêtre’.63 Such a 
description, as Johanna Malt has observed, ‘seems to invite painting to retreat from 
the self-conscious materiality of modernism and take refuge once more in the idea of 
itself as a transparent form’ – a surprisingly conservative analogy for a theorist so 
disdainful of traditionalism in the arts, and one that makes way for a number of 
possible conclusions.64 We might interpret this as an attempt to distance Surrealism 
from those avant-garde movements and tendencies that had set a precedent for 
artistic self-consciousness – abstraction, Cubism, even Dada – and deliberately to 
dismiss twentieth-century attempts to reappropriate and reshape the traditional 
window metaphor. Alternatively, we might conclude that Breton was unaware of or 
simply uninterested in exploring the problematics of equating windows to painting. 
But is there perhaps a sense in which this signals a new interpretation and reshaping 
of the old metaphor? 
The notion of Surrealist painting as a ‘transparent’ art form is reinforced by 
the movement’s stylistic distance from the abstract and near-abstract modes of 
expression developed in other avant-garde movements, which do not just depict 
unfamiliar objects and scenes, but disrupt and reconfigure space itself. The 
Surrealists ‘resist[ed] the lures of nonrepresentational abstraction’, as Jay puts it; the 
                                                                  
63 Breton, Le Surréalisme et la peinture (Paris: Gallimard, 1965), p. 2. 




representative space of their paintings is recognisably linear and Euclidean, their 
frequent depiction of interior spaces and rooms echoing the geometric architectural 
structures of Renaissance perspectival painting.65 In her article ‘The Surrealists’ 
Windows’, Susan Harris Smith develops Breton’s statement by citing examples of 
Surrealist paintings which ‘encourage the viewer to look through or beyond the 
object, not at it’, arguing that in Surrealism ‘the picture itself is a window; it is not a 
flat one-dimensional surface but a conduit to another world’.66 Her arguments have 
much in common with Linda Dalrymple Henderson’s suggestion that modernist 
paintings are ‘new kinds of windows […] into a complex, invisible reality’; both 
assessments suggest that the arresting and unsettling scenes revealed by these 
windows amount to a new manifestation of the traditional metaphor, while leaving 
the accepted function of the metaphorical window unchallenged. Breton himself was 
less concerned by the function of the window itself than the nature of the scene 
beyond it, continuing: ‘mon premier souci est de savoir sur quoi elle [la fenêtre] 
donne.’67 What, then, do Surrealist ‘windows’ look out upon? Certainly not upon 
events that can be said to resemble the viewer’s own everyday experience; rather, 
their familiar and comprehensible spaces provide an arena for strange, unsettling 
scenes to play out, the former throwing the latter into relief. In Smith’s analysis, these 
are windows that do not so much look out on the external world as look in towards 
the marvellous, dreamlike landscapes of the mind. This function is emphasised, she 
argues, in paintings in which a face at a window peers into a room:  
 
That the function of a window or picture ultimately should be to allow 
introspective discovery is evident in the last category of Surrealist window 
paintings. Repeatedly in these works the face at the window is a witness to a 
bizarre action in a room. It is not stretching the point too far, given Breton’s 
early insistence on the prominence of dream and Freudian theory in 
Surrealism, to suggest that the witnesses are, in effect, looking at images from 
their own subconscious minds.68 
 
                                                                  
65 Jay, p. 246. 
66 Susan Harris Smith, ‘The Surrealists’ Windows’, Dada/Surrealism, 13 (1984), pp. 48-69 (p. 51). 
67 Le Surréalisme et la peinture, p. 2. 
68 Smith, p. 62. She cites, among other examples, Giorgio de Chirico’s The School of the Amazons (1936), 
Max Ernst’s The Virgin Spanking the Infant Jesus Before Three Witnesses […] (1928), and Joan Mirò’s The 
Family (1924), in which the witness at the window is a single large eye.  
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By this argument, the Surrealists’ modernity is evidenced by the nature of the reality 
their paintings mediate, rather than by any visible or implied engagement with the 
dialectic of immersion and awareness. But we should nonetheless be cautious about 
dismissing this dialectic as irrelevant to Surrealism. Smith’s unquestioned 
acceptance of the equivalence between window and painting is apparent in the first 
sentence of the above quotation, which suggests she considers them almost 
interchangeable. Her approach implies that ‘we should look at what windows meant 
to the surrealists in order to understand what paintings meant to them,’ as Malt 
points out.69 Yet what Smith does not acknowledge is that such an equivalence also 
has the potential to problematise, rather than reinforce, the notion of the window as 
a transparent portal. The notion that paintings are windows raises the possibility that 
any comment on the window is also a comment on painting. Thus, a painting which 
seems visually to posit such a relation must inevitably be commenting, at some level, 
on itself. Indeed, the implication that a painted witness standing at a painted window 
is a visual metaphor for a real-life viewer standing before the painting precludes any 
possibility of total transparency: if this argument is taken to its logical conclusion, 
the window motif must be acknowledged as a device which comments, however 
subtly, on the function and purpose of the painting. The equivalence between 
window and painting, rather than privileging the painting’s status as a visual 
aperture over its status as a material object, becomes another manifestation of 
modernist autoreferentiality, making an irony of the traditional metaphor while 
simultaneously paying tribute to it. The metaphor thus slots into a broader Surrealist 
schema by which, in Jay’s words, ‘representation was resurrected only to call it into 
question’.70 
 
i. La Condition humaine I 
Although, as we have seen, René Magritte’s official association with Surrealism only 
lasted from 1927 to 1930,71 he remains a primary architect of this reappropriation of 
representation, writing in 1929 that ‘tout tend à faire penser qu’il y a peu de relation 
entre un objet et ce qui le représente’.72 His work persistently plays with the 
dynamics of immersion and awareness, transparency and opacity, most famously in 
                                                                  
69 Obscure Objects, p. 182. 
70 Jay, p. 246. 
71 According to Jay, ‘he ultimately came to regret his connection’; nonetheless, ‘his work was always 
admired by Breton’ (p. 246). 
72 ‘Les Mots et les images’, in René Magritte: Ecrits complets, ed. by Andre Blavier ([Paris]: Flammarion, 
2009), p. 60 (originally published in La Révolution surréaliste). 
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La Trahison des images (1929), in which a highly figurative image of a pipe is 
accompanied by the caption ‘Ceci n’est pas une pipe’.73 Other images explicitly bring 
the figure of the window into this investigation, notably La Condition humaine I of 
1933 (fig. 10). In this painting, the scene is dominated by a large window looking out 
on a rural landscape. The view, however, is obscured by a painting on an easel, which 
represents the very same landscape as it is seen through the window and seems to 
be a replacement or continuation of it. Smith proposes this painting as an example of 
those that act ‘[as] a conduit to another world’ – that are to be looked through, rather 
                                                                  
73 In his own words: ‘the famous pipe. How people reproached me for it! And yet, could you stuff my 
pipe? No, it’s just a representation, is it not? So if I had written on my picture “this is a pipe”, I’d have 
been lying!’ (In Harry Torczyner, Magritte: The True Art of Painting, trans. by Richard Miller (New York: 
Abradale Press/Harry N. Abrams, Inc., 1985), p. 71.)  
Fig. 10: René Magritte, La Condition humaine I, 1933 
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than at. In her words, ‘the picture in front of an open window so exactly reproduces 
the landscape that the two, framed by the window curtains, are simultaneously 
distinct and united. The window is as much a painting as a painting is a window.’74  
Smith is correct in one respect – the window is ultimately a painting – but it does not 
necessarily follow that the painting must, in its turn, ‘be’ a window. Her argument 
falls prey to the temptation to attribute transparency to the painting-within-a-
painting – exactly reproducing the literal view through a window, it appears as close 
to a ‘window on the world’ as a painting can realistically be. Were it a real painting 
it could be removed from its easel and exhibited elsewhere, acting as a portable 
stand-in for the window itself. But reframed within another painting, it is imbued 
with what Proust, in a passage we will consider in due course, calls ‘l’immobilité de 
l’art’ (II, 163): solid and static, it is fixed to the view it represents and consequently 
hides it from view. We have no means of peeling it back to determine whether or not 
it is a faithful stand-in, and our inability in this regard heightens our (impossible) 
desire to look beyond it. And yet if the painting bore no resemblance to the view it 
blocked, we would likely consider the latter to be of little consequence, simply an 
arbitrary background detail. The painting, therefore, draws our attention to the view 
while simultaneously negating it, asserting its importance as it denies us access to it. 
As Patricia Allmer argues, the canvas in La Condition humaine ‘destroys the 
illusion of a holistic view on to the landscape, […] covers and fragments what 
Magritte once described as “the reason for our existence”, namely the desire to look 
beyond’.75 This impossibility of ‘looking beyond’ is a recurring theme in Magritte’s 
paintings, many of which show objects blocking or standing in for other objects: 
paintings blocking views, sheets covering bodies, a woman’s torso standing in for 
her face. According to Michel Foucault in his short study of Magritte’s work, Ceci 
n’est pas une pipe, it is also affirmed by what Foucault defines as relations of 
‘similitude’ within the paintings themselves. In his definition, similitude is opposed 
to ressemblance. The latter is a ‘vertical’, hierarchical relation between an external 
referent and its mimetic representations; it invites us to contemplate something 
outside the canvas itself. ‘La ressemblance a un “patron”,’ writes Foucault: ‘élément 
original qui ordonne et hiérarchise à partir de soi toutes les copies de plus en plus 
affaiblies qu’on peut en prendre.’76 Similitude, on the other hand, is a ‘horizontal’, 
                                                                  
74 Smith, p. 51. 
75 Patricia Allmer, René Magritte: Beyond Painting (Manchester University Press, 2010), p. 153. 
76 Michel Foucault, Ceci n’est pas une pipe (Montpellier: Éditions Fata Morgana, 1973), p. 61. This is 
Foucault’s understanding of ressemblance; however, critics have demonstrated that his interpretation 
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non-hierarchical accumulation of visual elements that bear an equivalence to each 
other, ‘se développ[ant] en séries qui n’ont ni commencement ni fin’.77 Silvano Levy 
explains that for Foucault, ‘an image should be considered to demonstrate similitude 
when it draws attention to a lateral relationship which oscillates within the painting 
alone.’78 La Condition humaine appears to draw on both these concepts: it may well be 
founded on a ressemblance with a real room and a real landscape, although we cannot 
say for sure. Meanwhile, a relation of similitude clearly plays out between the 
painting-within-a-painting and the window. But according to Foucault, similitude 
overrides ressemblance, which is ‘chassée de l’espace du tableau, exclue du rapport 
entre les choses qui renvoient l’une à l’autre’.79 By this argument, the original referent 
– the physical landscape – pales into insignificance, outdone by the dynamic of 
reciprocity between the elements within the canvas itself, which partake in ‘un jeu 
de transferts qui courent, prolifèrent, se propagent, se répondent dans le plan du 
tableau’. This is ‘[un de] ces jeux infinis de la similitude purifiée qui ne déborde 
jamais à l’extérieur du tableau’.80 The image is not a proxy for a real-world scene, but 
a self-contained world of its own. So while the figurative style of Magritte’s 
brushwork invites us to look through the painting, our ‘ray of vision’ never quite gets 
that far, but stops at the intrapictorial play of representation. At the risk of 
vulgarising Ortega’s metaphor, we could envisage this set-up as a double or 
secondary glazed window: rather than looking through both layers of glazing to the 
world outside, we look through the first but not the second, focusing our attention 
on the space between the two. 
The possibility of gesturing to a domain ‘beyond’ the canvas is doubly 
thwarted because this particular relation of similitude (unlike Magritte’s doubled 
portrait of Paul Nougé, which is the example Levy gives in his article) plays out 
between two objects with a representative or quasi-representative function. What is 
hinted at in Delaunay’s ambiguous La Tour aux rideaux is here made explicit: the 
painting’s self-referential quality inevitably brings our attention back to the medium 
                                                                  
does not quite map onto Magritte’s own. The two corresponded by letter over the terms ressemblance 
and similitude, but Silvano Levy suggests that Foucault’s text ‘bring[s] what would have been a 
contentious exchange of ideas to a premature and unwarranted conclusion’, and may well not have 
been published in its existing form ‘had Magritte not died in 1967’ (Silvano Levy, ‘Foucault on Magritte 
on Resemblance’, The Modern Language Review, 85 (January 1990), pp. 50-56 (p. 50)). I have opted to use 
Foucault’s interpretation nonetheless, on the basis that even if it is founded on a misinterpretation of 
Magritte’s ideas, it is still interesting argument in its own right that is useful for our purposes here. 
77 Foucault, p. 61. 
78 Levy, p. 51. 
79 Foucault, p. 66. 
80 Foucault, p. 71. 
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of painting itself, enforcing a cyclical mode of looking that keeps us removed from 
the world contained within the image. Reinforcing this sense of removal is what 
Allmer calls ‘the recursive accumulation of frames’ in the painting; the frame of the 
painting-within-the-painting stands before the two framed panels of the window, 
which is framed in turn by the windowsill, the curtain rail, and the curtains, with the 
whole ensemble enclosed within the physical frame of the canvas. This 
understanding of the frame as a distancing mechanism relates to its role as an 
indicator of ‘fictionality, or at least artificiality’:81  
 
Reality becomes art or representation, once the ‘here’ and ‘there’, the ‘inside’ 
and ‘outside’ are marked out, less so by the window than by its frame. The 
frame is the sign of the creation of otherness in some kind of other space 
which is not mine any longer, which I cannot penetrate, which does not 
belong to my world and yet is in my world.82 
 
The focus here is shifted to the window’s status as a physical barrier that prevents us 
from accessing the outside world, rather than as an aperture that reveals it to us. This 
altered definition raises the possibility that the comparison between window and 
painting might be reversed – that the painting might be thought of as a metaphor or 
reference point for the window, rather than the other way around. However 
convincingly ‘realistic’ a painting, we are always, and by necessity, incapable of 
physically rejoining the reality it mediates. Similarly, while we might conceivably 
reconcile ourselves with the view through a window simply by going out- or inside, 
to do so is to rob the view of its defining quality: its separateness from us. A scene that 
we look upon as outsiders is fundamentally redefined when we ourselves become 
part of it; it becomes an immersive rather than a purely visual space. The view 
through the window, then, is elusive, and can never be experienced directly. When 
understood in this way, the window is no longer simply a threshold between 
different spaces; the view it provides is better described as a visual feature of one of 
those spaces, merely a fragment or a reduction – indeed, a representation – of the 
world it reveals.  
Proust illustrates this notion beautifully in a scene from Le Côté de Guermantes, 
in which the narrator describes the windows that give onto a courtyard, and which 
                                                                  
81 Werner Wolf, via Allmer, p. 148. 
82 Allmer, p. 159. 
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offer the outsider a glimpse of the domestic life within, as an exhibition of Dutch 
genre paintings:  
 
l’extrême proximité des maisons aux fenêtres opposées sur une même cour y 
fait de chaque croisée le cadre où une cuisinière rêvasse en regardant à terre, 
où plus loin une jeune fille se laisse peigner les cheveux par une vieille à 
figure, à peine distincte dans l’ombre, de sorcière; ainsi chaque cour fait pour 
le voisin de la maison, en supprimant le bruit par son intervalle, en laissant 
voir les gestes silencieux dans un rectangle placé sous verre par la clôture des 
fenêtres, une exposition de cent tableaux hollandais juxtaposés. (II, 860) 
 
The description calls to mind images by Johannes Vermeer or Pieter de Hooch, many 
of which layer up contiguous interior and exterior spaces to create the illusion of 
depth: we might be looking upon the action from the doorway of an adjacent room, 
for example, which might itself give on to an external courtyard through a window, 
or to another room through an open door. Proust inverts these techniques of mimesis 
by having his narrator perceive actual depth – signified by the old woman standing 
in the shadows, presumably at the back of the room – as a visual effect conveyed by 
a pictorial surface. The window in this depiction is a means not just of separating 
two physical spaces, then, but of ‘virtualising’ one of the two. This counters Breton’s 
suggestion, and Smith’s development of it, that Surrealist painting is ‘window-like’ 
in its transparency. Rather, the reverse is true: windows are like paintings, Surrealist 
or otherwise – barriers that not only prevent access to the world they reveal, but 
reduce it to a representation, a fiction. Thus, even without allowing for the distancing 
effect of similitude, we are separated from the view in La Condition humaine by three 
layers of representation: first by the window itself, then the canvas that stands before 
it, and finally the actual physical painting that contains these first two frames. 
For this reason, the image does reach beyond the domain of the canvas in a 
conceptual, if not a visual sense. According to Magritte himself, these mechanisms of 
removal are representative of a wider issue not limited to the process of painting and 
framing: that is, although we perceive the world as external to us, our only possible 
experience of it is as a visual imprint inside of us. We will never experience the 
objective reality of what we see; before painting or windows, we are first distanced 
from the world around us – cast as outsiders – by our own subjectivity. This is the 




Le problème de la fenêtre donna La Condition humaine. Je plaçai devant une 
fenêtre, vue de l’intérieur d’une chambre, un tableau représentant 
exactement la partie de paysage masquée par ce tableau. L’arbre représenté 
sur ce tableau cachait donc l’arbre situé derrière lui, hors de la chambre. Il se 
trouvait pour le spectateur à la fois à l’intérieur de la chambre sur le tableau 
et à la fois à l’extérieur, par la pensée, dans le paysage réel. C’est ainsi que 
nous voyons le monde. Nous le voyons à l’extérieur de nous-mêmes et 
cependant nous n’en avons qu’une représentation en nous.83 
 
This reasoning calls to mind two distinct forms of space, defined by the 
mathematician Henri Poincaré: l’espace géométrique and l’espace représentatif, which 
can be broadly understood as objective and subjective space. L’espace géométrique is 
inaccessible to us, and we are able to experience only a representation of it: 
 
Il nous est aussi impossible de nous représenter les corps extérieurs dans 
l’espace géométrique, qu’il est impossible à un peintre de peindre, sur un 
tableau plan, des objets avec leurs trois dimensions. L’espace représentatif 
n’est qu’une image de l’espace géométrique, image déformée par une sorte 
de perspective, et nous ne pouvons nous représenter les objets qu’en les pliant 
aux lois de cette perspective.84 
 
While we may think of the space we see as ‘true space’, it is in fact an illusion, akin 
to the illusion of three-dimensional space presented by linear perspective. Poincaré 
was among those who had theorised on the possible existence of a fourth dimension; 
his position thus assumes that the true nature of space is far more complex than our 
eyes will allow.85 His argument gives credence to W. J. T. Mitchell’s much later claim 
that ‘there is no neutral, univocal, “visible world” there to match things against, no 
unmediated “facts” about what or how we see’. Thus, Mitchell continues, 
                                                                  
83 ‘La Ligne de vie II’, in Ecrits complets, p. 144. 
84 Henri Poincaré, La Science et l’hypothèse (Paris: Flammarion, 1968), p. 82. 
85 Poincare’s ideas were popular, as is suggested in Le Côté de Guermantes when Robert de Saint-Loup, 
in a discussion of military tactics, remarks: ‘rappelle-toi le grand mathématicien Poincaré, il n’est pas 
sûr que les mathématiques soient rigoureusement exactes.’ (II, 414.) That Proust puts this observation 
in the mouth of the aristocratic Saint-Loup might be suggestive of the prevalence of new theories about 
space; Allen Thiher argues that it ‘points up that […] something as esoteric as concern about the 
foundations of mathematics, brought about by the puzzles proposed by non-Euclidean geometry, could 
occupy the usually frivolous aristocracy of the Faubourg Saint-Germain’ (Allen Thiher, Fiction Refracts 




if vision itself is a product of experience and acculturation – including the 
experience of making pictures – then what we are matching against pictorial 
representations is not any sort of naked reality but a world already clothed in 
our systems of representation.86 
 
We might here extend the window metaphor beyond the realm of art, and consider 
it emblematic of the way we see: through the ‘frame’ of the physical limits to our 
vision, and the ‘screen’ of our own subject position, which can never be broken 
through and is irreconcilable with objective, essential reality. I am reminded of 
another famous window metaphor of the Renaissance – Leonardo’s dictum that the 
eye is the ‘window of the soul’ (not to be confused with the somewhat hackneyed 
saying, of uncertain origin, that ‘the eyes are the windows to the soul’).87 By this 
reasoning, however, the eyes are the ‘windows of the soul’ not because they enable 
vision, but because they restrict it. La Condition humaine seems intended not merely 
as a metaphor for the inadequacies of the human eye, but as a comment on the 
inevitable fate of painting in a world that cannot be experienced except as an image. 
A medium that attempts to represent reality can never fully succeed if all of ‘reality’ 
is already itself a representation; it cannot simply trace or copy an original when the 
true nature of that original must always be in doubt. Like the canvas-within-the-
canvas, mimetic painting might purport to enable us to see, but in fact removes us 
by one step further from a reality that can never fully be grasped. 
 
 
IV. Proust’s Window Paintings 
 
As was discussed in the introduction to this thesis, it has been observed that the 
narrator of the Recherche displays a marked tendency ‘to represent objects and scenes 
ekphrastically – as things already represented on flat surfaces (as paintings)’.88 A 
                                                                  
86 W.J.T. Mitchell, Iconology: Image, Text, Ideology (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 
1986), p. 38. 
87 See Leonardo da Vinci, A Treatise on Painting, trans. by A. Philip McMahon, 2 vols (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1956), I, p. 18. 
88 Baldwin, The Material Object in the Work of Marcel Proust (Oxford, Bern et al.: Peter Lang, 2005), p. 103. 
David Mendelson has given a similar argument, quoted in my introduction: ‘déjà à Combray, nous le 
surprenons à transformer tel ou tel paysage qui lui est cher en un objet d’art dépourvu de matérialité, 
presque irréel.’ (Le Verre, p. 129.) 
 
134 
particularly pertinent example occurs in a passage in the second half of A l’ombre des 
jeunes filles en fleurs, before the encounter with Elstir, in which the narrator constructs 
a ‘musée imaginaire’ by looking out of his hotel room window.89 It is the occasion for 
a Magrittean blurring of the boundaries between reality and representation, and one 
which looks ahead to the ‘exhibition’ of tableaux hollandais; it plays with the 
traditional equivalence between window and painting by suggesting not that artistic 
representations enable us to see, but that seeing is already a form of representation. 
The narrator is ostensibly taking a siesta and preparing to dine at Rivebelle, but the 
narrative is paused while he describes the scene from the window as it appears over 
the course of the season. As the summer wears on, his successive views of the sea 
resemble an array of paintings of varying styles and genres: at the height of the 
season, the foam of the sea is as delicately outlined as a drawing by Pisanello; seen 
through the window pane there is an enamel quality and a fixity to it akin to Gallé’s 
glasswork. As the nights begin to draw in, the view starts to resemble an altarpiece, 
and then a collection of Japanese prints. Later still it reminds the narrator of one of 
Whistler’s Harmonies, awash with grey.90 Sometimes the illusion is so deceptive that 
he comes close to believing that the scene before him is a fiction: 
 
si, sous ma fenêtre, le vol inlassable et doux des martinets et des hirondelles 
n’avait pas monté comme un jet d’eau, comme un feu d’artifice de vie, 
unissant l’intervalle de ses hautes fusées par la filée immobile et blanche de 
longs sillages horizontaux, sans le miracle charmant naturel et local qui 
rattachait à la réalité les paysages que j’avais devant les yeux, j’aurais pu 
croire qu’ils n’étaient qu’un choix, chaque jour renouvelé, de peintures qu’on 
montrait arbitrairement dans l’endroit où je me trouvais et sans qu’elles 
eussent de rapport nécessaire avec lui. (II, 162) 
 
Here the Albertian metaphor, in which the painting gives the illusion of reality and 
physical depth as if it were a window, is directly inverted; instead, the view from the 
window gives the illusion of falsity and flatness, as if it were a painting. The notion 
                                                                  
89 This scene seems also to be encompassed within what Bal calls the ‘museum effect’, one of a number 
of visualising effects in the novel, which occurs ‘when the visible world that cannot be encompassed is 
represented as a juxtaposition of flat images’ (‘All in the Family’, p. 70). 
90 This seems also to be the occasion for one of the narrator’s own experiences of precognitive vision, 
which he will later refer to in the Elstir scene: ‘Parfois l’océan emplissait presque toute ma fenêtre, 
surélevée qu’elle était par une bande de ciel bordée en haut seulement d’une ligne qui était du même 
bleu que celui de la mer, mais qu’à cause de cela je croyais être la mer encore et ne devant sa couleur 
différente qu’à un effet d’éclairage.’ (II, 162-163.) 
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that the painting might be an appropriate metaphor for the window, rather than the 
other way around, is here taken further; the narrator does not merely compare the 
view to painting, but actually believes – or at least, very nearly believes – that it is a 
painting. Rather than suspending his disbelief in a fiction, he suspends his belief in 
the three-dimensional materiality of what he sees. The whole passage operates in a 
constant state of interstitial indeterminacy: we are dealing with quasi-ekphrastic 
descriptions of not-quite paintings, a reality that is not quite real and in which the 
narrator does not quite believe. 
As Baldwin points out in a discussion of this passage, the notion that the 
‘paintings’ are displayed ‘arbitrairement […] sans qu’elles eussent de rapport 
nécessaire avec [l’endroit où je me trouvais]’ raises questions about their relation to 
the actual, physical view through the window:  
 
[The narrator] seems to be denying that they are of the scene outside, that is 
to say, that there is any direct (or even relatively indirect) genetic connection 
between the paintings and what he can see through his window. This denial 
is unsettling: it suggests that the paintings could be of anything at all, or that 
they might be of another seascape – just not this one.91 
 
And yet, Baldwin continues, the swifts and swallows that dart across the ‘image’ 
serve to link it back to material reality and to reassert a causal link between the 
‘paintings’ and the view. This ambiguous instability leaves open the possibility that 
the ‘image’ both is and is not real. It is almost as if the narrator’s hotel room is a real-
life version of the room in Magritte’s La Condition humaine, in which the view through 
the window has been blocked by a painting that may or may not be an accurate 
depiction of it – the difference being that the ‘image’ is not detachable from the 
window in this case, but fills it. The set-up is also reminiscent of a later painting of 
Magritte’s: La Lunette d’approche, of 1963, which depicts a window that appears to 
look out over the sea. The right-hand windowpane, however, stands slightly ajar, 
revealing a black emptiness that seems to undercut the seascape, as if the latter is an 
image attached to the window glass rather than a physical space beyond the window. 
Yet if we look closely we find we can see the outer window frame through the top 
left-hand corner of the open pane, which raises the possibility that the glass is 
transparent after all, and that the seascape exists somewhere beyond the window, 
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rather than within it. This illogical combination of elements creates an indeterminacy 
that can never be resolved, magnifying the difficulty of distinguishing between 
image and reality that Proust’s text implies. 
Like that in La Lunette d’approche, the Balbec seascape appears not simply as 
an image beyond the glass, but an image in the glass. The sea appears ‘dans la verre 
glauque et qu’elle boursouflait de ses vagues rondes […] sertie entre les montants de 
fer de ma croisée comme dans les plombs d’un vitrail’ (II, 160). The image is fixed in 
place by the structure of the window, turning the glass blue-green and causing it to 
bloat and swell; where we might expect the glass to distort the view, the view has 
instead altered the very substance and quality of the glass. The stained-glass window 
simile implies both that the glass itself has become the focus of the gaze, and that in 
doing so it has obscured what actually lies beyond it. This recalls not only La Lunette 
d’approche, but also Marcel Duchamp’s satirising of the window metaphor in both the 
Grand Verre, or La Mariée mise à nue par ses célibataires, même (1915-23), and the Petit 
Verre, or A regarder d’un œil, de près, pendant presque une heure (1918). In both of these 
works, an image is painted not on a canvas, but on a glass pane, robbing the glass of 
its transparency. It is as if Duchamp, with characteristic irony, is setting out to 
demonstrate that a painting that is literally a window cannot be seen through at all. 
Yet traditionally, the role of stained glass is not so much to visually block off 
‘reality’, but to remind the viewer of a domain outside the material world. Are we to 
suppose, then, that the ‘vitrail’ to which the narrator refers might have some link to 
a new aspect or level of his reality? I would suggest, in fact, that the seascape 
represents the virtual, spectral reality of art and religion, and that the window is the 
gateway between this domain and its competitor: the empirical, superficial reality of 
the mundane and the mondain. The image of the stained glass is combined with 
strong overtones of religiosity in the narrator’s descriptions of what he sees outside: 
the setting sun, ‘[pareil] à la représentation de quelque signe miraculeux, de quelque 
apparition mystique’, moves towards the sea ‘comme un tableau religieux au-dessus 
du maître-autel’, while the reflection of the same scene in the windows of the 
bookcase behind him recalls the detached panels of an altarpiece. In an earlier 
passage, looking through the open window in the hallway prior to entering his room, 
the narrator allows himself ‘un instant d’adoration’ to ‘faire [s]es dévotions’ before 
the view of a cottage on a hillside, which reminds him of the miniature, ornamental 
buildings often used as reliquaries (II, 160). That the religiosity of these descriptions 
appears in parallel with references to secular art implies a reciprocal relation between 
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art and religion that is later made explicit in the narrator’s encounter with Elstir, who, 
like God, creates the world anew from his ‘laboratoire d’une sorte de nouvelle 
création du monde’ (II, 191). This implied connection between artistic and religious 
creation not only casts artists as mythical, quasi-deific figures, but also ranks their 
paintings at a level of importance and substance equal to God’s own work – the 
material world, les choses. Thus, the ‘paintings’ seen through the window are 
fundamentally real, whether three dimensional or not, tied to a higher, non-material 
reality. The image of the reliquary, implying as it does that the view is the container 
of some essential quality or object, recalls the narrator’s obsession with pinning down 
the essences that will enable understanding of such realities. It suggests that this may 
be another of those occasions on which he will attempt to detect the essential truth 
of what he sees, like at Martinville or Hudimesnil – that he will not settle for an 
understanding of the ‘images’ as mere representations, but will embark on an 
immersive, quasi-intuitive search for the ‘truth’ of the scene before him.  
But this is not, in fact, what happens. For one thing, the narrator cannot 
intuitively immerse himself in the window-image because to do so would be to rob 
it of its ‘image-ness’: looking ‘clear through’ the – literal, non-metaphorical – window 
would mean fully accepting the material reality of the view, at the expense of the 
very indeterminacy that set it apart in the first place. To continue operating in its 
uncertain, interstitial domain, the narrator’s ‘ray of vision’ must stop at the glass, or 
somewhere just beyond it. And yet, the narrator does not really look at the window-
image any more than he looks through it. He does observe some pictorial details, but 
he is largely preoccupied with thoughts of the outfit he will wear to Rivebelle, of the 
women he will encounter there and of the petite bande de jeunes filles – Albertine and 
her friends – whom he has glimpsed for the first time that afternoon. In his 
appreciation of the paintings he is, in Baldwin’s words, ‘essentially “only” parading 
his sophistication and taste’; in Mendelson’s, ‘c’est bien “l’amateur” qui s’adresse ici 
à nous, et non le créateur, qui reste encore à naître.’92 Later, he will learn to prioritise 
art over the trivial distractions of society, but for the moment he has learned no such 
lesson. Like a passenger in one of the boats on the horizon (‘comme si j’avais été sur 
la couchette d’un des bateaux que je voyais assez près de moi’), he is ‘de tous côtés 
entouré des images de la mer’ (II, 161), but is unable to engage with them as anything 
other than flat, arbitrary forms: 
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138 
bien souvent ce n’était, en effet, que des images; j’oubliais que sous leur 
couleur se creusait le triste vide de la plage, parcouru par le vent inquiet du 
soir. […] L’attente du dîner à Rivebelle rendait mon humeur plus frivole 
encore et ma pensée […] était incapable de mettre de la profondeur derrière 
la couleur des choses. (II, 161-162) 
 
That the beach goes unnoticed and invisible suggests an elimination of the 
physical distance that separates the narrator from the view: the ‘painting’ has been 
brought forward, towards the window. The hollow, melancholy emptiness of the 
beach, and the movement of the wind across it, are looked over and seen through. 
The view, then, has been rendered pure surface, robbed of its physical depth and 
consequently of its cruelly realistic elements – the ‘triste vide de la plage’ and the 
‘vent inquiet du soir’. But it has also lost its metaphorical depth: the narrator’s 
distracted mind is unable to accord it any significance except as an object of casual 
acknowledgement and appreciation. What is curious about this passage is that the 
proximity and the sequence of these two observations imply a correlation between 
them, suggesting that physical flatness and metaphorical superficiality are natural 
allies. Both are offered as evidence for the successive views being ‘que des images’, a 
construction suggesting that the physical view is in some way degraded by its 
resemblance to a painting. We might write this off as an anomaly: should we not 
expect the older narrator to know better, since he is to provide a lengthy analysis of 
the philosophical and metaphorical significance of Elstir’s (flat) canvases, only a few 
pages later? 93 But we might also take this passage as evidence that the ‘image’, as a 
category and a concept, has more than one role to play. Proust here puts forward a 
possibility ignored in the ‘immersion vs. awareness’ debate, which accepts without 
question the importance of attending to the image as an independent entity: that the 
latter might also exist merely as a subsidiary of its context, as a ‘nice picture’ with no 
autonomy or meaning of its own. The balance (or competition) between immersion 
in and awareness of the image might equally be made irrelevant by a more powerful 
call on the viewer’s attention: that is to say, by the wider world, of which the picture 
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is a part. In this scenario, the image is still the site of an oscillation – not between 
immersion and awareness, but between indifference and engagement. It awaits an 
external pair of eyes to cement its identity as either an element of a broader context 
or an object of attention in its own right. Its meaning, crucially, is as much a product 
of the subject looking as of the image-object itself – and aspiring young intellectuals, 
it seems, are no less likely than frivolous society figures to ignore an image’s cerebral 
potential in favour of a more superficial, platitudinous understanding. 
 
Oscillation between two modes of engagement is not the sole preserve of the 
window: it is also a defining factor in the linguistic workings of the passage itself. 
The virtual and the actual exist throughout in a state of awkward, indefinable 
ambiguity, but they are also brought together with surprising immediacy: 
 
parfois sur le ciel et la mer uniformément gris, un peu de rose s’ajoutait avec 
un raffinement exquis, cependant qu’un petit papillon qui s’était endormi au 
bas de la fenêtre semblait apposer avec ses ailes, au bas de cette ‘harmonie 
gris et rose’ dans le goût de celles de Whistler, la signature favorite du maître 
de Chelsea. Le rose même disparaissait, il n’y avait plus rien à regarder. Je me 
mettais debout un instant et avant de m’étendre de nouveau, je fermais les 
grands rideaux. (II, 163; my emphasis) 
 
Here the discussion moves without warning (and with no change in tense) from the 
hypothetical to the here and now – from an occasional occurrence to an immediate 
action. Two separate levels of the narrative are at once united and juxtaposed, in 
much the same way as the interior of the room and the distant view beyond are both 
united and juxtaposed by the butterfly in the window, and as Whistler’s butterfly 
symbol, which he used as a signature, unites the fiction of his paintings with the 
presence of the artist who constructed it. The butterfly bridges the separation, created 
by the window in the first case and the picture surface in the second, between the 
virtual and actual realms. The transition between two narrative levels, meanwhile, 
functions as a textual representation of the possibility of transitioning between 
different ‘levels’ of engagement with an image.  
 Moreover, Isabelle Zuber’s analysis, in her study of Proust’s seascapes, 
implies that we can also consider the passage itself to be a metaphorical ‘seen 
window’ – a window at the level of form as well as of content. Zuber finds a 
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particular significance in the following sentence, in which the narrator expresses 
disdain towards his younger, more superficial self: ‘avec le regard dédaigneux, 
ennuyé et frivole d’un amateur ou d’une femme parcourant, entre deux visites 
mondaines, une galerie, je me disais: “C’est curieux, ce coucher de soleil, c’est 
différent, mais enfin j’en ai déjà vu d’aussi délicats, d’aussi étonnants que celui-ci.”’ 
(II, 162) It would read more fluidly, she argues, if Proust had placed ‘une galerie’ 
directly after ‘parcourant’, and the fact that he has not done so is significant. His 
decision to chop the sentence into parts, she writes, creates a stilted rhythm that 
reflects the episodic nature of the gallery visits: ‘comme dans la réalité où la visite de 
la galerie forme une sorte d’intermezzo entre deux épisodes, elle coupe ici la phrase 
en deux.’94 This idea is particularly intriguing for our purposes because it also an 
accurate representation of the window as an object, in its capacity as an ‘intermezzo’, 
a limin or an entre-deux that cuts something in two.95 In that sense, the passage itself 
is a form of window, as other elements of Zuber’s analysis imply. It operates in its 
own domain, she suggests, partly as a result of the almost exclusive use of the 
imperfect tense throughout the passage, which contrasts with the frequent use of the 
simple past in the pages that precede and follow it. The imperfect is of course the 
tense of continuity and movement – ‘throughness’, so to speak –  as opposed to the 
stasis and completion of the simple past, so in this regard it is as if two solid, simple 
past ‘walls’ surround an imperfect ‘window’.  
Moreover, Zuber continues, the description of an entire season within what 
is ostensibly a brief pause between two social engagements situates the passage in a 
separate temporal sphere, outside the flow of the narrative: 
 
La série de tableaux vue à travers la fenêtre de la chambre d’hôtel du héros 
ressort du texte narratif qui l’entoure en se distinguant nettement de ce qui la 
précède et de ce qui la suit […] il s’agit surtout d’un moment d’arrêt dans la 
narration, de ce que Paul Ricœur, au sujet d’autres textes, nomme “station 
contemplative” […] grace à la remémoration de toute la saison, cette “station 
contemplative” semble bien plus longue que le temps que met le héros à 
regarder le paysage.96 (112-113) 
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95 This inevitably recalls André Breton’s famous description, in first Surrealist manifesto, of a dream in 
which a man is ‘coupé en deux par la fenêtre’ (Breton, p. 31). 




The role of the passage as it is described here is closely comparable to the typical role 
of the window in a literary text, as Zuber describes it earlier on in her study: ‘les 
fenêtres et les perspectives plongeantes sont des points névralgiques du récit, des 
nœuds où le cours narratif s’arrête. La pose du spectateur à ce moment réclame une 
pause de l’action, tandis qu’il s’absorbe dans le paysage.’97 I would suggest that both 
this passage in Proust’s text and the window it describes might then be described as 
‘stations contemplatives’, atemporal sites of stasis and reflection. Yet the narrator’s 
inability to forget the encounters of the afternoon just past and of the evening ahead 
prevents total suspension from the flow of narrative events. Much like the meta-
linguistic references in his discussion of Elstir’s paintings, the continued references 
to worldly concerns serve as a reference back to what Zuber calls ‘le premier niveau 
du récit’ and as a reminder of the passage’s situation within a longer text, just as the 
material of the window – the glass, wood, and metal – might remind us of its position 
within an overall architectural structure.98  
 
There is one final metaphor to call on. Although I note above that the passage is like 
a window because it functions in an atemporal zone apart, Zuber also suggests that 
Proust envisaged the seascapes ‘comme des “morceaux”, détachables du reste’, 
evidenced by the fact that he submitted them as independent pieces for publication 
in the Nouvelle Revue française.99 If the passage can in fact be broken apart and 
recontextualised, the metaphor of a gallery of images might be just as appropriate as 
that of the window. Certainly Zuber herself seems to favour it: 
 
le fait que le passage soit tiré hors du temps, devienne quelque chose qui a sa 
propre temporalité, le distingue nettement de ce qui l’entoure, l’isole, et en 
fait une sorte de monument, une galerie précisément, à l’intérieur du texte.100 
 
The gallery is a space of reflection and contemplation that provides both a sanctuary 
from the forward push of everyday life and an erratic experience of chronology: the 
visitor can hop from century to century as she moves from room to room, spending 
longer on the eras that most interest her and skipping others altogether. This process 
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in itself bears a certain resemblance to the writing of the passage under discussion: 
the gallery visitor, wandering autonomously as and where she desires, ‘edits’ the 
images into a personal chronology. The visit (though inevitably punctuated by 
objective factual information) also becomes an internal journey of sense- and 
meaning-making, played out in a private, non-standard temporality. The gallery is, 
in more than one sense, a ‘station contemplative’. 
All experiences of a gallery are in some way sequential, and the passage’s use 
of sequence further upholds the metaphor. At its most basic, it is a sequence of quasi-
ekphrastic descriptions, like a textual exhibition. Zuber also notes that the view from 
the hotel window, which gives on to the same subject at different hours of the day 
and at the same hour of different days, ‘[rappelle] implicitement la pratique de 
certains impressionnistes, notamment de Monet, qui créait des series consistant en 
des tableaux du meme sujet vus à différents moments’.101 A version of this same 
practice occurs quite by chance in the reflection of the view in the glass of the 
bookcase: 
 
les différentes vitrines de la bibliothèque montrant des nuages semblables 
mais dans une autre partie de l’horizon et diversement coloré par la lumière, 
paraissaient offrir comme la répétition, chère à certains maîtres 
contemporains, d’un seul et même effet, pris toujours à des heures différentes 
mais qui maintenant avec l’immobilité de l’art pouvaient être tous vus 
ensemble dans une même pièce, exécutés au pastel et mis sous verre. (II, 163) 
 
Sequence here is in itself a form of atemporality, enabled only by ‘l’immobilité de 
l’art’, or the painting’s exemption from the process of evolution that will inevitably 
alter its subject. As Zuber points out, the sequence of descriptions also forms ‘une 
sorte de coucher de soleil, puisqu’elle commence avec le “grand jour” pour finir avec 
la nuit’.102 Moreover, it begins with the long, bright evenings of the high season and 
ends with the grey light of the season’s end, and is thus embryonic of a broader, 
metaphorical ‘coucher de soleil’: the transformation of summer into autumn. While 
the images in the bookcase are a sequence made static, here natural sequence is 
condensed and accelerated. Both are processes that can be compared to the gallery 
                                                                  
101 Ibid., p. 113. 
102 Ibid., p. 117. 
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visit, the sequential aspect of which is shaped, accelerated and stilled by the visitor’s 
movement through it. 
The passage, then, is at once a textual window and a textual gallery of images 
that encloses the ‘window-images’ of its subject matter: a merging of entities and a 
use of mise-en-abyme highly reminiscent of Magritte’s self-referential, ironic use of 
the window motif. I would suggest, in fact, that Magritte’s paintings and this passage 
can be seen as contrasting interpretations of the same subject matter. Both see the 
window, the painting and the combination of the two as sites of ambiguity and 
fluctuation between the virtual and the actual. To Proust’s narrator, virtuality at 
times seems like the dominant force over material reality, only prevented from taking 
over completely by the flight of the birds before the window, while at others, his 
preoccupation with the evening ahead of him reasserts the material and subsumes 
the virtual. This vacillation is echoed in both La Condition humaine and La Lunette 
d’approche, in which the material is continually alluded to and thus retained as a 
persistent presence within the virtual world of the image. Proust and Magritte use 
the motif and metaphor of the window as an opportunity both to explore the merging 
of worlds and spaces, and to trouble the boundaries between them. As a result, the 
window and the painting, and the relationship between the two, are liminal and 
indeterminate: in Proust, a window represents an actual view that is almost but not 
quite a painting, while in La Condition humaine and La Lunette d’approche, actual 
paintings portray windows – and paintings-within-paintings – that give on to 
ambiguous and indeterminate views. All superimpose and juxtapose layers of the 
‘real’ and the illusory, the virtual and the material, the image and the object, 
complicating any attempt we might make to definitively categorise the viewer as 
either immersed in the represented world of the image or aware of its status as an 
object. What emerges more broadly from these works, and those of Delaunay, is a 
scenario in which the metaphor of the window, aided by its representation as a motif 
in a text or image, is reappropriated in a twentieth-century context to support 
multiple modes of viewing and reading.
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3. Technologies of Speed: Moving Observer, Moving 
Observed 
 
Introduction: The Culture of Speed 
 
I now turn away from questions relating to actual artists and art objects and towards 
a more implicit relation between broader cultural phenomena and art as both a 
formal and representational practice. My focus is on the ongoing development of 
mechanised transport technologies, one of the period’s most transformative 
influences on perceptions of the world and of the objects in it. The nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries were shaped by the invention and growth of the train, the 
bicycle, the car, and the aeroplane; in the space of a hundred years the way human 
beings travelled through space had changed beyond all recognition, and was 
continuing to do so as Proust wrote his novel and the avant-gardes developed new 
styles of painting. Proust, for one, was enthused by these developments. A self-
described ‘fervent d’automobilisme’,1 he was wealthy enough to indulge his interest 
well before mass production made the new technologies affordable for everyone else, 
as William Carter has observed.2 He hired the machine-obsessed Alfred Agostinelli 
as a chauffeur, for example, with whom he embarked on numerous motoring 
excursions around the Normandy countryside (which would inspire the account in 
‘Journées en automobile’, of 1907, and thus, by extension, the Martinville episode of 
Du Côté de chez Swann). He was also an acquaintance of the Duc Armand de Guiche, 
Carter recounts, ‘a pioneer in aerodynamics who stimulated [his] interest in aviation 
well before […] Agostinelli […] began to study flying.’3 Proust’s enthusiasm finds its 
way into the Recherche on numerous occasions: as well as the Martinville episode, the 
novel is punctuated with rides in trains and cars, aeroplane sightings and encounters 
with young cyclists. 
 Many of those in the avant-garde saw the new technologies as integral to their 
art. The Italian Futurists were famously passionate about mechanised movement and 
speed. Marinetti had eulogised on the allure of the automobile (his ‘beautiful shark’) 
in the ‘The Founding and Manifesto of Futurism’, published on the front page of Le 
                                                                  
1 Letter to Antoine Bibesco, 1907 (Correspondance, VII, p. 296). 
2 Carter, p. 2. 
3 Ibid. See Chapter 1 of Carter’s study (‘The Age of Speed’) for a detailed account of the changes wrought 
by these new technologies, and the book as a whole for biographical information about the role they 
played in Proust’s life.   
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Figaro in 1909;4 three years later, in ‘The Technical Manifesto of Futurist Literature’, 
he declared that he had ‘sensed the ridiculous inanity of the old syntax’ while sitting 
on the fuel tank of an aeroplane, the ‘whirling propeller’ of which had told him 
precisely what must be done with language to render it worthy of Futurism 
(destroying syntax, abolishing adjectives, adverbs, punctuation, and so on).5 His love 
of the car found its pictorial correlate in the painter Giacomo Balla’s heady, abstract 
depictions of speed, while other motifs of the mechanical age appear in the works of 
his colleagues – a tram in the work of Carlo Carrà, for example, and trains in that of 
Gino Severini and Umberto Boccioni, the latter of whom also depicted cycling in his 
stunning Dynamism of a Cyclist, of 1913. The Futurists were by no means alone in their 
love of mechanised movement. Jean Metzinger’s series of paintings of racing cyclists, 
which will be considered in this chapter, was the fruit of his own enthusiasm for the 
sport: he recalled in the 1950s that ‘he had won a bet in 1912 against Gleizes and 
Jacques Villon (with Fernand Léger as enthusiastic onlooker) to ride a bicycle 
nonstop over 100km in the Parisian Vel d’Hiv arena’.6  In 1923 Léger himself would 
defend his own use of machines as motifs in his painting against criticisms from his 
contemporaries (‘on m’a violemment critiqué en 1918-1919 d’avoir abordé l’élément 
méchanique comme possibilité plastique’.)7 He also provided an oft-cited account of 
a trip he made to the Paris Air Show with Marcel Duchamp and Constantin Brancusi 
(‘probably in 1912’, according to Christoph Asendorf),8 which gives an insight into 
Duchamp’s own enthusiasm for the aesthetic potential of the new technologies: 
‘Marcel qui était un type sec, avec quelque chose d’insaisissable en lui, se promenait 
au milieu des moteurs, des hélices sans dire un mot. Puis tout à coup, il s’adressa à 
Brancusi: “C’est fini la peinture. Qui fera mieux que cette hélice? Dis, tu peux faire 
ça?”’9  
                                                                  
4 F. T. Marinetti, ‘The Founding and Manifesto of Futurism’ [1909], in Futurist Manifestos, pp. 19-24 (21): 
‘They thought it was dead, my beautiful shark, but a caress from me was enough to revive it; and there 
it was, alive again, running on its powerful fins!’ 
5 ‘Technical Manifesto of Futurist Literature’ [1912], in Modernism: An Anthology, ed. by Lawrence 
Rainey (Malden, MA, Oxford, et al.: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), pp. 15-19 (15-16). 
6 Erasmus Weddigen and Sonya Weddigen-Schmid, ‘A Short Cycle Ride Through Art History towards 
New Dimensions’ in Cycling, Cubo-Futurism and the Fourth Dimension: Jean Metzinger’s At the Cycle-Race 
Track, curated by Erasmus Weddigen (New York: The Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation, 2012), pp. 
10-29 (p. 13). 
7 ‘L’Esthétique de la machine et de l’object: note sur l’élément méchanique’ [1923] in Fonctions de la 
peinture (Paris: Éditions Gonthier, 1965), pp. 50-52 (p. 50). 
8 Christoph Asendorf, ‘The Propeller and the Avant-Garde: Léger, Duchamp, Brancusi’, in Fernand 
Léger, 1911-1924: The Rhythm of Modern Life, ed. by Dorothy Kosinski (Munich and New York: Preste, 
1994), pp. 203-209 (p. 203). 
9 Cited in Dora Vallier, ‘La Vie fait l’œuvre de Fernand Léger: Propos de l’artiste recueillis’, Cahiers d’Art, 
29 (October, 1954), 133-172 (p. 140). 
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That Proust also saw a link between art and mechanised movement is 
suggested in Clayton Alcorn’s observation that ‘the subject of art, beauty and 
esthetics arises directly or indirectly in all of the passages [of the Recherche] which 
treat at any length the attributes of a particular mode of transport’.10 The manner in 
which the new technologies can be seen to have interwoven with parallel 
developments in art will be one of my areas of investigation in this chapter. Certainly, 
they provided new artistic subject matter: in her analysis of the role of transport 
technologies in Proust’s Recherche, Sara Danius observes that such technologies make 
the world appear new, ‘as if it ha[s] just been born’.11 This is partly, she argues, 
‘because the world itself is new’ (123; my emphasis) – full of strange objects that are 
not instantly recognisable, such as the aeroplane that the narrator sees on his second 
visit to Balbec, the sight of which reduces him to tears (this episode will be examined 
here in due course).12 But for the earliest passengers, as my analysis in Chapter 1 
suggested, the new mechanised vehicles were not just objects seen from the outside, 
nor even just instruments of movement, but optical tools that altered the seen world, 
seemingly changing the actual properties of the spaces through which they travelled. 
Indeed, if vision is above all a bodily mechanism, as Jonathan Crary has suggested, 
it follows that it would have been affected by the body’s newly heightened capacity 
of movement. Transport technologies did not just replicate the functioning of the eye, 
like the stereoscope, or see in a way that the eye was unable to, like 
chronophotography; rather, by acting upon the whole body, of which the eye was a 
part, they drastically altered the eye’s relationship to its object and to the space that 
it inhabited. Wolfgang Schivelbusch has demonstrated that the train in particular 
had a radical, paradoxical effect on space and distance: drastically increasing the 
spatial radius to which individuals had access, as the car and the bicycle would do 
later, its earliest passengers bore witness not simply to a shrinking of journey times, 
but an apparent shrinking of space itself. At the same time, space was also 
experienced as expanded: ‘this diminution of space,’ Schivelbusch writes, ‘[…] 
caused an expansion of transport space by incorporating new areas into the transport 
network. The nation’s contraction into a metropolis […] conversely appeared as an 
expansion of the metropolis.’13 Seen from the window of a speeding vehicle, this 
                                                                  
10 Clayton Alcorn, ‘Cars, Trains, Planes and Proust’, Nineteenth-Century French Studies, 14 (Fall-Winter 
1985), pp. 153–161 (p. 157). 
11 Danius, p. 108. 
12 Ibid., p. 123; my emphasis. 
13 Wolfgang Schivelbusch, The Railway Journey: The Industrialization of Time and Space in the 19th Century 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: The University of California Press, 1986), p. 35. 
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simultaneously expanded and contracted space also appeared to be in motion, as the 
French writer Octave Mirbeau suggests in his autobiographical novel, La 628-E8, an 
account of a motoring trip around Europe: ‘la vie de partout se précipite, se bouscule, 
animée d’un mouvement fou [….] Tout autour de [l’homme], et en lui, saute, danse, 
galope, est en mouvement, en mouvement inverse de son propre mouvement.’14 
 Of course, the influence of transport technologies on the body did not stop 
with the perceptive faculty. Numerous claims were made regarding the 
physiological risks posed by early mechanised transport: the lack of suspension in 
steam trains, for example, caused a ceaseless vibration that impacted on the bodies 
of travellers, with a pamphlet published by The Lancet in 1862 observing that ‘the 
frequency, rapidity, and peculiar abruptness of the motion of railway-carriages keep 
thus a constant strain on the muscles; and to this must be ascribed a part of that sense 
of bodily fatigue, almost amounting to soreness, which is felt after a long journey’. 
Moreover, the noise of the train was ‘of an intensity and pitch that are truly damaging 
to ears and nerves’.15 The bicycle, with its more direct relation to the human body, 
gave rise to numerous claims about its physiological effects, both positive and 
negative. Riders were warned against ‘bicycle stoop’, the result of arching one’s back 
for long stretches on a racing bike, and ‘bicycle face’, ‘a contorted appearance 
supposedly brought on by [the riders’] incessant struggle to keep their vehicle in 
balance’, in David V. Herlihy’s words.16 Cycling was considered particularly risky 
for women, doubtless by those who feared the social ramifications of this new source 
of female freedom of movement. As Hugh Dauncey notes in his social and cultural 
history of cycling in France, concerns were raised about the possible impact of 
cycling on female reproductive health, in particular by the French theorist of 
medicine, Dr. Philippe Tissié: 
 
[Tissié] was disapproving of women’s cycling, mainly since the design of the 
machines (hard saddles, solid tyres, frames ill-adapted to female anatomy) 
would prove injurious to women’s health through the strain they placed on 
reproductive organs. […] [In 1893] he reminds readers that medical opinion 
should be sought by aspiring female cyclists, given that a woman’s abdomen 
                                                                  
14 Octave Mirbeau, La 628-E8 [1907] (Paris: Les Éditions Nationales, 1936), p. 6. 
15 The Influence of Railway Travelling on Public Health [1862], via Schivelbusch, p. 117. 




is made for carrying the fruit of conception and that women are ‘wombs with 
other organs surrounding them’.17 
 
Others, however, rubbished concerns like these, extolling the value of cycling as a 
new form of exercise: ‘physicians […] are coming to the conclusion that it is 
practically a sovereign remedy for rheumatism, indigestion, dyspepsia, and other ills 
which are too frequently merely the result of a lifetime of little to no outdoor 
exercise,’ wrote Joseph B. Bishop in 1896.18 Still others took more creative liberties 
with the impact of cycling on the body, linking it to sexual freedom and prowess. 
Maurice Leblanc’s 1898 novel, Voici des ailes!, is the story of two couples who embark 
on a cycling tour and become increasingly uninhibited, finding a new pleasure in 
their own embodiment: the women remove their corsets, and then take off their 
blouses altogether and cycle bare-breasted; eventually the rapid progress of the 
couples’ social and sexual liberation enables them to ignore the bonds of marriage 
altogether, and switch spouses.19 Four years later Alfred Jarry would publish his 
novel Le Surmâle, in which the aristocrat André Marceuil, under the guise of 
anonymity, cycles in and wins a 10,000-mile race against a train, before having sex a 
record number of times in succession (eighty-nine). Not insignificantly, his partner 
in the endeavour is a motorist, implying a link between sexual prowess and speed 
more generally – or perhaps, in particular, between sexual prowess and the act of 
controlling one’s own mechanised, speeding vehicle.20 
 
This chapter will investigate the effects of mechanised travel on both the perceptive 
faculty and on physicality more broadly. The first half will focus on accounts of speed 
as an ‘intuitive’ or ‘immersive’ state, in which the subject travels in a mechanised 
vehicle. The Recherche, as a first person account that details such experiences in more 
depth and with more specificity than any in the visual avant-gardes ever did, will be 
my primary source here. Rather than attempting to make a direct comparison 
between Proust’s portrayal of transport technologies and that of the avant-gardes, 
                                                                  
17 Hugh Dauncey, French Cycling: A Social and Cultural History (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 
2012), p. 36. The actress Sarah Bernhardt also weighed in on this debate, as a note in the Pléiade edition 
of the Recherche informs us: ‘toutes ces jeunes femmes, toutes ces jeunes filles qui s’en vont dévorant 
l’espace renoncent pour une part notable à la vie intérieure, à la vie de famille.’ (II, p. 1416 [note to p. 
146].) 
18 Joseph B. Bishop, ‘Social and Economic Influence of the Bicycle’, Forum, 21 (March-August, 1896), 680-
689, p. 684. 
19 See Maurice Leblanc, Voici des ailes! [1898] (Vierzon: Éditions Le Pas de côté, 2012). 
20 See Alfred Jarry, Le Surmâle [1902] (Paris: Éditions le Terrain vague, 1977). 
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which in many cases does not get us very far, my intention here is to read the 
narrator’s perceptual experience of speed as an advocation of an avant-garde 
aesthetic.21 In a manner that recalls instances discussed in Chapter 2 – since the act 
of looking through a window is once again portrayed as having a representative 
function – travel functions as a heuristic experience that allows the narrator to 
develop a perceptual and artistic sensibility in line with avant-garde concerns. This 
approach will enable us not just to elucidate Proust’s avant-garde impulse, but also 
to theorise on the role of speed in the avant-garde aesthetic revolution. Moreover, 
the narrator’s distinction between train and car travel, and the contrasting 
relationships they enable between traveller and traversed space, allow us to figure 
the experience of speed as a site of ambiguity between states of ‘insidership’ and 
‘outsidership’.  
 The role of outsidership becomes more pronounced in the second half of this 
chapter, which considers the perceived physical effects of speed on those who control 
their own vehicles, whom I call practitioners of speed – namely cyclists and aviators. 
I investigate the ways in which such physical effects might also manifest as 
ideological effects, creating a division between practitioners and non-practitioners: 
speed or mechanicity, I will suggest, can be understood as a function of distancing 
and alterity that is imagined by artists and writers with reference, variously, to art, 
mythology, religion, and the elusive theory of the fourth dimension. If the experience 
of travelling at speed is intuitive or immersive, the relation between static observer 
and speeding observed, in this argument, is a sort of reverse process of analysis, with 
all the epistemological incapacity that this implies: speed, like certain 
understandings of the picture surface, is a means of closing off, of erecting an 
insurmountable barrier between the seeing subject and the object that is seen. 
 
I. Moving Observer: Space Witnessed from the Train and the 
Car 
 
i. Train space: from linear perspective to Cubism 
Proust’s major discussion of train travel comes in A l’ombre des jeunes filles en fleurs, 
when the narrator first travels to Balbec – an episode, I will argue in what follows, 
                                                                  
21 There is not much to compare, for example, between the narrator’s experience of motoring around 
the Balbec region and the ‘white-hot iron of joy’ that supposedly passed through Marinetti’s heart as he 
emerged from the ditch into which he had crashed his car (‘Founding and Manifesto’, p. 21). 
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with decidedly aesthetic undertones that evokes multiple modes of representation. 
The narrator’s attitude to rail travel does not explicitly change over the course of the 
episode; the events themselves, however, demonstrate a subtle evolution in values 
that aligns broadly with the developments in painterly values that were occurring 
between the time at which the episode is set (sometime in the 1890s) and the time at 
which the volume was written (the 1910s). Before the narrator embarks on the 
journey, his description of train travel reveals that he values it only in its relation to 
the places to which it provides access, and notes its superiority to the car in this 
regard: 
 
Ce voyage, on le ferait sans doute aujourd’hui en automobile, croyant le 
rendre ainsi plus agréable. On verra qu’accompli de cette façon, il serait 
même en un sens plus vrai puisqu’on y suivrait de plus près, dans une 
intimité plus étroite, les diverses gradations par lesquelles change la surface 
de la terre. Mais enfin le plaisir spécifique du voyage n’est pas de pouvoir 
descendre en route et s’arrêter quand on est fatigué, c’est de rendre la 
différence entre le départ et l’arrivée non pas aussi insensible, mais aussi 
profonde qu’on peut, de la ressentir dans sa totalité, intacte, telle qu’elle était 
dans notre pensée quand notre imagination nous portait du lieu où nous 
vivions jusqu’au cœur d’un lieu désiré, en un bond qui nous semblait moins 
miraculeux parce qu’il franchissait une distance que parce qu’il unissait deux 
individualités distinctes de la terre. (II, 5) 
 
The appeal of travel, according to this assessment, is not actually in the act of 
travelling at all – the narrator is not interested in exploring the intervening space 
between his point of departure and his destination, but rather in heightening his 
impression of the differences between those two points. These differences appear to 
best effect, it is implied, when the journey itself plays as minimal a role as possible. 
The narrator values the car less than the train precisely because it places more 
emphasis on the journey than on the destination; indeed, its ability to stop here and 
there en route practically does away with the act of arriving altogether (‘il n’y a guère 
plus d’arrivée’ (II, 5)).22 Schivelbusch has remarked on a metaphor frequently 
                                                                  
22 The narrator’s attitude here sets him at odds with Proust’s beloved John Ruskin, for whom the railway 
is devoid of interest precisely because it foregrounds arrival at the expense of the journey: ‘going by 
railroad I do not consider travelling at all,’ he writes; ‘it is merely “being sent” to a place, and very little 
different from becoming a parcel.’ (Modern Painters, p. 311.) 
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deployed in the nineteenth century to evoke the loss of sensory experience that 
distinguished train travel from horse-powered transport: ‘the train was experienced 
as a projectile, and travelling on it, as being shot through the landscape […] the rails, 
cuttings, and tunnels appeared as the barrel through which the projectile of the train 
passes.’23 Although the metaphor was generally used negatively, here it is the train’s 
projectile-like qualities that determine its appeal. Inherent in the narrator’s 
appreciation of train travel is his belief that railway stations contain the essences of 
the towns they serve; they are ‘ces lieux spéciaux, […] lesquels ne font pas partie 
pour ainsi dire de la ville mais contiennent l’essence de sa personnalité de même que 
sur un écriteau elles portent son nom’ (II, 5). Like a projectile, then, the train has a 
penetrative function, ‘piercing’ its target in search of the heart.  
This is an essentially aesthetic assessment: it is a model that calls on the 
passenger to look past the space surrounding the destination, as the viewer of many 
mimetic paintings is expected to ignore the surface of the canvas, carrying the 
passenger inwards to a singular centre as the eye of the viewer is drawn in towards 
the vanishing point. As the viewer’s sightline moves from its origin in actual space 
to its target in virtual space, so too, the narrator implies, is the traveller conveyed 
from the actual space of departure into the mysterious, virtual space of the imagined 
destination. But the narrator is making a crucial mistake in thinking the town as 
discovered by the railway can match up to the town as it appears in his imagination. 
Time and again, he will learn that the reality of a place or person cannot live up to 
the exalted image we construct in our heads; he has already been surprised and 
disappointed by his encounters with the writer Bergotte, who is not ‘le langoureux 
vieillard’ he had pictured but ‘jeune, rude, petit, râblé et myope’ (I, 537), and with 
Mme de Guermantes, whose image he had imbued with a feudal romance, but who 
turns out to be a flesh and blood human, complete with a spot on her nose (I, 173). 
This journey will be a comparable lesson in disappointment: he will not find Balbec 
church on the gothic, storm-whipped cliff of his imaginings, but several miles from 
the coast, brought down from its lofty, artistic heights by the café, tramline, and 
passers-by with which it shares the town square. This episode entirely discredits the 
narrator’s declaration, only a few pages earlier, that the train preserves the specific 
quality of a place ‘telle qu’elle était dans notre pensée’. 
All of this suggests that the journey should not be dismissed out of hand as 
secondary to the destination. This is borne out by the rest of the episode, which places 
                                                                  
23 Schivelbusch, p. 54. 
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a marked emphasis on the aesthetics of the journey itself and is, in Luzius Keller’s 
words, ‘essentiellement picturale’.24 That the journey itself will play an aesthetic 
function is foregrounded by the narrator’s numerous references to artists in the 
preceding passages: he has already called on Chardin and Whistler in his description 
of Françoise’s hat, and Mantegna and Veronese in his description of the Gare Saint-
Lazare. Once the journey begins – having enthusiastically followed his doctor’s 
advice to calm his nerves by drinking ‘un peu trop de bière ou de cognac’ – he is 
fascinated by the beauty of elements specific to the train itself: the deep blue of the 
window blinds, the way the sun hits the windowsill, the glint of the conductor’s 
buttons. In the morning, he wakes early to a view of the sunrise – an episode that I 
will shortly discuss in more depth – and immediately describes it in artistic terms. It 
appears ‘dans le carreau de la fenêtre’, like a landscape painting: the clouds are a 
‘doux duvet […] d’un rose fixé, mort, qui ne changera plus, comme celui qui teint 
[…] le pastel sur lequel l’a déposé la fantaisie du peintre’ (II, 15). Later that morning, 
the train stops at a station in the mountains and a local peasant girl, who appears on 
the platform to sell coffee, is described in a manner similar to the sunrise: ‘empourpré 
des reflets du matin, son visage était plus rose que le ciel […] le teint de sa figure était 
si doré et si rose qu’elle avait l’air d’être vue à travers un vitrail illuminé’ (II, 16-18). 
The narrator’s readiness to see the girl as an image is attributed by Danius to ‘the 
window gazing’ of the journey so far, which she claims ‘has aestheticized his way of 
seeing to such a degree that [the girl] immediately turns into a spectacle’.25 The idea 
that the act of looking through a train window turns the surrounding space into 
something like an image is a machine-age manifestation of the traditional 
equivalence between windows and paintings, and one that diverges from Alberti’s 
original metaphor in two senses: first, because it foregrounds the window’s status as 
a barrier, rather than as a site of visual passage, and second, because it encourages a 
move away from linear perspective, as I will show in the analysis that follows.  
One of the most prominent differences between the train and the organic 
modes of travel it replaced was the barrier imposed between the traveller and the 
space through which she passed. Controlled by a faceless system rather than the 
whims of individual passengers, who could no longer choose when to stop or 
                                                                  
24 Luzius Keller, ‘Tableaux exposés et tableaux cachés’, in Marcel Proust Aujourd’hui, 8 (2011), pp. 115-
130 (p. 122). 
25 Danius, p. 113. The girl becomes an Elstirean aesthetic object, in Danius’s view, because the narrator 
is ‘faithful to what he sees, not what he knows’ (p. 114) when he says not that she is getting nearer, but 
that she is getting bigger: ‘elle revint sur ses pas, je ne pouvais détacher mes yeux de son visage de plus 
en plus large’ (II, 18). 
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disembark, the train put the landscape behind glass, moving through it at a speed 
well beyond the capacity of either the human or the equine body.26 One result of 
these (relatively) high speeds was the disappearance of the foreground, which now 
moved past so quickly that its individual aspects could no longer be made out. While 
the slowness of travel on foot or by horse had allowed the traveller to ‘[see] himself 
as part of the foreground’, and thus as joined to the landscape, ‘the speed and 
mathematical directness with which the railroad proceed[ed] through the terrain 
destroy[ed] the close relationship between the traveler and the traveled space’.27 As 
Merleau-Ponty demonstrates in Phénoménologie de la perception, ‘la profondeur révèle 
immédiatement le lien du sujet à l’espace’; ‘elle annonce un certain lien indissoluble 
entre les choses et moi par lequel je suis situé devant elles, tandis que la largeur peut, 
à première vue, passer pour une relation entre les choses elles-mêmes où le sujet 
percevant n’est pas impliqué.’28 The passenger in the train, who sees the world in its 
breadth, not depth, is distanced from the passing scene. She is distanced, too, by the 
process of framing that the act of window gazing entails. We recall Patricia Allmer’s 
assertion, cited in Chapter 2, that the frame demarcates ‘some kind of other space 
which is not mine any longer, which I cannot penetrate, which does not belong to my 
world and yet is in my world’. In Schivelbusch’s assessment, the train – which 
Danius refers to as a ‘framing device on wheels – was a real-life replacement for the 
popular panorama and diorama technologies of the early nineteenth century, which 
created an illusion of travelling by reproducing views of distant land- and cityscapes 
– a fad, he remarks, that died away in Paris in around 1840, at approximately the 
same time as the first great railways opened.29 The implication that the one 
                                                                  
26 For many early passengers, this was a tiresome feature of the new modes of travel, and as Anne Green 
has demonstrated, it functioned for a number of writers as a pessimistic metaphor for individual 
powerlessness in the face of a world changing beyond all control or comprehension: ‘several [c19th] 
writers articulate a sense of apprehension by focusing on the dislocation between the view outside the 
moving window and the passenger who sits passively in his or her own enclosed space, detached from 
the passing scene. That image of the disengaged traveller appealed to disillusioned writers who had 
turned their backs on the political process after the failure of the 1848 revolution. For them it was a 
means of evoking the social imperviousness of a ‘progress’ which seemed independent of any 
individual agency, and whose powerless ‘passenger’ can only gaze uncomprehendingly at a two-
dimensional outside world.’ She cites Flaubert’s L’Éducation sentimentale, in which Frédéric sits in a train 
and watches the world outside ‘passing in a barely recognisable blur […] flattening into an artificial 
backdrop, disconnected and somehow unreal’. While it is clear how the train thus experienced might 
function as a social or political paradigm, there are clear aesthetic implications in the idea of a ‘two-
dimensional world’, seen from behind glass and therefore ‘disconnected and somehow unreal’ (Anne 
Green, Changing France: Literature and Material Culture in the Second Empire (London and New York: 
Anthem Press, 2011), p. 60). 
27 Schivelbusch, pp. 63, 53. 
28 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de la perception (Paris: Gallimard, 1945), pp. 309, 296.  
29 Danius, p. 113; see Schivelbusch, p. 62. In line with this assessment, the train was described in 1842 as 
‘la véritable lanterne magique de la nature’, by the novelist Paul de Kock (via Jack Jordan, ‘Proust’s 
Narrator: Travels in the Space-Time Continuum’, in Au Seuil de la modernité, pp. 151-163 (p. 155)). 
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experience replaced the other suggests that the railway had an aesthetic function 
right from the beginning. This function would continue with the advent of the closed 
car several decades later, as Lynda Nead has observed: ‘with railway and motor 
travel, viewers no longer belong to the same space as the objects they perceive; they 
become more detached […] their viewpoint becomes that of the machine that moves 
them through the world.’30 She and Danius both call on a telling assessment by the 
artist and motoring enthusiast Hubert von Herkomer, who declared in a 1905 
interview that ‘the pleasure [of motoring] is seeing Nature as I could in no other way 
see it; my car having “tops,” I get Nature framed – and one picture after another 
delights my artistic eye.’31 
If the train, and later the car, functioned as instruments of aestheticisation, 
the question that inevitably follows is: what kind of aesthetic approach do they 
promote or emulate? The train’s elimination of the foreground, for example, might 
make us think of certain Impressionist paintings in which depth is suppressed and 
the scene ‘flattened’, while the blurring of the foreground itself recalls the lack of 
visual distinction that characterised the movement. In a letter of 1837 – remarkably 
early to have been travelling by train – Victor Hugo described the experience in 
decidedly Impressionistic terms: 
 
Les fleurs du bord du champ ne sont plus des fleurs, ce sont des taches ou 
plutôt des raies rouges ou blanches; plus de point, tout devient raie; les blés 
sont de grandes chevelures jaunes; les luzernes sont de longues tresses 
vertes.32 
 
For Keller, the narrator’s description of the sunrise seen from the train window reads 
like a tribute to Monet’s Impression: Soleil levant of 1872. He points out that the 
Normandy coast is not far enough from Paris to justify taking a sleeper train, and 
argues that the fact the narrator does so 
                                                                  
30 Lynda Nead, The Haunted Gallery: Painting, Photography, Film c. 1900 (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 2007), p. 153. Gregory Votalato recounts that the closed car, as opposed to the earlier 
open- or canvas-topped automobile, was ‘an established part of the motoring scene before the first 
World War’, although it was unaffordable for the majority. It became commonplace by the later 1910s 
(Gregory Votalato, Transport Design: A Travel History (London: Reaktion Books, 2007), p. 76). 
31 Via Danius, p. 136; Nead, p. 155. 
32 Via Marc Baroli, ‘Le Train dans la littérature française’ (doctoral dissertation, University of Paris, 
1963), p. 50.  Lynne Kirby calls this description ‘a curious mixture of impressionistic amazement at the 
visual blending and objects and colors along the way and an aesthetic orientation opposed to the 
machine’ (Lynne Kirby, Parallel Tracks: The Railroad and Silent Cinema (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 




est l’artifice narratif qui permet à Proust de commencer ce que l’on pourrait 
appeler la ‘journée impressionniste de la Recherche’, c’est-à-dire le séjour à 
Balbec, par un lever de soleil, exactement comme l’impressionnisme 
commence par le Soleil levant de Monet.33 
 
The parallels with Impressionism suggest that, if we are to think of travel at speed as 
an aestheticising process, we should align it with the shift away from figurative 
realism. We have seen that what I term the ‘linear-perspectival model’ of train travel, 
which the narrator initially promotes, does not stand up under scutiny. In fact, the 
rejection of linear perspective by the Impressionists’ modernist successors was a sea 
change that I propose owed something to mechanised movement. In the first essay 
of his seminal volume Ways of Seeing, John Berger credits cinema with setting in 
motion a shift in perceptive norms that made linear perspective untenable. By 
‘isolat[ing] momentary appearances’, he argues, the camera ‘destroyed the idea that 
images were timeless’.34 Instead, it highlighted the fact that ‘what you saw was 
relative to your position in time and space. It was no longer possible to imagine 
everything converging on the human eye as on the vanishing point of infinity.’35 
While perspectival artworks suggested that the spectator was ‘the unique centre of 
the world,’ the camera, and particularly the cinematographic camera, ‘demonstrated 
that there was no centre’.36 This, he implies, had a direct effect on painting, 
particularly Cubism: 
 
The invention of the camera changed the way men saw. The visible came to 
mean something different to them. This was immediately reflected in 
painting. […] For the Cubists the visible was no longer what confronted the 
single eye, but the totality of possible views taken from points all round the 
object (or person) being depicted.37 
 
What is particularly interesting about this comparison is the fact that there are also 
clear parallels between cinema and train and car travel, and thus, perhaps, between 
                                                                  
33 ‘Tableaux exposés’, p. 124. 






travel and the shift away from linear perspective. Remarking on cinema’s timeless 
fascination with the railway, Lynne Kirby argues that:  
 
Some would see the cinema’s interest in the train as that of the double: the 
cinema finds an apt metaphor in the train, in its framed, moving image, its 
construction of a journey as an optical experience, the radical juxtaposition of 
different places, the ‘annihilation of space and time’. As a machine of vision 
and an instrument for conquering space and time, the train is a mechanical 
double for the cinema and for the transport of the spectator into fiction, 
fantasy, and dream.38 
 
If the train and the cinema are doubles, and if the cinema helped usher in a new 
aesthetics that rejected linear perspective, it is logical to conclude that the train also 
played a role in this process. I argued in Chapter 1 that movement at speed provided 
a means of expanding the perceptive faculty, as evidenced by Proust’s Martinville 
episode. If we accept Bergson’s thesis that artists are already in possession of an 
expanded perceptive faculty, it follows that their experiences of speed could have 
had radical perceptual and representational ramifications, perhaps even nudging 
painters from path that they had trodden since the Renaissance. The fact that 
Cézanne (who regularly travelled by train) seems to have begun to stray from this 
path before the popularisation of motion pictures lends itself to the conclusion that 
cinema might in fact have consolidated a process that the train had already – so to 
speak – set in motion.39 
                                                                  
38 Kirby, p. 2. 
39 There are some complexities to sift through here. Thomas Vargish and Delo E. Mook observe that 
Cézanne ‘allowed himself to suggest discontinuities in the premised realistic space of his compositions 
and often to show dislocations in the objects represented’ from as early as 1880, beginning with his still 
life of that year, Fruits, serviette et boîte à lait (Vargish and Mook, p. 31). This was well before Auguste 
and Louis Lumière had recorded and screened their footage of workers leaving the Lumière factory in 
1895, events often cited as the beginning of cinema. Writing in 1995, Virgilio Tosi acknowledges that a 
‘grand nombre de manifestations pour le centenaire du cinéma’ were taking place that year (‘Étienne-
Jules Marey et les origines du cinéma’ in Marey/Muybridge, pionniers du cinéma: rencontre Beaune/Stanford 
(Beaune: Conseil Régional de Beaune, 1995), pp. 134-143 (p. 135)). These celebrations, however, were 
the cause of some contention, given the numerous proto-cinematic technologies invented before 1895, 
notably Marey’s chronophotographic gun, which he began using in 1882. In 1893, Eadweard 
Muybridge’s Zoopraxigraphical Hall at the World Columbian Exposition in Chicago became the first 
pay-to-enter screening room, but Muybridge had been using the technology in question – the 
zoopraxiscope – since 1879. It would be too simplistic, then, to say that Cézanne’s upsetting of 
traditional perspective preceded cinema – rather, it developed in tandem with it. However, it seems 
uncontroversial to suggest he would not have been overly familiar with cinematographic technologies 
as he developed these new techniques, even if he was aware of their existence. What is certain, however, 
is that he regularly travelled by train: Nina M. Athanassoglu-Kallmyer states that he ‘shuttle[d] 
between’ Provence and Paris, and that he ‘walked or took the train [from Aix] to Gardanne [and back] 
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Arguments made by Fernand Léger and Umberto Boccioni in 1914 support 
this. In Futurist Painting and Sculpture, Boccioni remarks on the fact that ‘trains, 
automobiles, bicycles, and airplanes have upset the contemplative conception of the 
landscape’, and declares that ‘since speed is now the normal state with which we see 
natural appearances, the fact of limiting ourselves to observing the landscape […] 
only through the lenses of perspective or anatomy is something against nature’.40 An 
article of Léger’s, published in Apollinaire’s journal Les Soirées de Paris, elaborates on 
this idea, arguing that the culture of speed has brought about a new mode of 
perception and consequently a new means of visual expression: 
 
Si l’expression picturale a changé, c’est que la vie moderne l’a rendue 
nécessaire. L’existence des hommes créateurs modernes est beaucoup plus 
condensée et plus compliquée que celle des gens des siècles précédents. La 
chose imagée reste moins fixe, l’objet en lui-même s’expose moins que 
précédemment. Un paysage traversé et rompu par une auto ou un rapide 
perd en valeur descriptive, mais gagne en valeur synthétique; la portière des 
wagons ou la glace de l’auto, jointes à la vitesse acquise, ont changé l’aspect 
habituel des choses. L’homme moderne enregistre cent fois plus 
d’impressions que l’artiste du dix-huitième siècle; à tel point, par exemple, 
que notre langage est plein de diminutifs et d’abréviations. La condensation 
du tableau moderne, sa variété, sa rupture des formes est la résultante de tout 
cela.41 
 
Proust’s sunrise scene also corroborates this argument. No sooner has the 
narrator begun to enjoy the sight of his ‘Impressionist’ sunrise than the 
‘contemplative concept of the landscape’ is ‘upset’, taking an abrupt step towards 
these new aesthetic trends. As the narrator is pressing his eyes to the window 
(‘collant mes yeux à la vitre’) in order to command a better view of what he sees, the 
                                                                  
every day’ between 1885 and 1886 (Cézanne and Provence: The Painter in His Culture (Chicago and 
London: University of Chicago Press, 2003), pp. 10, 108).  
40 Futurist Painting, p. 113. 
41 Fernand Léger, ‘Les Réalisations picturales actuelles’ [1914], in Les Soirées de Paris: Revue littéraire et 
artistique, ed. by Guillaume Apollinaire and Jean Cérusse (Paris: Conti, 2010), pp. 497-504 (497). It is 
worth noting that Léger was himself a filmmaker and perhaps, therefore, particularly attuned to the 
aesthetic value of mechanised movement. Boccioni was to respond to Léger’s article with characteristic 
boasting in an article published in Lacerba in 1913: ‘Léger’s article is a true act of Futurist faith which 
gives us great satisfaction […] But […] he ought to know that dynamism, as a definitive system, received 
its first statement from the Futurist painters.’ And later: ‘We were the first to proclaim that modern life 
is fast and fragmented (words also used by F. Léger).’ (‘Futurist Dynamism and French Painting’ [1913] 
in Futurist Manifestos, pp. 107-110 (pp. 107, 109-110).) 
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train changes direction and the scene within the window is immediately replaced by 
‘un village nocturne aux toits bleus de claire de lune’ (II, 15-16). The narrator rushes 
to watch the sunrise from the opposite window, but the train turns again, ‘si bien que 
je passais mon temps à courir d’une fenêtre à l’autre pour rapprocher, pour rentoiler 
les fragments intermittents et opposites de mon beau matin écarlate et versatile et en 
avoir une vue totale et un tableau continu’ (II, 16). There is a cinematic quality to the 
event, as Danius has also noted: the scene no longer ‘converge[s] on the human eye’, 
and the human in question – moving in space and time – must change his relative 
position in order to keep it within his field of vision.42 The train becomes a quasi-
camera, offering up first the sunrise, then the moonlit rooftops in a rapid succession 
of contrasting frames. At the same time, it becomes the instrument of a modernist 
intervention into the narrator’s ‘journée impressionniste’, revealing a patchwork of 
cubistic visual fragments that he must piece together. As Keller notes: 
 
Le terme de rentoiler n’est pas tout à fait exact: il ne s’agit pas de fixer une 
peinture sur une toile neuve, mais de composer le tableau en réunissant sur 
la toile des fragments. En effet, le soleil levant de Proust n’est pas un tableau 
impressionniste; le train en mouvement en fait un spectacle futuriste, et les 
fragments rapprochés, rentoilés ou – choisissons le mot juste! – collés en font un 
collage cubiste.43 
 
The Cubist – or rather Cubo-Futurist – view from the window is matched by the 
narrator’s transformation into a Cubo-Futurist subject who dashes from one window 
to the other, looking on the scene from a series of slightly different angles, his 
sideways motion combining with the forward motion of the train to create a dynamic 
whole. His euphoric mood notwithstanding, he calls to mind Duchamp’s self-
portrait, Jeune homme triste dans un train, of 1911 (a prototype for the more famous 
Nue descendant un escalier, of 1912), which Duchamp himself credited with 
introducing movement into Cubism, and which uses techniques inspired by 
chronophotography – a precursor to cinema – to depict both the forwards motion of 
the train and the motion of the young man who walks about inside it.44 ‘Pour lire ce 
                                                                  
42 ‘Scenery follows upon scenery, as in a film montage.’ (Danius, p. 113.) 
43 ‘Tableaux exposés’, p. 124. 
44 See Thierry de Duve, Nominalisme pictural: Marcel Duchamp, la peinture et la modernité (Paris: Les 
Éditions de Minuit, 1984), p. 26. The two do not map onto each other perfectly, since Duchamp himself 
stressed that his young man is moving parallel to the train (see Marcel Duchamp/Pierre Cabanne, Marcel 
Duchamp: Entretiens avec Pierre Cabanne (Paris: Somogy, 1995), p. 36). 
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tableau comme un autoportrait,’ asserts Thierry de Duve, ‘il nous faut prendre en 
compte un dédoublement du personnage de Duchamp’; as well as the Duchamp who 
moves inside the train, ‘il y a […] cet autre Duchamp qui portraiture le mouvement 
relatif du premier, et qu’il faut bien imaginer sur le talus ou sur le quai, hors du train 
comme un observateur fixe’.45 That a comparable doubling of selves occurs in the 
Recherche is a given: the novel is itself an elaborate, temporal self-portrait of a younger 
narrator-protagonist by an older incarnation.46 It is precisely this doubling that 
allows us to imagine the scene at hand as Cubist (or Cubo-Futurist), because a 
fundamental realignment occurs in the space between the experience and its textual 
representation. The young narrator-protagonist is not consciously or intentionally a 
modernist spectator: preoccupied above all with the sunrise itself, which he feels to 
be ‘en rapport avec l’existence profonde de la nature’ (II, 15), he races around the 
carriage primarily in order to prolong his view of what he sees, and presses his eyes 
to the window as if in an attempt to traverse this physical picture plane and to 
reconcile himself with what is essential about the image. His aim, then, is to look 
through the means of representation to the represented reality. But in the older 
narrator’s account, the focus is shifted away from the visual object and towards the 
manner in which it is seen, and in which the train represents it – that is to say, from a 
succession of perspectives, as a series of fragments. It is no longer an attempt to 
intuitively know the sunrise; as I asserted in Chapter 1 with reference to Cubism, the 
interest is no longer in any sense of completion, but in the breaking apart. 
 Moreover, this narrator-as-author seems very consciously to have ‘Cubist-
ised’ the episode, since it relies on a further instance of what Keller calls artifice 
narrative – that is to say, the evidently implausible violence and speed with which 
the train twists and turns through the landscape. These contorsions enable the 
inclusion of a ‘moment cubo-futuriste’ into the broader ‘journée impressionniste’, 
and come across as a very deliberate – almost laboured – rejection of the directed 
linearity inherent in the projectile metaphor and, evidently, in the linear perspective 
system, both of which had mapped so neatly onto the model of train travel that the 
narrator had been extolling only pages before. This rejection of straight lines is a 
principle that will be furthered several volumes later by the experience of car travel, 
                                                                  
45 Duve, p. 27. 
46 This is not to suggest that a single, definitive ‘narrator’ or ‘protagonist’ can ever be pinned down. 
Individuals in the Proustian universe are plural and multifaceted; thus, within this basic duality of 
‘older narrator’ and ‘younger protagonist’ (critics sometimes refer to the latter as Marcel, in order to 
highlight this distinction), a more untidy process of splitting and layering takes place.   
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which is defined by ‘les tâtonnements mêmes du chauffeur incertain de sa route et 
revenant sur ses pas’ and ‘les chassés-croisés de la perspective faisant jouer un château 
aux quatre coins avec une colline, une église et la mer’ (III, 394; my emphasis). 
 But in keeping with this principle, the narrative will twist back towards a 
more bucolic, Romantic aesthetic in the following scene, in which the narrator enjoys 
the sight of the young coffee-seller against the picturesque backdrop of her mountain 
home. Once again, the narrator’s aesthetic of choice is underlined by an instance of 
narrative artifice, since there are evidently no mountains between Paris and 
Normandy – it is as if the train has contorted its route even further by taking a sudden 
detour through the Alps. As a step towards modernist aesthetics, then, the sunrise 
scene is a fairly tentative one, and the narrator will return to a more resolutely 
Impressionist aesthetic over the rest of the Balbec stay. At this stage, his commitment 
to modernist painterly techniques forms part of a broader aesthetic expanse that 
aligns with the train’s own chronology – but it becomes more pronounced, I will 
argue, in his descriptions of the car.47 
 
ii. Car space: continuity, fluidity, abstraction 
Car travel in the Recherche further distances the traveller from the linear perspective 
model, partly because it forces the narrator explicitly to rethink his appraisal of the 
relation between journey and destination, as we shall see in the first part of this 
section, and partly because it alters the relation between traveller and traversed 
space, as we shall see in the second. Initially, however, the narrator considers the car 
inferior to the train, as my first quote from A l’ombre des jeunes filles en fleurs attests. 
This has also been suggested earlier, at the end of Du Côté de chez Swann, when the 
narrator laments the changes time has wrought over the Allée des Acacias in the Bois 
de Boulogne: ‘hélas! il n’y avait plus que des automobiles’ (I, 417). For Proust himself, 
the charms of car travel were well established by this point, as evidenced by his 
article ‘Journées en automobile’, and his reincorporation of part of it into the novel 
as the Martinville episode. The narrator, however, will not travel in a car for a further 
three volumes, until he hires one for his excursions around the Balbec region with 
Albertine in Sodome et Gomorrhe. Once again, a trip to Balbec becomes the occasion 
for a revelation about the nature of mechanised movement: the experience sparks a 
                                                                  
47 The train had fascinated artists since its earliest days, and continued as an artistic subject through 
Impressionism and into the modernist era: see, for example, Turner’s Rail, Steam and Speed – The Great 
Western Railway (1844); Monet’s paintings of the Gare Saint-Lazare (1877), Boccioni’s triptych, States of 
Mind (1911), and Severini’s Train de banlieue arrivant à Paris (1915). 
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rethinking of his previous disdain for the car, and a new reflection on its differences 
with the train, in the light of which the Martinville episode can be understood not 
just as the occasion for a moment of self-discovery, but as the adumbration of new 
realisations about the nature of space and distance. That these spatial 
transformations have aesthetic implications is made clear by the narrator’s brief, 
unexplained assertion that art is ‘modified’ by them (‘l’art en est aussi modifié’); my 
purpose in this section will be to offer an interpretation of what might be meant by 
this. I quote at some length: 
 
[Albertine] pensait bien que nous pourrions nous arre ̂ter c ̧a et là sur la route, 
mais croyait impossible de commencer par aller à Saint-Jean-de-la-Haise, 
c’est-à-dire dans une autre direction [...] Elle apprit au contraire du 
mécanicien que rien n’était plus facile que d’aller à Saint-Jean où il serait en 
vingt minutes [...] ou [de] pousser beaucoup plus loin, car de Quetteholm à 
La Raspelière il ne mettrait pas plus de trente-cinq minutes. Nous le 
comprîmes dès que la voiture, s’élanc ̧ant, franchit d’un seul bond vingt pas 
d’un excellent cheval. Les distances ne sont que le rapport de l’espace au 
temps et varient avec lui. Nous exprimons la difficulté que nous avons à nous 
rendre à un endroit, dans un système de lieues, de kilomètres, qui devient 
faux dès que cette difficulté diminue. L’art en est aussi modifié, puisqu’un 
village qui semblait dans un autre monde que tel autre, devient son voisin 
dans un paysage dont les dimensions sont changées. En tout cas, apprendre 
qu’il existe peut-e ̂tre un univers où 2 et 2 font 5 et où la ligne droite n’est pas 
le chemin le plus court d’un point à un autre, eu ̂t beaucoup moins étonné 
Albertine que d’entendre le mécanicien lui dire qu’il était facile d’aller dans 
une me ̂me après-midi à Saint-Jean et à La Raspelière. Douville et 
Quetteholme, Saint-Mars-le-Vieux et Saint-Mars-le-Ve ̂tu, Gourville et Balbec-
le-Vieux, Tourville et Féterne, prisonniers aussi hermétiquement enfermés 
jusque-là dans la cellule de jours distincts que jadis Méséglise et Guermantes, 
et sur lesquels les me ̂mes yeux ne pouvaient se poser dans un seul après-
midi, délivrés maintenant par le géant aux bottes de sept lieues, vinrent 
assembler autour de l’heure de notre goûter leurs clochers et leurs tours, leurs 




Just as the côté de Méséglise and the côté de Guermantes had seemed irrevocably 
separate to the young narrator because he and his family would never walk along 
both in the same day, so he had thought of the towns around Balbec as hermetically 
sealed off from one another because the distances separating them had made it 
impractical to visit more than one in an afternoon. But as the narrator realises, 
distance is really only a measure of difficulty, and when that difficulty is overcome, 
distance is broken down. When this happens, space can no longer be understood in 
accordance with the model put forward by the train – as a series of immutable and 
closed locations, independent emplacements whose rigidity is their most essential, 
defining quality. The barriers imposed by distance are transcended, as Georges 
Poulet explains in his study of Proustian space:  
 
Le voyage bouleverse l’apparence des choses. Plus précisément, il altère 
gravement la situation dans laquelle elles existent les unes par rapport aux 
autres. Avant lui, les lieux étaient comme des vases clos entre lesquels les 
distances mettaient des barrières infranchissables. Et voici que ces barrières 
tombent, que les distances s’abolissent, qu’à l’isolement des lieux succède une 
sorte de voisinage.48 
 
True space, the narrator realises, is fluid and continuous, transcendent of the places 
that had appeared to compose it, greater than the sum of its parts. The experience of 
riding in the car forces the narrator to rethink the space he thought he knew, which 
now seems both bigger and smaller than he has ever given it credit for. Although this 
is a realisation about the nature of space, it can nonetheless be elucidated by 
Bergson’s arguments for the indivisibility of time: 
  
Qu’est-ce au juste que le présent? S’il s’agit de l’instant actuel, - je veux dire 
d’un instant mathématique qui serait au temps ce que le point mathématique 
est à la ligne -, il est clair qu’un pareil instant est une pure abstraction [...] il 
ne saurait avoir d’existence réelle. Jamais avec de pareils instants vous ne 
                                                                  
48 Poulet, L’Espace proustien (Paris: Gallimard, 1963), p. 93. This prefigures the ability of the aeroplane to 
transcend spatial boundaries and national borders, an idea given a utopian slant in the early days of the 
invention, as Stefan Zweig’s response to Blériot’s 1909 flight across the Channel indicates: ‘How useless, 
we said to ourselves, are frontiers when any plane can fly over them with ease, how provincial and 
artificial are customs-duties, guards and border patrols, how incongruous in the spirit of these times 




feriez du temps, pas plus qu’avec des points mathématiques vous ne 
composeriez une ligne. Supposez me ̂me qu’il existe: comment y aurait-il un 
instant antérieur à celui-là? Les deux instants ne pourraient e ̂tre séparés par 
un intervalle de temps, puisque, par hypothèse, vous réduisez le temps à une 
juxtaposition d’instants. Donc ils ne seraient séparés par rien et par 
conséquent ils n’en feraient qu’un: deux points mathématiques, qui se 
touchent, se confondent.49 
 
To the narrator, space had seemed to be an accumulation of places, all of which had 
an identity of their own and were delineated on subjective terms, according to the 
capacity of the human body to experience them in a given amount of time. But as he 
now understands it, space is no longer made up of a series of ‘places’, just as a line, 
in Bergson’s reasoning, is not made up of a series of mathematical points and time is 
not made up of a series of instants. Space contains places within it, certainly – places 
can be, as it were, ‘extracted’ from the space that contains them – but an accumulation 
of these places cannot reconstitute space any more than a series of instants can 
reconstitute time, a series of static positions can reconstitute movement – or, indeed, 
than an accumulation of analytic viewpoints can give intuitive knowledge. True 
space is fluid and continuous, transcendent of the places that had appeared to 
compose it; seen from a car, places are ‘séparés par rien’, and therefore ‘n’en [font] 
qu’un.’ A single place always carries with it the rest of space, just as the present 
moment is inseparable from ‘le passé qu’il traine avec lui’.  
Sometimes this reworking of space deprives places of the qualities that had 
defined them and made them unique. Such is the fate of Beaumont, which the 
narrator and his grandmother would visit in Mme de Villeparisis’s carriage on his 
previous trip to Balbec: a vantage point from which only sea and woodland were 
visible, and which they would always reach by the same tree-lined road, returning 
the same way ‘sans avoir rencontré aucun village, aucun château’ (III, 393). The trip 
was always a lengthy one, because the steepness of the road required the horses to 
walk, and the narrator, in consequence, had always thought of Beaumont as ‘quelque 
chose de très curieux, de très loin, de très haut’ (III, 393). But the trip in the car strips 
it of this mysterious quality: 
 
                                                                  
49 ‘Perception’, pp. 1385-1386. 
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L’automobile ne respecte aucun mystère: après avoir dépassé Incarville […] 
je demandai comment s’appelait cet endroit et avant même que le chauffeur 
m’eût répondu, je reconnus Beaumont à côté duquel je passis ainsi sans le 
savoir à chaque fois que je prenais le petit chemin de fer, car il était à deux 
minutes de Parville. (III, 393) 
 
The revelation of Beaumont’s location in space removes its unique, subjective 
identity, recasting it as one of many points in a spatial continuity in which places 
cannot be bracketed off by personal or emotive meaning any more than they can by 
distance. The subjectivisation of Beaumont was enabled by carriage-travel, but it has 
been sustained by the railway, which compartmentalises the landscape into a 
network of destinations in which Beaumont, unseen from the train and with no 
station of its own, has been allowed to pass by, out of sight.  
This, then, is the most marked difference between the understanding of space 
promoted by the car and the narrator’s initial understanding of ‘train space’: the 
‘vases clos’ that are kept enclosed and compartmentalised by the train start to bleed 
into the rest of space when experienced in a car.50 Of course, as we have seen, the 
narrator’s actual experience of train travel differs from his original assessment, 
taking a step towards this new understanding by shifting the emphasis from the 
destination itself to the journey through the surrounding space. The car, however, 
foregrounds the journey to the point that the destination – both the specific 
destination and the idea of destination –  is categorically changed. In place of the 
supposedly fairytale-esque quality of the unique emplacement approached on a train, 
the narrator learns to appreciate ‘ces cercles de plus en plus rapprochés que décrit 
l’automobile autour d’une ville fascinée qui fuyait dans tous les sens pour lui 
échapper et sur laquelle finalement il fonce tout droit, à pic’ (II, 394). In ‘train space’, 
the unique emplacement of the destination town exerts a centripetal force on the space 
                                                                  
50 This impression is emphasised by numerous descriptions of the landscape itself as being in motion: 
the towns and their buildings hurry towards the speeding car, while the fir trees of La Raspelière 
‘[cours] dans tous les sens’ to avoid it (III, p. 386). This is an echo of the church at Martinville, which 
throws itself into the path of Dr. Percepied’s carriage, and of Martinville itself, which is said to 
accompany the carriage for a few seconds before disappearing behind them. (This is in contrast to the 
train episode, in which the fragmented, episodic disappearance and reappearance of the sunrise is very 
clearly attributed to the movement of the train itself.) In Poulet’s words: ‘l’effet le plus marquant du 
mouvement par lequel le voyageur (imaginaire ou réel) passe d’un lieu à l’autre, c’est qu’il semble 
transmettre aux lieux mêmes la mobilité et l’activité unificatrice qui l’anime, de telle façon que ces lieux, 
eux aussi, entrent en branle.’ (Poulet, p. 96.) Danius points out that this ‘rhetoric of inversion’, by which 
space, rather than the vehicle, as described as being in movement, is part of a more widespread 
tendency; it is also found in several contemporary accounts of motoring, such as Maurice Maeterlinck’s 
‘En Automobile’, Octave Mirbeau’s La 628-E 8, and Eugène Demolder’s L’Espagne en auto. 
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that surrounds it, drawing the train in towards it, but in ‘car space’ the destination 
expands centrifugally outwards, and the car must work against this force as it 
encircles it and eventually chases it down. No longer reducible to their names or their 
landmarks, the towns ‘unravel’ outwards into space; their ‘essences’ are no longer 
solid, contained units to be juxtaposed with each other, but something like a gradual 
condensation of the same space that surrounds them – the nuclei at the centre of these 
expansive spatial circles. 
 
The changing relationship between journey and destination is mirrored by a shift in 
the relationship between the traveller and the traversed space. The narrator argues 
that the car allows the passenger to experience the landscape, rather than simply 
witness it: 
 
cet emplacement, point unique que l’automobile semble avoir dépouillé du 
mystère des trains express, [l’automobile] donne par contre l’impression de 
le découvrir, de le déterminer nous-même comme avec un compas, de nous 
aider à sentir d’une main plus amoureusement exploratrice, avec une plus 
fine précision, la véritable géométrie, la belle ‘mesure de la terre’. (II, 394) 
 
The destination is reached, then, not by cutting blindly through the landscape in a 
projectile, but by a process of exploration and discovery in which the traveller enters 
into and becomes part of space. This dual process of fusion – destination-space, 
traveller-space – is reminiscent of a broader modernist and proto-modernist 
devaluation of containment and centrality in favour of flux and continuity. This was 
explored in Chapter 1: it is implied in Impressionism’s visual indeterminacy; in 
Elstir’s blurring of the boundary between land and sea; in Cézannean and Cubist 
passage; in the Futurists’ expansive, ‘holistic’ perceptive faculty; in Severini’s 
suggestion that the Futurist artist’s intuitive capabilities cast him as a receptor of the 
‘qualitative radiations’ of objects; and in Boccioni’s apparent belief in ether physics 
and his declaration that ‘to paint a human figure you must not paint it; you must 
render the whole of its surrounding atmosphere’.51 
                                                                  
51 ‘Technical Manifesto’, p. 28. This was also a preoccupation of poets at around this time: Marianne 
Martin, for example, has attributed the Futurists’ belief in continuity to the influence of the poet Jules 
Romains and his notion of unanimisme. In his book-length poem of 1908, La Vie unanime, Romains had 
written: ‘Je ne me souviens pas d’avoir jamais vécu, | Et d’être plus ancien que ce chaud crépuscule | 
Où les yeux ne voient pas de formes séparées | Où l’on ne pense à rien qui ne semble total. | Chaque chose en 
prolonge une autre. Le métal | Des rails, et les carreaux éblouis; les entrées | De maisons; les passants, les 
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 In Le Temps retrouvé, the narrator will shift this model towards the domain of 
human psychology and behaviour, making implicit reference to the avant-garde as 
he does so. Having despaired of ever developing the perceptive faculty of an artist 
because he cannot notice detailed minutiae in the manner of the Goncourt brothers, 
he realises that he possesses a different sort of perceptive faculty, which instinctively 
looks beyond the surface appearances of a social situation to the depths beneath: ‘ce 
qui m’intéressait, c’était non ce qu’ils voulaient dire mais la manière dont ils le 
disaient […] le charme apparent, copiable, des êtres m’échappait parce que je n’avais 
pas la faculté de m’arrêter à lui.’ (IV, 297) Already, this interest in the manner of 
expression rather than the meaning sounds rather like the post-realist move towards 
prioritising the manner of seeing and representing over the seen object itself.52 The 
result of this perceptual tendency of the narrator’s is that the person him or herself 
is reduced to a minor element in a much broader web of psychological laws:  
 
Il en résultait qu’en réunissant toutes les remarques que j’avais pu faire dans 
un dîner sur les convives, le dessin des lignes tracées par moi figurait un 
ensemble de lois psychologiques où l’intérêt propre qu’avait eu dans ses 
discours le convive ne tenait presque aucune place. (IV, 297)  
 
Aware that this falls outside the bounds of a realist definition of art, he justifies 
himself by likening his technique to visual portraits that could easily be modelled on 
Boccioni’s Matter or Picasso’s portrait of his dealer, Daniel-Henry Kahnweiler: 
 
Mais cela enlevait-il tout mérite à mes portraits puisque je ne les donnais pas 
pour tels? Si l’un de ces portraits, dans le domaine de la peinture, met en 
                                                                  
chevaux, les voitures | Se rejoignent entre eux et rejoignent mon corps; | Nous sommes indistincts; chacun de 
nous est mort; | Et la vie unanime est notre sépulture.’ (La vie unanime: poème (Paris: Mercure de France, 
1913), p. 141; my emphasis). Martin considers it highly likely that Marinetti spoke of Romains’s work 
to the Futurist painters, since he visited Paris regularly and knew Romains personally (Marianne W. 
Martin, ‘Futurism, Unanimism and Apollinaire’, Art Journal, 18 (Spring, 1969), 258-268 (pp. 259-261)). 
Virginia Spate, citing Romains, Jacques Barzun, and Blaise Cendrars, has also described a tendency 
among poets at this time to use the image of ‘the circular expansion of light […] to suggest the expansion 
of consciousness from the single self to embrace and become one with all of life’ (Spate, p. 43).  
52 Jean-Yves Tadié’s analysis in Proust et le roman suggests that this tendency figures as an important 
factor of the novel more broadly. With reference to the difference between the narrator’s first impression 
of a character and the qualities the latter is subsequently revealed to have (as when the narrator 
unfavourably judges Saint-Loup on their first meeting), he remarks: ‘il ne s’agit pas […] de montrer 
comment Proust peint ses personnages, ni même de réfléchir sur leurs secrets, ou leur dévoilement 
progressif, mais comment le héros-narrateur regarde, écoute le monde; non pas ce qu’il nous livre du 
monde, mais comment il nous le livre.’ (Tadié, Proust et le roman: Essai sur les formes et techniques du roman 
dans A la Recherche du temps perdu ([Paris]: Gallimard, 1971), p. 39). 
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évidence certaines vérités relatives au volume, à la lumière, au mouvement, 
cela fait-il qu’il soit nécessairement inférieur à tel portrait ne lui ressemblant 
aucunement de la même personne, dans lequel mille détails qui sont omis 
dans le premier seront minutieusement relatés, deuxième portrait d’où l’on 
pourra conclure que le modèle était ravissant tandis qu’on l’eût cru laid dans 
le premier, ce qui peut avoir un importance documentaire et même 
historique, mais n’est pas nécessairement un vérité d’art. (IV, 297)53 
 
The car episode, I would argue, is an element in the narrator’s artistic 
education that helps him on the way to this eventual realisation. The experience 
teaches him the value, not of the focal point of a given experience – the person 
speaking at a dinner or the eventual destination of a car journey – but of the whole 
of the surrounding network of phenomena to which it relates. Again, this can be 
aligned with the move away from a realist aesthetics based on linear perspective, 
which not only asserts a principle of singularity within the image by drawing the eye 
towards a singular vanishing point, but also individuates the image in relation to its 
broader context by demarcating it as a virtual, representational space, inviting the 
viewer to look past its surroundings, through the canvas, and into the image itself. By 
bringing its passengers into closer contact with the landscape, Proust’s car troubles 
the boundary between viewing space and viewed space in a manner comparable to 
non-figurative painting, deconstructing the sense of virtuality and apartness that the 
train had imposed. This is most clearly demonstrated by the example of Beaumont, 
which is likened to a fictionalisation when the narrator has discovered its situation 
relative to the rest of space and wonders, horrified, whether ‘Mme Bovary et la 
Sanseverina m’eussent peut-être semblé des êtres pareils aux autres si je les eusse 
rencontrées ailleurs que dans l’atmosphère close d’un roman’ (III, 394). Beaumont 
was once a comparable ‘atmosphère close’: a clearly demarcated, quasi-virtual space. 
It is precisely these qualities that the car journey has removed. While the train 
presents and preserves the world as representation, as aesthetics, as fiction, giving a 
front-row view of the passing ‘theatre’, the car takes the spectator ‘backstage’: 
 
                                                                  
53 In Keller’s words, this passage ‘esquisse […] une poétique du portrait cubiste […] Volume, lumière, 
mouvement – autant de termes rappelant la peinture de Léger, Delaunay ou Duchamp’ 
(‘L’Impressionnisme’, p. 63). 
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Non, l’automobile ne nous menait pas ainsi féeriquement dans une ville que 
nous voyions d’abord dans l’ensemble que résume son nom, et avec les 
illusions du spectateur dans la salle. Il nous faisait entrer dans la coulisse des 
rues, s’arrêtait à demander un renseignement à un habitant. (III, 394) 
 
This impression is apparently reinforced by the lack of a clear physical 
boundary between traveller and space. It seems that in this instance, the landscape 
is not seen from behind glass: before the journey begins, the narrator asks the 
chauffeur to roll back the roof (he determines that they will close it later, so as to have 
more privacy, but we never actually hear of them doing so), while the intense 
summer heat means all the windows, if there are any, are likely to remain open. The 
narrator and Albertine, we might surmise, are thus in more direct contact with the 
passing landscape than they could possibly be in a train or a closed car, restoring the 
sense created by horse travel of being part of the traversed space. But crucially, we 
cannot say for sure, since the narrator has not told us explicitly; moreover, this 
assessment takes on a certain ambivalence when read in conjunction with the first 
paragraph of ‘Journées en automobile’, where Proust remarks that ‘le vitrage de 
l’automobile, que je gardais fermé, mettait pour ainsi dire sous verre la belle journée 
de septembre que, même à l’air libre, on ne voyait qu’à travers une sorte de 
transparence’ (CSB, 63).54 In this account, the car lends the landscape a certain visual 
apartness even when the windows are open. The combination of these two 
observations problematises any definitive conclusion we might reach about the car’s 
capacity either to pictorialise or to ‘de-pictorialise’ the landscape: on the one hand it 
seems, like the train, to mark out the view as a virtual space, qualitatively different 
from that occupied by the traveller, and on the other, to blur or even do away with 
this boundary by reinforcing the sense that landscape and traveller belong to the same 
space. This very ambiguity, I would suggest, is a further means of aligning the 
visuality of car travel with the move away from linear perspective: the car occupies 
an interstitial aesthetic position not unlike that occupied by the paintings that were 
considered in Chapter 2, which thematise their own materiality by asserting 
themselves as physical surfaces, but which nonetheless retain a representative, 
                                                                  
54 Jack Jordan has observed that Proust particularly valued the car’s ability to separate him from the 
outside world: ‘in an automobile he could go anywhere he wanted, when he wanted and, if necessary, 
remain insulated from whatever it was he had gone to see (for instance from flowers, to which he was 
allergic). The automobile was his enclosed little world.’ (Jordan, p. 152.) 
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virtualising function and thus cannot be said to operate exclusively as objects in the 
world.  
 
As well as aligning with broader aesthetic developments, the narrator’s experiences 
of train and car travel also anticipate his own later realisations about the nature of 
the work of art he intends to produce. Stephen Kern has compared the narrator’s 
understanding of train travel to his description of metaphor: the former, he suggests, 
is ‘like a metaphor in that it “unite[s] two distant individualities of the world”’.55 As 
I argued in Chapter 1, the point of metaphor in the Proustian context is to enable new 
meanings and new realities to emerge from the ‘space’ between the two elements, 
which suggests that the train ride aligns even more closely to the metaphor model 
than Kern’s analysis allows. The train does not just ‘unite two distant individualities’; 
the shift in focus to the journey itself means it is no longer simply a means of 
conveying the subject from one place to another, and thus of bringing the two 
together, but the creator of something new and valuable that emerges from the 
(physical) space between them. Chapter 1 demonstrated that the connection between 
the narrator and the perceptual object in the Martinville episode is like the metaphor 
process writ large, with the narrator’s first piece of writing emerging from the 
interstitial space between them. Here, an act of passage between two points in space 
functions, comparably, as an amplification of the metaphor process: this time, what 
emerges from the interstices is not a text but a set of Cubo-Futurist quasi-paintings. 
In both cases, a mode of representation is born from the coming-together of two 
disparate elements. Read like this, the train is both a means of linking modernist 
aesthetics to the literary process that the narrator will later advocate, and a building 
block in his own artistic apprenticeship, foreshadowing his later realisation about the 
way art should function and the techniques it should use. 
This dialectical model of bringing together two elements in a way that creates 
something greater than the sum of its parts is a fundamental tenet of the Proustian 
world. As well as metaphor, it also forms the basis of involuntary memory, in which 
the narrator is reimmersed in a past moment without leaving the present one, such 
that he transcends time altogether, reaching an extra-temporal state. This, too, can be 
linked to mechanised movement. Poulet has emphasised the importance of travel in 
the Recherche; journeys, in his view, ‘y tiennent une place au moins aussi important 
                                                                  
55 Kern, p. 217. 
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que les souvenirs’.56 A clue to this is his use of the term ‘vases clos’ to describe the 
narrator’s pre-car view of the towns in the Balbec region; Proust himself uses the 
term on only two occasions, firstly to describe the perceived spatial isolation of the 
côté de Guermantes and the côté de Méséglise, and secondly, hundreds of pages later, to 
describe the temporal isolation of the past moments through which we have lived 
and which remain buried in the depths of memory. Space is delivered from these 
kinds of compartmentalisations by the car, and involuntary memory serves the same 
function for time. Clayton Alcorn has written in some depth about this link between 
the two phenomena: 
 
The auto has done for space what the expérience proustienne does for time, or 
rather, the auto ride produces a phenomenon similar to that part of the 
expérience proustienne which demolishes the spatial barriers between the two 
moments (workings of the mémoire involontaire occur only in Paris, but they 
link that city with Combray, Balbec, Venice, and so on). During the moments 
bienheureux, there is a sense of living absolutely simultaneously in two points 
of time and space. The present is not erased; it is, rather, joined to the past in 
a marvelous, mystical manner. In the auto ride, the union is less perfect: it 
still requires some time to go from Beaumont to Incarville, although much 
less time than the traveller has been accustomed to. The experience is of a 
lower order, but its similarity is incontestable.57  
 
This is another manner in which the car is integral to the narrator’s artistic 
apprenticeship. If the train offers a glimpse into the primary technique – metaphor – 
that the narrator must use if his work of art is to ring true, the car hints at its subject 
matter by prefiguring the dynamics of involuntary memory in its manner of 
transforming space.  
Alcorn does not mention it, but in Le Temps retrouvé the narrator directly links 
the car to the importance of memory. Driving to the Guermantes’ matinée, where a 
series of involuntary memories will give him the impetus he needs to pursue his 
vocation, he remarks on the transcendental nature of what is about to happen by 
                                                                  
56 L’Espace proustien, p. 92. 
57 Alcorn, p. 154. Jack Jordan has also commented on this: ‘as memory brings together events isolated 
in time, so travel brings together places and people isolated in space. In both cases – in the internal, 
subjective travel of memory in time, and in physical travel in space – he is able to escape the paralyzing 
inertia and uncertainty in which he would otherwise be imprisoned.’ (Jordan, p. 152.) 
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suggesting that his car is taking off: ‘le sol de lui-même savait où il devait aller; sa 
résistance était vaincue. Et, comme un aviateur qui a jusque-là péniblement roulé à 
terre, “décollant” brusquement, je m’élevais lentement vers les hauteurs silencieuses 
du souvenir.’ (IV, 437)58 The linking of spatial locations through literal car travel 
might be of a ‘lower order’ to the linking of temporal moments through involuntary 
memory, but in the realm of metaphor, the car can overcome its restrictive, earth-
bound existence by turning into an aeroplane, carrying the narrator into a realm of 
spatial and temporal transcendence. The aeroplane itself has great importance as a 
metaphor for the narrator’s new understanding of time; as William Carter observes:  
 
the last two hundred pages of the novel, wherein the Narrator continues to 
explore the nature and purpose of art, amount to an ascension, replete with 
vertical imagery: airplanes, planets, telescopes, and people on stilts who 
stand tall, occupying space as they have occupied time. Proust uses vertical 
imagery and the example of the telescope to show that the Narrator can now 
see in time.59 
 
The car that moves upwards, then, transcending spatial and temporal 
compartmentalisations, is a way of imagining the narrator’s own ‘ascent’ towards 
the state of being an artist who perceives connections in time as well as space.  
 The train and the car – and indeed the aeroplane – thus have a privileged link 
to art in its Proustian definition. At the same time, they strengthen a nascent link 
between the foundational principles of Proust’s artistic philosophy and the broader 
artistic developments that were contemporaneous with him. All of the examples 
given above – metaphor, involuntary memory, car and train travel – can be further 
linked to tendencies in modernist painting. As the car brings two places into the same 
continuous space, as involuntary memory brings two experiences into the same 
moment of extra-temporal transcendence, and as the metaphor brings two otherwise 
unlinked ideas into the same sentence, the privileging of the work of art’s status as 
object over its representational function brings viewer and painting into the same 
                                                                  
58 In his use of this metaphor, the narrator aligns himself with his own much earlier definition of artistic 
talent, which he first uses to describe Bergotte: ‘Le génie, même le grand talent, vient moins d’éléments 
intellectuels et d’affinement social supérieurs à ceux d’autrui, que de la faculté de les transformer, de 
les transposer. […] Pour se promener dans les airs, il n’est pas nécessaire d’avoir l’automobile la plus 
puissante, mais une automobile qui, ne continuant pas de courir à terre et coupant d’une verticale la 
ligne qu’elle suivait, soit capable de convertir en force ascensionnelle sa horizontale.’ (I, p. 544-545.) 
59 Carter, p. 200. 
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spatial realm: the surface of the canvas does not function as an absolute boundary 
between virtual and actual space, but as a material surface in its own right. 
Furthermore, as the train focuses on the intervening space between two places, as 
involuntary memory highlights the essential, absolute importance of Time, which 
links the two moments, and as a new understanding of reality emerges from the 
aperture between the two elements in a metaphor, so the modernist focus on the act 
of seeing, rather than on the visual object itself, foregrounds the interstitial act that 
links viewer and viewed, casting vision not simply as a tool or a vehicle but as 
something tangible to be explored and interrogated. All these examples foreground 
interstices in a manner that reconciles elements that were thought to be 
irreconcilable, demonstrating a desire in both the Proustian world and the wider art 




II. Moving Observed: Practitioners of Speed  
 
When it comes to witnessing other people controlling speeding vehicles, however, 
the story is quite different. I will argue in what follows that the act of watching 
somebody else move at speed, or display the signifiers of someone who does so 
regularly, creates what Proust would call a ‘liséré’ – an intangible, ineffable barrier 
that is an indicator of radical difference between the observer and the observed, and 
which condemns the former to a state of irretrievable outsidership. 
 
i. Myth, mechanicity, alterity 
Not long after the narrator’s first ride in a car, a journey on horseback through the 
Balbec countryside is the occasion for another novelty: his first sight of an aeroplane. 
It is not the sort of setting in which encounters with cutting-edge technologies are 
expected: the bucolic scene so recalls a pair of early Elstir watercolours, Poète 
rencontrant une Muse and Jeune homme rencontrant un Centaure, that their memory 
superimposes itself onto the surrounding countryside, leaving the narrator 
‘tellement au-dehors du monde actuel’ (III, 417) that he half expects to run into a 
mythological being himself. But no sooner has he expressed this thought than an 




Je vis […] entre deux grandes ailes d’acier étincelant qui l’emportaient, un 
être dont la figure peu distincte me parut ressembler à celle d’un homme. Je 
fus aussi ému que pouvait l’être un Grec qui voyait pour la première fois un 
demi-dieu. (III, 417) 
 
The human body, augmented by this radically new means of moving through space, 
takes the place of the centaur and the muse whose presence might otherwise have 
completed the scene. The pilot and the plane that transports him form ‘a modern 
version of Icarus’,60 the god-like quality of the pilot fitting with a broader cultural 
association between flight and the divine, as Stephen Kern suggests: 
 
[The plane’s] cultural impact was ultimately defined by deeply rooted values 
associated with the up-down axis. Low suggests immorality, vulgarity, 
poverty, and deceit. High is the direction of growth and hope, the source of 
light, the heavenly abode of angels and gods. From Ovid to Shelley the 
soaring bird was a symbol of freedom.61 
 
This parallel emerges as a theme in Apollinaire’s poem of 1911, Zone, in which a 
modernised Christ is lauded because he flies ‘mieux que les aviateurs’ and holds ‘le 
record du monde pour la hauteur’, while an aeroplane flies in the company of a 
selection of figures from antiquity and the Bible: ‘Icare Énoch Élie Apollonius de 
Thyane | Flottent autour du premier aéroplane | Ils s’écartent parfois pour laisser 
passer ceux qui portent la Sainte-Eucharistie | Ces prêtres qui montent éternellement 
en élevant l’hostie.’62 
In Proust’s description, this crossover between the modern and the antique, 
the mechanical and the mythological, is underscored by the impossibility of visually 
separating the pilot from his plane. Clearly, the plane in question is an early biplane, 
with the head and upper body of the pilot visible from the exterior; as Akane 
Kawakami argues, it would be natural at this time ‘to see pilot and plane as a 
conjoined whole’.63 She cites an article published in Le Figaro on 19 December 1908, 
in which ‘man and machine are referred to in one breath as “l’homme-oiseau”’ (169). 
                                                                  
60 Danius, p. 122. 
61 Kern, p. 242. 
62 Guillaume Apollinaire, Alcools, ed. by A. E. Pilkington (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1970), pp. 2-3. 
63 Akane Kawakami, ‘When the Unfamiliar becomes Familiar…? Proust, Planes and Modernity’ in Rye 
and Segal, p. 169. 
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Proust’s description is not quite this explicit, but the same sentiment prevails. There 
is nothing in what the narrator sees to determine that the pilot and the machine are 
separate entities, and he cannot state with any certainty that the pilot is a human: he 
only seems to resemble one. Kawakami states that: 
 
The ‘being’ located between the wings, made up of a humanoid face and the 
fuselage, presumably, as seen from the front, appears as a creature who has 
relinquished its limbs in favour of inorganic wings, suggestive of what would 
come to be called cyborgs later in the century: the ultimate modern 
‘demigod’, half-man, half-machine, a common enough image today, but still 
a novel metamorphosis in Proust’s time.64 
 
Kawakami’s description recalls Fernand Léger’s painting of 1920, L’Aviateur, in 
which there is no clear distinction between the plane and the aviator in question, who 
is rendered in the same steely greys as some of the machinery. As Christoph 
Asendorf observes, he is ‘shown in a pose suggestive of nonchalant sovereignty, and 
barely needs to attend to the controls. Man and machine constitute a single functional 
unit’.65 
Indeed, such a crossover between human and machine is a recurrent theme 
of avant-garde theory and practice. The notion of a ‘mechanical man’ who merges 
with the machine that transports him recalls Marinetti’s intention, in Christine 
Poggi’s words, ‘to obliterate traditional distinctions between the organic and the 
inorganic, between sentient beings and the physical and mechanical world’.66 The 
most pertinent visual realisation of this idea is perhaps Umberto Boccioni’s sculpture 
of 1913, Unique Forms of Continuity in Space (fig. 11), the culmination of a period of 
                                                                  
64 Ibid. 
65 Asendorf, p. 207. 
66 Christine Poggi, Inventing Futurism: The Art and Politics of Artificial Optimism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2009), p. 151. Marinetti’s adoption of this idea was characteristically extreme: ‘he 
sought, in poetry but also in art and in politics, to open a new field in which a chiasmic exchange of 
properties and attributes might occur. The Futurist male, “multiplied” by the machine, would exemplify 
a new superhuman hybrid adapted to the demands of speed and violence. Sportsman, aviator, or 
warrior, he would be capable of astounding feats of physical prowess. His inner consciousness, 




sculptural experimentation based on the motif of a humanoid figure striding through 
space (although unfortunately most of the early models were destroyed in 1917 by a 
group of over-zealous workmen, clearing out the Milan storage space in which they 
were being held). The form of the body, which recalls both the bulging muscle and 
sinew of an elite athlete and the harsh angles of machine parts, ‘strives to represent 
the Nietzschean ideal of the heroic superman by realizing the dreamed-of fusion of 
human flesh and metal’.67 Yet rather than thinking of this being as an unrealisable 
Futurist (and proto-fascist) ideal, bordering on science fiction, we can also read the 
sculpture as an allegory for the human body that travels at speed, mechanically and 
kinetically augmented by the vehicle that transports it. The warrior-like helmet 
                                                                  
67 Poggi, p. 70. 
Fig. 11: Umberto Boccioni, Unique Forms of Continuity in Space, 1913 
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might be thought as a reference to the headgear of a chauffeur or aviator, and the 
flame-like projections emanating from the figure’s legs as a reference to the rush of 
air around a vehicle that draws the hair and clothing of the passengers back in its 
wake. That same suggestion of flames, rendered in metal, recalls the heat generated 
by an engine or by bodily exertion, juxtaposed with the metallic chill of the machine’s 
outer body. (Thought like this, it also becomes reminiscent of Proust’s description of 
the car as ‘le géant aux bottes de sept lieues’ (III, 386).) 
 Disappointed by the criticism his sculptures had received while on display at 
the Galerie La Boétie in Paris in 1913, Boccioni turned back to painting that same 
year. The result was Dynamism of a Cyclist (fig. 12), an unambiguous tribute to 
mechanised transport technologies and a clearer illustration of the quasi-fusion of 
flesh and metal that such modes of transport entailed: the cyclist in question, 
emerging barely perceptibly from a frantic mass of colours and lines, is 
Fig. 12: Umberto Boccioni, Dynamism of a Cyclist, 1913 
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indistinguishable from the bicycle on which he rides. Boccioni was not alone among 
his contemporaries in suppressing the distinction between bike and rider: in Jean 
Metzinger’s Au vélodrome of 1912 (fig. 13), the left shin and the bicycle frame share 
the same demarcating line; the left foot, in shadow, is indistinct from the pedal and 
the chain, and there is no discernible right foot at all. The dark lines, sharp angles, 
and dramatic divisions between planes give the appearance of a man pieced together 
from geometric fragments, in the manner of a machine. Duchamp’s tiny pencil 
sketch, Avoir l’apprenti dans le soleil (1914), would barely be comparable to either of 
these two images were it not for the lack of distinction between the bicycle and its 
Fig. 13: Jean Metzinger, Au vélodrome, 1912 
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rider. All these cases are reminiscent of the narrator’s experience of seeing an 
aeroplane for the first time, since the bicycle appears less as an addition to the body 
than a part of it. In what seems like a re-emergence of an Elstirean visual mode, it is 
only the viewer’s prior knowledge that signals out the rider and the bicycle as separate 
entities – the images themselves give no such information.  
These instances of apparent fusion between the human body and its vehicle are 
in accordance with other representations and discussions of cycling from this period. 
As Leblanc declares in Voici des ailes!: 
 
La bicyclette est un perfectionnement [du] corps lui-même, l’achèvement, 
pourrait-on dire. C’est une paire de jambes plus rapides qu’on lui offre. Lui et sa 
machine ne font qu’un. Ce ne sont pas deux êtres [...] Il n’y a pas un homme et 
une machine. Il y a un homme plus vite.68 
 
This idea – that cycling augments the human body to the extent that it acquires 
qualities that go beyond the human – recurs in numerous guises throughout cultural 
discussions or representations of it; Dauncey notes a tendency in the French media 
in the early twentieth century to ‘[present] the human body – that of Tour racers – as 
a machine whose performance could be described in terms of output and input, 
stress, power, productivity and effort’.69  
Cyclists are described in a comparable fashion in A l’ombre des jeunes filles en 
fleurs. Early in his trip to Balbec, the narrator notices a group of girls on the seafront, 
one of whom will turn out to be Albertine. She is the only one of the group who we 
know for sure is a cyclist, for the simple reason that she is pushing a bicycle, and the 
others are not. Nevertheless, Françoise Gaillard suggests that we might logically 
think of all the girls in the group as cyclists (and we know they are interested in sport 
more generally because two of them are carrying golf clubs). The proof, she asserts, 
is in their way of moving, in the relationships between their bodies and the 
surrounding space: 
 
Qu’importe que les bécanes de ces demoiselles soient restées ce jour-là 
comme bien d’autres à la maison. Tout dans leur allure, leurs manières, leurs 
attitudes, dit qu’elles sont ‘vélo’. Ça se sent au rapport à leur corps qu’elles 
                                                                  
68 Leblanc, pp. 34-35. 
69 Dauncey, p. 112. 
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négocient autrement; ça se sent à la relation qu’elles entretiennent avec 
l’espace. Elles savent d’instinct s’y placer, s’y déplacer. Elles sont bien dans 
leur peau. Elles sont à l’aise dans leur corps. Celui-ci, d’ailleurs, a changé. Le 
bas s’est musclé et en même temps étiré, affiné, allongé. La silhouette s’en 
trouve grandie. Au point qu’on s’interroge: de quelle race sont donc ces 
créatures […] si différentes, morphologiquement parlant, des autres jeunes 
filles?70  
 
Of note here is the suggestion that the cycling body is a ‘cycling body’ even when it 
is not on a bicycle. The girls are certainly not fused to their bikes, as the riders in the 
aforementioned images appear to be; but while the body and the bicycle are 
detachable, the bicycle nevertheless leaves traces – is still, in a sense, present, even 
when it is absent. A certain reciprocity exists between the two entities, such that they 
are never truly apart. The girls’ bodies have changed, and taken on a mechanical 
quality; the narrator notes that they move through the seaside crowd as might an 
uncontrollable machine: ‘elles ne paraissaient pas […] voir [la foule], forçaient les 
personnes arrêtées à s’écarter ainsi que sur le passage d’une machine qui eût été 
lâchée et dont il ne fallait pas attendre qu’elle évitât les piétons.’ (II, 149) 
Elsewhere in the novel, cyclists are described in similarly mythological, 
quasi-human terms to the pilot. In La Prisonnière, for example, three young women 
leaning against their bicycles in the Bois de Boulogne are compared to ‘trois 
immortelles accoudées au nuage ou au coursier fabuleux sur lesquels elles 
accomplissaient leurs voyages mythologiques’ (III, 675); another young cyclist is 
described as ‘[une] jeune créature mi-humaine, mi-ailée, ange ou peri’ (III, 678). After 
Albertine’s death, the narrator will remember her bending over ‘la roue 
mythologique de sa bicyclette […] la tête enturbannée et coiffée de serpents’ (IV, 70). 
Cyclists and aviators are part of a new mythology, defined by their quasi-mechanical, 
almost superhuman qualities that set them apart from ordinary people (indeed, 
Carter has remarked on the process of ‘evolution’ that links them, via the chauffeur, 
as if practitioners of speed belong to a separate and rapidly evolving species all of 
their own).71 The implication is that speed ‘deifies’ those who practise it; the pilot 
                                                                  
70 Françoise Gaillard, ‘A l’ombre des jeunes filles en vélo, ou l’invention de la jeunesse’, Cahiers de 
Médiologie, 5 (1998), 81-85 <10.3917/cdm.005.0081> (para 4 of 13). 
71 ‘For Proust and his contemporaries the chauffeur and the aviator were linked in an evolutionary way. 
To them the progression from cyclist to chauffeur to pilot was an observable and logical one. The 
immediate mechanical progression from car to airplane was self-evident since the airplane was in many 
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and the cyclist become mechanised déesses or demi-dieus, in contrast to the mortal 
narrator, who observes from a place of comparative stasis. His difference from the 
pilot is underscored by his horse, which ties him to the old kinetic order, while the 
image of Medusa, implicit in the description of Albertine as ‘coiffée de serpents’, 
obliquely draws attention to his own relative stasis and passivity. Elsewhere, Carter 
observes, ‘Albertine seems almost overburdened with athletic equipment, as though 
Proust wants to make certain we do not overlook this aspect of her personality and 
the sharp contrast between the sedentary Narrator and the athletic girl’.72  
 This contrast is an underlying principle of the mysterious inaccessibility that 
is Albertine’s defining quality, and which will plague the narrator throughout the 
novel. From the very beginning, she belongs to a separate world. The girls, all of 
them cyclists if we accept Gaillard’s arguments, are indisputably a unit, remarkable 
for their athletic poise and their meticulous command of their own limbs; as she 
argues, they appear as a different species or race from the clumsy, inelegant crowd 
that surrounds them. They are described early on as being akin to a group of birds, 
‘une bande de mouettes’ (II, 146), and later to a group of Grecian statues (II, 149).73 
Yet their physical features also appear to be in flux. At first the narrator notes not 
distinct, individualised bodies, but single facial features, which seem to belong first 
to one girl, then another, in what he describes as ‘un flottement harmonieux’ (II, 148). 
Cycling women seem to belong to their own anthropological or even zoological 
category, within which identity is collective, malleable, and interchangeable. They 
exist in a realm apart that reveals nothing of their individuality, and to which the 
narrator has no access. The idea that he might one day be a friend of these young 
girls seems ridiculous – ‘une contradiction aussi insoluble, que si devant quelque 
frise antique ou quelque fresque figurant un cortège, j’avais cru possible, moi 
spectateur, de prendre place, aimé d’elles, entre les divines processionnaires’ (II, 153). 
Entering the world inhabited by the young girls seems as impossible as stepping 
through the picture surface from material into virtual space. Even as he begins to 
distinguish them from one another, and to notice Albertine in particular, he is struck 
                                                                  
respects an automobile with wings.’ (Carter, p. 14.) Proust himself seems to illustrate this idea in his 
descriptions of cars that turn into aeroplanes and take off. 
72 Carter, p. 54. 
73 A visual realisation of the idea that cyclists constitute not only a collective but a collective machine can 
be found in the German-based Expressionist Lyonel Feininger’s 1912 painting, The Bicycle Race, as 
Bernard Vere has observed: ‘The riders seem at one with their machines. Just as importantly, the peloton, 
or bunch, seems to move as one […] the riders collectively seem to constitute a machine composed of 
triangles’ (Bernard Vere, ‘Pedal-Powered Avant-Gardes: Cycling Paintings in 1912-13’, in The 




by the private inner realities that seem hidden behind her eyes, which form a barrier 
of their own: like tinted windows or half-open doors, they hint at the existence of 
people, places, and experiences she has known and lived, and of which he knows 
nothing. That he singles out the memory of hippodrome lawns, and of paths down 
which she might have cycled, as particular examples of what this inner world might 
contain, suggests that her unattainable quality is intimately linked to her identity as 
a lover of sport and speed. 
 This implied alterity is reflective of a broader socio-cultural tendency, which 
‘othered’ female cyclists by suggesting that they no longer fitted the definition of 
what it meant to be a woman. Although the narrator never mentions it outright, 
debates abounded in the late nineteenth century about the suitability of cycling for 
women, with ‘guardians of morality’ warning that it enabled and encouraged them 
to leave home unchaperoned,74 and physicians that it posed a risk to the female 
reproductive system, as we saw in the introduction to this chapter. The most visible 
signifier of this new threat to femininity were the cycling bloomers that were worn 
instead of long skirts, and it is of note that while other girls at Balbec are sporty, 
Albertine and her friends are the only ones to wear specially adapted sporting 
clothes; as Carter asserts, ‘we should […] realize that at the moment the hero first 
sights Albertine, she is – although he does not mention this aspect – an androgynous 
figure.’75 In what was presumably a slight on such masculinising attire, a certain Mlle 
Wanda de Boucza, an actress at the Odéon theatre in Paris, is recorded as claiming 
in 1896 that ‘la bicycliste constitue un troisième sexe’, as a note in the Pléiade edition 
of the novel recounts (II, 1416). In the light of contemporary comment that viewed 
the female cyclist as, at best, unladylike, and at worst, barely a woman at all, it seems 
telling that the cyclist Albertine is suspected of being promiscuous (the narrator 
immediately assumes that she and her friends must be the ‘très jeunes maîtresses de 
coureurs cyclistes’ (II, 151)) and, later, a lesbian. She emerges as unfathomable and 
inaccessible not only because she is athletic, but because she does not fit into clearly 
defined gender parameters, erring instead towards what is perceived as a sort of 
gender ‘hybridity’. This hybridity was a phenomenon of car culture as well as cycling 
culture: androgynous chauffeurs’ uniforms had the same effect as cycling bloomers, 
but in reverse. This is illustrated by Proust’s description of his chauffeur, Agostinelli, 
as ‘une nonne de la vitesse’ in ‘Journées en automobile’ (CSB, 67), or by the episode 
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in La Prisonnière when the narrator observes a woman walking in the street below his 
bedroom window, only to realise that ‘she’ is in fact a male chauffeur, dressed in a 
long leather coat (III, 643-644). Like that of the cyclist, the identity of the chauffeur is 
obscured, in doubt; the physical accoutrements of speed function as a disguise.  
The aviator takes this further: in the narrator’s description, he is a being of 
indeterminate species, transcending not gender but humanity itself. Moreover, he 
inhabits a realm – the sky – which, although part of the physical world, is just as 
inaccessible to the onlooker as the quasi-virtual realm inhabited by the young 
cyclists. In all these cases, then, the fact of being an active practitioner of speed, as 
opposed to a passenger, creates a sort of psycho-social veil that conceals identity and 
inner reality and prevents access to the realm or domain to which the practitioner 
belongs. Cyclists and aviators (and chauffeurs, up to a point) are represented in a 
manner that suggests they exist in a sort of ‘beyond’ space, in which contradictions 
are resolved, and seemingly unshakeable distinctions between states of being – 
human-animal, human-deity, human-machine, male-female – are transcended. Like 
Elstir, with his creation of a world in which the distinction between illusion and 
reality can be undone, Proust and his avant-garde contemporaries use metaphor and 
pictorial experimentation as a means of depicting a world in which a dialectical 
resolution such as this can occur – in which the ‘vases clos’ of identity can be broken 
open, allowing new ‘hybrid’ forms to emerge from the interstitial space between 
them. Yet this in itself creates a new paradox, since in doing so they erect another 
boundary between those who have access to this world and those who do not. This 
boundary, I will argue, can be further elucidated with reference to the theory of the 
fourth dimension. 
 
ii. New dimensions 
As we have seen, the term ‘fourth dimension’ was prevalent at this time in learned 
and creative circles of various disciplines, reflecting a widespread questioning of the 
nature of time and space. Precisely what was meant by it is difficult to pin down: 
some theorists, notably the English mathematician Charles Howard Hinton, believed 
in and sought to prove the existence of an additional spatial dimension, 
perpendicular to the three known dimensions and imperceptible to the human eye. 
Others were more interested in its implications for time; as H. G. Wells has his Time 
Traveller say, ‘“there are really four dimensions, three which we call the three planes 
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of Space, and a fourth, Time.”’76 As I have already noted, Linda Dalrymple 
Henderson’s extensive research has demonstrated that the concept was a source of 
inspiration and speculation for many in the avant-garde, although again there was 
no real consensus about its precise definition, and the extent to which it was a topic 
of earnest enquiry, rather than a fashionable buzzword or shorthand for a more 
general interest in new understandings of time and space, is in some doubt.77 
According to Marcel Duchamp, speaking in 1966, ‘la quatrième dimension devenait 
une chose dont on parlait, sans savoir ce que ça voulait dire.’78 But however vague 
its definition, the prevalence of such a concept is nonetheless an important indicator 
of a deeper hunger for a new version of reality that falls outside the rigid parameters 
of nineteenth-century postivism, Euclidean geometry, and Newtonian physics.  
By far the most interesting interpretation of four-dimensionality, for our 
purposes, is that which sees it as linked to or enabled by movement and speed.79 A 
rather cryptic passage of Boccioni’s book appears to suggest – somewhat 
unsurprisingly – that the author subscribes to a version of four-dimensionality 
underpinned by movement, force and dynamism: 
 
                                                                  
76 H.G. Wells, The Time Machine [1895] (London, et al.: Penguin Books, 2005), p. 4. 
77 In Les Peintres cubistes, Apollinaire implies that use of the term was fairly generalised and unspecific: 
‘les peintres ont été amenés tout naturellement […] à se préoccuper de nouvelles mesures possibles de 
l’étendue que dans le langage des ateliers modernes on désignait toutes ensemble et brièvement par le 
terme de quatrième dimension.’ (pp. 51-52.) Erasmus Weddigen and Sonya Weddigen-Schmid have 
also suggested that it was moulded to fit a variety of philosophical and artistic agendas. For the painter 
Albert Gleizes ‘the new four-dimensional pictorial space was to unite the contradictions between space 
and time’, while the German writer and critic Carl Einstein ‘wanted to see the destruction of the 
hierarchy of time and space’ (Erasmus Weddigen and Sonya Weddigen-Schmid, ‘A Short Cycle Ride 
Through Art History towards New Dimensions’ in Cycling, Cubo-Futurism and the Fourth Dimension: Jean 
Metzinger’s At the Cycle-Race Track, curated by Erasmus Weddigen (New York: The Solomon R. 
Guggenheim Foundation, 2012), pp. 10-29 (pp. 21-22)). Maurice Raynal went further, as they point out, 
claiming that ‘si […] le peintre arrive à rendre un objet sous toutes ses dimensions il réalise une œuvre 
de méthode d’un ordre supérieur à celui d’une œuvre peinte sous les seules dimensions visuelles’ 
(Raynal, p. 5). In his study of Surrealism and modern physics, Gavin Parkinson has analysed the 
importance for Salvador Dalí of the ‘fourth dimension’ in its later incarnation as Einsteinian space-time. 
The melting clocks of Dalí’s The Persistence of Memory, he asserts, ‘[evoke] Einstein’s notion of “time 
dilation”; that is, the relative variation, depending upon position in space, of the rate of temporal flow 
– the function within Relativity of the fourth dimension, [what Dalí referred to in his essay “The Tears 
of Heraclitus” as] the “delirious and Surrealist dimension par excellence”.’ (Gavin Parkinson, 
Surrealism, Art and Modern Science: Relativity, Quantum Mechanics, Epistemology (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 2008), p. 192.) 
78 Duchamp/Cabanne, p. 29. 
79 As Henderson has detailed, movement played an important role in Hinton’s definition of four-
dimensionality. His texts (A New Era of Thought (1888), The Fourth Dimension (1904), and numerous 
articles and short stories) explored the ideas that movement in space could generate a fourth dimension, 
or that a four-dimensional being or object could visibly pass through our own, three-dimensional space. 
Hinton’s texts were not translated into French, but his ideas were referenced in a number of French texts 
on the fourth dimension, such as Maurice Boucher’s Essai sur l’hyperespace, of 1903, so it was possible 
that members of the avant-garde were familiar with these ideas. For more on Hinton, see Henderson, 
The Fourth Dimension. 
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The dynamic form is a sort of fourth dimension in painting and sculpture [...] 
If, with artistic intuition, it ever becomes possible to get close to a fourth 
dimension, we Futurists will be the first to arrive there. In fact, with the sole 
form that depicts continuity in space, we’re creating a form that’s the sum of 
the potential developments of the three known dimensions. For this reason, 
we can’t depict a measured and finite fourth dimension, but rather a continuous 
projection of forces and forms that are intuited in their infinite development. 
The single dynamic form whose existence we’ve declared is, in reality, only 
the suggestion of a form of motion that appears for an instant and is then lost 
in the infinite unfolding of its multiplicity.80 
 
Precisely what is meant here is uncertain; critics have drawn different conclusions as 
to the wider theoretical implications of the passage, although certainly Boccioni’s 
reliance on notions of continuity and intuition betrays his debt to Bergson.81 What is 
particularly striking, however, is the almost word-for-word reference to the title of 
the 1913 sculpture that we considered above: the ‘sole [unique] form that depicts 
continuity in space’. We might logically conclude that the sculpture is intended as a 
representation or investigation of four-dimensionality; that it is in some way ‘the 
sum of the potential developments of the three known dimensions’. What is also 
intriguing is the fact that this four-dimensional ‘single dynamic form’ is simply a 
form of movement ‘that appears for an instant and is then lost in the infinite 
unfolding of its multiplicity’. For all the abstruseness of Boccioni’s prose, this sounds 
rather like what a static viewer would see of a speeding vehicle, which would appear 
for an instant only to be lost, continuing on with no end in sight. I have already 
argued that Unique Forms, seemingly an expression of four-dimensionality, can also 
be read as an allegory for the human body moving through the world in a speeding 
vehicle. Are we to infer, then, that mechanised speed is itself a form of four-
dimensionality? 
 A potential answer to this question can be found in Georges Poulet’s analysis 
of movement in Proust, in his early study, Études sur le temps humain. In what must 
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185 
surely be a nod – if a vague one – to Proust’s own use of the term ‘quatrième 
dimension’ in Du Côté de chez Swann, which I will consider in due course, Poulet 
argues that movement in time and space gives access to a new, four-dimensional 
reality:  
 
N’est-ce pas proprement le rôle du temps de surmonter cette exclusivité 
réciproque des points de vue qui est le propre de l’espace? Tels les clochers 
de Martinville, apparaissant d’abord en face d’un spectateur immobile, au 
fond d’une perspective immuable, ne livrant alors d’eux-mêmes qu’un aspect 
nécessairement ‘épisodique et momentané’; mais qui, dès qu’ils se trouvent 
engagés par le déplacement du spectateur dans un mouvement inverse, 
entrent par le simple changement successif de leurs lignes, dans un univers 
tout différent; un univers qui n’est plus celui où les trois dimensions de 
l’espace composent à elles trois un univers épisodique et momentané, mais 
un univers où la quatrième dimension, qui est celle du temps, fait sortir l’objet 
de l’épisodique et du momentané pour en livrer tous les aspects au spectateur 




Le temps est […] comme une quatrième dimension qui en se combinant avec 
les trois autres, achève l’espace, rapproche et rentoile ses fragments opposites, 
enferme en une même continuité une totalité qui autrement resterait toujours 
irrémédiablement dispersée. Vu à travers le temps l’espace se trouve délivré, 
transcendé.83 
 
In this account, four-dimensional space is not an imperceptible, inaccessible realm, 
but the space we know and inhabit, altered and redefined by the visible unfolding of 
time. Although Poulet does not state it, it seems safe to conclude that this unfolding 
is enabled by mechanised movement in particular; as we are by now well aware, the 
Martinville episode is brought about by a journey in a ‘car in disguise’, and the 
narrator’s first explicit description of car travel, which we discussed above, also fits 
Poulet’s description here. The aeroplane is surely the ultimate enabler of this spatial 
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transformation: moving both at speed and upwards, into the third dimension, it 
‘delivers’ space from fragmentation, offering up a view of the landscape in its 
totality. To varying degrees, then, mechanised transport technologies can overwrite 
the old version of space with the new. Active practitioners of speed, I would argue, 
have a particularly privileged relationship to this continuous, ‘total’ space, since they 
enter it under their own control and on their own terms, while those who travel 
slowly or who remain static are, by contrast, confined to the old, fragmented, 
episodic version. Static humans are separate from speeding humans not only because 
the latter are physically ‘mechanised’ or because their identities are in doubt, but also 
because they occupy a separate dimensional reality. 
 I am not suggesting that Poulet’s description here should be taken as a 
decisive answer to the ‘fourth dimension question’; indeed, his use of the term is 
largely metaphorical and acknowledges neither its many possible scientific or critical 
definitions, nor its place in cultural history. Rather, it provides one possible means 
of shedding light on an extremely woolly concept, which, in the case of the avant-
garde, was always confined to the realm of metaphor and inference anyway, the lack 
of consensus as to its true meaning freeing up artists and writers to use and represent 
it as they saw fit. What is more important than settling on a clear definition is the 
suggestion that there might be a distinction between those who can access a four-
dimensional space and those who cannot, and that mechanised movement might be 
the means of providing such access. 
This distinction is made tangible in Metzinger’s Au vélodrome, which Erasmus 
Weddigen and Sonya Weddigen-Schmid argue was also an attempt to engage with 
a concept of four-dimensionality. The painting is the last in a series of three, all of 
which depict racing cyclists – subject matter that trespasses onto Futurist territory, 
with the transparency of the third cyclist’s body in particular recalling Boccioni’s 
declaration in the Technical Manifesto of Futurist painting that ‘movement and light 
destroy the materiality of bodies’.84 The number 4 appears in all of them: on the 
                                                                  
84 ‘Technical Manifesto’, p. 30. Weddigen and Weddigen-Schmid dub the series ‘Cubo-Futurist’, and 
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would undoubtedly have also taken an interest in the exhibition of Futurist painting at the Galerie 
Bernheim-Jeune in Paris in 1912. Citing Henderson’s research, they claim that Boccioni in particular was 
impressed by what he saw on his visit to Metzinger’s studio (see Weddigen and Weddigen-Schmid, p. 
28; note 50). This, however, paints a more amicable picture of Boccioni’s relations with the Cubists than 
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dynamism of J. Metzinger”’ (via Vere, p. 1169). Vere suggests that Boccioni’s Dynamism of a Cyclist might 
be a response to Au vélodrome, particularly since he went on to produce Dynamism of a Footballer – ‘surely 
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cyclist’s back in Le Bicycliste, the first in the series; on his arm in the second, Coureur 
Cycliste, and on a sign above the grandstand hoardings in Au vélodrome. Weddigen 
and Weddigen-Schmid take this as a reference to the fourth dimension, since the 
number ‘[is] important neither for the rider’s identity nor for the details of the 
contest’.85 Metzinger was interested in the concept, without doubt; a subsequent 
painting, now lost, was entitled Nature morte (4e dimension), and he declared in a letter 
to Gleizes of 1916 that ‘the fourth dimension holds no more secrets for me. Before I 
had only ideas, now I have certainty.’86 The viewer, of course, can have no such 
certainty – the lost painting might have helped to pinpoint what remains unclear in 
the cycling paintings. Nonethless, it remains to be observed that the cubistically 
geometric, futuristically transparent form of the cyclist implies the sort of avant-
garde investigation into spatiality that, in Apollinaire’s account, was generally 
referred to by the shorthand ‘fourth dimension’ (see note 77), and if Metzinger was 
intentionally flirting with Futurism at this time, it makes sense that his version of 
four-dimensionality would be based on movement, dynamism and speed.  
The fact that Metzinger’s only painting explicitly to reference the fourth 
dimension was a still life suggests he soon gave up on trying to link four-
dimensionality to movement, and for Weddigen and Weddigen-Schmid, there is no 
doubt that the cycling painting falls short in its attempt to explore the concept, if that 
is indeed its aim. Part of this failure is the fact that the crowd, confined behind the 
hoardings of the grandstand, is rendered in traditional academic perspective. 
Ultimately, they conclude, ‘the conventions of Euclidean geometry and perspective 
were stronger, for Metzinger, than avant-gardist demands for a reassessment of 
traditional values’.87 Boccioni would likely have had qualms about this use of 
perspective, given that it implies a finite fourth dimension, restricted to the space 
inhabited by the cyclist himself. But I read this as more than simply a stylistic 
inconsistency. Indeed, the perspectival distinction between the cyclist and the crowd 
serves to heighten the impression that they exist not merely in separate spaces, 
demarcated by the white barrier of the grandstand, but in separate spatial systems, 
one of them conventional and old-fashioned, the other new and revelatory. The sign 
on the hoardings, reading ‘PARIS-ROUB’ and pasted from a real newspaper, informs 
                                                                  
a response to Gleizes’s The Football Players’. If so, it was likely he was trying reclaim what he saw as 
Futurist subject matter from its usurpers in Paris.  
85 Weddigen and Weddigen Schmid, p. 24. 
86 Via Weddigen and Weddigen Schmid, p. 23. 
87 Weddigen and Weddigen-Schmid, p. 26. 
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us that the cyclist is taking part in the gruelling Paris-Roubaix cycle race, and that he 
has been travelling not just around the velodrome but many kilometres across 
northern France. We could speculate that the experience has altered his view of the 
space he has traversed in a manner that fits Poulet’s description of four-
dimensionality, whereas the spectators – seated in a confined space, their sightlines 
blocked by the walls of the velodrome – remain in the fragmented, episodic space of 
pre-mechanisation, as their perspectival rendering implies. What is more, the general 
culture of professional cycling at this time demonstrated a wilful ideological 
distancing between spectators and competitors, the former hero-worshipping the 
latter with a fervour that ‘came close to the cult for touching icons, reliquaries and 
lingams’.88 In the light of this, it is pleasing to note Hinton’s declaration, in his book 
of 1904, that the concept of four-dimensionality was ‘generally embraced by our 
religious faculties, by our idealising tendency’.89 
 
In the Recherche, Proust demonstrates at least a passing interest in the furore 
surrounding the concept of the fourth dimension. If he can be said to belong to a 
particular school of thought, it is to that which sees time as a fourth dimension, as is 
implied when the narrator describes the church at Combray as ‘un édifice occupant, 
si l’on peut dire, un espace à quatre dimensions – la quatrième étant celle du Temps’ 
(I, 60). The church as the narrator experiences it is a three-dimensional ‘section’ of its 
four-dimensional existence, although the successive epochs through which the 
church has passed have left traces, visible and tactile evidence of its spatio-temporal 
coexistence.90 The fact that his own life unfolds in ‘space-time’, to borrow a phrase 
from Einstein, will become clear at the end of the novel, when he recognises time as 
‘cette dimension énorme que je ne me savais pas avoir’ and realises that involuntary 
memory suppresses ‘cette grande dimension du Temps suivant laquelle la vie se 
réalise’.91 Well before the narrator has recognised this aspect of time, however, he has 
                                                                  
88 Ibid., p. 11. 
89 Charles Howard Hinton, The Fourth Dimension (London: Swan Sonnechschein & Co.; New York: John 
Lane, 1904), p. 1.  
90 For more on Proust’s ‘four-dimensional’ understanding of time, see Diane R. Leonard, ‘Proust in the 
Fourth Dimension’, in Au Seuil de la modernité, pp. 165-178; see also Richard Durán, ‘Fourth-Dimensional 
Time and Proust’s “A la recherche du temps perdu”’, South Atlantic Review, 56 (May 1991), 73-90. 
91 It is almost certain that Proust, by this stage, had at least a layperson’s awareness of Einstein’s notion 
of four-dimensional space-time, an integral part of relativity theory, since relativity had entered the 
public consciousness in 1919, when a well-publicised English astronomical expedition successfully set 
out to validate his theories through observation of a total solar eclipse. As John D. Erickson has pointed 
out, there was a vogue in the 1920s for comparing Proust to Einstein: ‘for a brief period, largely in the 
early twenties, a few critics thought they had discovered the key to the structure of A la recherche du 
temps perdu.’ (Erickson, ‘The Proust-Einstein Relation: A Study in Relative Point of View’, in Marcel 
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been confounded by his awareness of Albertine’s ‘four-dimensional’, spatio-
temporal existence. Her memories of the past, her desires for the future, and the 
spaces she has known and will yet know inevitably slip from his grasp. Their 
cohabitation in La Prisonnière will teach him that the object of love is not simply a 
physical being, ‘un être [...] enfermé dans un corps’, but ‘l’extension de cet être à tous 
les points de l’espace et du temps que cet être a occupés et occupera’ (III, 607-608). It 
is impossible, therefore, to truly inhabit or possess the beloved: ‘si nous ne possédons 
pas son contact avec tel lieu, avec telle heure, nous ne le possédons pas. Or nous ne 
pouvons toucher tous ces points.’ (III, 608) As Carter has it: 
 
The person he desires is […] fugitive, always fleeing, insaisissable, moving 
away from him at a rate that increases in direct proportion to his desire. The 
conception of woman as the geometric embodiment of space-time is 
expressed in a maxim: ‘L’amour, c’est l’espace et le temps rendus sensibles 
au coeur.’92 
 
Carter goes on to point out that speed and desire are intimately linked in the 
Recherche. The narrator, he notes, ‘desires only those girls who are in motion or those 
whom he sees while he is moving, which also endows them with fugacity’.93 Of all 
these girls, it is the sport-loving Albertine whose character is most defined by 
movement; it is no coincidence that it is also she whom the narrator most desires, 
and whose unknowable quality causes him the most anguish. Her passion for 
physical movement and speed directly correlates, then, to her internal fugacity: her 
actual status as a cyclist is a physical manifestation of her metaphorical status as an 
                                                                  
Proust: A Critical Panorama, ed. by Larkin B. Price (Urbana, IL, Chicago, and London: University of 
Illinois Press, 1973), pp. 247-276 (p. 251).) In 1922, Proust described one such comparison, made by 
Camille Vettard as ‘le plus grand honneur que je puisse recevoir’ (letter to Vettard, Corr., XXI, p. 396). 
Nevertheless, he also confessed his inability to understand Einstein’s theories in a letter to the Duc de 
Guiche in 1921: ‘Que j’aimerais vous parler d’Einstein! On a beau m’écrire que je dérive de lui, ou lui 
de moi, je ne comprends pas un seul mot à ses théories, ne sachant pas l’algèbre.’ (Corr., XX (1921), p. 
578.) 
92 Carter, p. 35. Jordan relates this impossible situation to relativity theory, and Einstein’s use of the train 
as an image with which to illustrate his argument: ‘not only can he never find out exactly what 
[Albertine] is doing, and with whom she is doing it, he cannot even escape the confines of his own 
temporal context. As Einstein explains, events which are simultaneous with reference to one coordinate 
system (such as on a train) are not simulaneous with regard to another (such as on the embankment): 
“Every reference-body (co-ordinate system) has its own particular time; unless we are told the 
reference-body to which the statement of time refers, there is no meaning in a statement of the time of 
an event”. The Narrator will try to imprison Albertine on the train, in the compartment, in his arms, 
and even there cannot do it because of what is going on outside the train, in the compartment, inside 
Albertine, and inside his own self. There are far too many ‘coordinate systems’ to arrive at any solid, 
fixed certainty.’ (Jordan, pp. 158-159.)   
93 Carter, p. 46. 
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‘être de fuite’ (III, 599). As Carter remarks, the narrator first hears of Albertine when 
she is described by Gilberte as ‘sûrement très fast’, a clever double entendre; ‘it is 
evident,’ he asserts, ‘that Proust chose the English word because of its double 
meaning: rapid movement through space and sexual promiscuity.’94 The word 
foreshadows the fact that Albertine cannot be ‘stilled’, whether physically, 
emotionally, or sexually.  
 Moreover, Albertine is figured not just as in motion but as a geographical 
space. When he first catches sight of her with the petite bande, the narrator imagines 
their inner lives as spaces into which he would like to advance:  
 
C’était […] toute sa vie qui m’inspirait du désir; désir douloureux, parce que 
je le sentais irréalisable, mais enivrant, parce que ce qui avait été jusque-là ma 
vie ayant brusquement cessé d’être ma vie totale, n’étant plus qu’une petite 
partie de l’espace étendu devant moi que je brûlais de couvrir, et qui était fait 
de la vie de ces jeunes filles. (II, 152) 
 
Albertine herself is frequently associated with the sea. The image of her ‘silhouettée 
sur l’écran que lui fait, au fond, la mer’ will remain one of the narrator’s abiding 
memories (II, 186). Later, however, he will imply that Albertine’s relation to the sea 
is considerably less easily contained than the flatness of a screen suggests, given that 
she seems in fact to contain the sea within herself: ‘quand elle […] fermait [ses yeux], 
c'était comme quand avec des rideaux on empêche de voir la mer’ (III, 528). At once 
almost infinitely expansive and unfathomably deep, the sea is a telling metaphor for 
an internal self that extends both synchronically and diachronically. Moreover, it is 
visibly continuous in a way that landscapes – littered with trees, mountains, 
buildings, and so on – are not, unless of course they are ‘delivered’ from 
fragmentation by movement at speed. Looking in from the outside, the narrator has 
only a limited, partial view of this continuous space. He is like one of the spectators 
in Metzinger’s vélodrome, or a pedestrian who watches an automobile speed by, 
aware that what he is witnessing cannot be caught or contained, and that it exists in 
a spatio-temporal reality that must remain separate from his own. The difference is 
that the narrator, not content to hero-worship his cyclist from afar, cannot accept this 
state of outsidership even though he knows his attempts to overcome it are futile. 
                                                                  
94 Ibid., p. 52. 
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Precisely how he attempts to overcome it will be considered in more depth in the 
second half of Chapter 4. 
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4. Human Boundaries: Walls, Skins, Self, Other  
 
 
Introduction: The Self, Inside and Out 
 
The second half of Chapter 3 considered the idea that a certain – mechanical – type 
of human exists on a separate, inaccessible plane that cannot be entered by those who 
do not belong to the same select group. Integral to this set-up is an absolute boundary 
that separates each party: one is fully ‘inside’ his or her own plane, and one is locked 
out, separated from the other as if by an unbreachable barrier. This opposition of 
outsidership and insidership was heightened, as we saw, by the sense that the other 
exists in a separate dimension or realm. Of course, we might think of this simply as 
an amplified version of what is already a fundamental aspect of self-other relations 
– namely that selfhood is a matter of interiority and ‘otherhood’ is a matter of 
exteriority. I exist inside myself; everything else is external to me and I am external 
to it. Learning as much is a normal and necessary part of a child’s development, 
although it may be a distressing one. Sylvia Plath’s short story ‘Ocean 1212-W’ 
beautifully illustrates the disappointment of this moment of realisation, which occurs 
after the birth of a younger sibling: ‘as from a star I saw, coldly and soberly, the 
separateness of everything. I felt the wall of my skin; I am I. That stone is a stone. My 
beautiful fusion with the things of this world was over.’1 And yet a human being is 
not entirely closed off, hermetically sealed like a fragment of space or time not yet 
delivered from its isolation by movement at speed or involuntary memory. We are 
exterior beings too: we communicate with each other in various ways, often as a 
means of externalising our inner experience. It is this interaction – or perhaps conflict 
– between states of interiority and exteriority that interests me here. 
 This chapter compares Proust’s work to the paintings and writings of the 
Surrealist artist, Dorothea Tanning, and marks something of a shift in conceptual 
language. While Chapters 1 to 3 have centred, broadly speaking, around the 
ontological and the phenomenological – how human beings understand and 
perceive the wider world – here I move into the realm of the psychological, and more 
specifically the psychoanalytic. This shift enables me to examine what are still, 
                                                                  
1 Sylvia Plath, Johnny Panic and the Bible of Dreams and other prose writings (London: Faber and Faber, 
1977), pp. 123-130 (p. 126). 
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essentially, relationships between the subject and the external world: in the first half, 
I argue that the subject’s experience of selfhood is defined by a close interaction 
between the internal self and external, private architectural spaces, like bedrooms 
and apartments, with the latter providing, variously, a structure for self-identity, a 
projective extension of the self, its allegorical expression, or its protective – or 
oppressive – casing. In the second half, I consider the subject’s experience of relating 
to another person – specifically a heterosexual partner and cohabitee – whose own 
self remains partially, if not totally hidden away. Both sections hark back to Chapter 
2 by using architectural metaphors – rooms and walls, in this case – to articulate these 
relationships, while the second half expands on my investigation in the last section 
of Chapter 3 by continuing to explore the relevance of spatial metaphors in Proust’s 
narrator’s experience of Albertine’s alterity. In doing so it interweaves the 
psychoanalytic discourse with an epistemological one, related to that used in 
Chapter 1, but asking a much more specific question: not ‘how can I know the 
world?’, but ‘how can I know another person?’ 
 
i. The spatial self 
The quest to understand the self is often figured as a process of retreat, and of internal 
exploration: Freudian psychoanalysis, for example, is centred around just such an 
exploration. Indeed, Freud might seem particularly germane to this investigation, 
given that Surrealism owes its existence to his influence on André Breton,2 while A 
la recherche du temps perdu, in Elisabeth Ladenson’s words, has ‘long provided 
something of a field day for psychoanalytic criticism’ – partly, she writes, because 
‘much of “Combray” in particular sounds as though it might have been written by 
Freud himself, under a Gallic pseudonym, to dramatize his theory of the Oedipus 
complex.’3 (This is in spite of the fact that Proust, as we know, had never read Freud.) 
It should come as little surprise, then, that both Proust and the Surrealists commit to 
a philosophy of introspection, conceiving of the self as an interior world or space to 
be explored. This sense of spatiality is indicated by a variety of metaphors. For 
example, the opening section of Breton and Philippe Soupault’s jointly-written 
automatic text, Les Champs magnétiques (1919), is entitled ‘La Glace sans tain’, which 
in Katharine Conley’s argument, ‘suggests the possibility of looking through, instead 
                                                                  
2 In the First Manifesto of Surrealism, Breton explains that the original Surrealist practice of automatic 
writing was an attempt to practice Freudian techniques on himself (see Manifestes, p. 33). 
3 Elisabeth Ladenson, Proust’s Lesbianism (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1999), p. 109. 
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of into, the reflective surface of a mirror, as though staring through glass from one 
state of consciousness into another’.4 What she does not acknowledge is that a glace 
sans tain differs from a mirror in a crucial respect: it is a reflective window that 
conceals an inner room from which an observer can look out, unseen. Thus, if 
Surrealist practice is a means of looking through the reflective surface, the 
unconscious itself must be the room.  
If Susan Harris Smith’s contention (cited in Chapter 2) is correct, the same thing 
is implied in Surrealist visual depictions of figures who look through windows and 
into rooms that stand for unconscious spaces. Among Smith’s examples are images 
from Max Ernst’s collage novel, Une semaine de bonté (1934): in one, a woman looks 
in through a bedroom window at an Easter Island head atop a figure in Victorian 
dress, regarding itself in a mirror; in another, a sphinx stares into a train carriage at 
a besuited monkey and the prostrate legs of a woman. In Hal Foster’s words, 
numerous images in this work and in Ernst’s other collage novels (La Femme 100 têtes, 
of 1929, and Rêve d’une petite fille qui voulut entrer au carmel, of 1930) cast nineteenth-
century bourgeois interiors as ‘an implicit mise-en-scène of the unconscious’.5 Ernst’s 
original source material for the collages – outmoded images from old books and 
magazines etc – are imperceptibly transformed and made strange, ‘relocate[d] […] 
in psychic reality through the substitution of surrealist figures of the unconscious: an 
Easter Island head […], a lion head[…], and a general becoming animal’.6  
The first section of Louis Aragon’s Le Paysan de Paris (1926) implies a 
comparable link between unconscious and architectural space. It is set in the ill-fated 
Passage de l’Opéra, a nineteenth-century commercial space soon to be destroyed by 
the tail-end of Haussmanisation, figured here as a dream-like realm: ‘with its “lueur 
glauque, en quelque manière abyssale”,’ writes Johanna Malt, ‘[it] is a metaphor for 
the dark spaces of the unconscious, in which the surrealist flâneur roams.’7 Here and 
there in the passage are objects that serve as something like physical and spatial 
Freudian slips or ‘serrures qui ferment mal sur l’infini’, which allow the unconscious 
to slip through into consciousness as if through a partially-open door.8 As well as 
architectural space, the unconscious is also figured as landscape and a marine 
                                                                  
4 Katharine Conley, ‘Anamorphic Love: The Surrealist Poetry of Desire’, in Surrealism: Desire Unbound, 
ed. by Jennifer Mundy, Vincent Gille, and Dawn Ades (Princeton, N.J. and London: Princeton 
University Press; Tate Publishing Ltd, 2001), pp. 101-118 (p. 103). 
5 Hal Foster, Compulsive Beauty (Cambridge, MA and London: The MIT Press, 1993), p. 176. 
6 Ibid., p. 177. 
7 Obscure Objects, pp. 43-44. 
8 Louis Aragon, Le Paysan de Paris [1926] (Paris: Gallimard, 2004), p. 50. 
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expanse (‘toute la faune des imaginations, et leur végétation marine, comme par une 
chevelure d’ombre se perd et se perpétue dans les zones mal éclairées de l’activité 
humaine’) and as an abyss that the passer-by, engaging with the ‘serrures qui 
ferment mal sur l’infini’, can explore: ‘ce sont ses propres abîmes que grâce à ces 
monstres sans figure il va de nouveau sonder.’9 
Proust uses a similar lexis to describe the unconscious mind as a limitless, 
unfamiliar expanse or depth (as Simon Kemp remarks, ‘Proust’s mind does comprise 
conscious and unconscious parts, with the latter figured, as in Freud, as a vast realm 
that both stores memories and motivates our actions for reasons unknown to us’).10 
To recover memories, the narrator informs us, we should not alter our position in 
physical space – by revisiting a location from our childhoods, for example – but 
retreat into psychic space: ‘il faut descendre pour […] retrouver’ (II, 390). One such 
means of descent, sleep, is figured as a whole spatial world of its own, described 
variously as a garden, a room, an apartment, a cave, and a hole. Like Aragon, the 
narrator will later call on the verb sonder: the artist looking for material, he says, 
should not describe surface appearances, but should dive deep into the self, ‘comme 
un plongeur qui sonde’ (IV, 458; my emphasis). Dorothea Tanning also thinks of the 
spatial self as an artistic resource, describing her experience of grief as a force that 
cuts her off from her deep inner repositories of creative material:  
 
Still in the studio. Everything is there at the bottom of my crazy brain. 
Everything. But it’s stone-heavy and will not rise. Most of the time it’s all dark 
down there. You can stumble around for hours without joy. My mind is a cave 
and its words are hidden in boxes and trunks with lost or rusty keys.11  
 
In the Proustian experience of involuntary memory, this material rises to the surface 
when we least expect it: in the madeleine episode, the memory (located in ‘[un] pays 
obscur’) is described as ‘quelque chose qu’on aurait désancré, à une grande 
profondeur’, and which ‘monte lentement’ (I, 45). We might conclude, then, that such 
metaphors constitute a persuasive argument for studying both Proust and Tanning 
through a Freudian lens.  
                                                                  
9 Ibid.; my emphasis. 
10 Simon Kemp, ‘Postpsychoanalytic Proust’, Modern Language Quarterly, 75 (March 2014), 77-101, p. 82. 
11 Dorothea Tanning, Between Lives: An Artist and Her World (New York and London: W.W. Norton and 
Company, 2001), p. 297. 
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My intention in this chapter, however, is to move beyond Freud, with the 
exception of a brief side-note on the uncanny. There are two main reasons for this. 
For one thing, Tanning uses her memoir, Between Lives: An Artist and Her World, to 
speak out vehemently against reductive Freudian readings of her work, condemning 
 
the sad little procession of analyzers, trudging toward the altar of libido, 
singing their quavering hymns from the open books of people like Sigmund 
Sang Froid (Max’s pun). […] Some paintings of mine that I had believed to be 
a testimony to the premise that we are waging a desperate battle with 
unknown forces are in reality dainty feminine fantasies bristling with sex 
symbols. Elsewhere, two rows of terrible teeth on one of my sculptures 
became, under these beady eyes, incredibly, a vulva. A statue that I thought 
was a moment of grace is the male member, this doubtless because it is 
standing up instead of lying down.12 
 
This serves not just as a condemnation of past critics, but as a warning to future ones. 
Who, after all, would want to join this ‘sad little procession’? As for Proust, there is 
already a huge body of critical work on the Freudian implications of his novel; 
documenting this in his article ‘Postpsychoanalytic Proust’, Simon Kemp argues for 
a discourse that moves beyond psychoanalysis as a means of elucidating the 
Proustian account of selfhood. This chapter follows his advice, but only up to a point: 
I do not bypass psychoanalysis altogether, but consider Proust and Tanning in 
relation to a later, post-Lacanian branch of it – Didier Anzieu’s theory of the skin-ego 
or Moi-peau. To my knowledge, this has been critically applied to Proust in only one 
study (Thomas Baldwin’s The Material Object in the Work of Marcel Proust, of 2005), 
and never to Tanning.  
As we shall see, Anzieu’s model of selfhood places equal value on both inside 
(the mind) and outside (the surface of the body). It is thus ill-suited to metaphors of 
depth or expanse, which (like early psychoanalysis) stress the importance of the 
interior while erasing the exterior from the equation. It does, however, align with 
architectural metaphors – and more neatly, I would argue, than do Freudian models. 
In the Freudian ‘room’, the internal space takes precedence over the walls that 
demarcate it, and yet a room without its walls is not a room at all. A building, like 
the self as Anzieu defines it, is as much exterior as it is interior, as much container as 
                                                                  
12 Tanning, p. 336. 
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contents. To be human is to be like a building: to exist between inner and outer 
realities, to communicate and conceal through a series of boundaries, surfaces, 
thresholds, openings, and interfaces. It is a connection that is culturally and 
linguistically embedded. Language makes the comparison endlessly: as embodied 
humans, we are made of cells, have abdominal walls and pelvic floors, arches in our 
feet, and roofs in our mouths; as thinking, feeling humans, we are liable to hit the 
roof, get driven up the wall, come out of the closet, have bats in the belfry, hold the 
keys to someone’s heart, or to have to talk to a brick wall. The connection also works 
the other way: in his book The Architectural Uncanny, Anthony Vidler describes ‘the 
history of bodily analogy in architecture’, remarking that in classical theory, ‘the 
(idealized) body was, so to speak, directly projected onto the building, which both 
stood for it and represented its ideal perfection.’13 This notion endured through the 
Renaissance and into the eighteenth century, during which time ‘the body, its 
balance, standards of proportion, symmetry, and functioning, mingling elegance and 
strength, was the foundation myth of the building.’14 
 
This chapter will weave a set of architectural metaphors and Anzieu’s theory of the 
Moi-peau into a framework by which to compare two specific ways of being and 
interacting in the world. One is embodied by Proust’s narrator; the other is implied 
in Dorothea Tanning’s paintings and writings. My analysis here is intended partly 
as a more complete bringing together of the apparently contradictory notions of 
surface and depth, inside and outside. As we saw in Chapter 1, the period spanning 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries can be understood as the occasion 
for a transition to privileging depth over surface, driven partly by the discoveries of 
scientific processes invisible to the human eye and, in Douglas R. Nickel’s words, by 
‘the antimaterialism and antiocularcentrism of Henri Bergson and Sigmund Freud’.15 
This was a radical transition that played a formative role in modernism. Yet, as we 
have seen elsewhere, avant-garde pictorial developments also privilege the concept 
of the surface in no small way. My use of Anzieu’s theory in this chapter, in 
combination with architectural metaphors, will allow me more fully to explore the 
importance of considering depth and surface, inside and outside, less as ideologically 
opposed states, than as a symbiotic pairings that inform and shape each other. 
                                                                  
13 Anthony Vidler, The Architectural Uncanny: Essays in the Modern Unhomely (Cambridge, MA and 
London: The MIT Press, 1992), pp. 70-71. 
14 Ibid, p. 71. 
15 Nickel, p. 39. 
 
198 
I. Self Spaces 
 
i. Personal spaces: reciprocity, projection, containment 
Part of my rationale for choosing Dorothea Tanning as a subject of my investigation 
here is the fact that she demonstrates an ‘intense interest’ in the relationship between 
interior and exterior, and expresses it in many of her paintings in architectural 
terms.16 It is clearly implied in her depictions of incomplete walls, of landscapes 
containing incongruous elements of domestic spaces, and above all in her frequent 
use of the motif of the door. The more specific relationship between human interiority 
and spaces external to the body is implied in a particular subcategory of her work, 
produced mostly in the 1940s and early 1950s, in which the human occupants of 
domestic spaces appear to be coming into contact with the products of their own 
dreams and imaginings. Always female, often children, they appear next to, 
entwined, or in battle with other-worldly forms and nightmarish forces. In Birthday 
(1942; fig. 14), a representation of Tanning herself stands in her own New York 
apartment with an unidentifiable winged creature at her feet and a series of half-
open doors behind her, which extend back towards the vanishing point of the 
painting, revealing increasingly distant and shadowy spaces and continuing, we 
suppose, onwards to infinity. In Avatar, a girl flies around her bedroom on a trapeze, 
high above the unmade bed she seems likely just to have left; her eyes are closed and 
she is accompanied by a faceless, wraith-like form, which clings to her back. Other 
paintings more explicitly convey the violence and hostility that such a meeting might 
entail: in Children’s Games (fig. 15), two young girls are fighting against the 
monstrous, fleshy forms escaping from beneath the wallpaper; in Eine Kleine 
Nachtmusik we seem to be witnessing a bizarre stand-off between a young girl and a 
giant sunflower, and in Intérieur, a girl pushes against an open door with all her 
might in an effort to keep out the monster (a giant, legless grasshopper, perhaps?) 
who is pushing the door from the other side. What is arresting in certain of these 
paintings is not only what is contained within the room, but what the room itself has 
become: in Birthday, for example, the main point of interest is the extension of the 
room into a never-ending passage full of half-open doors, while what is most 
unsettling in Children’s Games is what lurks beneath the wallpaper – the very 
substance of the walls themselves. In Avatar, it is only thanks to a drastically 
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heightened ceiling that the girl and her unidentifiable companion are able to swing 
from the trapeze, far above the floor below. In this respect Tanning differs from many 
of her Surrealist colleagues, for whom the room often serves as a neutral arena in 
which unsettling and fantastical occurences play out (as in Magritte’s La Condition 
humaine), rather than as a structure and a space that is subject to the same strange 
forces as the people, creatures or objects that occupy it. 
These improbable scenes of Tanning’s might be understood as pure fantasy, 
depictions of dreamscapes tout court. But as we have seen, in Breton’s definition 
‘surreality’ is a state of resolution between dream and reality into ‘une sorte de réalité 
absolue’.17 Tanning’s grounding of her paintings in recognisable (even if distorted) 
interior spaces – dingy bedrooms, eerie hotel corridors, her own apartment – implies 
a meeting of actual physical spaces with dream or fantasy realities, suggesting that 
the characters she portrays are projecting their own dreams, nightmares, and 
imaginings outwards into the rooms they occupy. 
Several of Tanning’s paintings thus imply a relationship according to which 
the room is changed and subjectivised by the outward projection of inner experience. 
But the case for the room’s structural identification with the self is posited by one 
painting in particular: the much-lauded Birthday, of 1942, particularly when it is read 
in conjunction with Tanning’s discussion of it in Between Lives. The painting, one of 
only two self-portraits Tanning produced over the course of her lengthy career, 
depicts not only the artist herself but also, as I have mentioned, the apartment she 
was living in at the time she painted it. In Between Lives, she recalls: 
 
It was a modest canvas by present-day standards. But it filled the place as if 
it had always been there. For one thing, it was the room. 
I had been struck, one day, by a fascinating array of doors – hall, 
kitchen, bathroom, studio – crowded together, soliciting my attention with 
their antic planes, light, shadows, imminent openings and shuttings. From 
there it was an easy leap to a dream of countless doors.18 
 
A few pages later, Tanning explicitly suggests an equivalence between this space and 
her own self. Her account of the arrival of her new partner, Max Ernst, conflates self 
and apartment, blurring the boundaries between the two: 
                                                                  
17 Manifestes, p. 24.  




It took only a few hours for him to move in. There was no discussion. It was 
as if he had found a house. Yes, I think I was his house. He lived in me; he 
decorated me, he watched over me. […] In no time at all, the last picture 
found a place by the door and the last mask was hung over my desk. […] A 
Fig. 14: Dorothea Tanning, Birthday, 1942 
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glory of objects and pictures expanding my rooms, making other worlds out 
of my walls.19 (64-65) 
 
The questions raised by this paragraph concerning gender dynamics and self-other 
relations will be explored in due course. For now, however, it is enough to observe 
that a complex, intricate process of wrapping, enclosure, and containment is at play. 
The most basic expression of the relationship is that Tanning and the apartment are 
each other – that they form part of the same entity. But Tanning also contains within 
herself a dream version of that same apartment, which she externalises on a canvas 
that then fills the very room that inspired it. The apartment, then, contains its own 
dream-likeness as well as several versions of its inhabitant: the physical Tanning, the 
painted Tanning, and, in a more metaphorical sense, the painting itself.20 And if 
Tanning ‘is’, or contains, both the physical and the dream apartment, the endless 
doors (which remind us of a literal depiction of Aragon’s ‘serrures qui ferment mal 
sur l’infini’) must lead into the unseen, infinite spaces of her own self. 
Reinforcing this connection between self and space is what appears to be a 
mirror behind the painted figure: a sharp change in the colour of the floorboards 
provides a break in continuity that implies the meeting of the floor with its own 
reflection. Its status as mirror, however, is in doubt: it does not reflect what we can 
see of the room in any logical way, and the painted Tanning’s own reflection is 
conspicuously absent. There is no visible physical barrier that marks it out as pure 
surface rather than simply the delimitation of another area of space; there is nothing, 
it seems, to prevent the painted woman from turning around and walking through 
it, Alice-like. She might indeed be tempted to do so, since the ‘mirror’ contains a door 
of its own, although it is impossible to say whether this is an actual door or simply a 
reflection of one. In an additional quirk, the proliferation of doors behind Tanning 
are themselves reminiscent of the mise-en-abyme effect created when two mirrors 
are placed opposite each other. A collection of door-mirrors and mirror-doors thus 
                                                                  
19 Ibid., pp. 64-65. 
20 Of course, it is a commonplace to suggest that a creative work is a version or a part of its creator, but 
the space Tanning accords this painting in her memoir implies it is somehow special, particularly when 
it comes to her account of Ernst’s refusal to let her sell it and his declaration that it must form part of 
their life together: ‘That picture! Days later I was showing it to a would-be collector […] Max stood, 
hand on hip, in the doorway. He listened pleasantly until the visitor asked the price.  
   “The picture is not for sale,” said Max. A modest silence, as his words sank into two brains. 
   […] A brief moment of rapid phrases, high tension, a pause. I hesitated – was I dreaming? Because 
Max was saying quite distinctly:  
   “I love Dorothea. I want to spend the rest of my life with her. The picture is part of that life.” 
   To this the collector had no reply. Nor did I.’ (Tanning, pp. 70-72.) 
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dominates the background of the painting, suggesting it was this work Tanning had 
in mind when, in a 1974 interview, she reflected that in the early years of her career, 
‘I was painting our side of the mirror – the mirror for me is a door.’21 The implicit 
connection between Tanning and her own apartment, which I have already 
discussed, suggests that all of these openings lead into psychic as well as physical 
space. 
The idea of a mirror that does not reflect but offers a way in to the inner spaces 
of the self recalls Breton and Soupault’s ‘glace sans tain’, or Breton’s window that 
separates conscious from unconscious – the difference being that Tanning’s mirror-
door posits the self as a space not merely to be observed but to be physically walked 
into. Her painted alter-ego, then, is less like the early Surrealist automatists, 
observing their unconscious activity through a mirror-window, than the protagonist 
in Cocteau’s Le Sang d’un poète, who jumps through a mirror and into a deserted hotel 
corridor (not unlike those depicted in Children’s Games or Eine Kleine Nachtmusik). In 
Tanning’s hands the equation of the mirror with the door takes on gendered 
connotations, seeming deliberately to react against the consistent use of the mirror in 
Western art as a symbol of female narcissism and vehicle of self-objectification. Her 
original use of an old trope negates the mirror’s role as a means of reducing the self 
to a two-dimensional image, seen from the outside; rather, by implying not merely a 
surface but a threshold, an opening into which she might retreat, it allows for the 
possibility of an extensive, spatial interiority rather than a self reduced to the spectral 
and the external. 
 
ii. The narrator’s room-self 
In Proust’s novel, a comparable reciprocity between self and space is expressed. 
Bedrooms are hugely important spaces in the Recherche, as Jean-Pierre Richard has 
observed: ‘le roman proustien glisse […] de chambre en chambre,’ he writes; ‘il ne 
cesse de manifester le choix d’une sorte de claustration domestique, d’un 
enfermement à la fois protecter et créateur.’22 The opening pages of the novel 
famously describe the liminal state between sleep and waking – the parallel 
processes of falling asleep and waking up again. The ambiguity of this state causes 
the narrator to question his own identity. As he edges towards wakefulness he is, in 
                                                                  
21 Victoria Carruthers, ‘Imagining the in-between: the art of Dorothea Tanning’ (unpublished doctoral 
thesis, University of Essex, 2012), p. 16. 
22 Jean-Pierre Richard, ‘Proust et la demeure’, Littérature, 164 (December 2011), 83-92, p. 83. 
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Malt’s words, ‘denuded and “bereft” even of a self’.23 All he has at such moments is 
‘le sentiment de l’existence comme il peut frémir au fond d’un animal’; he is ‘plus 
dénué que l’homme des cavernes’ (I, 5). As Georges Poulet observes, this lack of self 
is rooted in his inability to situate himself in space and time: 
 
Il ne sait plus [qui il est], et il ne le sait plus, parce qu’il a perdu le moyen de 
relier le lieu et le moment où il vit, à tous les autres lieux et moments de son 
existence antérieure. Sa pensée trébuche entre les temps, entre les lieux.24 
 
It is a series of remembered bedrooms that draws him out of this strange liminal state 
in which nothing is certain. Before even the mind can identify the room, the body has 
momentarily recomposed certain of the bedrooms that it has slept in over the years 
– physical memories ‘non encore du lieu où j’étais, mais de quelques-uns de ceux que 
j’avais habités et où j’aurais pu être’ (I, 5). This succession of fleeting, fragmentary 
memories enables him to ‘recompos[er] peu à peu les traits originaux de [s]on moi’ 
(I, 6), to determine whether he is at that moment what Joshua Landy labels the ‘moi-
Combray, the ‘moi-Balbec’, the ‘moi-Doncières’ or the ‘moi-Tansonville’.25 A reversal 
of this process is (briefly) described later on, when the narrator wonders how it is 
that when we wake, we happen upon the very same self we were before we fell 
asleep. ‘On n’est plus personne’, he declares; ‘comment, alors, cherchant sa pensée, 
sa personnalité comme on cherche un objet perdu, finit-on par retrouver son propre 
moi plutôt que tout autre?’ (II, 387). At the beginning of the novel, the bedroom is 
cast as the end point in a chain of memories that culminates in self-recognition; here, 
however, it is the first link in such a chain. Even if we have only seen it once, it 
awakens ‘des souvenirs auxquels de plus anciens sont suspendus’ (II, 387), providing 
the context and the catalyst for the process of remembering that brings the narrator 
back to ‘son propre moi’.  
As Poulet’s argument and Landy’s labels imply, place is a primary 
determinant in the narrator’s ongoing project of self-definition. Within the streets 
and landscapes that constitute these places, however, it is the singular space of the 
bedroom that provides the initial parameters by which the self is defined, an essential 
                                                                  
23 Johanna Malt, ‘The Blob and the Magic Lantern: On Subjectivity, Faciality and Projection’, Paragraph, 
35.3 (2013), 305-323 <10.3366/para.2013.0096> (p. 318). 
24 L’Espace proustien, p. 13. 
25 Joshua Landy, ‘“Les Moi en Moi”: The Proustian Self in Philosophical Perspective’, New Literary 
History, 32 (Winter 2001), 91-132, p. 101. 
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point de repère in the narrator’s journey from a state of spatial and temporal dispersal 
towards a unified self that knows – for a while, at least – both where and when it is. 
But the relationship between self and bedroom is twofold: the room grounds the 
subject in a stable, recognisable identity, but it also has the potential to be 
transformed by the internal workings of the narrator’s memory. Just as Tanning’s 
painted subjects seem able to structurally transform the spaces they occupy with 
projections from their own imaginations, so the chain of physical memories 
described at the very beginning of the novel set the narrator’s surroundings into 
motion, liberating them from their fixed and static locations and causing invisible 
walls to swirl in the shadows (‘tout tournait autour de moi dans l’obscurité, les 
choses, les pays, les années [...] les murs invisibles, changeant de place selon la forme 
de la pièce imaginée, tourbillonnaient dans les tenèbres’ (I, 6)). And as Tanning’s 
description of Birthday implies, the blurring of this boundary – the dual process of 
internalisation of the room and projection onto the room – creates an intimate link 
between the subject and the space it occupies. A more complete assimilation between 
self and room is described a page or so later, when the narrator remarks that his 
childhood bedroom at Combray, site of the [in]famous drame du coucher, was ‘une 
chambre que j’avais fini par remplir de mon moi au point de ne pas faire plus 
attention à elle qu’à lui-même’ (I, 10). The bedroom contains, in Malt’s words, ‘the 
projective extension of the narrator’s own consciousness, the limit of which falls not 
at the boundary of his body, but at the boundary of his room’.26 Like Tanning’s 
apartment, it is a site of interdependence betwen soi and chez soi, in which subject 
and space are part of the same entity. In the narrator’s case, it is habit that has enabled 
this connection, rendering the room imperceptible and unnoticed to the point that 
there is no longer any clear distinction between the two. So fully permeated is the 
room with the narrator’s ‘moi’ that he no longer notices it is there. 
 One problem with this intense connection between self and room is that it risks 
making the subject dependent on a familiar space, and thus vulnerable to trauma 
when that space is altered or left behind. For the sensitive narrator, habit encloses the 
self in the comfort of the everyday, shielding it from all that is hostile and unfamiliar; 
it is a protective casing that envelops the consciousness as the skin does the body, a 
psychological boundary that protects the self from the outside world. The experience 
of being in an unfamiliar or a defamiliarised bedroom strips away this protective 
outer layer of habit: the newness and strangeness of everything forcibly exposes the 
                                                                  
26 ‘Magic Lantern’, p. 319. 
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‘raw’ self beneath, as the narrator discovers when he is provided with a magic lantern 
in Combray, in an attempt to ease the anxiety that plagues him before bedtime. The 
display tells the story of Geneviève de Brabant and her husband’s intendant, Golo, 
whose false accusations of adultery result in her banishment and eventual death. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly given the content, it fails to comfort the anxious narrator. It 
is not the story, however, that is blamed for his unease, but rather the projection itself, 
which overlays his familiar space with a virtual one and replaces the solid, opaque 
walls with ‘d’impalpables irisations, de surnaturelles apparitions multicolores’ (I, 9). 
In appearing to compromise the solidity of the walls, the projection also destroys the 
‘wall’ of habit that had shielded him from the world. The appearance of Golo is as an 
invasion, a forced entry into this once-familiar space. The narrator remarks that his 
anxiety is akin to that he feels ‘dans une chambre d’hôtel [...] où je fusse arrivé pour 
la première fois en descendant du chemin de fer’ (I, 9), anticipating his later arrival 
in Balbec in A l’ombre des jeunes filles en fleurs. There, in his unfamiliar hotel room, 
with no habit to protect him, he must ‘faire entrer en contact avec les choses ce “moi” 
que je ne retrouvais qu’à des années d’intervalles’ (II, 381). In the absence of an 
architectural boundary between self-space and world-space, the narrator’s inner self 
is as exposed and as vulnerable as a room from which the walls have been violently 
removed. 
Both the Combray and the Balbec experiences are inherently uncanny. In its 
Freudian definition, the uncanny is an eruption of the unfamiliar into the familiar; 
Anthony Vidler notes that historically, ‘its favorite motif was precisely the contrast 
between a secure and homely interior and the fearful invasion of an alien presence’, 
and that for Freud, ‘“unhomeliness” was more than a simple sense of not belonging; 
it was the fundamental propensity of the familiar to turn on its owners, suddenly to 
become defamiliarized, derealized, as if in a dream.’27 Simply being present in an 
unfamiliar space, as the narrator is in Balbec, would not classify as ‘uncanny’ were it 
not for the inherent connection between self and space, according to which the new 
room is not experienced as external to the narrator, but as an invasive psychological 
force, and thus as a vehicle of ‘self-defamiliarisation’. The body is implicated in this 
process of invasion, the sensory organs functioning as entry points by which the 
room can launch its ‘offensive’: the narrator is disorientated by the incessantly-
ticking clock (the clock in his own room has been silenced by habit), while the smell 
of vetiver launches a sensory attack on the innermost spaces of his self (‘c’était presque 
                                                                  
27 Vidler, pp. 3, 7. 
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à l’intérieur de mon moi que celle du vétiver venait pousser dans mes derniers 
retranchments son offensive’ (II, 27-28; my emphasis)). They contrast starkly with the 
objects in his bedroom in Paris, which ‘ne gênaient pas plus que ne faisaient mes 
propres prunelles, car ils n’étaient plus que des annexes de mes organes, un 
agrandissement de moi-même’ (II, 28). It is not just an expanded consciousness, then, 
that is enclosed by the room, but an expanded body. This casts an additional uncanny 
light over the act of changing bedrooms: the experience, by this token, is akin to being 
removed from the body and placed in a new one. In the magic lantern episode, the 
surrealistic interplay between the familiar bedroom and the virtual reality with 
which it has been overlaid is rendered more disquieting by the idea that the image 
of Golo, which merges with and absorbs every object it touches through a process of 
‘transvertébration’, is attaching itself not just to the narrator’s consciousness, but to 
his body. At best, he is a parasite, and at worst, a physical invader, troubling the 
narrator’s sense of bodily identity by making an unwelcome, defamiliarising 
inscription on the representational surface of his ‘skin’. 
 
iii. The Moi-peau and gender 
The negativity with which these experiences are depicted is a little surprising: 
watching a visual narrative display or arriving at one’s holiday destination are more 
commonly thought to be enjoyable, or at least benign. The extremity of the narrator’s 
reactions to these experiences can be elucidated by Anzieu’s theory of the Moi-peau, 
which offers us a framework by which to understand him not just as oddly 
oversensitive, but as the victim of a developmental failure that provides a possible 
explanation for certain of his subsequent behaviours, including his over-attachment 
to interior spaces. My point here is not to pathologise or diagnose the narrator, per 
se; rather, I use a degree of ‘metaphoric licence’ in my application of Anzieu’s theory, 
which can be briefly summarised as follows. Psychoanalysis as a discipline, he 
writes, has traditionally only attended to the detection and assessment of psychic 
contents, while largely ignoring the mechanisms by which they are contained. This is 
problematic because the human psyche is as much container as it is contents; ‘un 
contenu,’ he writes, ‘ne saurait exister sans un rapport à un contenant.’28 Indeed, 
many of the problems that he and his fellow psychoanalysts have encountered in 
                                                                  
28 Didier Anzieu, Le Moi-peau (Paris: Dunod, 1995), p. 33. Anzieu’s interest in surface is partially 
informed by the structure of the brain itself: the position of the cortex as an outer layer of grey matter 
means, paradoxically, that the ‘centre’ of the brain is in fact ‘situé à la périphérie’ (p. 31). 
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their patients, he says, are rooted in a problematic relation between these two entities. 
His own theory shifts the focus away from inner depth and towards the external 
surface of the body, foregrounding the skin as a fundamental component in both the 
development and maintenance of the self. As the infant develops, its experience of 
touch leads it to understand itself as an individuated ‘container of contents’ that 
exists separately from its caregiver. Its physical skin, imagined as a differentiating 
outer membrane, becomes an ‘inner pictogram’, in Marc Lafrance’s words, that 
serves also to differentiate the psyche, figuring the self as contained and individuated 
by a ‘skin’ that is both psychic and somatic. This is what Anzieu terms the skin-ego 
or Moi-peau. The prominent role of the infant’s skin in the development of a fully-
fledged thinking ego means that ‘la pensée [est] autant une affaire de peau que de 
cerveau’;29 in Lafrance’s succinct summary, Anzieu’s work asserts that ‘subjectivity 
is at once completely psychic and utterly somatic and, as a result, that mind and body 
must be viewed as both produced by and productive of one another’.30 
 According to Anzieu, a crucial stage in the evolution of mature subjectivity is 
the development and subsequent severing of what he terms the ‘peau commune’, or 
common skin, an imagined membrane that links the baby to its caregiver. In Anzieu’s 
words, mother (or mother-figure – the ‘entourage maternant’) and baby form ‘une 
dyade mère-nourisson’, or ‘un seul système formé d’éléments interdépendants se 
communiquant des informations entre eux et dans lequel le feed-back fonctionne 
dans les deux sens, de la mère vers le bébé et du bébé vers la mère’.31 This system of 
‘double feed-back’ results in a fantasy on the part of the baby of ‘une interface, 
figurée sous la forme d’une peau commune à la mère et à l’enfant, interface d’un côté 
de laquelle se tient la mère, l’enfant étant de l’autre côté’.32 Healthy development 
requires the eventual separation of these two entities: ‘l’étape suivante requiert 
l’effacement de cette peau commune et la reconnaissance que chacun a sa propre 
peau et son propre Moi, ce qui ne s’effectue pas sans résistance ni sans douleur.’33 
This painful stage of separation can cause traumatic fantasies of the skin, including 
of ‘la peau arrachée’.34 But if these fantasies can be surpassed, writes Anzieu, the 
infant will acquire a skin-ego of its own via ‘un processus de double intériorisation’, 
                                                                  
29 Anzieu, p. 31. 
30 Marc Lafrance, ‘From the Skin Ego to the Psychic Envelope: An Introduction to the Work of Didier 
Anzieu’, in Skin, Culture and Psychoanalysis, ed. by Sheila Cavanagh, Angela Failler, and Rachel Alpha 
Johnson Hurst (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013), pp. 16-44 (p. 39).  
31 Anzieu, p. 78. 





in which both the interface and the ‘entourage maternant’ are internalised, the first 
becoming ‘une enveloppe psychique contenante des contenus psychiques’, the 
second becoming ‘le monde intérieur des pensées, des images, des affects’.35 
When we read the Recherche through Anzieu, we are presented with 
numerous signs that the narrator has not successfully overcome this crucial stage. 
The famed (and much psychoanalysed) scene of the drame du coucher suggests that 
he does not yet regard his mother as a separate entity to himself, even though he is 
no longer a baby. Her initial refusal to kiss him at bedtime, only to grant him the kiss 
later after much distress on all sides, can be read as a splitting and then a regrafting 
of the common skin. When, unable to sleep, the narrator sends a note to his mother, 
begging her to come to him, he envisages it as a means of repairing the severed link 
between them, describing it in terms of a literal splitting of skin: 
 
Mon petit mot allait [...] me faire du moins entrer invisible et ravi dans la 
même pièce qu’elle, allait lui parler de moi à l’oreille; puisque cette salle à 
manger interdite, hostile [...] s’ouvrait à moi et, comme un fruit devenu doux 
qui brise son enveloppe, allait faire jaillir, projeter jusqu’à mon cœur enivré 
l’attention de maman tandis qu’elle lirait mes lignes. Maintenant je n’étais 
plus séparé d’elle; les barrières étaient tombées. (I, 30; my emphasis) 
 
The narrator imagines the arrival of his note causing the room that contains his 
mother to split open like a ripe fruit, allowing her to project her self outwards 
towards him. It is not pushing the point too far to suggest that he also desires the 
splitting of his mother’s own ‘skin’, which, like the walls of the dining room, contains 
her and excludes him, as if starting to ‘heal over’. In a reversal of the process 
described by Anzieu, the image of a ‘peau arrachée’ is not a step towards the 
necessary separation between child and mother, but towards a regressive reunion in 
the narrator’s bedroom, which will mark the restoration of their threatened peau 
commune and their status as two parts of a single whole. Yet when this hard-won 
reunion finally occurs, the narrator is acutely aware of his mother’s reluctance to be 
there, realising sadly that his need of her is ‘trop en opposition avec les nécessités de 
la vie’ (I, 42) – one such necessity being ‘the recognition that an original commonality 
of skin has been effaced’, in Baldwin’s words.36  
                                                                  
35 Ibid., pp. 85-86. 
36 The Material Object, p. 156.  
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 Since severing the common skin is an essential step towards developing an 
individuated skin-ego, it follows that the narrator’s neurotic tendencies might be 
attributable to a skin-ego that is somehow incomplete or underdeveloped, precisely 
because this process of severing has not fully occurred. The narrator’s ‘skin’ seems 
inadequately equipped either to contain or protect his self – two of its basic functions, 
in Anzieu’s definition. And since the latter’s theory implies that the unsevered 
common skin will have impeded the development of ‘une enveloppe psychique 
contenante des contenus psychiques’, it is logical to conclude that the narrator’s 
attachment to interior spaces and his need to be doubly enclosed – by both the 
physical second ‘skin’ of his own bedroom walls and the psychological second ‘skin’ 
of habit – are part of an attempt to replace the missing or incomplete internal 
‘enveloppe’ with an exterior equivalent.37 
An easily-missed detail in the embryonic version of the drame du coucher, in 
Jean Santeuil, suggests that this early failure to sever the common skin and thus to 
develop a fully-functioning skin-ego is attributable not to parenting, but to gender. 
Explaining her son’s inability to go to sleep without a goodnight kiss, Mme Santeuil 
tells the doctor that ‘nous ne voulons pas qu’il garde ces habitudes de petite fille. 
Trop longtemps sa mauvaise santé nous a obligés à des ménagements qui lui 
rendraient plus tard la vie impossible, et nous voulons, mon mari et moi, l’élever 
virilement.’ (JS, 202) The version of the scene that appears in the Recherche omits this 
explicit reference to normative conceptions of gender, but two later episodes are 
more subtly suggestive of the narrator’s failure to live up to these norms. At Balbec, 
for example, he implicitly compares his own dislike of new bedrooms with that of a 
woman: the aristocratic Mme de Villeparisis, who unlike him has the means to 
prevent this mal de pays by travelling surrounded by ‘la cloison de ses habitudes’ (II, 
39) and filling her hotel room with her own familiar belongings. Later, when he visits 
Robert de Saint-Loup at the latter’s barracks in Doncières, Saint-Loup seeks special 
permission from his captain so that the narrator can spend the night with him rather 
than alone in the hotel. The contrast between the latter’s nervousness and the 
former’s easy confidence is stark, and the implication of this episode, particularly 
                                                                  
37 Baldwin has compared the narrator’s tendency to fill a familiar room with his self to Anzieu’s 
description of the patient in the therapy room: ‘le patient, seul dans une pièce familière et valorisée, vit 
une expérience d’accroissement et d’élation du Soi, avec une extension des limites du Moi corporel aux 
dimensions mêmes de la pièce.’ (Anzieu, p. 198.) The entrance of the therapist, however, ‘représente 
une effraction traumatique dans cette enveloppe [Moi-peau] trop large et trop fragile’ (ibid.). In 
Baldwin’s analysis, the effect of entering the Balbec hotel room ‘is the same as that of the entrance of the 
psychotherapist’ (The Material Object, p. 160). 
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when it is considered in the light of the previous one, is that the tendency to look to 
the bedroom as a form of protection, as well as the anguish that results when such 
protection is felt to be lacking, are ultimately unmasculine afflictions. 
 Here we can turn back to Tanning, whose work, I would argue, provides a 
counterpart to these instances, particularly her painting Children’s Games, of 1942. 
The sense of the uncanny that is implied in the narrator’s experience of bedrooms 
seems here to be pushed 
into the realm of 
nightmare: a pair of 
young girls in Victorian-
style dress are seemingly 
ripping away strips of 
wallpaper to reveal a pair 
of  ambiguous – yet still 
almost certainly female – 
fleshy orifices. 
Numerous critics have 
noted the connection 
between this painting 
and Tanning’s remark 
that her hometown of 
Galesburg, Illinois, was a 
place ‘where nothing 
happens but the 
wallpaper’.38 Carruthers 
asserts that this remark 
refers to Tanning’s own 
childhood game of 
looking for recognisable 
shapes in the wallpaper 
of the rooms in which she 
                                                                  
38 This phrase is frequently cited by critics engaging with Tanning’s work; she herself used it on more 
than one occasion – for example, in her short story of 1976, ‘Dorothéa, ses jeux, son enfer…’, which 
begins ‘Galesburg, où rien ne se passe, sauf le papier peint’ (via 
https://www.dorotheatanning.org/life-and-work/view/525/ [accessed 23/11/2017]; originally 
published in XXe Siècle, 1977). 
Fig. 15: Dorothea Tanning, Children’s Games, 1942 
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spent her childhood, as if to consciously evoke an uncanny scene in which the walls 
are teeming with unfamiliar life forms, the like of which would terrify Proust’s young 
narrator.39 In Children’s Games, the game of the title has escalated out of control: the 
children have been forced into contact with the actual malevolent forces that lurk 
within the walls. Ragged strips of the wallpaper are blown back by the force of the 
life forms beneath; the long hair of the girl on the right is being pulled upwards and 
sucked into the orifice, while in the foreground of the painting, the prostrate legs of 
an earlier casualty highlight the fact, in case there were any doubt, that this is a game 
of life and death. What the narrator experiences as a psychological invasion has here 
been transposed into the realm of physical attack. 
In Compulsive Beauty, Hal Foster argues that the bourgeois rooms portrayed 
in Ernst’s Une Semaine de bonté are fundamentally uncanny spaces, into which 
repressed elements erupt in a process of ‘becoming-hysterical’.40 The ‘stuffed 
interiors’, he writes, are ‘literally convulsed’.41 He does not discuss Tanning’s work 
– yet Children’s Games seems to render this process explicit, representing a hysterical, 
uncanny space par excellence, in which a force that is normally hidden or ‘repressed’ 
behind wallpaper quite literally erupts into the room. Foster remarks on the 
Surrealists’ gendering of such spaces as feminine, arguing that the confinement of 
women to interior spaces had developed ‘a system of spatial oppositions [...] – eg., 
office and home, public and private, exterior and interior – that were coded as a 
gendered opposition of male and female’.42 Surrealism, Foster argues, ‘does nothing 
to disturb this coding’. The three Surrealists who form the subject of his chapter – 
Aragon, Ernst, and Dalí – ‘feminize the passage, the interior, and art nouveau, as they 
do the unconscious: they hystericize the former as they historicize the latter’.43 Foster 
does not, however, consider what such a coding might become in the hands of a 
female Surrealist painter. Children’s Games troubles this coding in multiple ways. For 
one thing, in its violence and fleshiness, the scene evokes pregnancy and birth 
(indeed, one of the forces beneath the wallpaper resembles a rounded belly).44 Birth 
                                                                  
39 See Carruthers, p. 32. 
40 For example, ‘images evocative of “perverse” desires (e.g., sodomy, sadomasochism), erupt in those 
rooms, most often in the spaces of representation – in paintings or mirrors on the walls’ (Foster, p. 177). 
41 Foster, p. 177. 
42 Ibid., p. 190. 
43 Ibid., p. 191. 
44 Carruthers’s interviews with Tanning herself have revealed a marked hostility towards the idea of 
childbirth: ‘Tanning explained that she never liked celebrating her actual birthday and was shocked 
and upset that anyone would wish to remember that on that fateful day, “my darling mother 




has its own place in Freud’s theory of the uncanny: he observes that certain of his 
male patients receive an uncanny impression from the sight of female genitalia, 
which he attributes to repressed memories of being born: ‘what they find uncanny 
[‘unhomely’] is actually the entrance to man’s old “home”, the place where 
everything once lived.’45 Foster’s account of rooms as uncanny spaces would seem 
to map neatly onto this painting: the corridor is an uncanny, convulsive space 
because a repressed memory of birth is quite literally erupting into it. This argument 
is supported by what Carruthers terms the ‘umbilical’ connection between the girl 
and the wall, effected by ‘the unstoppable wave of her own auburn hair’ (55).46 But 
Carruthers also remarks that the girl, through this same connection, seems to be 
becoming the wall. It is precisely this that a Freudian reading ignores: what these girls 
are set to become, the future that is mapped out for them. Birth is not just a repressed 
memory for them but also a trauma that likely awaits them when they are older, 
when it will figure as a decidedly uncanny force – an unfamiliar invader into a space 
of safety, as well as a sometime bringer of death. If the wall-forces are representative 
of childbirth, the girls are confronting not only the entrance to their own ‘old 
“home[s]”’, but also the idea of themselves as home, for if the womb is the home of 
the foetus, the mother, logically, is the house – literally, in this case, since the painted 
building seems actually to have been constructed from female flesh.  
It is not only a repressed past, then, that erupts into the room, but also the 
signifiers of an oppressive future that will cast each girl as a house and contain her 
within a house, Russian doll-like. As Katharine Conley argues, their attack on the 
walls ‘serves as a challenge to the conventions society imposes on their bodies, 
particularly the convention that assumes a correlation between a tidy house and a 
pure, inviolate female body’.47 I would add that it also serves implicitly as a challenge 
to nineteenth-century clothing conventions, which render female flesh static and 
rigid, like the imagined process of sculpting it into walls. As if in an earlier attack on 
a literal item of clothing, part of one girl’s dress has already been cut away, leaving 
a gap the shape of a strip of wallpaper. Their challenge, then, is to the many 
structures – biological, textile, architectural – by which their bodies are contained 
and controlled, and it is borne out in their own partial nakedness and in their long, 
                                                                  
45 Sigmund Freud, ‘The Uncanny’ in The Uncanny [1919], trans. by David McLintock (London, et al.: 
Penguin Books, 2003), pp. 123-162 (p. 151). 
46 Carruthers, p. 55. 
47 Katharine Conley, Surrealist Ghostliness (Lincoln, NE and London: University of Nebraska Press, 
2013), p. 125. 
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unkempt hair, which recalls tropes of female sexuality, hysteria, and madness. By 
peeling away the wallpaper, the girls help the forces in the walls to reveal 
themselves, symbolically liberating the ‘inviolate female body’ by destroying the 
claustrating material surface that had suppressed it. For Mary Ann Caws, this act 
‘reveal[s] what we might have known all along: [the wallpaper] was really the skin 
of a body’ – and indeed, the latter is rendered in a very similar colour to the greyish 
skin of the nearest girl’s back.48 I would argue, however, that it is symbolic not just 
of a literal skin, but of the multiple ‘skins’ or layers by which women and girls are 
restrained, whether physical (walls, clothing) or social (marriage, decorum).49 Their 
problem is the opposite of the narrator’s: they are not exposed by a lack of ‘skin’ but 
stifled by an excess of it. After all, for those in possession of a fully-fledged skin-ego, 
no further ‘layers’ are required to keep the self intact and protected. And when such 
layers are externally imposed, rather than actively sought, their function is no longer 
to enclose, but to suppress. In perfect opposition, Tanning and Proust have their 
characters push against the normative gender expectations of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries: one depicting a young boy who lacks the protective outer 
surface that society expects him to possess, and who seeks to replace it by taking 
refuge inside, in specific domestic spaces, the other depicting two young girls 
frustrated by the excess of protective layers that society imposes on them, and who 
transform a domestic space in an attempt to break out, symbolically ripping these 
layers away.  
 
 
II. Other Spaces: Caregivers and Love Objects 
 
i. The narrator and Albertine: prolongement, multiplication 
I return now to Proust, and the behavioural consequences of the narrator’s failure to 
sever the common skin. Since doing so should have resulted in the interiorisation of 
the ‘entourage maternante’, the fact that this cannot fully have happened might go 
some way to explaining the narrator’s perpetual desire to find a replacement 
entourage by ‘merg[ing] with a source of strength outside of himself’, as Leo Bersani 
puts it (15). This need will shape his relations to others, and will, in one notable case, 
                                                                  
48 Caws, p. 84. 
49 Recalling the earliest days of her friendship with Ernst, Tanning refers to decorum in comparable 
terms: ‘thin laminae of an old husk, decorum, kept me sitting in the prim chair instead of starred on the 
bed.’ (Tanning, p. 64.) 
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transform him into a force of oppression and containment, the like of which 
Tanning’s young girls appear to be attacking. 
That the older narrator still has need of a maternal entourage is in evidence 
when he travels to Balbec as a teenager, realising belatedly, and with alarm, that ‘il 
était possible que ma mère vécût sans moi, autrement que pour moi, d’une autre vie’ 
(II, 9). In Balbec, the grandmother will take her place. When the former comes to him 
in his unfamiliar bedroom in the Balbec hotel, dressed for the task of caring for him, 
he is comforted by the knowledge that however vast his sorrow, she will receive it 
‘dans une pitié plus vaste encore’: 
 
que tout ce qui était mien, mes soucis, mon vouloir, serait, en ma grand-mère, 
étayé sur un désir de conservation et d’accroissement de ma propre vie 
autrement fort que celui que j’avais moi-même; et mes pensées se 
prolongaient en elle sans subir de déviation parce qu’elles passaient de mon 
esprit sans changer de milieu, de personne. (II, 28) 
 
This sense of oneness with his grandmother is a primary example of the process of 
merging that Bersani describes. It is as if they are two parts of a single unit; she is an 
open vessel into which the narrator can project himself without obstacle, standing in 
for his mother and functioning as a human replacement for the familiar bedroom 
that had provided the site for his externalised self. Their unity is manifested 
physically in the rooms they inhabit: their bedrooms abut each other, separated only 
by a thin wall or ‘cloison’ through which they are able to communicate in a swiftly-
developed language of knocks and taps. Indeed, since a cloison is defined as both a 
‘paroi plus léger que le mur, qui limite les pièces d’une maison’ and ‘ce qui divise 
l’intérieur d’une cavité, détermine des compartiments’, it would be more appropriate 
to describe this wall as a partition – a means not of enclosing a singular spatial entity, 
but of dividing two interdependent parts of a whole.50 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick 
echoes Anzieu when she calls this partition ‘as eloquent a membrane as if it 
demarcated the chambers of a single ear, or heart’;51 Baldwin is explicit, arguing that 
                                                                  
50 Le Petit Robert: dictionnaire alphabétique et analogique de la langue française, ed. by Josette Rey-Debove 
and Alain Rey (Paris: Le Robert, 2012), p. 453. Ingrid Wassenaar has also pointed this out, demonstrating 
that the word ‘originally designat[ed] what surrounded and protected the whole’, before eventually 
‘[coming] to refer to internal division’ (Proustian Passions: The Uses of Self-Justification for A la recherche 
du temps perdu (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 100. Oxford Scholarship Online ebook). 
51 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, ‘The Weather in Proust’, in The Weather in Proust, ed. by Jonathan Goldberg 
(Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press, 2011), pp. 1-41 (p. 14). 
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the permeable architecural ‘membrane’ – ‘pénétrée de tendresse et de joie, devenue 
harmonieuse, immatérielle’ (II, 30) – seems in fact to constitute a peau commune.52 
 This physical arrangement is strikingly similar to a later one. When in La 
Prisonnière Albertine comes to live with the narrator in Paris, their adjoining 
bathrooms are separated by a cloison thin enough to allow them to talk to each other 
as they wash (‘les cloisons qui séparaient nos deux cabinets de toilette [...] étaient si 
minces que nous pouvions parler tout en nous lavant chacun dans le nôtre’ (III, 521)). 
Does this in its turn symbolise a relationship analogous to what the narrator shares 
with his grandmother, centred around an unmediated connection or ‘peau 
commune’ between self and other that diminishes the latter’s ‘otherness’? Certainly, 
the narrator has previously expressed a desire to extend his self into Albertine (and 
her friends) in a manner that echoes this relationship: at the moment when he first 
sees the petite bande on the beach, he imagines knowing them with an intimacy that 
would allow him ‘ce prolongement, cette multiplication de soi-même, qui est le 
bonheur’ (II, 152). Tellingly, however, the words ‘prolongement’ and ‘multiplication’ 
imply markedly different means of connecting with the other, despite being used 
here as if they were interchangeable. The analysis that follows will consider the 
differences between the two terms, and their implications for the narrator’s 
relationship to Albertine.  
I turn first to the idea of ‘prolongement’, which maps neatly on to the 
narrator’s emotional connection with his grandmother, as he has described it; indeed, 
his account uses the word itself, in its verbal form (‘mes pensées se prolongaient en 
elle’). A self that is prolongé is not clearly demarcated; it is permeable, fluid, like liquid 
spilling out of its container. Its contact with the other is a process of blending, such 
that the boundaries become blurred between the two. We might also expect it to 
receive the other in an inverse process of prolongement, although no such reverse 
process is described by the narrator. Either way, it is a model that would seem to rely 
on the presence – whether imagined or physical – of a mediating connective surface, 
like a cloison or a peau commune. The narrator’s professed desire to extend his self into 
the lives of Albertine and her friends seems cast of the same mould. After all, it is 
uncontroversial to suggest that love relationships echo earlier relationships between 
                                                                  
52 See The Material Object, p. 157. The cloison as it figures here stands in opposition to Richard’s 
description of the paroi in his discussion of Proustian bedrooms. ‘Toute paroi est bien d’abord comme 
une coupure,’ he writes, ‘comme une césure névralgique du lieu: elle y inscrit et y dessine deux régions, 
un ici et un au-delà de l’ici, un lieu du moi, et un lieu de l’autre’ (‘Proust et la demeure’, p. 84). This can 
be partly attributed to the fact that the word ‘paroi’ does not have the same specificity of meaning as 
the word ‘cloison’, given that the former can refer to either an exterior wall or an interior partition. 
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children and their parent-figures, and as if to illustrate this, Albertine’s goodnight 
kiss is described as ‘un pouvoir d’apaisement tel que je n’en avais éprouvé de pareil 
depuis les soirs lointains de Combray où ma mère penchée sur mon lit venait 
m’apporter le repos dans un baiser’ (III, 585).53  
But while Albertine might provide something of what the narrator originally 
found in his relationships with his mother and grandmother, their relationship is 
very far from allowing the same fluid interchange of selves via a permeable peau 
commune. Baldwin cites the passage from Le Côté de Guermantes that was also 
analysed in Chapter 1 of this thesis, in which a series of differing Albertines is 
revealed by the narrator’s attempt to kiss her. The kiss, we recall, ‘[fait] surgir de ce 
que nous croyions une chose à aspect défini, les cent autres choses qu’elle est tout 
aussi bien, puisque chacune est relative à une perspective non moins légitime’ (II, 
660). In Baldwin’s analysis: 
 
moving closer to – or even touching – Albertine’s face does not create a ‘peau 
commune’ between her skin and the narrator’s. With his lips pressed against 
Albertine’s cheek, the surface of her body becomes multiple, and while he 
may feel a contiguity between the surface of his own body and that of one of 
the Albertines he encounters, this does not constitute a commonality of skin 
between him and the remaining ‘cent autres’.54 
 
In one regard, then, the possibility for a peau commune is negated by Albertine’s 
unfathomable multiplicity. But this passage of the novel also implies that her skin 
itself functions as an impermeable barrier beyond which the narrator cannot 
penetrate. The kiss is motivated by the narrator’s desire for ‘connaissance par les 
lèvres’, as if he believes it will allow him to take a quasi-intuitive step inside her 
mind. But he discovers that the lips, part of the physical apparatus designed to 
assimilate external objects by consumption (‘faites pour amener au palais la saveur 
de ce qui les tente’) are not made to assimilate external objects by penetration: ‘[elles] 
doivent se contenter, sans comprendre leur erreur et sans avouer leur déception, de 
                                                                  
53 In Anzieu’s words, the stage that precedes the fantasy of the ‘peau commune’, the ‘fantasme 
d’inclusion réciproque’, is ‘ravivé plus tard par l’expérience amoureuse, selon lequel chacun des deux, 
en le tenant dans ses bras, envelopperait l’autre tout en étant enveloppé par lui’ (p. 85). In the Recherche, 
the similarity between the narrator’s desire for his mother at bedtime and Swann’s desire for Odette is 
explicitly stated in the opening pages of the novel: ‘une angoisse semblable fut le tourment de longues 
années de sa vie, et personne aussi bien que lui peut-être n’aurait pu me comprendre; lui, cette angoisse 
[...] c’est l’amour qui la lui a fait connaître.’ (I, 30.) 
54 The Material Object, p. 167. 
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vaguer à la surface et de se heurter à la clôture de la joue impénétrable et désirée’ (II, 659; 
my emphasis). In an inversion of Plath’s formulation (‘I felt the wall of my skin’) the 
narrator’s lips come up against the wall of Albertine’s skin, which, rather than a semi-
permeable membrane that mediates a ‘système de double-feedback’, functions as the 
inviolable surface of a human ‘vase clos’. 
Albertine’s eyes, on the other hand, are better characterised as windows – not 
Leonardo’s ‘windows of the soul’, but the ‘windows to the soul’ of the anonymous 
cliché. Though hackneyed, it fits; indeed, the narrator uses it obliquely himself, 
remarking (in a passage already cited in Chapter 3) that when Albertine’s eyes close, 
‘c’[est] comme quand avec des rideaux on empêche de voir la mer’ (III, 528). In 
contrast to the opaque impenetrability of her skin, her eyes offer a partial, tantalising 
view into her inner world, hinting at the existence of secrets, memories, and desires 
that will never be fully revealed.55 While her self is concealed completely by her skin, 
it can be perceived within and behind her eyes, disappearing towards an unreachable 
horizon or a non-existent vanishing point.56 I suggested in Chapter 3 that her eyes 
function as something akin to tinted windows (a ‘glace sans tain’), or perhaps half-
open doors like those in Tanning’s Birthday, and I would add here that we could also 
think of them as a sort of cloison, since they constitute the point at which two separate 
but interdependent spaces meet – that is to say, the internal ‘spaces’ of the mind and 
the physical, external spaces that the body inhabits. But they are less reminiscent of 
the cloison that separates the narrator’s bedroom from his grandmother’s than of the 
one that separates his bathroom from Albertine’s, which differs from the former in a 
                                                                  
55 When he first sees her on the beach at Balbec, the narrator suggests that it might be possible to 
‘possess’ the contents of Albertine’s eyes: ‘je savais que je ne posséderais pas cette jeune cycliste si je ne 
possédais aussi ce qu’il y avait dans ses yeux.’ (II, p. 152.) Later, he questions this assumption: ‘comment 
n'avais-je pas depuis longtemps remarqué que les yeux d'Albertine appartenaient à la famille de ceux 
qui […] semblent faits de plusieurs morceaux à cause de tous les lieux où l'être veut se trouver – et 
cacher qu'il veut se trouver – ce jour-là? Des yeux, par mensonge toujours immobiles et passifs, mais 
dynamiques, mesurables pas les mètres ou kilomètres à franchir pour se trouver au rendez-vous voulu, 
implacablement voulu, des yeux qui sourient de la tristesse et du découragement qu'il y aura peut-être 
une difficulté pour aller au rendez-vous.’ (III, p. 599.) 
56 This simultaneous process of display and concealment correlates directly to the very phenomenon 
that Albertine may or may not be at pains to hide: her supposed desire for other women. As Elisabeth 
Ladenson has shown, a paradox exists at the heart of Proust’s portrayal of lesbianism, or ‘Gomorrah’. 
His lesbians are much less concerned with discretion than their male counterparts, much more given to 
public displays of their homosexuality (in the voyeuristic Montjouvain scene, for example, Mlle 
Vinteuil’s lover initially determines to keep the shutters open, leaving them visible to passers-by: ‘“Et 
puis quoi? […] quand même on nous verrait ce n’en est que meilleur”.’ (I, p. 159).) And yet, despite this 
current of exhibitionism, lesbianism is nonetheless ‘impossible to actually see’: while the narrator is 
‘consistently able to witness spectacles of male homosexual debauchery in all their depraved grandeur, 
[…] his efforts to see what women do together ends, as does the Montjouvain scene, with the blinds 
being drawn at the crucial moment’ (Ladenson, pp. 68, 63). Albertine is doubly unknowable, then, since 
even if the narrator could be certain of her lesbianism, her lesbianism would nonetheless remain on the 
margins of visibility.  
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crucial respect. While the narrator and his grandmother had communicated in a way 
that was only possible because the partition was there – by knocking on it – Albertine 
and the narrator communicate in spite of the presence of the cloison, not because of it. 
The latter does not prevent all interaction, as a more substantial wall would, but their 
conversation is undoubtedly hindered by the barrier between them, particularly 
since they are frequently interrupted by the sound of running water.57 In this case, 
then, the cloison is less the symbol of a common skin, than of the glassy barrier or 
‘liséré’ that separates the narrator from the self he glimpses in Albertine’s eyes, which 
impedes the passage of their selves as the cloison impedes the passage of their 
conversation. 
 
The narrator’s relationship with Albertine cannot therefore be characterised as a 
‘prolongement de soi’, since the metaphorical permeable membrane that allows such 
a prolongement between the narrator and his grandmother is replaced in the later 
relationship by a thin but impenetrable barrier. Whether or not it can be characterised 
as a ‘multiplication de soi’, however, is a different story. A self that multiplies is 
discretely replicated and repeated rather than continuously extended; a self that 
multiplies into the other invades and dominates, transforming it into its own replica. 
And in stark contrast to the unity that underpins the self he ‘shares’ with his 
grandmother, the narrator’s relationship with Albertine is invasive rather than 
reciprocal, structured around a dynamic of attack and of forced entry. The narrator 
spends much of their time together trying to break through the liséré that separates 
them, pursuing the sort of knowledge that he believes will enable him to possess her 
to the point that, in Bersani’s words, ‘the activity of loving turns out to be something 
like a compulsive intellectual investigation’.58 This investigation is largely futile, but 
there are occasional moments when he feels that Albertine is truly his own, as if his 
self has successfully ‘multiplied’ into hers. One such occasion is when she is asleep – 
that is to say, when her eyes are closed and her internal ‘sea’ is so effectively screened 
that he can momentarily forget it ever existed. Plant-like in her unconsciousness 
(‘animée [...] de la vie inconsciente des végétaux’ (III, 578)), the sleeping Albertine is 
finally reducible to her body (‘elle avait rappelé à soi tout ce qui d’elle était au dehors; 
                                                                  
57 It is not the grandmother who is said to respond to the ‘dialogue rhythmé’ of the narrator’s three 
knocks but the wall itself, as if it is an extension of her own body and an active participant in the process 
of communication (II, 30). 
58 Bersani, p. 46. 
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elle s’était réfugiée, enclose, dans son corps’ (III, 578)).59 Her self no longer escapes 
‘par les issues de la pensée inavouée et du regard’; he has before him ‘toute la 
personne, toute la vie de la charmante captive, étendue là sous mes yeux’ (III, 178-
179). At the same time, her deepest state of sleep is imagined by the narrator first as 
a landscape (‘son sommeil, [...] c’était pour moi tout un paysage’ (III, 579)) and then, 
curiously, as the sea (he lies down next to her as soon as he can be certain that any 
potential ‘écueils de conscience’ are ‘recouverts […] par la pleine mer du sommeil 
profond’ (III, 580)). His subsequent impression of having ‘set sail’ (‘je m’étais 
embarqué sur le sommeil d’Albertine’ (III, 580)) indicates that this cannot be the same 
‘sea’ as the one that lies behind the impenetrable liséré of her eyes; rather, when she 
is sleeping, Albertine’s inaccessible internal spaces are overwritten with unrestricted, 
colonisable ones into which the narrator’s own self can encroach and multiply. It is a 
physical as well as a metaphorical colonisation; her unconscious body is later turned 
into a sort of subsidiary of his conscious one, which touches her and moves her head 
and limbs as if she were a doll: 
 
Je pouvais mettre ma main dans sa main, sur son épaule, sur sa joue, Albertine 
continuait de dormir. Je pouvais prendre sa tête, la renverser, la poser contre 
mes lèvres, entourer mon cou de ses bras, elle continuait à dormir comme une 
montre qui ne s'arrête pas. (III, 620) 
 
The sleeping woman becomes a sort of uncanny, automatic puppet, under the 
narrator’s control and devoid of the ungraspable interiority that otherwise 
confounds him. More disturbingly, he will also allow himself to ‘goûter un plaisir 
moins pur’ as he kisses and touches her unconscious body (III, 580). Bersani argues 
that this is the moment at which the narrator ‘can best express his real tenderness for 
Albertine’ – that ‘he can love her most gently now because it is really he who is at 
rest’– despite acknowledging that this behaviour is nevertheless ‘abstractly 
sinister’.60 Now, however, three waves of feminism after Bersani’s book was first 
published, it is difficult to see anything abstract here, and problematic to read the 
narrator’s actions as anything but sexual assault. The episode almost bears out 
Carter’s assertion that ‘the naïve narrator envisages the beloved as terrain to be 
                                                                  
59 She is, the narrator says, disturbed only occasionally by ‘une agitation légère et inexplicable, comme 
les feuillages qu’une brise inattendue convulse pendant quelques instants’ (III, p. 578). 
60 Bersani, p. 64. 
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conquered by the metaphorical planting of a flagpole or the actual insertion of a 
penis’ – almost, because the sexual act itself is not penetrative (in fact, it is 
surprisingly benign; he needs only to trail his leg against hers like an oar trailing in 
the water (III, 580)).61 But by contemporary standards, he comes murkily close to 
matching his metaphorical colonisation of Albertine’s unconscious seascapes with a 
physical, sexual ‘colonisation’ – to physically ‘multiplying’ himself through an 
unwanted act of reproduction.62 
 
ii. Consumption of the other 
No less troublingly, the narrator will later kiss the sleeping Albertine on the lips, 
seemingly inserting his tongue into her open mouth: ‘j’avais son souffle près de ma 
joue, dans sa bouche que j’entr’ouvrais sur la mienne, où contre ma langue passait sa 
vie.’ (III, 580.) In one respect, this is a penetrative act of physical colonisation. But it 
also indicates another model of assimilation with the other: neither ‘prolongement’ 
nor ‘multiplication’, but consumption or envelopment – a process not of extending 
or multiplying outwards into Albertine, but of bringing Albertine inwards into 
himself. The act of bringing his tongue into contact with Albertine’s ‘life’, capturing 
her breath in his mouth in a manner that allows him to consume something of her 
essence, inevitably suggests hunger – that he is in some sense trying to ‘eat’ her. 
Bersani remarks on ‘the abundance of eating and digestion metaphors’ in the novel, 
which ‘suggest possession not only by becoming something else, but also by 
transforming what is desired into Marcel’s system’.63 The desire to consume 
Albertine is an echo of his ‘consumption’ of his grandmother, after the arrival in 
Balbec has rendered him so miserable that he has declared himself ready to die.64 
                                                                  
61 Carter, p. 34. Carter also observes that ‘although Proust usually presents a woman as a landscape the 
Narrator yearns to possess, occasionally the exploration of the terrain itself is presented as an erotic 
experience.’ He cites both the narrator’s assessment of the ability of the car ‘de nous aider à sentir d’une 
main plus amoureusement exploratrice [...] la véritable géométrie, la belle “mesure de la terre”’, and 
one of Proust’s own letters, in which he speaks of an urge to ‘rape’ cities seen from a train at dawn: ‘Au 
matin, un désir fou de violer des petites villes endormies (lisez bien ville et non des petites filles 
endormies!)’ (Carter, p. 32.) 
62 Mieke Bal offers us another way of looking at this. The fact that the narrator is satisfied by touching 
Albertine’s leg with his own supports Bal’s contention that his model of love is ‘lesbian’, in that it is 
predicated on ‘two bodies rubbing against each other’, rather than on penetration (‘Family’, p. 68). At 
such moments, she points out, he feels he possesses her ‘plus complètement, comme une chose 
inconsciente et sans résistance de la muette nature’ (III, p. 581). In this argument, then, Albertine’s actual 
skin might in fact be thought of as a permeable membrane that enables him to ‘enter’ her. This 
conclusion troubles the distinction between ‘prolongement’ and ‘multiplication’, suggesting this 
singular sexual act lies somewhere between the two. 
63 Bersani, pp. 16-19. 
64 ‘N’ayant plus d’univers, plus de chambre, plus de corps que menacé par les ennemis qui 
m’entouraient, qu’envahi jusque dans les os par la fièvre, j’étais seul, j’avais envie de mourir.’ (II, 28.) 
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When his grandmother enters, she provides not only an open self into which his own 
can be extended, but a source of strength that can be consumed: ‘quand j’avais ainsi 
ma bouche collée à ses joues, à son front, j’y puisais quelque chose de si bienfaisant, 
de si nourricier, que je gardais l’immobilité, le sérieux, la tranquille avidité d’un 
enfant qui tète’ (II, 28). Contact with the grandmother replenishes him and restores 
him to life, as if assimilation with another being is a necessary form of nourishment, 
without which the narrator cannot function as a living subject. Perhaps because he 
has never fully been able to accept the separation between himself and his mother, 
he sees his own self as incomplete and unable to exist on its own. This, as my earlier 
analysis has suggested, can be seen as the root not only of his desire to assimilate 
with ‘a source of strength outside of himself’, but also of his habit of seeing familiar 
bedrooms as part of himself: he needs to assimilate with these familiar spaces in 
order to make himself whole. 
Clearly, the act of ‘consuming’ Albertine is more explicitly sexual. Jean-Pierre 
Richard has linked the experiences of eating and of sex as they are presented in the 
novel: ‘vis-à-vis du terme charnel,’ he writes, ‘le terme comestible tient donc lieu tout 
à la fois de métaphore et de métonymie: il est tantôt voisin, et tantôt substitut, 
souvent les deux en même temps. Entre embrasser les joues d’Albertine et les 
manger, point vraiment de différence.’65 This final sentence is a reference to the 
episode considered above, in which the narrator sees ten Albertines as he moves his 
lips towards her cheek. Yet there is a difference between the two acts Richard 
describes. The narrator specifies that kissing Albertine’s cheeks is essentially a failed 
attempt to ‘eat’ them: at the moment his lips make contact with her skin, they enter 
into ‘cette zone désolée où elles ne peuvent trouver leur nourriture’, unable to ‘goûter 
davantage la saveur que la nature les empêche actuellement de saisir’ (II, 659). But 
kissing Albertine on the mouth while she sleeps seems to rectify the previous failure, 
breaking through the ‘wall’ of her skin. In Chapter 3, I quoted Boccioni’s declaration 
in the ‘Technical Manifesto of Futurist Painting’ of 1910 ‘that movement and light 
destroy the materiality of bodies’, which I argued is borne out in his painting, 
Dynamism of a Cyclist. Here, the opposite has happened. Albertine is no longer a 
cyclist; she no longer inhabits the inaccessible realm or dimension of the practitioner 
of speed. Her materiality is restored – her physical and psychological stasis render 
her substantial, and thus ‘edible’, consumable. No longer an ‘être de fuite’, she 
                                                                  
65 Jean-Pierre Richard, Proust et le monde sensible (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1974), p. 16. 
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becomes an unconscious object of consumption at the same time as being an 
unguarded space to be colonised.  
 This combination of consumption and colonisation is a two-way process of 
assimilation that reaches its epitome in the subsequent paragraph, in which the 
narrator describes the still greater pleasure of watching Albertine wake up: 
 
Il [m’était doux] que, quand du fond du sommeil elle remontait les derniers 
degrés de l’escalier des songes, ce fût dans ma chambre qu’elle renaquît à la 
conscience et à la vie, qu’elle se demandât un instant ‘où suis-je?’, et voyant 
les objets dont elle était entourée […] pût se répondre qu’elle était chez elle 
en constatant qu’elle s’éveillait chez moi. Dans ce premier moment délicieux 
de l’incertitude, il me semblait que je prenais à nouveau plus complètement 
possession d’elle, puisque […] c’était ma chambre, dès qu’elle serait reconnue 
par Albertine, qui allait l’enserrer, la contenir. (III, 582) 
 
In one sense, this is an amplification of the idea of consumption by eating. The logic 
of the spatially dependent and architecturally constructed self dictates that by 
waking up in the narrator’s bedroom, Albertine is also, to some degree, waking up 
both in and as him – that if the narrator’s bedroom encircles and contains her, then 
so too does he. The objects that surround her, we remember, are so familiar to him 
that they are effectively annexed organs. The narrator himself functions as another 
of the restrictive layers that the girls in Children’s Games seem to be ripping away, 
engulfing Albertine in his externalised body and consciousness. This is not just a 
process of bringing the other into the self, but also the reverse: if, like the narrator, 
Albertine must work to recompose ‘les traits originaux de [s]on moi’ as she ascends 
from sleep, it is the narrator’s self-space that provides the point de repère in her journey 
towards a whole, waking self. Casting an externalised part of the self as a building 
block in the other’s process of self-reconstruction is perhaps the ultimate act of 









III. Other Spaces: Tanning and Ernst 
 
i. Shared spaces, shared selves 
An alternative model of self-other relations is offered in Dorothea Tanning’s account 
of her marriage to Max Ernst, as given in her memoir, Between Lives. There are 
inevitably some tricky gender dynamics at play in a relationship between a male 
artist of great renown and a younger woman whose own art has never been accorded 
equal recognition; in the memoir Tanning is frank about this imbalance and the 
frustrations it caused.66 The book itself is also founded on an inherent imbalance: 
Max Ernst himself having died some years before its publication, it can only recount 
the relationship from the perspective of a single participant. Nevertheless, it offers 
an encouraging alternative to the narrator’s conception of heterosexual love and 
cohabitation, challenging the idea that such relationships must be based on models 
of colonisation and consumption, but nevertheless drawing on comparable 
metaphors to elucidate the complex processes that play out in romantic relations 
between two people. 
Tanning’s description of the moment Ernst moved into her New York 
apartment has been considered earlier in this chapter for its alignment of the self and 
the domestic space it inhabits, in a manner comparable to Proust’s narrator’s notion 
that his bedroom is an extension and a part of himself. But it also demonstrates an 
openness to the entry and influence of another that runs counter to the narrator’s 
later attitude to Albertine. I quote again: 
 
It took only a few hours for him to move in. There was no discussion. It was 
as if he had found a house. Yes, I think I was his house. He lived in me; he 
decorated me; he watched over me. […] In no time at all, the last picture 
found a place by the door and the last mask was hung over my desk. […] A 
glory of pictures expanding my rooms, making other worlds out of my 
walls.67 
 
There are parallels here with the narrator and Albertine’s domestic set-up: in both 
scenarios, one lover moves into the apartment that belongs to the other and that 
                                                                  
66 ‘Has there ever in the world existed an artist (poet) who has been for the greater part of adult life so 
relentlessly condemned to listen to, to read of, to watch at close range – I almost said rage – the 
overwhelming attention paid to a fellow poet?’ (Tanning, p. 277.) 
67 Tanning, pp. 64-65. 
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doubles as a spatial extension of his or her self. But the comparison is muddied by a 
complication of the roles in each relationship: Tanning herself combines qualities of 
both the narrator and Albertine without fully equating to either of them. Like 
Albertine, she is the woman in a heterosexual partnership, but there the similarities 
end. Unlike her, she has both a voice, since she is telling her own story, and power, 
since the apartment in question is hers, not her male lover’s. As the apartment’s 
‘gatekeeper’, her role is closer to that of the narrator, but they are set apart in turn by 
their respective attitudes to their new cohabitees. Tanning does not attempt to 
colonise or consume Ernst, and nor is she colonised or consumed by him; she 
‘receives’ Ernst as the narrator is ‘received’ by his grandmother, or his childhood 
bedroom, but she is not taken over. Although changed by having met him, she 
remains herself – she is both plastic and stable, like a building that preserves its 
structural integrity despite having been qualitatively altered by the entrance of a new 
resident and his possessions. And in a reversal of the oppressive gender dynamics 
explored in my discussion of Children’s Games, it is Tanning who is described as 
providing an additional ‘skin’ or casing for Ernst, and not the other way around. 
 Unlike Proust’s narrator, Tanning’s account suggests she had always thought 
of her self as stable and contained. An artistic child, she was an anomaly growing up 
in her small, Midwestern town; later, as a female painter, she was an anomaly in the 
masculine world of 1940s Surrealism. The memoir recounts that as a teenager – that 
is to say, at a comparable age to Proust’s narrator on his trip to Balbec – Tanning used 
her own money to rent a cabin next to a lake in Illinois, where she retreated for two 
weeks, alone, to paint. Her physical isolation was matched by a sense of separation 
from her family – ‘baffled, hurt’ – and friends, ‘who had thought I was one of them 
until this’.68 In contrast to the narrator’s chronic need to merge with or digest an 
external source of strength, Tanning displays a need to withdraw, to be ‘self-
consciously, uncompromisingly alone’.69 The solitary cabin is a potent symbol of this 
conscious and deliberate apartness, and stands as a counterpart to the narrator’s 
room in the hotel, with its cloison that links him to his grandmother. As the cloison 
stands in for a peau commune that has not been successfully dissolved, the walls of 
the cabin suggest the kind of fully-fledged skin-ego that develops only after the 
dissolution of the shared skin. One function of the skin-ego is individuation; it allows 
the subject to ‘s’affirmer soi-même comme un individu ayant sa peau personnelle’, 
                                                                  
68 Ibid., p. 25. 
69 Ibid., p. 24. 
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thus creating ‘le sentiment d’être un être unique’.70 Tanning’s childhood 
independence implies just such a strong sense of clearly-defined psychic and somatic 
borders, in stark contrast to the narrator, whose ‘elastic, permeable boundaries of 
individuation’, in Sedgwick’s words, are suggestive of the incompleteness and 
inadequacy of his own Moi-peau.71 
 Testament to these clearly-defined boundaries of the self, I would argue, is 
Tanning’s preservation and assertion of her artistic individuality over decades of 
living with one of the most renowned painters of the twentieth century. And indeed, 
her sense of childhood apartness persists into her eventual union with Ernst, both 
psychologically and architecturally, and matched by a sense of apartness in her 
partner. She and Ernst both have their own studios, each painting ‘in our own 
shimmering four walls’, to which the other has only limited access: ‘Max did not 
welcome unannounced irruptions into his studio. Nor for that matter did I. Studio 
visits even between us were by invitation.’72 Later in the memoir, Tanning is frank 
about the existence of unknown, unseen parts of her husband’s psyche that she will 
never know or understand: 
 
There was something about him I came to recognize as time went on, and with 
trepidation. Now, to speak of it at all I must dig deep for words that, as they 
surface, turn brown and dry as clods, leaving me agonized, embarrassed, 
inadequate. The presence of this profound and absolutely impenetrable 
something, this incalculable something – was he carrying some special burden 
of knowledge beyond the things in books, a heavy arcanum? – removed him 
ever so slightly from where he stood, so that his gentleness, his elegance, and 
the whole amalgam of his being spoke of apartness. Apart from the studio, 
from people; from even me, for I saw it clearly and did not panic: why should 
I want to plumb his very depths? Why bore behind the cool, faraway gaze 
directed straight through my eyes? – for at times his regard was of such 
distance that I was unsettled and had to swallow a rising knot in my throat. 
[…] It is well to remember that deep-diving absence, hinting at a place I could 
never hope to fathom. […] The great bulging bag of his past slumped 
                                                                  
70 Anzieu, p. 126. The other functions of the skin-ego are maintenance, contenance, pare-excitation, inter-
sensorialité, soutien de l’excitation sexuelle, recharge libidinale, and inscription des traces (see Anzieu, pp. 121-
129). 
71 Sedgwick, p. 14. 
72 Tanning, pp. 144, 274. 
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unopened. Its charms and hideousnesses […] moldered dankly in their dark 
nowhere, lost, unfound, and unclaimed.73 
 
Although Tanning is unsettled by this visible absence, she expresses no desire to 
penetrate into the mysterious ‘arcanum’, aware that human beings contain spaces 
and truths that are accessible to no one but themselves. There are parts of her, after 
all, that are equally closed off to him. ‘To share the fundamental wild truth that 
wrapped him close, ah, that was not for me,’ she writes. ‘Why should it be? He could 
not share mine.’74 In a reversal of the narrator’s desire to penetrate the other’s essence 
as a means of ‘self-completion’, it is perhaps Tanning’s stable, independent sense of 
self that allows her to accept Ernst’s right to a private self-space of his own. 
 But notwithstanding this natural and inevitable apartness, there is also a 
complex interdepence. In the later chapters of her memoir, she recounts Ernst’s death 
and her subsequent period of grief, retrospectively implying that they had 
functioned as two parts of an interdependent whole, their partnership itself forming 
a sort of external casing. ‘For thirty-five years, life was love, a second skin,’ she 
writes. ‘[…] Now life is life, an absolutely polished structure of skeletal simplicity.’75 
Without this second skin, she is ‘hardly more than a diagram of anatomy, the stringy 
crimson-blue of nerves without epiderm’, craving the protective outer shell that she 
now lacks: ‘during this period, there wasn’t a fiber of my being that didn’t long to be 
enfolded and consoled.’76 This word ‘enfold’ is revealing. Rather than a 
multiplication of the self or a consumption or absorption of the other, Tanning’s 
relationship with Ernst is based on a process of mutual ‘enfolding’ – of layering, 
wrapping – that can be elucidated by a further Proustian image. In Du Côté de chez 
Swann, the narrator watches the local children dipping jars into the Vivonne river to 
catch fish, remarking that a process of mutual containment is at play: 
 
Je m’amusais à regarder les carafes que les gamins mettaient dans la Vivonne 
pour prendre les petits poissons, et qui, remplies par la rivière, où elles sont à 
leur tour encloses, à la fois ‘contenant’ aux flancs transparents comme un eau 
durcie, et ‘contenu’ plongé dans un plus grand contenant de cristal liquide et 
courant. (I, 166) 
                                                                  
73 Tanning, p. 269. 
74 Ibid., p. 271. 
75 Ibid., p. 317. 




The jars are both the containers of the water and contained by the water, and vice 
versa. The metaphors Tanning employs to illuminate her relationship with Ernst 
imply that it follows an analogous dynamic: Tanning is the ‘architectural’ space that 
contains Ernst, and is herself contained by the ‘wrapping’ of the second skin that 
their relationship provides. We recall that in her description, Ernst does not just 
inhabit the ‘house’ she provides, but also watches over her/it: his relationship to the 
‘house’ is thus one of externality as well as internality. Like a more reciprocal version 
of the narrator’s relationship with his grandmother, then, each provides a receptacle 
for the other’s prolonged, extended self. If we take the Vivonne metaphor to its 
logical conclusion, we might also conclude that the descriptions of the water as 
‘cristal liquide’ and of the jar as ‘eau durcie’ implies a privileged unity shared by 
Tanning and Ernst, as if they are different forms of the same essential ‘substance’. 
This, arguably, is one way of looking at the rather mawkish idea that as well as a 
coupling between two essentially autonomous beings, their union is a meeting of 
minds, a consolidation of two related, painterly ways of looking at the world. Yet 
ultimately this ‘sameness’ is restricted to the realm of simile: the jar is not actually 
solid water, and nor is the river liquid glass. Moreover, as well as containment, the 
scene also evokes impenetrability and the impossibility of containment – as the jar’s 
solidity renders it impermeable to the water, so the water exceeds the jar’s capacity 
to capture and contain it. Ultimately, the underlying, irrevocable difference between 
them will always prevent complete assimilation. In any case, complete assimilation 
is not the purpose of the exercise: the jar has not been submerged in the water with 
a view to capturing the whole river, and the river does not flow into the jar with the 
intention of penetrating the glass. So it is with Tanning and Ernst. Proust, it seems, 
has unwittingly provided a metaphor for a mode of sexual partnership that runs 
counter to that observed by his own narrator, who brings Albertine to live with him 
precisely so that he might ‘capture’ and ‘penetrate’ her. 
 
 
IV. The Aesthetics of Partnership 
 
The two contrasting relationships I have considered in this chapter can be elucidated 
by different epistemological models. These epistemological models, in their turn, can 
be mapped onto different aesthetic models; to do so is to bring the my argument full 
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circle, back to the question of the picture surface with which this thesis began.  
 The narrator’s relationship to Albertine follows a centuries-old approach to 
knowledge acquisition that in Lafrance’s words ‘privileg[es] inside over outside and 
depth over surface’, and which Anzieu explicitly rejects.77 Since the Renaissance, he 
writes, 
 
la pensée occidentale est obnubilée par un thème épistémologique; connaître, 
c’est briser l’écorce pour atteindre le noyau. Ce thème arrive à épuisement, 
après avoir produit quelques réussites et quelques dangers: la physique du 
noyau n’a-t-elle pas conduit savants et militaires jusqu’à l’explosion 
atomique?78 
 
This model is familiar to us: a version of it – Bergsonian intuition – was examined in 
some depth in Chapter 1. The narrator’s attempts to know and possess Albertine 
follow the same logic: not content with his analytic, external view of her many facets, 
their relationship is underwritten by his chronic desire to break through her outer 
surface in order to ‘intuitively’ access the essential truth within. This model is 
problematic – partly, of course, because it comes close to the dynamics of rape and 
forced entry, but also because of its inherent limitations. As Sedgwick points out, the 
narrator’s desire for Albertine is impossible and paradoxical; he ‘can desire another 
only as she makes him jealous, but experiences jealousy as the spiraling demand for 
a total control that cannot be achieved and would terminate his desire if it ever 
were’.79 We can go further, and suggest that the achievement of total control would 
also ‘terminate’ Albertine herself. Given that her identity within the novel revolves 
around her status as an object of desire, it follows that if this desire were negated 
through the eventual attainment of the knowledge the narrator so desperately 
                                                                  
77 Lafrance, p. 22. 
78 Anzieu, p. 31. 
79 Sedgwick, p. 10. As Katja Haustein puts it, ‘Marcel’s desire must not be fulfilled, as the total alterity 
of the other is the very spur of his desire. And yet, his desire is motivated by, not directed at the total 
alterity of the other and its aim remains possession. Therefore, Albertine’s constant withdrawal can at 
no point turn into giving and Marcel’s look leaves no space for hope.’ (Regarding Lost Time: Photography, 
Identity, and Affect in Proust, Benjamin, and Barthes (Oxford: Legenda, 2012), p. 48.) Ladenson has also 
commented memorably on this phenomenon, pointing out that ‘the gist of the Recherche’ is rendered 
most successfully by Groucho Marx, ‘who in a telegram to the Friars Club famously captured the very 
essence of Proustian psychology with the observation that he didn’t want to belong to any club that 
would have him for a member. This neo-Marxian dictum accounts for almost everything that happens 
over the course of the novel’s 3,000-odd pages.’ (‘Proust and the Marx Brothers’, in Proust and the Arts, 
ed. by Christie McDonald and François Proulx (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 213-
222 (pp. 217, 218).)  
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pursues, she would, in a certain 
sense, cease to exist. (Indeed, on 
the occasions that the narrator 
feels satisfied that he does possess 
Albertine, his desire begins to 
wane and he determines to end 
the relationship, to write her out 
of his narrative – before his 
jealousy returns, and with it, his 
desire for knowledge.) The 
intuitive ideal is thus 
condemned to cancel itself out: 
its attainment doubles as its 
negation, cutting subject off from 
newly-effaced object at the very 
moment of their epistemological 
assimilation. 
 By contrast, Tanning and 
Ernst embody a post-Bergsonian model of self-other relations: not quite intuitive, not 
quite analytic, refusing to accord the same value to the distinction between inside 
and outside, surface and depth. The process of mutual enfolding and wrapping that 
Tanning’s text implies is reminiscent of Anzieu’s argument for a congruence between 
these elements rather than a privileging of one over the other. This is perhaps best 
illustrated by Tanning’s descriptions of Ernst, cited above: she refers to the 
hypothetical process of searching for his essential self as ‘plumb[ing] his very 
depths’, but two pages later, that same essentiality is termed ‘the fundamental wild 
truth that wrapped him close’ – a formulation that suggests not so much depth as an 
external, enveloping surface. The other’s essential being does not just exist beyond 
the surface; the pursuit of full knowledge of the other, were it to be attempted, would 
not simply be a matter of diving deep until the secret is found and grasped, but 
would take in the more complex interplay between inner and outer truths. This 
understanding aligns with Anzieu’s theory that the self is as much container as 
contents – itself anticipated in the narrator’s observation that the jar in the Vivonne 
is at once ‘contenant’ and ‘contenu’. 
Fig. 16: Dorothea Tanning and Max Ernst in 
Sedona, Arizona, 1946 (Lee Miller) 
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 Fittingly for a relationship between two painters, Tanning and Ernst’s Anzieu-
esque transcendence of these distinctions is reminiscent of the broader aesthetic 
question that was discussed briefly in the introduction to this thesis and addressed 
in depth in Chapter 2: whether a picture is primarily representational surface or 
primarily represented space, or both at once, or a fluctuation between the two. If their 
life together were an image, it would hover between simply representing and 
drawing attention to its own status as image. In fact, moments from their life in 
Sedona, Arizona, are documented in a series of photographs that make just such a 
meta-pictorial commentary. Tanning and Ernst collaborate with the photographer, 
their friend Lee Miller, to comment visually on their status as both images and image 
creators, and on the nature of images themselves. In one, Miller makes a wry 
comment on their respective stature in the art world by playing with perspective to 
create a giant Ernst, in the foreground, who appears to be crushing a smaller 
Tanning, in the middle distance, with his fist. In another, Tanning and Ernst are back 
to back, she looking at her seemingly recently-completed painting Maternity, still on 
its easel, he staring out of the window, the symmetry of the set-up positing an 
equivalence between the two. In another, Tanning and Ernst are photographed from 
the other side of a window, so that they appear framed, an image within the image 
(fig. 16). The most explicit meta-
pictorial reference occurs when 
Ernst nonchalantly holds up an 
empty picture frame, which 
surrounds himself and Tanning as 
they concentrate on their game of 
chess (fig. 17). Tanning and 
Ernst’s willingness to be, as it 
were, ‘imagised’, is also 
demonstrated by the fact that they 
both posed for their own portraits, 
notably her 1947 painting of Ernst, 
Max in a Blue Boat, and his 1960 
Portrait of Dorothea.80   
                                                                  
80 In a documentary made in 1996 about her life and work, Tanning displays her portrait of Ernst, for 
which, she remarks, he ‘posed, very nicely, for several days’ (Horst Mühlenbeck, Birthday: Die 
amerikanische Malerin Dorothea Tanning (1996) 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1edrxYABGW8&t=508s> [accessed 15/8/2017]). 
Fig. 17: Dorothea Tanning and Max Ernst in 
Sedona, Arizona, 1946 (Lee Miller) 
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The narrator explicitly compares Albertine to a painting more than once, at 
one point relating the unknowable quality of her expression to that of a woman in a 
Latour portrait,81 and elsewhere congratulating himself on possessing ‘un oeuvre 
d’art’ more precious than any painting: ‘Albertine elle-même’ (III, 884). On both 
occasions, the narrator is the viewer, and Albertine is either a work of art or its 
subject; there is no fluctuation between the roles of image and image creator or 
viewer. What changes is his relationship to the work of art – whether he feels satisfied 
he possesses it, or whether its subject matter confounds him. I would argue that there 
is another, implicit aesthetic model at play in the text, which again casts Albertine as 
image and the narrator as viewer. The desire to penetrate the wall or ‘liséré’ of 
Albertine’s skin sidelines the surface of the body in a manner comparable to mimetic 
painting’s sidelining of the surface of the canvas: the first treats the surface as an 
obstacle to be broken through, while the second treats it as an irrelevance to be 
ignored. Both are then faced with a problem: once past the surface, what then?  
‘Beyond’ the surface, the perspectival mimetic painting terminates in a 
vanishing point. But as Tanning observes in her memoir, this is an arbitrary, 
intangible point that does not correspond to anything spatially real. Trying to 
pinpoint the beginning of her story is pointless, she says, because: 
 
the beginning is an impossible place, as meaningless as that dot on my 
drawing in a class perspective lesson, the spot in the middle of the paper 
where all lines – roads? – came together at a place called Infinity. Only, 
supposing out of curiosity you tried to go there, you’d never make it. The 
spot would have gone, would have streaked ahead, and you would have to 
start all over again.82 
 
For Tanning, painting is an explicit metaphor for an anti-perspectival mode of 
relation and of being in the world. It would be foolish, she implies, to try and pursue 
life’s ‘vanishing point’. Her relationship with Ernst, she suggests, plays out 
somewhere between the surface of the ‘canvas’ and the infinity of this point: 
 
on this diagram of my own devising, the lines, instead of converging, open to 
                                                                  
81 ‘Il eût été impossible de dire qu’elle blâmât, qu’elle approuvât, qu’elle connût ou non ces choses […] 
elle avait l’air d’un pastel et de ne pas plus avoir entendu ce qu’on venait de dire que si on l’avait dit 
devant un portrait de La Tour.’ (III, p. 851.) 
82 Tanning, p. 61. 
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reveal a middle distance where we contend, Max and I, with all kinds of 
ardent ferment […] we blend our lives as easily as the colors in our pictures, 
we scoff at perspectives which are, after all, so false.83 
 
Her perspectival approach to her actual painting, she suggests, has been a remedy 
for or an escape from a perspectival approach to life. The retreating doors of Birthday 
are among the perspectives she scoffs at – ‘half open like Venus’s flytraps, irresistible 
snares inviting me in. Yes, I had painted them as if doing so would liberate me from 
a doom of perspective, the beckoning nowhere that had dogged my errant life so 
far.’84 
 The narrator does not have this insight. His attitude towards his relationship 
with Albertine is doggedly perspectival: his role is like that of a frustrated pursuer, 
trying in vain to chase down the ever-retreating horizon or the non-existent 
vanishing point. In one regard, his desire is simplistic and straightforward: he is one 
of a number of characters whose quest to pin down the ‘truth’ about the love object, 
Sedgwick observes, ‘always and only means demanding to know one single thing: 
whether or not that person is unfaithful’.85 In this conception, truth, like a vanishing 
point, is singular, contained, and seemingly attainable. But, also like a vanishing 
point, which recedes with every imagined step towards it, so each piece of 
information that should lead to this truth only raises further questions, opening out 
the ‘space’ of the investigation until the truth begins to seem impossible to know or 
encompass. In an episode already cited in Chapter 3, the narrator realises that 
possession in the shape of total knowledge and control is impossible because the love 
object is not, in fact, ‘un être qui peut être couché devant nous, enfermé dans un 
corps’, but:  
 
l’extension de cet être à tous les points de l’espace et du temps que cet être a 
occupés et occupera. Si nous ne possédons pas son contact avec tel lieu, avec 
telle heure, nous ne le possédons pas. Or, nous ne pouvons pas toucher tous 
ces points. (III, 607-608)  
 
                                                                  
83 Ibid., p. 62. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Sedgwick, pp. 4-5. 
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The task becomes even more untenable if we challenge the narrator’s un-Bergsonian 
assumption that space and time consist of a series of points. Just as an imagined 
pursuer would discover that the vanishing point is not a ‘point’ at all, but a 
continuous extension of space, the knowledge the narrator desires is neither a 
singular kernel of truth nor a series of such truths, but a fluid, multidimensional, 
uncontainable expanse.  
This is a failure of the linear-perspectival model akin to that already 
examined in Chapter 3, when it becomes clear that the narrator’s ‘perspectival’ ideal 
of train travel does not stand up under scrutiny. He is as misguided in his pursuit of 
absolute knowledge and total control of Albertine as he was in his belief that a train 
journey could carry him to the essential heart of a town as he had conceived of it in 
his imagination. As in that instance, the older narrator seems to distance himself from 
his own earlier position when, in the sentences immediately following the passage 
quoted above, he remarks that: ‘nous tâtonnons sans les retrouver. De là la défiance, 
la jalousie, les persécutions. Nous perdons un temps précieux sur une piste absurde 
et nous passons sans le soupçonner à côté du vrai.’ (III, 608.) His failure to capture 
Albertine seems, implicitly, to make the case for a non-perspectival model. Albertine 
is not a mimetic subject, but, in her very unfathomability, asserts herself as an avant-
garde one. We saw in Chapter 3 that her inner spaces can be characterised as four-
dimensional landscapes in motion, and, in Chapter 1, that she appears to the narrator 
as a collection of cubistic, analytic surfaces. If her eyes figure as a seascape seen 
through a window, as I argued earlier in this chapter, the window in question is 
surely a Magrittean aperture, which does not simply reveal, but highlights the 
inaccessible otherness of what lies beyond. Faced with these unfathomable 
manifestations, the younger narrator is like a conservative viewer at an exhibition of 
avant-garde paintings, consistently confounded in his attempts to understand a 
modernist subject by applying the rules of realist mimesis. But Proust himself, we 
might conclude, makes a compelling argument for the essentially ‘avant-garde’ 





This thesis has explored points of thematic overlap between Marcel Proust’s A la 
recherche du temps perdu and the artworks and theoretical writings of the historical 
avant-gardes. It has considered Proust’s work in relation to the paintings and 
writings (and in one instance, sculpture) of movements with which his work overlaps 
chronologically – the aesthetically similar but philosophically divergent Cubist and 
Futurist movements – and to visual works completed after his death, but which fall 
under the banner of Surrealism, a movement that began towards the end of his 
lifetime. It has brought these works together via their engagement with broader 
cultural phenomena, such as mechanised movement technologies and photography 
in its various forms; via the theory of a contemporary thinker, Henri Bergson, and a 
later one, Didier Anzieu; and via a set of culturally-embedded spatial and 
architectural metaphors (the work of art as a ‘window on the world’; the body as a 
‘building’). 
From this expansive corpus has emerged the central thematic debate of the 
thesis: can and should subjects ‘enter into’ the objects they perceive, the processes 
they witness, and the beings with whom they interact, or do – should – they remain 
in a marginal position, cut off from what is ultimately an inaccessible interior 
domain? These two opposing positions have reappeared in various guises – analysis 
vs. intuition, awareness vs. immersion, surface vs. depth, exterior vs. interior. The 
terms ‘insidership’ and ‘outsidership’, however, work as umbrella terms that 
encompass these various states. In many instances, a hierarchy is implied between 
the two, as when the state of being ‘outside’ is imbued with negative epistemological 
implications: outsiders, it has often been suggested, cannot hope to truly know the 
object or person to whom they relate. An ‘analytic’ relation to an object in the world 
is, in Bergson’s view, a state of epistemological incompleteness inferior to the 
absolute knowledge that would be afforded if the subject were intuitively to ‘enter’ 
the object in question. Those who travel by organic means or who remain static are 
cut off, to their detriment, from an ‘inside’ that belongs to the practitioner of speed, 
and which figures as a sort of ‘beyond’ space, with new conditions of possibility, in 
which categories are transcended and contradictions are resolved. In his relationship 
with Albertine – herself a practitioner of speed – the narrator tries to break through 
into a hallowed interior domain precisely because his position as the eternal outsider 
is so epistemologically unsatisfying. 
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But the idealisation of insidership can rapidly degenerate into more sinister 
territory. The step required to relate the narrator’s attempts to ‘enter’ Albertine to the 
dynamics of rape and forced entry is a very small one indeed. The message I 
discerned from Tanning’s Children’s Games, on the other hand, is that being too much 
of an insider ultimately amounts to a state of claustration and imprisonment. Anzieu, 
meanwhile, points out that the centuries-old approach to knowledge acquisition as 
an attempt to ‘briser l’écorce pour atteindre le noyau’ led, ultimately, to the 
development of the atom bomb.1 Aspiring to a state of insidership may be misguided 
not only because of its potential to cause harm, but because such a state frequently 
fails to realise its epistemological promise. After all, as we saw towards the end of 
Chapter 4, ‘entering’ Albertine would ultimately serve no purpose for the narrator, 
since this very act would cancel itself out by negating his original desire to 
understand her inner world. And while Bergson explains the superiority of intuition 
by likening it to the sort of absolute knowledge we have of ourselves, the theories of 
his contemporary, Freud, trouble this comparison by illustrating that even our own 
selves are not truly known to us: the mysterious domain of the unconscious is, on the 
contrary, largely unseen and unknown. Moreover, the narrator’s consistent attempts 
to ‘complete’ his self by merging with a ‘source of strength outside of himself’,2 and 
the notion that his self ‘spills out’ of the boundary provided by the body and colours 
the spaces and objects of the external world, are an amplified illustration of the fact 
that selfhood might not, after all, be a state of unambiguous insidership.  
Insidership, then, is perhaps not all it is cracked up to be. In some of the 
accounts considered in this thesis, it is harmful; in others, it is no guarantee of 
epistemological satisfaction; in still others, it does not seem truly to exist at all. The 
Cubist method, on the other hand, with its endorsement of an analytic, relativistic 
mode of relation and its implicit dismissal of the possibility of intuition, can be read 
as a celebration of outsidership. Indeed, outsidership is cast as a state of 
epistemological superiority in the representative model that Cubism is often seen to 
endorse, whereby the art object’s status as object outdoes its potential as a transparent 
portal through which the viewer can ‘enter’ the represented reality. This is indicated 
by the terminology used to elucidate the dichotomy: a realistic representation in 
which the viewer might become immersed is ‘deceitful’, a ‘fascination’, an ‘illusion’, 
                                                                  
1 Anzieu, p. 31. 
2 Bersani, p. 15. 
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while acknowledging the object as object is ‘awareness’ or ‘consciousness’ – a clear-
sighted act of distancing, of seeing the object for what it is.3  
But as we saw, the positions that champion a single side of the dichotomy, 
arguing that the viewer can only ever be immersed in or aware of the work of art, 
have limitations of their own. I argued, via the works studied in Chapter 2, for a 
position that acknowledges the possibility of looking both through and at the work of 
art, and which suggests, by implication, that states of insidership and outsidership 
are not mutually exclusive. What is offered in Chapter 4, by Didier Anzieu’s theory 
of the Moi-peau and by the Tanning-Ernst relation as it is portrayed in Between Lives, 
is a further possibility for transcending this binary, for taking inside and outside as 
two interdependent parts of a whole. Elsewhere, the crossover between insidership 
and outsidership becomes a fertile ground from which a new term can emerge: the 
implications of my exploration of the Martinville episode, for example, are that the 
complex troubling of the boundary between analysis and intuition creates a 
productive interstitial space from which a new art object can grow. The same idea is 
implied by the narrator’s changing attitude towards train travel: where once he 
wanted to ‘enter’ the virtual space of the destination, the shift in focus to the train 
journey itself – an interstitial space in between an ‘outside’ domain (the point of 
departure) and an ‘inside’ one (the point of arrival) – provides the conditions for the 
development of a new mode of seeing and an imagined set of paintings. Taken 
together, these instances suggest that the most epistemologically sophisticated 
positions arise out of a troubling of the insider-outsider dichotomy, a symbiotic 
pairing or layering of the two.  
 
A paper by Adam Watt, given in 2013 and cited in my introduction, compares 
Proust’s layering of papers and ideas, in redrafting his manuscript proofs, to 
Picasso’s layering of materials to create his guitar sculptures – suggesting, thereby, 
that the idea of layering might be a useful point of departure for a study of Proust 
and the avant-garde. This, I would suggest, could be a fruitful area of investigation 
for a future study. Meanwhile, a different manifestation of the idea of layering has 
proved an important factor in my own methodological approach to Proust’s novel. 
What has emerged over the course of this investigation is the fact that Proust’s 
processes of narrative and diegetic layering are central to his ‘avant-gardism’. While 
                                                                  
3 Marian Hobson uses the terms ‘fascination’, ‘illusion’ (p. 3), ‘awareness’ (p. 5), and ‘consciousness’ (p. 
3); W. J. T. Mitchell uses the term ‘deceitful illusion’ (p. 156).  
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the moving Martinville belltowers can be and have been related to the avant-garde 
in and of themselves, my argument in Chapter 1 demonstrated that a more intricate, 
illuminating connection to the avant-garde, via Bergsonian epistemology, can be 
made when we consider not simply the towers themselves, but the ways in which 
the narrator sees them, the way he represents them in writing, and moreover, the 
way he uses the mature text to represent the first representation. Considering the 
intricacies of a layered textual whole can be a means of detecting an avant-garde 
impulse in Proust’s work even when the ‘raw material’ of an episode seems to align 
more naturally with nineteenth-century aesthetic or perceptual values. Thus, in 
Chapter 2, I engaged with the ekphrastic paintings attributed to Elstir, not because 
they themselves embody an avant-garde aesthetic, but because the textual whole of 
which they are part presents us with some intriguing complexities that can be linked 
to broader avant-garde ideas about the nature of perception and representation. We 
inevitably arrive at a more complex verdict than the standard ‘Elstir is 
Turner/Monet/Whistler’ when we take into account the fact that the painter 
espouses a multifarious and incompatible set of aesthetic positions; that the paintings 
and the way the narrator responds to them bring our attention back, in various ways, 
to the text in which they are situated; and that Proust and his narrator use the 
paintings to comment both on the way the artist sees and the way his works are seen 
by their viewers.  
Sometimes the ‘raw material’ to which I refer is something the younger 
narrator says or does, or an attitude he adopts, at the level of the diegesis, and which 
is not borne out by what the older narrator says at the level of narration, or what 
Proust himself implies through the whole ensemble. Often the novel’s avant-garde 
impulse emerges in the moments when the older narrator distances himself, whether 
explicitly or implicitly, from an opinion or action of the younger. The younger 
narrator is often more concerned with looking through than looking at, for example – 
as when he tells Elstir he would like to visit Carquethuit without realising that what 
appeals to him is a quality of Elstir’s representation rather than of the place itself, or 
when he looks through the window of the train (‘collant mes yeux à la vitre’) to try 
and pin down the essential quality of the sunrise. In the first instance, a wiser 
narrative voice comments explicitly on the naïveté of this earlier position; in the 
second, the events that follow make it clear that what is important is the manner of 
looking, not the essential qualities of the view itself. Later, he comments 
retrospectively on the folly of having tried to relate to Albertine according to what I 
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term a ‘linear perspectival’ model. But it is not always the older narrative voice that 
dismisses a flawed way of thinking on the part of the younger; sometimes, the 
reverse is the case. The ‘linear perspectival’ assessment of train travel in A l’ombre des 
jeunes filles en fleurs, for example, is a retrospective one (‘ce voyage, on le ferait sans 
doute aujourd’hui en automobile, croyant le rendre ainsi plus agréable’); it is only 
the events that follow, at the level of the diegesis, that call this assessment into 
question.  
This complex slippage between diegetic levels has been crucial to my 
investigation. It would have been much harder to detect an avant-garde impulse in 
Proust’s work by taking account of only one such level at a time; the avant-garde 
impulse might, in that case, have been restricted to the ‘collection Marcel Proust’ – 
the set of passages in which the events of the narrator’s life play out as if they were 
happening in a Cubist or Futurist painting. These passages play an important role in 
any study of Proust and the avant-garde, and I have considered certain of them in 
my investigation here: the Martinville episode, the ‘Cubo-Futurist’ view from the 
train window, the attempt to kiss Albertine on the cheek. But what I conclude is that 
Proust’s avant-garde impulse does not only manifest itself in passages that seem 
obviously to share avant-garde concerns, or to reference avant-garde visual practices: 
sometimes it is hidden in the cracks between hypotheses and events, between what 
is said and what is done, what is stated and what is implied. 
 
The episodes in which an avant-garde undercurrent seems to play against a more 
overt suggestion of dix-neuvièmisme lead us, perhaps, to the sort of conclusion we 
might expect from an investigation into this material: that Proust is more radically 
modern than we generally give him credit for. But the reverse might also be the case. 
Sometimes, aligning his work with that of the avant-gardes points to contradictions 
in the assumption that the latter invariably sits at the most extreme end of the 
‘modernity spectrum’, and that ‘avant-gardeness’ should be a benchmark against 
which other manifestations of modernity are judged. Indeed, the only artist whom I 
consider in this thesis to be significantly more forward-looking than Proust is 
Dorothea Tanning, who was, in any case, nearly forty years his junior, and 
unsurprisingly more progressive in her gender politics. Elsewhere, however, I note 
instances in which a link emerges between the culture of the past and the theory and 
practice of the avant-gardes. In Chapter 1, for example, I argued for a trajectory 
between the perceptual processes that are represented in the novel by Elstir and the 
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Futurists’ ideal of artistic perception – an argument that inevitably also posits a 
connection between Futurism and a real-life proponent of these Elstirean processes, 
John Ruskin, whom the younger artists would surely have deemed even more ‘old 
and worm-eaten’ than Proust himself. I also suggested, in the same chapter, that 
while Proust’s narrator’s explicit dismissal of photography masks a more implicit 
appreciation of its ability to demonstrate the inherent multiplicity and relativism of 
the world, Boccioni’s outspoken hostility towards the medium masks a deeper 
underlying conservatism, an adherence to traditional artistic hierarchies that sits 
uncomfortably with his professed desire to break with the art of the past. In Chapter 
2, I drew attention to the importance for Robert Delaunay of aesthetic values more 
commonly associated with Impressionism and post-Impressionism, which forestalls 
the idea that Proust’s own interest in these movements precludes or outweighs a 
more avant-garde impulse in his work. In Chapter 3, I quoted an extract from 
Apollinaire’s Zone that combines references to cutting-edge technology with biblical 
and classical imagery, a usage that fits with an implicit cultural tendency to imagine 
technology as a means of ‘deifying’ the human.4 The avant-gardes, then, do not 
unequivocally disavow the past, even when they might wish to. This means that we 
do not necessarily have to look to the most straightforwardly modern aspects of the 
Recherche in order to posit a connection to the artistic developments of his 
contemporaries. Proust’s affinity for Ruskin and Impressionism, his apparent 
hostility to photography, and his use of metaphors of antiquity do not, in this context, 
mark him out as a passéiste, out of step with the creative developments of his day; 
rather, in some instances, it is the very aspects of his work that seem to cement him 
in a nineteenth-century artistic lineage that allow us to align him more closely with 
avant-garde values. 
 
Ultimately, the relationship between Proust and the avant-garde can be elucidated 
by a return to the thematic terms of this thesis. Proust, by most accounts, was an 
‘outsider’ in his relation to avant-garde activity – an interested but marginal 
observer. Yet in a certain sense, all the artists I have considered here were outsiders. 
                                                                  
4 This use of the tropes and figures of the past as a means of integrating the new into existing systems 
of understanding is seen elsewhere in avant-garde practice, particularly writing. Louis Aragon, for 
example, introduces Le Paysan de Paris as a ‘mythologie du moderne’ (Paysan, p. 35). Blaise Cendrars 
makes use of the juxtaposition between the modern and the ancient in his long poem about a journey 
on the Transsiberian Railway, La Prose du transsibérien (‘L’ancêtre préhistorique aura peur de mon 
moteur | J’atterrirai | Et je construirai un hangar pour mon avion avec les os de mammouth.’ (‘La Prose 
du transsibérien et de la petite Jehanne de France’, in Blaise Cendrars: Poésies complètes (Paris: Éditions 
Denoël, 1944), pp. 65-80 (p. 74).)  
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The Italian Futurists were geographically isolated from the formal innovations, 
driven by artists based in Paris, on which the pictorial developments of their own 
movement relied. It does not take a wild imagination to detect something of an 
inferiority complex in Boccioni’s vehement declarations of Cubism’s irrelevance. Yet 
in Paris, the division between the Montmartre Cubists (Picasso, Braque, Gris) and 
the Salon Cubists (Gleizes, Metzinger, et al.) meant that even the members of this 
pivotal avant-garde centre were isolated from each other and thus, in a sense, 
‘outsiders’, even within their own movement. Meanwhile, Robert Delaunay, 
although associated with Cubism, was something of lone wolf who wanted to restrict 
the Apollinaire-coined epithet ‘Orphism’ to his own style of painting, as we have 
seen. Magritte only officially belonged to the Surrealist camp for three years, while 
Tanning was distanced from core Surrealist activity by age, gender, and geography. 
‘Mainstream’ Surrealism was, moreover, riven with divisions and disavowals. Can 
we still think of Proust as an outsider, then, in the knowledge that the ‘inside’ is 
neither so cosy nor so homogeneous as the term might imply? It would be a mistake 
to assume that there is a way to be truly ‘inside’ the avant-garde, to fully and purely 
embody the essence of ‘avant-gardeness’. Perhaps, then, an investigation into Proust 
and the avant-garde should begin and end with a troubling of the term ‘avant-garde’ 
itself, a misleadingly singular turn of phrase that bears no small part of the 
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